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In This Issue

Gary Schwartz, research associate, Institute for Juvenile Research, is project director of a study of American youth culture under a grant from the National Institutes of Mental Health. He is generally interested in urban anthropology and has studied urban religious movements and middle-class families. **Don Merten**, Institute for Juvenile Research, is an associate director of the youth-culture study and is also interested in urban voluntary associations.

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Both **Jerald Hage** and **Michael Aiken** are assistant professors at the University of Wisconsin. Both share an interest in the theories of organizational behavior and in the methodological problems that are involved in the testing of such theories. Professor Hage also has an interest in social change, while Professor Aiken's additional interest is centered primarily in comparative community studies.

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Path Analysis: Sociological Examples[1]

Otis Dudley Duncan

ABSTRACT

Linear causal models are conveniently developed by the method of path coefficients proposed by Sewall Wright. Path analysis is useful in making explicit the rationale of conventional regression calculations. It may also have special usefulness in sociology in problems involving the decomposition of a dependent variable or those in which successive experiences of a cohort are measured. Path analysis focuses on the problem of interpretation and does not purport to be a method for discovering causes. It may, nevertheless, be invaluable in rendering interpretations explicit, self-consistent, and susceptible to rejection by subsequent research.

The long-standing interest of sociologists in causal interpretation of statistical relationships has been quickened by discussions focusing on linear causal models. The basic work of bringing such models to the attention of the discipline was done by Blalock,[2] drawing upon the writings of Simon[3] and Wold[4] in particular. The rationale of this approach was strengthened when Costner and Leik[5] showed that "asymmetric causal models" of the kind proposed by Blalock afford a natural and operational explication of the notion of "axiomatic deductive theory," which had been developed primarily by sociologists working with verbal formulations. Most recently, Boudon[6] pointed out that the Simon-Blalock type of model is a "special case" or "weak form" of path analysis (or "dependence analysis," as Boudon prefers to call it). At the same time, he noted that "convincing empirical illustrations are missing," since "moderately complicated causal structures with corresponding data are rather scarce in the sociological literature." This paper presents some examples (in the form of reanalyses of published work) which may be interesting, if not "convincing." It includes an exposition of some aspects of path technique, developing it in a way that may make it a

[1] Prepared in connection with a project on "Socioeconomic Background and Occupational Achievement," supported by contract OE-5-85-072 with the U.S. Office of Education. Useful suggestions were made by H. M. Blalock, Jr., Beverly Duncan, Robert W. Hodge, Hal H. Winsborough, and Sewall Wright, but none of them is responsible for the use made of his suggestions or for any errors in the paper.

[2] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

[3] Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), chap. ii.

[4] Herman Wold and Lars Jureen, *Demand Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953).

[5] Herbert L. Costner and Robert K. Leik, "Deductions from 'Axiomatic Theory,'" *American Sociological Review,* XXIX (December, 1964), 819–35.

[6] Raymond Boudon, "A Method [illegible] al Analysis: Dependence Analy[illegible] *ciological Review,* XXX (Ju[illegible]

little more accessible than some of the previous writings.

Path coefficients were used by the geneticist Sewall Wright as early as 1918, and the technique was expounded formally by him in a series of articles dating from the early 1920's. References to this literature, along with useful restatements and illustrations, will be found in Wright's papers of 1934, 1954, and 1960.[7] The main application of path analysis has been in population genetics, where the method has proved to be a powerful aid to "axiomatic deductions." The assumptions are those of Mendelian inheritance, combined with path schemes representing specified systems of mating. The method allows the geneticist to ascertain the "coefficient of inbreeding," a quantity on which various statistical properties of a Mendelian population depend. It also yields a theoretical calculation of the genetic correlations among relatives of stated degrees of relationship. Most of Wright's expositions of this *direct* use of path coefficients are heavily mathematical;[8] an elementary treatment is given in the text by Li.[9]

Apart from a few examples in Wright's own work, little use has been made of path coefficients in connection with the *inverse* problem of estimating the paths which may account for a set of observed correlations on the assumption of a particular formal or causal ordering of the variables involved. Of greatest substantive interest to sociologists may be an example relating to heredity and environment in the determination of intelligence.[10] Another highly suggestive study was a pioneer but neglected exercise in econometrics concerning prices and production of corn and hogs.[11] Although the subject matter is remote from sociological concerns, examples from studies in animal biology are instructive on methodological grounds.[12] If research workers have been slow to follow Wright's lead, the statisticians have done little better. There are only a few expositions in the statistical literature,[13] some of which raise questions to which Wright has replied.[14]

PATH DIAGRAMS AND THE BASIC THEOREM

We are concerned with linear, additive, asymmetric relationships among a set of

[7] Sewall Wright, "The Method of Path Coefficients," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics,* V (September, 1934), 161–215; "The Interpretation of Multivariate Systems," in O. Kempthorne *et al.* (eds.), *Statistics and Mathematics in Biology* (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1954), chap. ii; "Path Coefficients and Path Regressions: Alternative or Complementary Concepts?" *Biometrics,* XVI (June, 1960), 189–202.

[8] Sewall Wright, "The Genetical Structure of Populations," *Annals of Eugenics,* XV (March, 1951), 323–54.

[9] [illegible] Li, *Population Genetics* (Chicago: Uni- [illegible]icago Press, 1955), chap. xii–xiv. See [illegible] "The Concept of Path Coefficient [illegible] Population Genetics," *Bio-* [illegible]1956), 190–210.

[10] Sewall Wright, "Statistical Methods in Biology," *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* XXVI (March, 1931, suppl.), 155–63.

[11] Sewall Wright, *Corn and Hog Correlations,* U.S. Department of Agriculture Bulletin 1300 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925); also, "The Method of Path Coefficients," pp. 192–204.

[12] Sewall Wright, "The Genetics of Vital Characters of the Guinea Pig," *Journal of Cellular and Comparative Physiology,* LVI (suppl. 1, November, 1960), 123–51; F. A. Davidson *et al.*, "Factors Influencing the Upstream Migration of the Pink Salmon (*Oncorhynchus gorbuscha*)," *Ecology,* XXIV (April, 1943), 149–68.

[13] J. W. Tukey, "Causation, Regression and Path Analysis," in O. Kempthorne *et al.*, *op. cit.*, chap. iii; Oscar Kempthorne, *An Introduction to Genetic Statistics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), chap. xiv; Malcolm E. Turner and Charles D. Stevens, "The Regression Analysis of Causal Paths," *Biometrics,* XV (June, 1959), 236–58; Eleanor D. Campbell, Malcolm E. Turner, and Mary Frances Wright, with the editorial collaboration of Charles D. Stevens, *A Handbook of Path Regression Analysis,* Part I: *Estimators for Simple Completely Identified Systems* (Preliminary Ed.; Richmond: Medical College of Virginia, Department of Biophysics and Biometry, 1960); Henri Louis Le Roy, *Statistische Methoden der Populationsgenetik* (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1960), chap. i; P. A. P. Moran, "Path Coefficients Reconsidered," *Australian Journal of Statistics,* III (November, 1961), 87–93.

[14] "Paths Coefficients and Path Regressions."

variables which are conceived as being measurable on an interval scale, although some of them may not actually be measured or may even be purely hypothetical—for example, the "true" variables in measurement theory or the "factors" in factor analysis. In such a system, certain of the variables are represented to be dependent on others as linear functions. The remaining variables are assumed, for the analysis at hand, to be given. They may be correlated among themselves, but the explanation of their intercorrelation is not taken as problematical. Each "dependent" variable must be regarded explicitly as *completely* determined by some combination of variables in the system. In problems where complete determination by measured variables does not hold, a residual variable uncorrelated with other determining variables must be introduced.

Although it is not intrinsic to the method, the diagrammatic representation of such a system is of great value in thinking about its properties. A word of caution is necessary, however. Causal diagrams are appearing with increasing frequency in sociological publications. Most often, these have some kind of pictorial or mnemonic function without being isomorphic with the algebraic and statistical properties of the postulated system of variables—or, indeed, without having a counterpart in any clearly specified system of variables at all. Sometimes an investigator will post values of zero order or partial correlations, association coefficients, or other indications of the "strength" of relationship on such a diagram, without following any clearly defined and logically justified rules for entering such quantities into the analysis and its diagrammatic representation. In Blalock's work, by contrast, diagrams are employed in accordance with explicit rules for the representation of a system of equations. In general, however, he limits himself to the indication of the sign (positive or negative) of postulated or inferred direct relationships. In at least one instance[15] he inserts zero-order correlations into a diagram which looks very much like a causal diagram, although it is not intended to be such. This misleading practice should not be encouraged.

In path diagrams, we use one-way arrows leading from each determining variable to each variable dependent on it. Unanalyzed correlations between variables not dependent upon others in the system are shown by two-headed arrows, and the connecting line is drawn curved, rather than straight, to call attention to its distinction from the paths relating dependent to determining variables. The quantities entered on the diagram are symbolic or numerical values of *path coefficients*, or, in the case of the bidirectional correlations, the simple correlation coefficients.

Several of the properties of a path diagram are illustrated in Figure 1. The original data, in the form of ten zero-order correlations, are from Turner's study of determinants of aspirations.[16] The author does not provide a completely unequivocal formulation of the entire causal model shown here, but Figure 1 appears to correspond to the model that he quite tentatively proposes. At one point he states, "background affects ambition and ambition affects both IQ and class values; in addition . . . there is a lesser influence directly from background to class values, directly from background to IQ, and directly between IQ and class values."[17] Elsewhere,[18] he indicates that school rating operates in much the same fashion as (family) background. As for the relationship between the two, Turner notes, on the one hand, that "families may choose their place of residence," but also that "by introducing neighborhood, we may only be measuring family background more precisely." Hence, it seems that there is no firm assumption about the causal ordering within

[15] Blalock, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[16] Ralph H. Turner, *The Social Context of Ambition* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing [illegible] 1964), pp. 49 and 52, Tables 11, 17, and [illegible]

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 54–61.

this pair of variables; but since these two precede the remaining ones, it suffices to *represent the link between* X_1 *and* X_2 as merely a bidirectional correlation.

Allowing Turner to take responsibility for the causal ordering of the variables (assuming his statements are understood correctly) and deferring the question of how the path coefficients were estimated, let us see what the system represented by Figure 1 is like. Each variable is taken to be in standard form; that is, if V_i is the ith variable as measured, then $X_i = (V_i - \bar{V}_i)/\sigma_{V_i}$. The same convention holds for the residuals, R_u, R_v, and R_w, to which a literal subscript is attached to indicate that these variables are not directly measured. The system represented in Figure 1 can be written:

$$
\begin{aligned}
X_3 &= p_{32}X_2 + p_{31}X_1 + p_{3u}R_u\,, \\
X_4 &= p_{43}X_3 + p_{42}X_2 + p_{41}X_1 + p_{4v}R_v\,, \quad (1) \\
X_5 &= p_{54}X_4 + p_{53}X_3 + p_{52}X_2 + p_{51}X_1 \\
&\quad + p_{5w}R_w\,.
\end{aligned}
$$

The use of the symbol p for the path coefficient is perhaps obvious. Note that the order of the subscripts is significant, the convention being the same as that used for regression coefficients: the first subscript identifies the dependent variable, the second the variable whose direct effect on the dependent variable is measured by the path coefficient. The order of subscripts is immaterial for correlations. But note that while $r_{42} = r_{24}$ and $r_{42.123} = r_{24.123}$, $p_{42} \neq p_{24}$; indeed p_{42} and p_{24} would never appear in the same system, given the restriction to




FIG. 1.—Causal model from Turner, *op. cit.*, with path coefficients estimated for male sample

recursive systems mentioned subsequently. Contrary to the practice in the case of partial regression and correlation coefficients, symbols for paths carry no secondary subscripts to identify the other variables assumed to affect the dependent variable. These will ordinarily be evident from the diagram or the equation system.

In one respect, the equation system (1) is less explicit than the diagram because the latter indicates what assumptions are made about residual factors. Each such factor is assumed by definition to be uncorrelated with any of the immediate determinants of the dependent variable to which it pertains. In Figure 1, the residuals are also uncorrelated with each other, as in the Simon-Blalock development.[20] We shall see later, however, that there are uses for models in which some residuals are intercorrelated, or in which a residual is correlated with variables antecedent to, but not immediate determinants of, the particular dependent variable to which it is attached. Where the assumption of uncorrelated residuals is made, deductions reached by the Simon-Blalock technique of expanding the product of two error variables agree with the results obtained by the formulas mentioned below, although path analysis involves relatively little use of the partial correlations which are a feature of their technique.

Equation system (1), as Blalock points out, is a recursive system. This discussion explicitly excludes non-recursive systems, involving instantaneous reciprocal action of variables, although Wright has indicated ways of handling them in a path framework.[21] Thus we shall not consider diagrams showing a direct or indirect feedback loop.

The principle that follows from equations in the form of (1) is that the correlation between any pair of variables can be written in terms of the paths leading from common antecedent variables. Consider r_{35}. Since $X_3 = (V_3 - \bar{V}_3)/\sigma_3$ and $X_5 = (V_5 - \bar{V}_5)/\sigma_5$ we have $r_{35} = \Sigma(V_3 - \bar{V}_3) \times (V_5 - \bar{V}_5)/N\sigma_3\sigma_5 = \Sigma X_3 X_5/N$.

We may expand this expression in either of two ways by substituting from (1) the expression for X_3 or the one for X_5. It is more convenient to expand the variable which appears later in the causal sequence:

$$\begin{aligned} r_{35} &= \Sigma X_3 X_5/N \\ &= \frac{1}{N}\Sigma X_3(p_{54}X_4 + p_{53}X_3 + p_{52}X_2 + p_{51}X_1 + p_{5w}R_w) \qquad (2) \\ &= p_{54}r_{34} + p_{53} + p_{52}r_{23} + p_{51}r_{13}, \end{aligned}$$

making use of the fact that $\Sigma X_3 X_3/N = 1$ and the assumption that $r_{3w} = 0$, since X_3 is a factor of X_5. But the correlations on the right-hand side of (2) can be further analyzed by the same procedure; for example,

$$\begin{aligned} r_{34} &= \frac{1}{N}\Sigma X_3 X_4 = \frac{1}{N}\Sigma X_3(p_{43}X_3 + p_{42}X_2 + p_{41}X_1 + p_{4v}R_v) \qquad (3) \\ &= p_{43} + p_{42}r_{23} + p_{41}r_{13}, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} r_{32} &= \frac{1}{N}\Sigma X_2 X_3 = \frac{1}{N}\Sigma X_2(p_{32}X_2 + p_{31}X_1 + p_{3u}R_u) \qquad (4) \\ &= p_{32} + p_{31}r_{12}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that r_{12}, assumed as a datum, cannot be further analyzed as long as we retain the particular diagram of Figure 1.

These manipulations illustrate the basic theorem of path analysis, which may be written in the general form:

$$r_{ij} = \sum_q p_{iq} r_{jq}, \qquad (5)$$

where i and j denote two variables in the system and the index q runs over all vari-

[20] Blalock, *op. cit.*, p. 64; Boudon, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

[21] Sewall Wright, "The Treatment of Reciprocal Interaction, with or without Lag, in Path Analysis," *Biometrics*, XVI (September, 1960), 423–45.

ables from which paths lead directly to X_i. Alternatively, we may expand (5) by successive applications of the formula itself to the r_{jq}. Thus, from (2), (3), (4), and a similar expansion of r_{13}, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} r_{53} = p_{53} &+ p_{51}p_{31} + p_{51}r_{12}p_{32} + p_{52}p_{32} \\ &+ p_{52}r_{12}p_{31} + p_{54}p_{42}p_{32} \\ &+ p_{54}p_{42}r_{12}p_{31} + p_{54}p_{43} \\ &+ p_{54}p_{41}p_{32}r_{12} + p_{54}p_{41}p_{31} . \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Such expressions can be read directly from the diagram according to the following rule. Read *back* from variable *i, then forward* to variable *j*, forming the product of all paths along the traverse; then sum these products for all possible traverses. The same variable cannot be intersected more than once in a single traverse. In no case can one trace back having once started forward. The bidirectional correlation is used in tracing either forward or back, but if more than one bidirectional correlation appears in the diagram, only one can be used in a single traverse. The resulting expression, such as (6), may consist of a single direct path plus the sum of several compound paths representing all the indirect connections allowed by the diagram. The general formula (5) is likely to be the more useful in algebraic manipulation and calculation, the expansion on the pattern of (6) in appreciating the properties of the causal scheme. It is safer to depend on the algebra than on the verbal algorithm, at least until one has mastered the art of reading path diagrams.

An important special case of (5) is the formula for complete determination of X_i, obtained by setting $i = j$:

$$r_{ii} = 1 = \sum_q p_{iq} r_{iq} , \quad (7)$$

or, upon expansion,

$$r_{ii} = \sum_q p_{iq}^2 + 2 \sum_{q,q'} p_{iq} r_{qq'} p_{iq'} , \quad (8)$$

where the range of q and q' $(q' > q)$ includes all variables, measured and unmeasured. A major use for (8) is the calculation of the residual path. Thus we obtain p_{3u} in the system (1) from

$$p_{3u}^2 = 1 - p_{32}^2 - p_{31}^2 - 2 p_{32} r_{12} p_{31} . \quad (9)$$

The causal model shown in Figure 1 represents a special case of path analysis: one in which there are no unmeasured variables (other than residual factors), the residuals are uncorrelated, and each of the dependent variables is directly related to all the variables preceding it in the assumed causal sequence. In this case, path analysis amounts to a sequence of conventional regression analyses, and the basic theorem (5) becomes merely a compact statement of the normal equations of regression theory for variables in standard form. The path coefficients are then nothing other than the "beta coefficients" in a regression setup, and the usual apparatus for regression calculations may be employed.[22] Thus, the paths in Figure 1 are obtained from the regression of X_3 on X_2 and X_1, setting $p_{32} = \beta_{32.1}$ and $p_{31} = \beta_{31.2}$; the regression of X_4 on X_3, X_2, and X_1, setting $p_{43} = \beta_{43.12}$, $p_{42} = \beta_{42.13}$, and $p_{41} = \beta_{41.23}$; and the regression of X_5 on the other four variables, setting $p_{54} = \beta_{54.123}$, $p_{53} = \beta_{53.124}$, and so on. Following the computing routine which inverts the matrix of intercorrelations of the independent variables, one obtains automatically the standard errors of the β coefficients (or b^*-coefficients, in the notation of Walker and Lev). In the present problem, with sample size exceeding 1,000, the standard errors are small, varying between .027 and .032. All the β's are at least twice their standard errors and thus statistically significant.

In problems of this kind, Blalock[23] has been preoccupied with the question of whether one or more path coefficients may be deleted without loss of information. As compared with his rather tedious search

[22] Helen M. Walker and Joseph Lev, *Statistical Inference* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1953), chap. xiii.

[23] *Op. cit.*, chap. iii.

procedure, the procedure followed here seems more straightforward. Had some of the β's turned out both non-significant and negligible in magnitude, one could have erased the corresponding paths from the diagram and run the regressions over, retaining only those independent variables found to be statistically and substantively significant.

As statistical techniques, therefore, neither path analysis nor the Blalock-Simon procedure adds anything to conventional regression analysis as applied recursively to generate a system of equations, rather than a single equation. As a *pattern of interpretation,* however, path analysis is invaluable in making explicit the rationale for a set of regression calculations. One may not be wholly satisfied, for example, with the theoretical assumptions underlying the causal interpretation of Turner's data provided by Figure 1, and perhaps Turner himself would not be prepared to defend it in detail. The point is, however, that *any* causal interpretation of these data must rest on assumptions—at a minimum, the assumption as to ordering of the variables, but also assumptions about the unmeasured variables here represented as uncorrelated residual factors.[24] The great merit of the path scheme, then, is that it makes the assumptions explicit and tends to force the discussion to be at least internally consistent, so that mutually incompatible assumptions are not introduced surreptitiously into different parts of an argument extending over scores of pages. With the causal scheme made explicit, moreover, it is in a form that enables criticism to be sharply focused and hence potentially relevant not only to the interpretation at hand but also, perchance, to the conduct of future inquiry.

Another useful contribution of path analysis, even in the conventional regression framework, is that it provides a calculus for indirect effects, when the basic equations are expanded along the lines of (6). It is evident from the regression coefficients, for example, that the direct effect of school on class values is greater than that of background, but the opposite is true of the indirect effects. The pattern of indirect effects is hardly obvious without the aid of an explicit representation of the causal scheme. If one wishes a single summary measure of indirect effect, however, it is obtained as follows: indirect effect of X_2 on $X_5 = r_{52} - p_{52} = .28 - .15 = .13$; similarly, indirect effect of X_1 is $r_{51} - p_{51} = .24 - .06 = .18$. These summations of indirect effects include, in each case, the effects of one variable via its correlation with the other; hence the two are not additive. Without commenting further on the substantive implications of the direct and indirect effects suggested by Turner's material, it may simply be noted that the investigator will usually want to scrutinize them carefully in terms of his theory.

DECOMPOSITION OF A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Many of the variables studied in social research are (or may be regarded as) composite. Thus, population growth is the sum of natural increase and net migration; each of the latter may be further decomposed, natural increase being births minus deaths and net migration the difference between in- and out-migration. Where such a decomposition is available, it is of interest (1) to compute the relative contributions of the components to variation in the composite variable and (2) to ascertain how causes affecting the composite variable are transmitted via the respective components.

An example taken from work of Winsborough[25] illustrates the case of a variable with multiplicative components, rendered additive by taking logarithms. Studying variation in population density over the seventy-four community areas (omitting the central business district) of Chicago in 1940, Winsborough noted that density, de-

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.

[25] Hal H. Winsborough, "City Growth and City Structure," *Journal of Regional Science* IV (Winter, 1962), 35–49.

fined as the ratio of population to area, can be written:

$$\frac{\text{Population}}{\text{Area}} = \frac{\text{Population}}{\text{Dwelling Units}} \times \frac{\text{Dwelling Units}}{\text{Structures}} \times \frac{\text{Structures}}{\text{Area}}.$$

Let $V_0 = \log$ (Population/Area), $V_1 = \log$ (Population/Dwelling Units), $V_2 = \log$ (Dwelling Units/Structures), and $V_3 = \log$ (Structures/Area); then

$$V_0 = V_1 + V_2 + V_3 .$$

The intercorrelations of the components, shown in Table 1, are used to complete the diagram, Figure 2, *a*. The correlations of the dependent variable with its components may now be computed from the basic theorem, equation (5).

$$r_{01} = p_{01} + p_{02}r_{12} + p_{03}r_{13} = -.419;$$
$$r_{02} = p_{01}r_{12} + p_{02} + p_{03}r_{23} = .636; \text{ and}$$
$$r_{03} = p_{01}r_{13} + p_{02}r_{23} + p_{03} = .923.$$

The analysis has not only turned up a clear ordering of the three components in terms of relative importance, as given by the path coefficients, it has also shown that one of the components is actually correlated negatively with the composite variable, owing to its negative correlations with the other two components.

TABLE 1

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR LOGARITHMS OF DENSITY AND ITS COMPONENTS AND TWO INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: CHICAGO COMMUNITY AREAS, 1940

Variable	X_1	X_2	X_3	W	Z
X_0 density (log)	−.419	.636	.923	−.663	−.390
X_1 persons per dwelling unit (log)	...	−.625	−.315	.296	.099
X_2 dwelling units per structure (log)	...	...	.305	−.594	−.466
X_3 structures per acre (log)	...	...	...	−.517	−.226
W distance from center	...	...	...	...	.549
Z recency of growth	...	...	...	...	...

Source: Winsborough, *op. cit.*, and unpublished data kindly supplied by the author.

If each variable is expressed in standard form, we obtain,

$$\frac{V_0 - \bar{V}_0}{\sigma_0} = \frac{V_1 - \bar{V}_1}{\sigma_1}\cdot\frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_0} + \frac{V_2 - \bar{V}_2}{\sigma_2}\cdot\frac{\sigma_2}{\sigma_0} + \frac{V_3 - \bar{V}_3}{\sigma_3}\cdot\frac{\sigma_3}{\sigma_0},$$

or

$$X_0 = p_{01}X_1 + p_{02}X_2 + p_{03}X_3 ,$$

where $X_0, \ldots, X_3$ are the variables in standard form and p_{01}, p_{02}, p_{03} are the path coefficients involved in the determination of X_0 by X_1, X_2, and X_3. Observe that the path coefficients can be computed in this kind of problem, where complete determination by measured variables holds as a consequence of definitions, without prior calculation of correlations:[26]

$$p_{01} = \sigma_1/\sigma_0 = .132 \quad \sigma_0 = .491 \quad \sigma_1 = .065$$
$$p_{02} = \sigma_2/\sigma_0 = .468 \quad \sigma_2 = .230$$
$$p_{03} = \sigma_3/\sigma_0 = .821 \quad \sigma_3 = .403.$$

Winsborough considered two independent variables as factors producing variation in density: distance from the city center and recency of growth (percentage of dwelling units built in 1920 or later). The diagram can be elaborated to indicate how these factors operate via the components of log density (see Fig. 2, *b*).

The first step is to compute the path coefficients for the relationships of each component to the two independent variables. (The requisite information is given in Table 1.) For example, the equations,

$$r_{1W} = p_{1W} + p_{1Z}r_{ZW} ,$$
$$r_{1Z} = p_{1W}r_{ZW} + p_{1Z} ,$$

[26] Based on data kindly supplied by Winsborough.

may be used to solve for p_{1z} and p_{1W}. (This is, of course, equivalent to computing the multiple regression of X_1 on W and Z, with all variables in standard form.) Substantively, it is interesting that distance, W, has somewhat larger effects on each component of density than does recency of growth, Z, while the pattern of signs of the path coefficients is different for W and Z.

The two independent variables by no means account for all the variation in any of the components, as may be seen from the size of the residuals, p_{1a}, p_{2b}, and p_{2c}, these being computed from the formula (7) for complete determination. It is possible, nevertheless, for the independent variables to account for the intercorrelations of the components and, ideally, one would like to




FIG. 2.—*a*, decomposition of log density (X_0) into components; *b*, effects of distance and recency of growth on log density via components. (Source: Winsborough, *op. cit.*, and unpublished calculations kindly supplied by the author.)

discover independent variables which would do just that. The relevant calculations concern the correlations between residuals. These are obtained from the basic theorem, equation (5), by writing, for example,

$$r_{23} = p_{2W}r_{3W} + p_{2Z}r_{3Z} + p_{2b}p_{3c}r_{bc}\,,$$

which may be solved for $r_{bc} = .014$. In this setup, the correlations between residuals are merely the conventional second-order partial correlations; thus $r_{ab} = r_{12.WZ}$, $r_{ac} = r_{13.WZ}$, and $r_{bc} = r_{23.WZ}$. Partial correlations, which otherwise have little utility in path analysis, turn out to be appropriate when the question at issue is whether a set of independent variables "explains" the correlation between two dependent variables. In the present example, while $r_{23} = .305$, we find $r_{bc} = r_{23.WZ} = .014$. Thus the correlation between the logarithms of dwelling units per structure (X_2) and structures per acre (X_3) is satisfactorily explained by the respective relationships of these two components to distance and recency of growth. The same is not true of the correlations involving persons per dwelling unit (X_1), but fortunately this is by far the least important component of density.

Although the correlations between residuals are required to complete the diagram and, in a sense, to evaluate the adequacy of the explanatory variables, they do not enter as such into the calculations bearing upon the final question: How are the effects of the independent variables transmitted to the dependent variable via its components? The most compact answer to this question is given by the equations,

$$r_{0W} = p_{01}r_{1W} + p_{02}r_{2W} + p_{03}r_{3W}$$
$$= .039 - .278 - .424 = -.663,$$

and

$$r_{0Z} = p_{01}r_{1Z} + p_{02}r_{2Z} + p_{03}r_{3Z}$$
$$= .013 - .218 - .185 = -.391.$$

Density is negatively related to both distance and recency of growth, but the effects transmitted via the first component of density are positive (albeit quite small). Distance diminishes density primarily via its intermediate effect on structures per acre (X_3), secondarily via dwelling units per structure (X_2). The comparison is reversed for recency of growth, the less important of the two factors. More detailed interpretations can be obtained, as explained earlier, by expanding the correlations r_{1W}, r_{2W}, etc., using the basic theorem (5). For further substantive interpretation, the reader is referred to the source publication, which also offers an alternative derivation of the compound paths.

The density problem may well exemplify a general strategy too seldom employed in research: breaking a complex variable down into its components before initiating a search for its causes. One egregious error must, however, be avoided: that of treating components and causes on the same footing. By this route, one can arrive at the meaningless result that net migration is a more important "cause" of population growth than is change in manufacturing output. One must take strong exception to a causal scheme constructed on the premise, "If both demographic and economic variables help explain metropolitan growth, then we may gain understanding of growth processes by lumping the two together."[27] On the contrary, "understanding" would seem to require a clear distinction between demographic *components* of growth and economic *causes* which may affect growth via one or another of its components.

A CHAIN MODEL

Data reported by Hodge, Siegel, and Rossi[28] seem to fit well the model of a *simple causal chain* (see Fig. 3, *a*). These

[27] George L. Wilber, "Growth of Metropolitan Areas in the South," *Social Forces*, XLII (May, 1964), 491.

[28] Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925–1963," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXX (November, 1964), 286–302.

authors give correlations between the occupational prestige ratings of four studies completed at widely separated dates: Counts (1925), Smith (1940), National Opinion Research Center (1947), and NORC replication (1963). In a simple causal chain, the correlations between temporally adjacent variables are the path coefficients (this is an immediate consequence of the definition of path coefficient). Using these three correlations as reported by Hodge *et al.*, we may infer that the correlation between NORC (1963) and Smith is (.990)(.982) = .972; between NORC (1963) and Counts is (.990)(.982)(.968) = .942; and between NORC (1947) and Counts is (.982)(.968) = .951. The observed values of these correlations (with differences from the inferred values in parentheses) are $r_{YS} = .971$ (—.001), $r_{YC} = .934$ (—.008), and $r_{XC} = .955$ (.004). Acceptance of this causal chain model is consistent with the conclusion of Hodge *et al.* that the amount of change in the relative positions of occupations in a prestige hierarchy is a direct function of elapsed time.




FIG. 3.—Causal chain: *a*, correlations taken from Hodge *et al.*, *op. cit.* (C = Counts, 1925; S = Smith, 1940; X = NORC, 1947; Y = NORC, 1963); *b*, intercorrelations of residuals implied by acceptance of chain hypothesis for the data in *a*.

Although the discrepancies between inferred and observed correlations seem trivial, it is worth noting that acceptance of the estimates shown in Figure 3, *a*, along with the assumption of a simple causal chain, requires us to postulate a complex pattern of correlations (most of them negligible in size) among the residuals or errors. This pattern is shown in Figure 3, *b*. In obtaining this solution, we assume that

each residual is uncorrelated with the immediately preceding variable in the chain but not necessarily with variables two or more links behind it. In the present example, then, the crucial assumptions are that $r_{VS} = r_{WX} = 0$. We can then, using equation (5) or the verbal algorithm, write the number of equations required to solve for the quantities to be entered on the diagram (for convenience, lower-case letters designate paths):

$$r_{YX} = a = .990 ,$$

$$r_{XS} = b = .982 ,$$

$$r_{SC} = c = .968 ,$$

$$r_{YY} = 1 = a^2 + w^2 ,$$

$$r_{XX} = 1 = b^2 + v^2 ,$$

$$r_{SS} = 1 = c^2 + u^2 , \qquad (11)$$

$$r_{XC} = .955 = bc + v r_{VC} ,$$

$$r_{YC} = .934 = abc + av r_{VC} + w r_{CW} ,$$

$$r_{YS} = .971 = ab + cw r_{CW} + uw r_{UW} ,$$

$$r_{VS} = 0 = u r_{UV} + c r_{CV} ,$$

$$r_{WX} = 0 = v r_{VW} + b r_{SW}$$

$$(\text{where } r_{SW} = c r_{CW} + u r_{UW}) .$$

In general, if we are considering a k-variable causal chain, we shall have to estimate $k - 1$ residual paths, $(k - 1)(k - 2)/2$ correlations between residuals, $k - 1$ paths for the links in the chain, and $k - 2$ correlations between the initial variable and residuals $2, 3, \ldots, k$ in the chain. This is a total of $(k^2 + 3k - 6)/2$ quantities to be estimated. We shall have at our disposal $k(k - 1)/2$ equations expressing known correlations in terms of paths, $k - 1$ equations of complete determination (for all variables in the chain except the initial one), and $k - 2$ equations in which the correlation of a residual with the immediately preceding variable in the chain is set to zero. This amounts to ($k^2 + 3k$ [illegible]tions, exactly the number required for a solution. The solution may, of course, include meaningless results (e.g., $r > 1.0$), or results that strain one's credulity. In this event, the chain hypothesis had best be abandoned or the estimated paths modified.

In the present illustration, the results are plausible enough. Both the Counts and the Smith studies differed from the two NORC studies and from each other in their techniques of rating and sampling. A further complication is that the studies used different lists of occupations, and the observed correlations are based on differing numbers of occupations. There is ample opportunity, therefore, for correlations of errors to turn up in a variety of patterns, even though the chain hypothesis may be basically sound. We should observe, too, that the residual factors here include not only extrinsic disturbances but also real though temporary fluctuations in prestige, if there be such.

What should one say, substantively, on the basis of such an analysis of the prestige ratings? Certainly, the temporal ordering of the variables is unambiguous. But whether one wants to assert that an aspect of social structure (prestige hierarchy) at one date "causes" its counterpart at a later date is perhaps questionable. The data suggest there is a high order of persistence over time, coupled with a detectable, if rather glacial, drift in the structure. The calculation of numerical values for the model hardly resolves the question of ultimate "reasons" for either the pattern of persistence or the tempo of change. These are, instead, questions raised by the model in a clear way for further discussion and, perhaps, investigation.

THE SYNTHETIC COHORT AS A PATTERN OF INTERPRETATION

Although, as the example from Turner indicates, it is often difficult in sociological analysis to find unequivocal bases for causal ordering, there is one happy exception to this awkward state of affairs. In the life

cycles of individuals and families, certain events and decisions commonly if not universally precede others. Despite the well-known fallibility of retrospective data, the investigator is not at the mercy of respondents' recall in deciding to accept the completion of schooling as an antecedent to the pursuit of an occupational career (exceptions granted) or in assuming that marriage precedes divorce. Some observations, moreover, may be made and recorded in temporal sequence, so that the status observed at the termination of a period of observation may logically be taken to depend on the initial status (among other things). Path analysis may well prove to be most useful to sociologists studying actual historical processes from records and reports of the experience of real cohorts whose experiences are traced over time, such as a student population followed by the investigator through the first stages of post-graduation achievement.[29]

The final example, however, concerns not real cohorts but the usefulness of a hypoethical synthesis of data from several cohorts. As demographers have learned, synthetic cohort analysis incurs some specific hazards;[30] yet the technique has proved

[29] For example, Bruce K. Eckland, "Academic Ability, Higher Education, and Occupational Mobility," *American Sociological Review*, XXX (October, 1965), 735–46.

[30] P. K. Whelpton, "Reproduction Rates Adjusted for Age, Parity, Fecundity, and Marriage,"




FIG. 4.—Respondent's occupational status (Y) at successive ages, in relation to father's occupational status (X) and respondent's educational attainment (U). Occupational status at age 25–34 = Y_1; at 35–44 = Y_2; at 45–54 = Y_3; at 55–64 = Y_4. (Source: Duncan and Hodge, *op. cit.*, and unpublished calculations kindly supplied by the authors.)

invaluable for heuristic purposes. Pending the execution of full-blown longitudinal studies on real cohorts, the synthetic cohort is, at least, a way of making explicit one's hypotheses about the sequential determination of experiences cumulating over the life cycle.[81]

In a study of the social mobility of a sample of Chicago white men with nonfarm backgrounds surveyed in 1951, Duncan and Hodge,[82] used data on father's occupational status, respondent's educational attainment, and respondent's occupational status in 1940 and 1950 for four cohorts: men 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–64 years old on the survey date. Their main results, somewhat awkwardly presented in the source publication, are compactly summarized by the first four diagrams in Figure 4. (The superfluous squared term in their equations has been eliminated in the present calculations. The amount of curvilinearity was found to be trivial, and curvilinear relations cannot be fitted directly into a causal chain by the procedure employed here.)

These data involve partial records of the occupational careers of the four cohorts and thus depict only segments of a continuous life history. In the original analysis, it was possible to gain some insights from the interperiod and intercohort comparisons on which that analysis was focused. Here, attention is given to a different use of the same information. Suppose we thought of the four sets of data as pertaining to a single cohort, studied at four successive points in time, at decade intervals. Then, all the data should fit into a single causal or processual sequence.

It is obvious that one cannot achieve perfect consistency on this point of view. The initial correlation, r_{UX}, varies among cohorts, for example. Moreover, age-constant intercohort comparisons of the other correlations (the Y's with X and U) suggest that some variations result from genuine differences between the conditions of 1940 and 1950. But if one is willing to suppress this information for the sake of a necessarily hypothetical synthesis, it is possible to put all the data together in a single model of occupational careers as influenced by socioeconomic origins.

The four correlations r_{UX} were averaged. The remaining correlations for adjacent cohorts were likewise averaged; for example, r_{1U} based on 1950 data for men 25–34 years old was averaged with r_{1U} based on 1940 data for men 35–44 in 1951, and so on. Only r_{4X}, r_{4U}, and the three intertemporal correlations, r_{21}, r_{32}, and r_{43}, had to be based on the experience of just one cohort. (In deriving this compromise one does, of course, lose the temporal specificity of the data by smoothing out apparently real historical fluctuations.) When the correlations had been averaged, the results shown in the "composite" model on the right of Figure 4 were obtained. The estimates of path coefficients here are simply the partial regression coefficients, in standard form, of Y_1 on X and U; Y_2 on Y_1, X, and U; Y_3 on Y_2, X, and U; and Y_4 on Y_3, X, and U.

The results for the synthetic cohort make explicit the following interpretations: (1) The background factors, father's education (X) and respondent's education (U), have an important direct impact during early stages of a cohort's life cycle; after age 35–44 their direct effects become small or negligible, although they exert indirect effects via preceding achieved statuses (Y_1 and Y_2). (2) Careers tend to stabilize after age 35–44, as indicated by the sharp rise in the path coefficients representing persistence of status over a decade (compare p_{21} with p_{32} and p_{43}) and by the decreasing magnitudes

Journal of the American Statistical Association, XLI (December, 1946), 501–16.

[81] See, for example, A. J. Jaffe and R. O. Carleton, *Occupational Mobility in the United States: 1930–1960* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1954), p. 53 (n. 6) and Table 13.

[82] Otis Dudley Duncan and Robert W. Hodge, "Education and Occupational Mobility," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVIII (May, 1963), 629–

of the residual paths from $R_a, \ldots, R_d$. (3) During the life cycle, many circumstances essentially independent of background factors affect occupational mobility, so that achievement in the later stages of the career becomes more and more dependent upon intervening contingencies while continuing to reflect the indirect influence of conditions determinate at the outset. Thus, for example, r_{4c}—the correlation of occupational status at age 55–64 with residual for age 45–54—may be computed as (.789) (.626) = .494, and the residual path to

TABLE 2

OBSERVED AND IMPLIED (*) CORRELATIONS FOR SYNTHETIC COHORT MODEL OF OCCUPATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT

VARIABLE (AGE AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS)	VARIABLE		
	Y_2	Y_3	Y_4
25–34 (Y_1)..........	.552	.455*	.443*
35–44 (Y_2)..........	....	.772	.690*
45–54 (Y_3)..........	....	....	.866
55–64 (Y_4).........	....	....	....

Source: Duncan and Hodge, *op. cit.*, and calculations from model in Figure 4.

Y_4 itself is $P_{4d} = .479$. These are comparable in size with the correlations $r_{4X} = .301$ and $r_{4U} = .525$. The residuals are, by definition, uncorrelated with X and U and represent, therefore, the influence of factors quite unrelated to social origins and schooling. The prevailing impression that the United States enjoys a rather "loose" stratification system is thus quantified by a model such as this one. (4) While the data include observed interannual correlations of occupational statuses separated by a decade (r_{43}, r_{32}, and r_{21}), the synthetic cohort model also implies such correlations for statuses separated by two or three decades. These may be computed from the following formulas based on equation (5):

$$r_{42} = p_{4X}\, r_{2X} + p_{43} r_{32} + p_{4U}\, r_{2U} \ ,$$
$$r_{31} = p_{3X}\, r_{1X} + p_{32} r_{21} + p_{3U}\, r_{1U} \ ,$$
$$r_{41} = p_{4X}\, r_{1X} + p_{43} r_{31} + p_{4U}\, r_{1U} \ ,$$

inserting the value of r_{31} obtained from the second equation into the third. The observed and implied correlations are assembled in Table 2. The latter represent, in effect, hypotheses to be checked whenever data spanning twenty or thirty years of the occupational experience of a cohort become available. In the meantime, they stand as reasonable estimates, should anyone have use for such estimates. If forthcoming evidence casts doubt on these estimates, the model will, of course, be called into question. It is no small virtue of a model that it is capable of being rejected on the basis of evidence.

This last example, since it rests on an explicit fiction—that of a synthetic cohort —perhaps makes clearer than previous examples the point that the role of path analysis is to *render an interpretation* and not merely to provide a format for presenting conventional calculations. In all the examples the intention has been to adhere to the purpose of path analysis as Wright formulated it:

> . . . the method of path coefficients is not intended to accomplish the impossible task of deducing causal relations from the values of the correlation coefficients.[33] . . . The method depends on the combination of knowledge of the degrees of correlation among the variables in a system with such knowledge as may be possessed of the causal relations. In cases in which the causal relations are uncertain, the method can be used to find the logical consequences of any particular hypothesis in regard to them.[34] . . . Path analysis is an extension of the usual verbal interpretation of statistics not of the statistics themselves. It is usually easy to give a plausible interpretation of any significant statistic taken by itself. The purpose of path analysis is to determine whether a proposed set of interpretations is consistent throughout.[35]

[33] "The Method of Path Coefficients," p. 193.

[34] "Correlation and Causation," *Journal of Agricultural Research*, XX (1921), 557–85 (quotation from p. 557).

[35] "The Treatment of Reciprocal Interaction, with or without Lag, in Path Analysis," p. 444.

NEGLECTED TOPICS

This paper, for the lack of space and especially for lack of "convincing" examples, could not treat several potentially important applications of path analysis: (1) Models incorporating feedback were explicitly excluded. Whether our present techniques of social measurement are adequate to the development of such models is perhaps questionable. (2) The problem of two-wave, two-variable panel analysis, recently discussed by Pelz and Andrews,[36] might well be formulated in terms of path coefficients. The present writer, however, has made little progress in attempts to clarify the panel problem by means of path analysis. (3) The pressing problem of the disposition of measurement errors[37] may perhaps be advanced toward solution by explicit representation in path diagrams. The well-known "correction for attenuation," where measurement errors are assumed to be uncorrelated, is easily derived on this approach.[38] It seems possible that under very special conditions a solution may also be obtained on certain assumptions about correlated errors. (4) Wright has shown[39] how certain ecological models of the interaction of populations can be stated in terms of path coefficients. The inverse method of using path analysis for studies of multiple time series[40] merits consideration by sociologists. (5) Where the investigation involves unmeasured variables, path analysis may be helpful in deciding what deductions, if any, can be made from the observed data. Such unmeasured variables may, in principle, be observable; in this case, path analysis may lead to hypotheses for testing on some future occasion when measurements can be made. If the unmeasured variable is a theoretical construct, its explicit introduction into a path diagram[41] may well point up the nature of rival hypotheses. Ideally, what are sometimes called "validity coefficients" should appear explicitly in the causal model so that the latter accounts for both the "true causes" under study and the ways in which "indicator variables" are thought to represent "underlying variables." A particular case is that of factor analysis. As Wright's work demonstrates,[42] a factor analysis is prone to yield meaningless results unless its execution is controlled by explicit assumptions which reflect the theoretical structure of the problem. An indoctrination in path analysis makes one skeptical of the claim that "modern factor analysis" allows us to leave all the work to the computer.

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[36] Donald C. Pelz and Frank M. Andrews, "Detecting Causal Priorities in Panel Study Data," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (December, 1964), 836–54.

[37] H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Some Implications of Random Measurement Error for Causal Inferences," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXI (July, 1965), 37–47; Donald J. Bogue and Edmund M. Murphy, "The Effect of Classification Errors upon Statistical Inference: A Case Analysis with Census Data," *Demography*, I (1964), 42–55.

[38] Wright, "The Method of Path Coefficients" and "Path Coefficients and Path Regressions."

[39] "The Treatment of Reciprocal Interaction."

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Making Causal Inferences for Unmeasured Variables from Correlations among Indicators," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIX (July, 1963), 53–62.

[42] "The Interpretation of Multivariate Systems."

The Campus as a Frog Pond: An Application of the Theory of Relative Deprivation to Career Decisions of College Men[1]

James A. Davis

ABSTRACT

Data from a large national probability sample of graduating Senior men reveal a pattern of findings which suggests the operation of "relative deprivation" in the career decisions of college men. Generally speaking, grade-point averages show stronger correlations with career choice than a measure of the intellectual caliber of the student body, although both are equally strongly related to tests of scholastic aptitude. The finding suggests the operation of "relative deprivation," that is, a tendency for students to evaluate their academic ability by comparison with their fellows on the same campus, not in terms of criteria which allow for school differences in ability level. When attitude items regarding feelings of academic success are introduced into the tabulations, the interpretation is generally, but not completely, supported.

The theory of "relative deprivation"[2] was developed by Samuel A. Stouffer and his colleagues during World War II to explain some puzzling results in large-scale surveys of soldiers. Although the theory has been well codified, mathematized, and otherwise embalmed since then,[3] there have been relatively few studies[4] of its hypotheses.

Therefore, it is of some interest to note a set of mildly puzzling findings in a recent large-scale survey which seem to suggest the operation of this same social-psychological mechanism. Unfortunately, the chain of evidence is tortuous, but its aim is simple: to draw a systematic analogy between college men and enlisted men, between college campuses and military units, between grade-point averages (GPA) and military promotions; and to trace some of the consequences of these similarities.

During the last five years, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) has been studying the careers of some 35,000 young men and women from 135 colleges and universities, a representative probability sample of persons receiving the bachelor's degree from an American college or university in spring, 1961.[5]

[1] This research was supported through the Cooperative Research Program of the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and by a National Institutes of Mental Health Career Development Award to the author. I should like to thank Mrs. Judith Bagus, David Lopez, Matthew Crenson, and Karen Oppenheim for their diligent assistance on the tabulations. I owe Robert Crain many thanks for his advice and comments.

[2] Stouffer never stated the theory in systematic fashion. Most of the analyses in which he uses the idea appear in S. A. Stouffer, E. A. Suchman, L. C. DeVinney, S. A. Star, and R. M. Williams, Jr., *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1949).

[3] For example, R. K. Merton and A. S. Kitt, "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in R. K. Merton and P. F. Lazarsfeld, *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier"* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), pp. 40–105; J. A. Davis, "A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation," *Sociometry*, XXII (December, 1959), 280–96.

[4] Among these, see A. J. Spector, "Expectations, Fulfillment and Morale," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LII (January, 1956), 51–56; Martin Patchen, "A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Data regarding Comparisons of Social Rewards," *Sociometry*, XXIV (June, 1961), 136–56. Spector's data support the theory, while Patchen maintains that his do not.

[5] The study and sample are described in detail in James A. Davis, *Great Aspirations: The Grad-*

The study was designed to focus on enrolment in graduate schools, but we were quickly led to analyses of occupational choice because, truism or not, a graduating Senior's career preference is the best predictor of whether he will attend graduate school. In particular, by comparing the Seniors' reports of their "anticipated long-run career field" and "career preference when you started college,"[6] we were able to analyze a number of variables associated with career decisions during undergraduate study. These analyses are reported in a recent volume,[7] but for present purposes the important conclusions are these: (1) We estimate that up to one-half of the graduating Seniors made a meaningful change in career preference during college. (2) While career decisions during college show certain correlations with such background characteristics as parental socioeconomic status, religion, size of home town, and race, the major correlates appear to be occupational values, sex, and "academic performance."

This last variable is the subject of this article, because a reanalysis of the data has suggested that the relationship between academic performance and career choice is not entirely what common sense would suggest.

SCHOOL QUALITY, GPA, AND ABILITY

We begin, however, with the obvious, not the surprising. Our measure of academic performance combines two items: the respondent's self-reported GPA in answer to the question, "What is your over-all—cumulative—grade-point average for undergraduate work at your present college?" and a measure of the intellectual caliber of the student at his institution (school quality).[8]

School quality was introduced to correct GPA's for the well-known variation in the mean scholastic aptitude among American colleges and universities. McConnell and Heist, who examined aptitude test scores in a sample of two hundred schools, summarize this variability:[9]

> A number of colleges in 1952 attracted or selected freshmen all of whose scores were above the national mean of all entering students; the reverse of this is also true in that the great majority in some schools scored below the national mean. On the basis of academic ability alone the composition of student bodies on a great many campuses is highly unlike that in many others.

The school quality measure was developed as follows: For 114 of the 135

uate School Plans of America's College Seniors (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1964). Data on religious correlates of career choice in this sample have been reported in Andrew Greeley, *Religion and Career: A Study of College Graduates* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1963). Materials from the first of four annual follow-up waves are reported in Norman Miller, "One Year after Commencement" (Chicago: NORC Report No. 93, 1963 [multilithed]).

[6] The data are treated as if they constituted a panel study, but the Freshman-year measures are retrospective. The amount and nature of error introduced is unknown. The only data on this problem of which we are aware are reported by Alexander Astin in "Influences on the Student's Motivation To Seek Advanced Training," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, LIII (December, 1962), 303–9. He presents a comparison of Seniors' reported Freshman-year educational aspirations and their actual Freshman-year reports previously gathered in a panel study of National Merit Scholarship finalists. If the data are dichotomized as bachelor's or less (no graduate school) versus master's or doctor's, the Q coefficient of association is .83. Since this is higher than any of the substantive correlations we shall report, and since memory of career plans should be as accurate as that of educational aspirations, we shall treat the answers as if they came from a true panel.

[7] James A. Davis, *Undergraduate Career Decisions: Correlates of Occupational Choice* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965).

[8] The phrase "school quality" is not entirely apt in the present analysis, since we are treating the item as a measure of the academic ability of the students, not the character of the faculty, library, etc. However, since the term is used in most of the reports from this research, we have retained it for the sake of consistency.

[9] T. R. McConnell and Paul Heist, "The Diverse College Student Population," in Nevitt Sanford (ed.), *The American College* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 232.

schools in the sample, the research staff of the National Merit Scholarship Corporation[10] kindly made available average scores for entering Freshmen who, as high-school students, had taken the test administered throughout the nation by that organization to select candidates for its scholarships. This test correlates strongly with similar measures, such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test administered by the College Entrance Examination Board. For the twenty-one schools with insufficient National Merit data (in most instances because they were so small that too few scores were available for reliable estimates), average National Merit scores were estimated on the basis of items (Phi Beta Kappa chapters, library expenditures, etc.) that correlated with National Merit scores among the other schools.

Schools were divided into four levels on the basis of the distributions of scores and certain intuitive beliefs about American higher education. (We assumed that there are relatively few highly selective schools in the top levels, a large "middle mass" of moderately selective ones, and a sizable minority of relatively unselective institutions.) In this analysis, we will combine the top two levels and treat three groups: I and II (which graduated 14 per cent of the Seniors), III (54 per cent), and IV (32 per cent).

The GPA's were grouped to give a roughly similar distribution of cases. "High" (B+ or higher) includes 18 per cent of the total sample, "Medium" (B and B−) includes 41 per cent, and "Low" (C+ or below) includes 40 per cent.

Before turning to the substantive findings, it is important to review some of the statistical relationships involving GPA and school quality. In particular, we call attention to the following: *school quality and GPA are independent of each other, but appear to be equally strongly associated with scholastic aptitude.*

The first part of the statement is obvious, for if schools tend to use similar grading systems (if "everyone grades on the curve"), GPA distributions will be the same from school to school and independent of *any* classification of schools. However, there is enough cynicism about grading procedures that the second part of the statement deserves documentation.

Unfortunately, we do not have precollege test scores for our sample (which is why the Academic Performance Index was developed), but the questionnaire did provide a crude analogue. Each student was asked to check whether he was a "National Merit Scholarship holder, Finalist, or Semi-Finalist" in high school. Since we are informed in a personal communication that some 90 per cent of our sample probably took the National Merit examination, and since the group of semifinalists, finalists, and scholarship-holders falls above a fixed cutting point on the test, we can assume that the students who checked this item represented a pool of uniformly high talent when they began college. Only 3 per cent of the total sample met this criterion. While they undoubtedly constitute a uniformly bright subgroup,[11] the remaining 97 per cent cover such a range of ability that the item cannot be used as a dichotomy. However, if we assume that where the very, very bright students are, the very and fairly bright will tend to be also, we can use the proportion of National Merit finalists as a statistical indicator of test ability.

Table 1 gives the percentage of National Merit finalists by school quality, GPA, and sex, the latter being controlled here because girls get better grades than boys.[12]

[10] For this and many other favors we are indebted to John Holland, Alexander Astin, and Robert C. Nichols, of the National Merit Scholarship Corporation. Norman Bradburn of NORC developed the School Quality Index.

[11] For a description of this group, see Robert C. Nichols and James A. Davis, "Characteristics of Students of High Academic Aptitude," *Personnel and Guidance Journal* (April, 1964), pp. 794–800.

[12] See David E. Lavin, *The Prediction of Academic Performance: A Theoretical Analysis and Review of Research* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965). Lavin writes, "Three factors

Zero order γ coefficients of association in Table 1 are shown in Table 2. School quality and GPA are essentially independent, and both are associated with National Merit status. Among the men the two γ's (.611 and .625) are almost identical, and among the women the coefficients (.537 and .646) are reasonably close.

Because school quality was measured with data from National Merit examinations (albeit from different respondents), the existence of that association is no surprise. What is important is this: Table 2 suggests that if school quality and GPA show different relationships with a third variable, the difference cannot be explained by the distribution of academically promising Freshmen because the two measures are about equally associated with high-school tests of scholastic aptitude.[13]

TABLE 1

SCHOOL QUALITY, GRADE-POINT AVERAGE, AND NATIONAL MERIT STATUS, CONTROLLING FOR SEX (PERCENTAGE REPORTING THEMSELVES AS NATIONAL MERIT WINNERS, FINALISTS, OR SEMIFINALISTS)

School Quality	Men: GPA			Women: GPA		
	C+	B or B−	B+	C+	B or B−	B+
I and II .	5 7 (1,774)	11.6 (1,986)	23 5 (856)	4 2 (756)	7.5 (1,370)	15.9 (642)
III.........	0 6 (8,085)	2.4 (6,176)	7.5 (2,643)	0.0 (4,270)	1.7 (5,608)	6.9 (2,736)
IV.........	0 0 (4,894)	1 0 (4,012)	5 8 (1,657)	0.0 (2,007)	0.8 (3,026)	3.3 (1,788)

Weighted N*................	54,295
NA on GPA....	903
NA on National Merit.........	1,466
Total weighted N	56,664

* Because of differential sampling rates in the various strata of the original design, it is necessary to weight up the original 33,782 questionnaires of a total of 56,664 to provide an unbiased estimate of the universe (cf J. A. Davis, *Undergraduate Career Decisions*, pp. 257-82, for a detailed description of the sample).

TABLE 2

GOODMAN AND KRUSKAL'S γ COEFFICIENTS FOR DATA IN TABLE 1

Association	Men	Women
School quality×GPA....	+.048	−.039
School quality×National Merit	.611	+.537
GPA×National Merit.........	+.625	+.646

Table 1 has another implication which follows of mathematical necessity from the relationships in Table 2 but which is not widely recognized: *when scholastic aptitude is controlled, the relationship between school quality and grade-point average will be negative.* Among high-school graduates with a given level of scholastic aptitude, the more selective the college they attend, the lower their grades will be. The diversity of American colleges and universities means that students in the middle ranges of aca-

emerge as basic correlates of academic performance. These are ability, sex and socio-economic status" (p. 43). Our measure of socioeconomic status, which combines father's education, parental family income, and occupation of the head of the parental family, is associated with school quality ($\gamma = +.45$ for men, $+.55$ for women), but is independent of GPA ($+.00$ for men, $+.06$ for women), Because of the complexity of the tabulations reported later, socioeconomic status was not controlled. However, the reader should remember that our data will tend to overstate the effects of school quality for variables correlated with socioeconomic status.

[13] The inference is also supported by Senior-year test results for the small proportion (a weighted total of 1,595 cases) who took the Law School Admissions Test (see Davis, *Undergraduate Career Decisions*, pp. 245-48).

demic aptitude can choose to be big frogs in little ponds or little frogs in big ponds.

As we have no general measure of scholastic aptitude, this relationship cannot be demonstrated for the total sample. However, the data in Table 1 can be reorganized to show this effect among the National Merit group (Table 3).

The values of γ (—.333 for men and —.433 for women) are both negative. Among the men, two-thirds of those graduated from Level IV schools had GPA's of B+ or better, while among those who were graduated from schools in Levels I and II, it is reversed—about two-thirds had less than a B+ average.

We have now set the stage, and we turn to the plot—the association between academic performance and career choice.

SCHOOL QUALITY, GPA, AND CAREER CHOICE

While the total group of graduates is highly selected in terms of scholastic ability, it is well known that within this able minority of young people, career choice is still correlated with academic performance. Like many other studies, *Undergraduate Career Decisions* shows that during the college years the more able students gravitate toward careers in the arts and sciences and the free professions.[14] It reports that among those choosing such fields during their Freshman year, the Academic Performance Index (which combines GPA and school quality) is generally associated with retention of those career plans, and among those choosing other fields while Freshmen, the Index is associated with shifts into arts and sciences or the free professions by graduation time.

We have shown that the two components of the Index are independent and equally associated with scholastic aptitude. Let us now look at their associations with career decisions during college.

As a start, we will lump together as "high academic-performance career fields" physical sciences, biological sciences, social sciences, humanities and fine arts, law, and medicine.[15] After dividing the students into those who chose high-performance fields as Freshmen versus those who chose any other career ("other"), we will examine the associations between our two ability measures and career preference at graduation. Among those who initially aimed for high-performance fields, we will be examining correlates of retention of these plans, and in the "other" group we will be examining correlates of shifts into high-performance fields.

TABLE 3

GRADE-POINT AVERAGE AND SCHOOL QUALITY AMONG NATIONAL MERIT WINNERS, FINALISTS, AND SEMIFINALISTS, BY SEX (PERCENTAGE)

GPA	School Quality		
	IV	III	I–II
Men ($\gamma_{\text{Quality and GPA}}$ = −.333):			
High	70	50	38
Medium	29	38	43
Low	1	12	19
Total	100	100	100
Weighted *N*	(138)	(398)	(534)
Women ($\gamma_{\text{Quality and GPA}}$ = −.433):			
High	72	67	43
Medium	28	31	43
Low	0	2	14
Total	100	100	100
Weighted *N*	(82)	(283)	(237)

Weighted *N*	1,672
NA on GPA	1
Total weighted *N*	1,673

Table 4 presents the results for men. Women have been excluded for the good reason that the trends reported in the remainder of this paper do not hold among them. We feel that this is not merely sweeping exceptions under the rug. The career decisions of women students are quite dif-

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 48–54.

[15] For a detailed list of the specific fields in the classification, see *ibid.*, pp. 7–9.

ferent from those of men in ways which make the trends discussed here less relevant for them. Specifically, the major trend for women, regardless of their personal characteristics, is away from the high-performance fields into primary and secondary education.[16] In addition, there is considerable evidence that women are less oriented toward "career success," and the interpretation of the data presented here hinges on the assumption that concerns about success are important for career choice. Lavin implies a similar generalization when he writes, "Choice of a major field is directly related to academic performance in the case of males, but no such relationship pertains for females."[17]

Table 4 tells us that both measures are associated with choice of a high-performance career field, and because Freshman preference is controlled, the relationships cannot be explained by any tendency for the more able students to aim for high-performance careers even before entering college.

To assess the relative magnitude of the relationships, we shall make use of partial γ's.[18] The coefficients are presented in

TABLE 4

GRADE-POINT AVERAGE, SCHOOL QUALITY, AND CHOICE OF "HIGH-PERFORMANCE" FIELD AT GRADUATION, CONTROLLING FOR FRESHMAN PREFERENCE (MEN ONLY) (PERCENTAGE CHOOSING HIGH-PERFORMANCE FIELD AT GRADUATION)

GPA	Freshman Preference					
	Other (School Quality)			High-Performance Field (School Quality)		
	IV	III	I-II	IV	III	I-II
High........	16 (1,104)	25 (1,418)	26 (370)	69 (435)	84 (967)	90 (428)
Medium.....	12 (2,843)	15 (3,723)	18 (1,021)	71 (747)	71 (1,817)	77 (801)
Low........	8 (3,483)	11 (5,233)	12 (1,082)	50 (694)	52 (1,785)	60 (534)

Weighted N..................	28,485
NA on GPA.................	456
NA on occupation	4,421
NA on both	82
Women	23,220
Total weighted N...........	56,664

TABLE 5

γ COEFFICIENTS FOR DATA IN TABLE 4

Relationship	γ
Zero order:	
GPA×high performance career at graduation....................	+.356
School quality × high-performance career at graduation............	+.269
Partials:	
GPA × career/school quality and Freshman preference...........	+.311
School quality × career/GPA and Freshman preference...........	+.151

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 46–48.

[17] Lavin, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

[18] See James A. Davis, "A Partial Coefficient for Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma" (unpublished manuscript, NORC, 1965). In a nutshell, the coefficient may be described as follows: A zero-order γ between ordered items A and B treats pairs which differ on both item A and item B; a partial γ, $\gamma AB/C$, controlling for item C, is simply γAB calculated on pairs which differ on A and B but which are tied on C. The coefficient is calculated by dividing the cases into the various categories of the control variable, C, calculating the cross-products involved in zero-order γ's (Πs and Πd) within categories of C, summing all the various Πs's to

Table 5. The values are higher for GPA than for school quality for both the zero-order and partial coefficients. The difference is small in the zero-order relationships, but when Freshman choice is controlled, the school-quality coefficient dwindles considerably while the GPA partial drops less. Input differences play a large part in the association between school quality and the proportion of Senior men aiming for careers in high-performance fields. For the partials, the coefficient for GPA (+.311) is twice as large as that for school quality (+.151).

TABLE 6

PARTIAL γ'S FOR SPECIFIC FIELDS (MEN ONLY)*

Dependent Item: Field at Graduation	Freshman Preference	Partial γ: (A) Field and GPA, Controlling for School and Freshman Preference	Partial γ: (B) Field and School, Controlling for GPA and Freshman Preference	Partial γ: (C) Difference (A) − (B)
Physical sciences	Physical sciences	+.434	−.127	+.561
	Not high performance	.243	+.125	+.118
Biological sciences	Biological sciences	.461	+.247	+.214
	Not high performance	.001	−.102	+.103
Social sciences	Social sciences	.337	+.194	+.143
	Not high performance	.288	+.083	+.205
Humanities and fine arts	Humanities and fine arts	.354	+.046	+.308
	Not high performance	.422	−.145	+.567
Medicine	Medicine	.707	+.279	+.428
	Not high performance	.551	+.354	+.197
Law	Law	.300	+.188	+.112
	Not high performance	+.140	+.386	−.246

* For the total table, N's are the same as Table 4. Because of the tabulation procedures explained in the text, the N's for each field vary. For each field, the weighted numbers in the Freshman choice groups ("field" and "not high performance") are as follows: physical sciences, 2,022 and 18,316; biological sciences, 325 and 17,794; social sciences, 470 and 18,045; humanities and fine arts, 973 and 18,130; medicine, 1,668 and 17,745; and law, 1,411 and 18,167.

Having seen the general trend, let us look at the result for a more detailed breakdown of the high-performance fields: physical sciences, biological sciences, social sciences, humanities and fine arts, medicine, and law. Tabulation procedures were as follows: (a) A cross-tabulation of detailed Freshman field by detailed Senior field by GPA by school quality was obtained. (b) For each of the six detailed fields, a table was laid out in which the career data were trichotomized as the field in question, "other high performance" and "other." (c) For each of the six detailed fields, a nine-celled turnover table was laid out within each of the GPA by school-quality groups, making nine turnover tables for each field. (d) Cases classified as "other high performance" for Freshman and/or Senior choice were removed. The effect of this is to exclude cases which shifted from one high-performance field to another and those which shifted from a low-performance to a high-performance field other than the one in question. Such cases are ambiguous when one is considering a *particular* high-performance field. Of course, they are included in the data in Table 4. (e) Appropriate cross-products were calculated and summed across GPA (across school-quality) groups to give the various partials.

The upshot of these numerous calcula-

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get $\Pi s_{AB} t_C$, and summing all the various d's to get $\Pi d_{AB} t_C$.

$$\gamma_{AB/C} = \frac{\Pi s_{AB} t_C - \Pi d_{AB} t_C}{\Pi s_{AB} t_C + \Pi d_{AB} t_C}.$$

tions is the set of coefficients reported in Table 6. With a single exception—recruitment to law among men originally in "other" fields—the values for GPA are higher than those for school quality.

We can summarize the findings so far as follows:

Among men (but not women) choice of a high-performance career field (save for recruitment to law among men originally choosing a field in "other") is more strongly associated with GPA than with school quality, a pattern which cannot be explained by Freshman-year scholastic aptitude (which is equally associated with both variables) or by the students' career preferences at the beginning of college (which are controlled in the tabulations).

TABLE 7

ASSOCIATIONS WITH "HIGH-PERFORMANCE" CAREER CHOICE AMONG MALE NATIONAL MERIT FINALISTS

Association	γ
Career choice×GPA/Freshman preference	+.264
Career choice×school quality/Freshman preference	+.023

Weighted N	1,018
NA on GPA	1
NA on career	52
Total weighted N.	1,071

Granted these conclusions, an additional hypothesis follows: If scholastic aptitude and Freshman preference are controlled, but not GPA, there will be a zero or negative correlation between school quality and decisions to enter a high-performance career field. The argument is this: The better the school a young man attends, the lower his GPA will be. Since GPA appears to affect career choices more strongly than school quality, attending a "better school" will "lower" scores on a more powerful variable while "raising" scores on a less powerful variable.

Again, in the absence of scholastic-aptitude measures across the total sample, this hypothesis cannot be fully tested with the data. Table 7, though, shows that for the male National Merit group, school quality is essentially independent of career choice, in contrast to the positive values seen in the previous tables and the positive γ of .264 for GPA. It is entirely possible that a group from the middle ranges of scholastic aptitude, where GPA would vary more, might show a negative correlation.

We now have our mildly puzzling finding—a difference in the correlations for GPA and school quality which cannot be explained by scholastic aptitude.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

Why should GPA be the stronger correlate and school quality the weaker correlate? One plausible explanation comes from the theory of relative deprivation.

In fact, the situation quite resembles the famous example of promotions in the Air Force and the Military Police. Stouffer and his colleagues noted that although airmen had higher rates of promotion than did Military Police, airmen tended to be more critical of promotions. Stouffer reasoned as follows: (*a*) Soldiers judge their success by comparison with others in their unit. (*b*) In the Air Force, where promotions were plentiful, being promoted was not viewed as an extraordinary accomplishment, while not being promoted was seen as unfair because so many comparison soldiers had received stripes. (*c*) In the Military Police, where promotions were rare, those who had "made it" felt they had done relatively well, while the non-promoted had fewer complaints because few of their buddies had surpassed them.

With a few substitutions, the same ideas can be applied to our data, substituting scholastic aptitude for longevity, GPA for promotion, and colleges for military units. In this sense, the elite colleges and universities are the Military Police of higher education, because a given level of scholastic aptitude (longevity) is least likely to yield high grades (promotions) in such schools. The argument is not identical, though. In

the Air Force–Military Police example, the distribution of longevity was assumed to be fairly equal, while the distribution of rewards was skewed; in our academic data, the distribution of rewards is constant across units, but the distribution of aptitude is not.[19] However, the two situations have the same nub: just as the same longevity led to differences in success, depending on the unit, the same scholastic aptitude leads to differences in GPA's depending on the selectivity of the institution.

The theory of relative deprivation suggests the following interpretation of our data: (*a*) In making career decisions regarding the high-performance fields (which generally require graduate training), the student's judgment of his own academic ability plays an important role. (*b*) In the absence of any objective evidence, students tend to evaluate their academic abilities by comparison with other students. (*c*) Most of the other students one knows are those on one's own campus, and since GPA's are reasonably public information, they become the accepted yardstick. (*d*) Comparisons across campuses are relatively rare, and where they take place it is difficult to arrive at an unambiguous conclusion because institutional differences are not well publicized; even when these differences are known, there is no convenient scale comparable to GPA for drawing conclusions. (*e*) Since more conclusions are drawn on the basis of GPA standing on the local campus than by comparison with students on other campuses, GPA is a more important variable in influencing self-evaluations and, consequently, career decisions.

AN INTERVENING VARIABLE: "FLAIR"

While the argument is plausible, it would be desirable to buttress it with some data. One strategy would be this: (1) find some measure of students' subjective feelings of academic success; (2) show that the measure is more strongly related to GPA than school quality; (3) show that feelings of academic success are associated with choice of a high-performance career during college; and (4) show that when subjective success is controlled, the differential in the GPA by career versus that school quality by career associations vanishes. That is, if our interpretation is correct, feelings of success should *explain* the GPA versus school quality differential.[20]

The questionnaire completed by the Seniors included a cafeteria item asking them to check various reactions to the following courses: physics, chemistry, mathematics, biology, zoölogy, botany, social sciences, and English. Among the possible responses was, "I have a flair for course work in this area." Although not designed for our purposes, this phrase appears to tap the feelings of subjective success called for. Let us see whether it meets the requirements outlined above.

If our interpretation is to be supported, "flair" should be more strongly related to GPA than to school quality. Table 8 shows this to be so. For each of the five fields of study and in each of the two broad groupings of Freshman career choice, the measure of subjective success is more strongly related to GPA than to school quality, the average of the ten GPA coefficients being +.198, while the average for school quality is +.020. This finding, standing alone, is of some interest, for both common sense

[19] For this reason, the theory does not predict that students in less selective schools will be more critical of grading practices.

[20] This strategy admittedly leaves out the question of whether it is actually comparisons with this-that-or-the-other students which generate the process or whether the "GPA yardstick" is transmitted through student culture, via the faculty, or perhaps through parents. The question is left out because we have no data to tackle it. Actually, data not reported here show that students' self-reports regarding whether faculty members encouraged them to go on in their field behave much like the "flair items" reported in the following section of this article. Nevertheless, even if it could be shown that faculty encouragement was the main causal factor, these results would only complicate, not vitiate, the key social-psychological principle behind the theory of relative deprivation—that success is judged by relative standing in the social group, not by standing in the total population.

TABLE 8

ASSOCIATIONS WITH SELF-REPORT "I HAVE A FLAIR FOR COURSE WORK IN THIS AREA"

FRESHMAN PREFERENCE	COURSE OR AREA				
	Physics, Chemistry	Mathematics	Biology, Zoölogy, Botany	Social Sciences	English
High performance:					
GPA*	+.303	+.210	+.012	+.087	+.199
School†	+.104	+.116	−.237	+.045	+.058
Difference	+.199	+.094	+.249	+.042	+.141
Weighted *N*	(8,104)	(8,102)	(8,037)	(8,119)	(8,130)
Other:					
GPA*	+.480	+.312	+.189	+.018	+.168
School†	.000	+.023	−.105	−.072	+.088
Difference	+.480	+.289	+.294	+.090	+.080
Weighted *N*	(20,113)	(20,160)	(19,782)	(20,090)	(20,278)

* γ GPA × flair/school.

† γ school × flair/GPA.

TABLE 9

ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN "FLAIR" AND CAREER CHOICE, CONTROLLING FOR GRADE-POINT AVERAGE AND SCHOOL QUALITY* †

SENIOR	FRESHMAN‡	FLAIR				
		Physics, Chemistry	Mathematics	Biology, Zoölogy, Botany	Social Sciences	English
Physical sciences	Physical sciences	+.613	+.339	−.018	−.549	+.227
	Not high performance	+.665	+.504	−.266	−.352	−.367
Biological sciences	Biological sciences	+.160	−.102	+.420	−.635	−.374
	Not high performance	+.090	−.567	+.880	−.382	−.317
Social Sciences	Social sciences	+.616	+.511	−.060	−.029	−.118
	Not high performance	−.543	−.332	−.073	+.693	+.163
Humanities and fine arts	Humanities and fine arts	−.049	−.170	−.072	−.105	−.162
	Not high performance	−.537	−.522	+.064	+.299	+.622
Medicine	Medicine	+.462	+.269	+.531	−.078	−.199
	Not high performance	+.343	−.076	+.795	−.217	+.184
Law	Law	−.147	−.158	−.022	+.033	−.008
	Not high performance	−.103	−.219	−.243	+.485	+.208

* γ flair × Senior choice/GPA × quality.

† Because the table actually collapses 60 separate tables, detailed *N*'s will not be reported in order to save space. *N*'s are essentially the same as for Table 7, differing only for cases which are NA on flair for the course in question. Since NA's on the flair items run well under 5 per cent, table *N*'s are quite close to those in Table 7.

‡ Occupations are grouped and classified, as described in Table 6.

and the data on scholastic aptitude would suggest that being graduated from a topflight school should enhance one's feeling of academic prowess.

The findings are quite in agreement with the notion that students[21] judge themselves by local standing, but since it is possible that the topflight institutions imbue their graduates with a becoming modesty, we will be more impressed if the items are also related to vocational choice. Table 9 provides the necessary data.

In general, Table 9 supports the argument, for it shows that in most comparisons, flair items are associated with career preference at graduation even after Freshman preference, GPA, and school quality are controlled. Considering first the cases where the same trends hold in both Freshman preference groups:

a) For the physical sciences, flair for physics, chemistry, and mathematics is positively associated, while flair for the social sciences and English shows negative relationships.
b) For the biological sciences, flair for biology, zoölogy, and botany has a positive association, while flair for the social sciences and English shows negative relationships.
c) For medicine, flair for biology, zoölogy, and botany and for physics and chemistry shows positive relationships.

Thus, in the three scientific fields, the pattern of results for the flair items is as expected: positive relationships for the relevant courses and negative relationships for others.

For the remaining three fields—social sciences, English, and law—the results are not so neat. In each, the results for those whose Freshman choice was a low-performance field are what one would expect:

a) For the social sciences, positive associations with flair for social science, negative associations with physics, chemistry, and mathematics.
b) For the humanities and the fine arts, positive associations with flair for English and negative associations with physics, chemistry, and mathematics.
c) For law, positive associations with flair for the social sciences.

For those men whose Freshman preference was in the humanities and fine arts, the social sciences, or law, however, the results are meager. There are positive relationships with mathematics, physics, and chemistry among those originally choosing the social sciences, but inspection of the data shows that only thirty out of 445 weighted cases reported a flair for physics and chemistry and twenty-nine cases for mathematics. Thus these γ's are of little practical significance.[22] What is more surprising is that those who remain in the social sciences are no more likely to report a flair for this field than are those who shift to a low-performance career choice; and similarly, those remaining in humanities and the fine arts are not especially likely to view themselves as having a flair for English. The similar lack of association with flair for social science among those whose initial preference was law is also surprising, given the positive coefficient among those who shifted to law from an original low-performance field.

Granted that the results are negative among those whose Freshman preference was law, the social sciences, or the humanities and fine arts, fifty-seven out of the sixty coefficients in Table 9 lend support to our notion that feelings of success in relevant courses are a factor in career decisions during undergraduate study.

To complete the argument, we must make a further analysis of the data treated in

[21] We say "students," not "men," because the generalizations regarding the relationships between GPA, school quality, and "flair" hold for the girls, too. It is where vocational choice enters the picture that sex differentials appear. Thus we feel that the "relative-deprivation" process operates in the same way for men and women up to the point where it impinges on career decisions.

[22] That is, if we were to use these flair items as controls, the number *not* checking the flair item would be more than 90 per cent of the total. Thus they would be almost as heterogeneous on the item as the original sample, and the purpose of controls —reduction of heterogeneity—would be defeated.

Table 9. If our interpretation—that GPA is a stronger correlate of career choice than school quality because GPA affects self-conceptions through a process similar to relative deprivation—is correct, when the flair items are introduced as controls, the difference in the coefficients for GPA and school quality should vanish or diminish.

Table 10 presents the necessary partial finding is a difference (between the coefficients for GPA and school). If "flair" is an intervening variable which explains the finding, then the difference should vanish or diminish when flair items are controlled.

For convenience, the three columns of coefficients are presented in Table 11. The interpretation is supported in each of the eight comparisons among students who

TABLE 10

PARTIAL COEFFICIENTS, CONTROLLING FOR FLAIR ITEMS

Dependent Item: Field at Graduation	Freshman Preference	Flair*: Yes (A) GPA	Yes (B) School	Yes (C) Difference (A)−(B)	No (D) GPA	No (E) School	No (F) Difference (D)−(E)
Physical sciences	Physical sciences	+.391	−.093	+.484	+.156	−.028	+.182
	Not high performance	.080	+ 041	+.039	+ 213	+ 113	+.100
Biological sciences	Biological sciences	337	+.331	+.006	+.673	+ 407	+.266
	Not high performance	.089	+.169	+.080	−.268	+.129	−.397
Social sciences	Not high performance	.251	+.152	+ 099	+.305	+.229	+.076
Humanities and fine arts	Not high performance	.358	−.119	+.477	+.386	−.072	+.458
Medicine	Medicine	.704	+.469	+.235	+.627	+.192	+.435
	Not high performance	+ 644	+.646	−.002	+.437	+.196	+.241

* (A) = GPA by field at graduation, controlling for school and Freshman preference, among those checking the relevant flair item. (B) = School by field at graduation, controlling for GPA and Freshman preference, among those checking the relevant flair item. (C) = Difference between coefficients in column (A) and column (B) (D) = GPA by field at graduation, controlling for school and Freshman preference, among those not checking the relevant flair item (E) = School by field at graduation, controlling for GPA and Freshman preference, among those not checking the relevant flair item (F) = Difference between coefficients in column (D) and column (E)

Relevant flair items are as follows: physical sciences—"physics, chemistry", biological sciences—"biology, zoölogy, botany"; social sciences—"social science"; humanities and fine arts—"English", medicine—"biology, zoölogy, botany." Occupational comparisons and N's are the same as in Table 9.

coefficients. Freshmen choosing the social sciences and the humanities and fine arts have been excluded because the flair items do not fit the interpretation. Similarly, law has been excluded because no appropriate flair item was found for Freshmen choosing law, and shifts into law from low-performance fields did not show the GPA versus school quality disparity which is the phenomenon to be explained.

Whether the results in Table 10 support the interpretation is determined by comparing the difference column (C) in Table 6 with the difference columns (C) and (F) in Table 10. The original, mildly puzzling checked the relevant flair item and among five out of eight comparisons among those not checking the item. Since the latter group is more heterogeneous (most of the flair items have positive marginals around 25 per cent), a less stringent control has been achieved there, and the exceptions, which are small, are tolerable. In total, thirteen out of sixteen comparisons support the interpretation.

It is important to stress a number of qualifications and exceptions which have turned up along the way: (a) The phenomenon does not appear among women Seniors. (b) Among men shifting into law, the

GPA versus school quality difference is reversed. (*c*) Among Freshmen choosing the social sciences and the humanities and fine arts, the flair items do not operate in the expected fashion.

Nevertheless, 60 per cent of the college Seniors are men, and among them roughly 7 per cent shift into law or begin college with a preference for the social sciences or the humanities. Thus the findings reported here, if valid, apply to about 56 per cent of the graduating Seniors and, considering the attrition of women's career plans after marriage, to an even higher proportion of those who enter the labor force.[23]

Smoothing out these exceptions, we may summarize the results: Among men being graduated from college,

a) GPA is more strongly associated with career decisions regarding arts and science fields and free professions (i.e., law, medicine) than is school quality.

b) The differential cannot be explained by scholastic aptitude at entry because GPA and school quality are independent of each other and equally associated with test scores.

c) Nor can the differences be explained by initial career preferences because they are controlled in the tabulations.

d) The theory of relative deprivation suggests a plausible explanation, that students' career decisions are affected by their self-judgments regarding their academic abilities, and that, like soldiers, students tend to judge themselves by comparison with others in their unit, that is, in terms of GPA.

e) A questionnaire item regarding self-reported "flair" for various courses, when introduced to test the interpretation, provides considerable but not complete support for the argument. Flair is more strongly related to GPA than to school quality; flair is associated with career decisions independent of school, GPA, and Freshman choice; and when flair is introduced as a control, the differential between GPA and school quality is reduced more often than not.

TABLE 11

DIFFERENCES IN TABLE 6 AND TABLE 10

Dependent Item: Field at Graduation	Freshman Preference	Column (C), Table 6	Flair: "Yes," Column (C), Table 10	Flair: "No," Column (F), Table 10
Physical sciences	Physical sciences	+.561	+.484	+.182
	Not high performance	.118	+.039	+.100
Biological sciences	Biological sciences	.214	+.006	+.266*
	Not high performance	.103	−.080	−.397
Social sciences	Not high performance	.205	+.099	+.076
Humanities and fine arts	Not high performance	.567	+.477	+.458
Medicine	Medicine	.428	+.235	+.435*
	Not high performance	+.197	−.002	+.241*

* Coefficient is equal to or greater than coefficient for Column (C), Table 6.

IMPLICATIONS

The argument presented above is fairly complex, and while we have attempted to join the crucial seams with data rather than common sense, not every seam has been joined so securely that we may say that the data "prove" our interpretation. Since, however, the data do fit the argument to some degree and since there is little in the way of alternative explanations for the

[23] This claim assumes that career preferences are maintained beyond graduation. NORC's four annual follow-up waves of this sample suggest that, at least for the period immediately after college, this is a reasonable assumption, especially for men.

weak relationship between school quality and choice of a high-performance career, we may be justified in considering some of the implications which our interpretation suggests.

First, these data may be taken as providing additional support for the theory of relative deprivation.

Second, these findings raise some questions pertinent to studies of college effects. A number of studies have stressed the importance of contextual or compositional effects during college. Newcomb's 1943 study of Bennington,[24] the work of Pace and Stern,[25] Astin's EAT technique,[26] and Thistlethwaite's recent study of dispositions to seek graduate study[27] share the idea that the characteristics of undergraduate student bodies constitute an "environment," "press," or "climate" which has important consequences for values and career decisions. By and large, such studies have produced findings consistent with the idea that group-level and individual-level effects operate in the same direction (that is, they are Type III*a* effects in the Davis-Spaeth-Huson classification[28]). For example, the implication of the Bennington study is that high proportions of liberal students are associated with shifts toward liberalism among originally conservative Freshmen; and Thistlethwaite concludes that dispositions to seek advanced study are correlated with strong humanistic and intellectual presses. One can locate quite a number of studies to support the generalization that undergraduate bodies with high proportions of X will tend to influence each other toward the dependent variables normally associated with X at the individual level.

While our data do show a compositional or structural effect, it is the reverse one (Type III*b*) in which individual- and group-level correlations have opposite signs. We have argued that if scholastic aptitude were well controlled, school quality (i.e., the proportion of able students on a campus) would show a negative association with choice of a high-performance career, while on a given campus there will be a positive correlation between aptitude and GPA and hence between aptitude and choice of a high-performance career.

There is no rule that all compositional effects should have the same statistical structure, but it should be noted that our data constitute an exception to a trend of research findings.

The contradiction may perhaps be resolved by recalling Kelley's distinction between the normative function of reference groups, "sources and reinforcers of standards" and the comparison function, "comparison point against which the person can evaluate himself and others."[29] Kelley's distinction suggests the following general contextual hypothesis: The greater the proportion of a group possessing or indorsing some characteristic X, the *more* likely it is that a newcomer will tend to become favorable toward X and the *less* likely it is that he will view himself as possessing X to any unusual degree.

Third, these ideas have some implications for educational policy. At the level of the individual, they challenge the notion that getting into the "best possible" school is the most efficient route to occupational

[24] Theodore M. Newcomb, *Personality and Social Change* (New York: Dryden Press, 1943).

[25] C. R. Pace and G. G. Stern, "An Approach to the Measurement of Psychological Characteristics of College Environments," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, XLIX (October, 1958), 269–77.

[26] Alexander W. Astin, "Undergraduate Institutions and the Production of Scientists," *Science*, CXLI (July 26, 1963), 334–38; and *Who Goes Where to College?* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1965).

[27] Donald L. Thistlethwaite, *Effects of College upon Student Aspirations* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University, 1965 [lithographed]).

[28] James A. Davis, Joe L. Spaeth, and Carolyn Huson, "A Technique for Analyzing the Effects of Group Composition," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (April, 1961), 215–26.

[29] Harold H. Kelley, "Two Functions of Reference Groups," in Guy E. Swanson, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (rev. ed.; New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1952), p. 413.

mobility. Counselors and parents might well consider the drawbacks as well as the advantages of sending a boy to a "fine" college, if, when doing so, it is fairly certain he will end up in the bottom ranks of his graduating class. The aphorism "It is better to be a big frog in a small pond than a small frog in a big pond" is not perfect advice, but it is not trivial. At the level of the college and university, these data raise some policy questions. In particular, the elite institutions, whose academic selectivity is probably *increasing* as higher education expands, may want to pay some attention to the demonstrable fact that their "worst" graduates would be toward the top of the heap in a national distribution. There is increasing emphasis these days on "raising standards" and "challenging" students, which generally means requiring more work for the same grades. The theme of the data reported here is that the "feeling of success" is a crucial ingredient in career choice, and college staffs may do well to consider ways of improving the feedback of "success information" as well as procedures for increasing the output of class work. If our data are to be trusted, the current grading system is far from efficient in distributing such feedback.

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A Reappraisal of the Social and Political Participation of Negroes[1]

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ABSTRACT

Inspection of the effect of socioeconomic status on the organizational membership of Negroes and whites indicates that the known relationship between social class and membership is much less pronounced for Negroes. Lower-class Negroes are more likely to belong to organizations than lower-class whites, while middle-class whites are slightly more likely to belong than middle-class Negroes. Upper-class whites, in turn, are much more likely to be "joiners" than their Negro counterparts. Similar comparisons of Negroes and whites show that Negroes are, without exception, more likely to participate actively in associations. Examination of membership in different kinds of organizations reveals that Negroes are more likely to belong to political and church groups than their white counterparts and equally likely to belong to civic groups. Finally, evidence on Negro voting in presidential elections since 1952 points to a remarkable increase in voter turnout, especially in comparison with the stable turnout of the nation as a whole.

Social scientists have often pointed to the important role that social and political organizations play in facilitating the assimilation of minority groups into the larger American society. As compared with other immigrants to urban America, Negroes are believed to be particularly lacking in those organizational resources that provide both the means by which group demands are effectively brought to bear in the political and economic spheres and the opportunities to learn the co-operative skills that equip them for life in the metropolis. Without these organizational supports, so the argument goes, the individual Negro migrant is left "naked unto his enemies."

The rapid and effective rise of the civil rights movement and the proliferation of action organizations that display a relatively high degree of sophistication is surprising in light of the general beliefs about the Negroes' low level of organizational experience. While much has been said and written about the movement, very little attention has been given to the social facts upon which it is based—that is, the participation of Negroes in social and political life. In this paper we shall examine critically the evidence on which the belief in the low level of Negro participation rests and present new data indicating that some significant facts have been overlooked in earlier studies.

The most prevalent interpretation of Negro participation is based partly on the observation that people in the lower socioeconomic stratum in American society participate less in voluntary associations and general elections than do those in the middle and upper social strata. In the precursor to many studies on participation in voluntary associations, Komarovsky showed that, among people in an urban area, the extent of affiliation varied directly with social class.[2] Axelrod, in a more recent study in

[1] Revision of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Sociological Society, April, 1965. This investigation was supporteed by Public Health Service Special Grant No. MH 09183 from the National Institute of Mental Health to the National Opinion Research Center. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Norman Bradburn for his encouragement and sustained interest in this research. David Caplovitz and Amy Wexler Orum provided helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.

[2] Mirra Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," *American Sociological Review*, XI, No. 6 (December, 1946), 686–98, esp. 689.

Detroit, found that both membership and degree of activity in associations were positively associated with family income.[3]

Since Negroes are found predominantly in the lower socioeconomic groups, one is led to suppose that they are also less likely to be affiliated with and actively participate in formal organizations. At least one piece of evidence directly confirms this supposition. Using a national sample of respondents, Wright and Hyman showed that 60 per cent of Negro families, compared with 46 per cent of white families, did not belong to any organizations, while only 11 per cent of the Negroes and 23 per cent of the whites belonged to two or more organizations.[4] This study, however, failed to control for the previous relationship found between social class and participation, thereby obscuring membership rates of whites and Negroes at comparable socioeconomic levels. This consideration, as we shall see later, is crucial in any investiagtion of Negro-white differentials in participation.

Research on voting behavior has reached conclusions similar to those found in studies of associational membership. In a study of the 1952 election, Campbell, Gurin, and Miller stated that "Negroes feel more politically impotent than the rest of the population."[5] A later work based on the elections of 1948, 1952, and 1956 confirmed this impression. Campbell *et al.* suggested that while "Negroes . . . are almost unanimous in their belief that the group has a right to further its end by political activity," the motivation for Negroes to vote was lower than in most other groups.[6] Woodward and Roper also came to the same conclusion. They indicated that 38 per cent of the total adult population was politically very inactive, but 60 per cent of the Negroes were very inactive.[7] The voting studies, however, also failed to consider the Negro-white differentials among comparable socioeconomic groups of voters.

An explanation that supports these and similar results is implicit in these findings. It is a two-headed demon: one head may be seen as social alienation or anomie and the other as political apathy. Perhaps the best way of describing the demon is with the concept of involuntary "isolation" from civic affairs.[8] As Lipset put it: "[The] characteristics [of the lower strata] also reflect the extent to which [they] are *isolated* from the activities, controversies, and organizations of democratic society—an isolation which prevents them from acquiring the sophisticated and complex view of the political structure which makes understandable and necessary the norms of tolerance."[9] Various forms of the prevalent social segregation of Negroes are viewed as conducive to their "isolation" from civic affairs; this isolation, in turn, accounts for both a low level of participation in associations and a low voting turnout.

This view of the Negroes' "isolation" is not universally accepted, however. There is a second point of view that is in direct opposition to it. Myrdal, appearing as its first advocate, suggested that Negroes are "exaggerated Americans" since they organ-

[3] Morris Axelrod, "Urban Structure and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, XXI, No. 1 (February, 1956), 13–18, esp. 15.

[4] Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII, No. 3 (June, 1958), 284–94, esp. 287.

[5] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1954), pp. 191–92.

[6] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), p. 316.

[7] Julian L. Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activity of American Citizens," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV, No. 4 (December, 1950), 872–85, esp. 877.

[8] The author recognizes that there has been rather heated controversy about the concept of alienation. Since this paper does not attempt a theoretical excursion into the meanings and nuances of alienation, it was felt that the value-free concept of isolation would be sufficient for our purposes.

[9] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960), p. 112.

ize and are active in *more* voluntary organizations than other Americans.[10] Hunter supported this contention.[11] He found more than 350 organizations within the Negro subcommunity of Atlanta; that, he said, "represents the high degree of social organization within the Negro community."[12] Aside from fraternal and other social groups, he stated, "the top associational groupings identified in the subcommunity have a political content not found in the larger community. This is true even in the welfare and recreational associations."[13] A recent and somewhat more systematic investigation has provided evidence to support Myrdal and Hunter. In comparison with the findings on the organizational membership of whites from previous studies, Babchuk and Thompson concluded that Negroes in their sample were more likely to be affiliated with associations than whites.[14]

The explanation for the higher organizational participation of Negroes is most succinctly stated by Babchuk and Thompson. Following the line of argument established by Myrdal, they claim that since Negroes are not allowed to gain prestige and power in most "organized life" in America, for example, in the occupational sphere, they compensate by exaggerated tendencies to create and/or participate in a large number of formal organizations. In other words, they contend that the response of Negroes to segregation is quite the opposite of civic indifference and apathy.

The contradiction between these two interpretations stands out boldly. The "isolation" point of view supposes that Negroes participate much less in associations and general elections than whites. The "compensatory" point of view claims, on the other hand, that Negroes participate much more than whites. To resolve this contradiction, we shall analyze data on Negro-white differentials in participation in formal organizations and voting turnout obtained from a number of sample surveys conducted during the past few years.

The strategy for the following analysis was guided essentially by three questions: What is the extent of participation—that is, membership and activity—in organizations among comparable socioeconomic groups of Negroes and whites in similar ecological settings? What kinds of organizations do Negroes participate in? And finally, are both the participation in associations and the voting turnout of Negroes so low that we could describe them as isolated from most civic affairs?

DATA

A major part of this analysis is based on data gathered for a panel study in mental-health-related behavior currently being conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC).[15] For the purposes of this paper we will be concerned only with questions on membership and activity in organizations. While this study was conducted in several different communities, we shall be concerned primarily with two samples, one Negro and the other white. The Negro sample is located in the inner city area of Detroit. The socioeconomic composition of this sample is predominantly lower class with almost two-thirds of the families earning less than five thousand dollars a year. The white sample is also located in an urban area, the inner city of Chicago. Here, too, many families are in the lower socioeconomic groups, one-third of them earning less than five thousand dollars a year. This sample is drawn from a tradi-

[10] Gunnar Myrdal, Richard Sterner, and Arnold Rose, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), p. 952.

[11] Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1963), pp. 114 ff.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[14] Nicholas Babchuck and Ralph V. Thompson, "Voluntary Associations of Negroes," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (October, 1962), 647–55.

[15] The panel study, financed by grants from the National Institutes of Health, is under the supervision of Professor Norman Bradburn of the National Opinion Research Center.

tional ethnic area; many of the respondents were either born in eastern Europe or are second-generation Americans of eastern European descent.

Of lesser concern is a third sample located in a suburban county outside Washington, D.C. While most of the sample consists of middle-class whites, there are included in it seventy Negroes who are primarily lower or lower middle class. The Washington suburb will be used for comparisons of differential participation between Negroes and whites in that area, as well as for comparisons with the two other samples.

In addition to the data obtained from these three samples, data on organizational participation and voting in presidential elections from several unpublished NORC studies and from previously published sources will be used.

FINDINGS

Participation in formal organizations.—There are two facets of participation in formal organizations. The one that has been most commonly studied is membership in an association. Since, in the past, many authors have been concerned with either proving or disproving the thesis of De Tocqueville and the Beards that America is a nation of "joiners," this measure of participation has been quite adequate. Another view, which has gained some recent currency, is found in such works as Barber's "Participation and Mass Apathy in Associations" and those of students of trade unions.[16] This view has been concerned with the apathy prevailing among the members of organizations, a tendency the consequence of which may be the concentration of power among a clique of officials. In order to focus on this issue, authors have studied the kinds of people who participate actively in organizations and who, thus, may be said to exert influence within organizations. To acquire a comprehensive picture of the participation of Negroes in associations, we will look at the characteristics of both those people who are members and those who are active participants.

Organizational membership.—Information about the affiliations of respondents was obtained by asking the following question: "How many organizations such as church and school groups, labor unions, or social, civic, and fraternal clubs do you belong to?" Measures of total membership for each community demonstrate the relationship between race and membership already found without examining membership rates for comparable socioeconomic groups of Negroes and whites. Thus, the white middle-class Washington suburb showed the highest membership rate, while the Detroit Negro community showed the lowest. Within each community, we also find that the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and membership was generally sustained; the higher the SES, the more likely a person was to belong to organizations.[17]

Table 1, controlling for SES, presents the membership differences between the two races. Looking first at the Detroit and Chicago data, we find that, among the lowest SES groups, the Detroit Negro respondents were more likely to belong to organizations than the Chicago white respondents. The importance of this result should not be overlooked; the community rates by themselves obscure the fact that, among Negroes and whites at the lower-class level, the Negroes were more likely to be affiliated with organizations. Further evidence of this finding comes from the Washington suburb, where we observe again that within the lowest SES group Negroes were more likely to

[16] Bernard Barber, "Participation and Mass Apathy in Associations," in Alvin W. Gouldner (ed.), *Studies in Leadership* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950).

[17] The SES index was constructed by using occupation, education, and income with scores ranging from 0 to 3 assigned to individuals on the basis of percentiles. With each of the three categories scored accordingly, they were combined into an index that yielded scores from 0 to 9. A person with a score of 9, for example, would be a professional or official with some college education or better, earning ten thousand dollars or more a year.

be "joiners" than whites; 71 per cent of the Negroes in the low SES group compared to 60 per cent of their white counterparts belonged to at least one organization.

The findings for the medium- and high-SES groups are less clear. The medium-SES respondents in Chicago were more likely than medium-SES respondents in Detroit to belong to an organization, but there was no important difference between Negro and white medium-SES respondents in the Washington suburb. The number of cases in the high-SES Negro samples was too small to make meaningful comparisons.

TABLE 1

PER CENT OF MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS BY COMMUNITY, SES, AND RACE

SES	White		Negro	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
	Detroit			
Low	....	....	66	*327*
Medium	....	....	70	*90*
High	....	....	[83]*	*12*
	Chicago			
Low	58	*117*	....	....
Medium	79	*90*	....	....
High	92	*40*	....	....
	Washington Suburb			
Low	60	*137*	71	*34*
Medium	71	*455*	75	*24*
High	82	*595*	[92]	*12*

* Brackets indicate that the number of cases was less than twenty.

Source: Unpublished data from the National Opinion Research Center panel study of mental-health-related behavior, No. 485, 1963–66.

In order to clarify the relationship of race, class, and membership found in the three communities, we examined similar data from two NORC studies involving nationwide samples of respondents. The wording of the membership question was the same in both studies and somewhat different from that in the panel study: "Do you belong to any groups or organizations here in the community?" In Table 2 we present data from the 1955 study used by Wright and Hyman. Education is used here as an approximation of SES. We find that the less well-educated Negroes were slightly more likely to belong to organizations than equally educated whites, while the situation was reversed in slight favor of whites in the medium-education stratum. Comparing high-education groups, we find that better educated whites were more likely to belong than their Negro counterparts.

TABLE 2

PER CENT OF MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS BY RACE AND EDUCATION

Education	White		Negro	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
Grade school or less	22	*720*	25	*142*
Part high school	33	*449*	30	*43*
High-school graduate or more	49	*954*	33	*40*

Source: National Opinion Research Center study, No. 367, 1955; data used by Wright and Hyman (see n. 4).

The clearest way to view these findings is to observe that for whites there is a strong positive relationship between education and membership but that for Negroes the relationship is not as strong. Table 1 also shows that the relationship for Negroes between SES and membership is not nearly as pronounced as for whites in the Detroit, Chicago, and suburban Washington samples.

There were similar results in a nationwide NORC study conducted in 1962. Table 3 presents these data showing the relationship of race, education, and membership. We find again that Negroes in the lower stratum were more likely to belong to organizations than their white counter-

parts. In the medium-education group there was no difference between Negroes and whites, while more highly educated whites were more likely to belong than similarly educated Negroes.

The evidence here clearly shows that the relationship between social class and membership in organizations is not nearly as pronounced for Negroes as for whites. These findings help to explain the similarity in the aggregate figures on Negro and white membership in organizations. Since the large majority of Negroes come from the lower socioeconomic strata, the aggregate proportion of Negro membership will tend to be similar to the total lower-class figure. For whites, on the other hand, the aggregate proportion will tend to be similar to the proportion of middle- and upper-class membership. Aggregate figures, then, obscure racial differences because of the strong correlation between social class and race.

TABLE 3

PER CENT OF MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS BY RACE AND EDUCATION

EDUCATION	WHITE		NEGRO	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
Grade school or less	30	*2,288*	45	*505*
Part high school	36	*1,699*	36	*283*
High-school graduate or more	51	*4,561*	43	*330*

Source: Unpublished data from the National Opinion Research Center study of adult education, No. 447, 1962. For the report of this study, see John W. Johnstone and Ramon Rivera, *Volunteers for Learning* (NORC Monograph in Social Research series [Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965]).

Organizational activity.—We learned about the activity of respondents in organizations by asking the following question: "How many [of the organizations to which you belong] do you take an active part in?" As in the case of the membership results, we find that the relationship between SES and activity was not as pronounced among Negroes as among whites.

Following the strategy on membership and controlling for SES, we looked at activity rates within samples by race. Table 4 presents these findings for members of organizations. Comparisons of the Detroit and Chicago respondents clearly show that Negroes in each SES group were more likely than whites to participate actively. Within the Washington-suburb sample, we find further evidence: among the low-SES respondents, almost two-thirds of the Negroes participated actively compared to only one-half of the white respondents.

TABLE 4

PER CENT ACTIVE MEMBERS BY COMMUNITY, RACE, AND SES

SES	WHITE		NEGRO	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
Detroit				
Low	....	....	66	*212*
Medium	....	....	84	*62*
High	....	....	[90]*	*10*
Chicago				
Low	38	*68*	....	....
Medium	60	*69*	....	....
High	71	*35*	....	....
Washington Suburb				
Low	49	*72*	63	*24*
Medium	62	*322*	[89]	*18*
High	74	*489*	[82]	*11*

* Brackets indicate that the number of cases was less than twenty.

Source: Unpublished data from the National Opinion Research Center panel study of mental-health-related behavior No. 485, 1963–66.

Again we examined data from the 1955 study used by Wright and Hyman. Table 5 shows the relationship of race, education, and activity. As with SES, the relationship between education and activity was not as pronounced for Negroes as for whites. Nevertheless, Negroes in each educational

group were more likely than their white counterparts to be active in organizations.

In the previous section on membership, we found that Negroes apparently were not much less likely than whites to belong to organizations. Lower-class Negroes, in fact, were more likely to be "joiners" than their white counterparts. In contrast to these findings, the activity data from the three communities and a nationwide sample indicate that Negroes, without exception, are more likely to be active in associations than whites.

TABLE 5

PER CENT OF ACTIVE MEMBERS BY RACE AND EDUCATION

Education	White		Negro	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
Grade school or less	47	*161*	71	*34*
Part high school	55	*149*	[67]*	*12*
High-school graduate or more	64	*464*	[77]	*13*

* Brackets indicate that the number of cases was less than twenty.

Source: Unpublished data from National Opinion Research Center study, No. 367, 1955; data used by Wright and Hyman (see n. 4).

Kinds of associations.—Thus far we have considered simply the membership and activity of Negroes in associations. Although the evidence suggests that comparatively large proportions of Negroes are participating in organizations, it does not enable us to conclude anything about the kinds of organizations and, hence, the kinds of organizational activities that the largest proportions of Negroes pursue. To investigate this matter, we shall consider two studies that obtained information on the types of associations to which Negroes belong.

The 1955 NORC data used by Wright and Hyman revealed several interesting facets of Negro participation compared with white participation in particular kinds of organizations. Table 6 presents these data; we approximated the class distinction here by controlling for income level. In general, even in 1955 Negroes were more likely than whites to belong to political organiza-

TABLE 6

PER CENT OF MEMBERSHIP IN TYPE OF ORGANIZATION BY RACE AND INCOME (FOR INDIVIDUALS)

Income	Civic	Church	Cultural	Political	*N*
	White				
Under $4,000	20	32	3	2	*237*
$4,000–$7,499	40	21	4	3	*373*
$7,500 plus	38	21	4	7	*170*
Total sample	34	24	4	3	*780*
	Negro				
Under $4,000	28	32	2	12	*50*
$4,000–$7,499	[50]*	[42]	[0]	[25]	*12*
$7,500 plus	....	....	....	....	*0*
Total sample	32	34	2	15	*62*

* Brackets indicate that the number of cases was less than twenty.

Source: Unpublished data from National Opinion Research Center study, No. 367, 1955; data used by Wright and Hyman (see n. 4).

tions. Thus, comparing low-income whites with low-income Negroes, we find that 12 per cent of the low-income Negroes compared with 2 per cent of the low-income whites belonged to political organizations. Civic organizations such as the PTA, YMCA, community centers, and others attracted a large proportion of Negroes. Comparison of the total sample measures for Negroes and whites shows that Negroes were as likely to belong to civic associations as were whites, 34 per cent of the whites compared to 32 per cent of the Negroes. And, finally, Negroes in general were more likely to belong to churches and related groups than whites.

To confirm these findings on the participation of Negroes, we then looked at evidence from a study by NORC in 1964 of Negro families in a heavily Negro urban area in the Midwest. In Table 7, we present these data, controlling for income level. Comparing low-income Negroes and the total sample measure with their respective groups in Table 6, we find similar proportions of Negroes belonging to each type of organization. While this evidence is quite tenative because we lack comparative data for whites, it nonetheless appears to confirm the above findings on the particular kinds of organizations to which Negroes predominantly belong, that is, political, civic, and church groups.

Although there are some limitations to the data presented here, two observations seem in order. First, in general Negroes are more likely to participate in political organizations than whites. And second, Negroes are just as likely as whites to participate in civic organizations and tend to be somewhat more likely to participate in church associations.

TABLE 7

PER CENT OF MEMBERSHIP IN TYPE OF ORGANIZATION BY INCOME (FOR NEGRO FAMILIES ONLY)

Income	Civic	Church	Cultural	Political	*N*
Under $4,000	35	28	6	15	*68*
$4,000–$7,999	34	37	4	11	*134*
$8,000 plus	52	20	11	28	*54*
Total sample	36	31	6	15	*256*

Source: Unpublished data from the National Opinion Research Center study of community housing, January–February, 1964.

Voting behavior.—In this section we will examine the voting turnout of Negroes. Although the "compensatory" point of view has little to say about Negro voting behavior, the "isolation" point of view would lead us to expect a comparatively small turnout of Negroes in elections. Results from an intensive nationwide survey of the 1952 presidential election, conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, support this expectation.[18] These findings, reported by Janowitz and Marvick, show a positive relationship between voting turnout and social class; 89 per cent of the upper middle class voted in that election compared to 55 per cent of the lower lower class. Among Negroes, however, only one out of every three eligible persons reported voting in 1952. The proportion of voters for the entire sample was 73 per cent.

Despite the paucity of reliable information on Negro voting, two nationwide studies allow us to contrast the above findings with turnout in the 1960 presidential election. Both were conducted by NORC—

[18] Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XIX (Winter, 1955–56), 384–85. See tables.

one in May, 1963, and the other directly after the assassination of President Kennedy in November, 1963.[19] In each study, the following question was asked of respondents: "Did you happen to vote in that [the 1960 election] or were you unable to for some reason?" Table 8 is a comparison of these findings with those of the 1952 study. Looking first at the proportion of voters in the samples, we observe little change from 1952 to 1960. By contrast, the proportions of Negro voters show a dramatic positive trend. Indeed, the NORC figures indicate that Negroes were almost twice as likely to vote in 1960 as in 1952.[20]

More adequate information on trends in Negro voting behavior is available for urban areas. The presence of political machines in these areas encourages voter registration and turnout in general, and among Negroes in particular. In fact, there seems to have been consistently high turnout among urban Negroes in the North—despite fluctuations in some cities—for the past several presidential elections.[21] Glantz's examination of census data for predominantly Negro areas in several Northern cities shows, for example, that about three-fourths of the registered Negroes voted in Chicago and St. Louis in the elections of 1948, 1952, and 1956.[22] His data also reveal a positive trend in the voter turnout in Detroit from 1948 to 1956, climaxed in the 1956 election by the vote of almost eight of every ten registered Negro voters.[23] Additional confirmation of these findings comes from a study that used computer simulation.[24] It suggests that "non-voting is *not* significantly disproportionate between Negroes and comparable whites in the North, and that if there is any difference it is that Negroes vote more. It is true that lower-class people vote less than higher-class ones, so that there is some validity to the argument that the Negro voting potential is reduced by the larger proportion of Negroes in the

[19] For papers using data from these studies see—May, 1963, study: Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes toward Desegregation," *Scientific American*, CCXI, No. 1 (July, 1964), 16–23; Post-Assassination study, November, 1963: Paul B. Sheatsley and Jacob J. Feldman, "The Assassination of President Kennedy: A Preliminary Report on Public Reactions and Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Summer, 1964).

[20] In light of this nationwide trend in the Negro turnout, it is important to caution against acceptance of either the Survey Research Center figures or the National Opinion Research Center figures at their face value. The proportions who claim to have voted or not voted are most likely exaggerated due to over-reporting. The *1956 Statistical Abstract of the United States* reports that 62.7 per cent of the total eligible population voted in the 1952 election, while the 1963 *Abstract* reports that 63.8 per cent of the "resident" population voted in 1960. The findings presented here are exaggerated in the same direction, however, and to the same approximate degree. Specifically, the estimated over-reporting in the Survey Research Center findings is about 10 per cent and is about 8 per cent in the National Opinion Research Center data. While we are not warranted, therefore, in drawing precise numerical differences in these trends of Negro voting turnout, we are warranted in noting these trends and approximating their magnitude by comparison of the results of the Survey Research Center study with those of the National Opinion Research Center study.

[21] Because of the difficulty in obtaining registration figures for Negroes and whites separately, we have consciously ignored the issue of the proportion of registered Negro voters among those Negroes eligible to vote. There are indications, however, that registration of Negroes is quite high in some northern urban areas. In Chicago and Philadelphia, for example, the proportion of registered Negro voters for the 1948 presidential election was approximately 70 per cent. See Oscar Glantz, "The Negro Voter in Northern Industrial Cities," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIII (December, 1960), 1007.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 1004.

[23] For an earlier report on the political participation of Detroit Negroes, see Edward H. Litchfield, "A Case Study of Negro Political Behavior in Detroit," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, V, No. 2 (June, 1941), 265–74. Even at this early date, Litchfield notes that "above all else . . . the Negro is at last becoming politically average. His participation, while once very small, has gradually approached the average" (p. 274).

[24] Simulmatics Report No. 1, "Negro Voters in Northern Cities," May, 1960, referred to in Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel L. Popkin, *Candidates, Issues and Strategies* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 94–99.

lower income group. But the effect of this on Negro turnout is not very great since class by class there is no difference in Negro and white turnout."[25]

Voting data from the assassination study pertinent to subsamples of the Washington suburb and Detroit reveal the relatively high proportion of Negro turnout. Table 9, controlling for the relationship with class, presents these data. With the exception of the medium SES group in Detroit, the relationship between class and turnout is similar to that found by the Survey Research Center study. Most important, we find that 86 per cent of the Negroes reported voting in the 1960 election. Since a positive trend in the turnout from 1948 to 1956 has already been noted, it is not surprising that almost nine of every ten registered Negroes in Detroit voted in 1960.

Let us now consider regional differences in comparing Negro and white turnout. In Table 10 we compare southern and non-southern turnout in 1960. Again the data are taken from the two NORC studies conducted in 1963. In both surveys, we find evidence of the smaller proportion of voters in the southern section of the country. Similarity in turnout tends to be regional more than racial. The data from the May survey, for example, indicate 83 per cent of the eligible whites and 77 per cent of the eligible Negroes outside the South voted in 1960, while only 67 per cent of the eligible whites and 60 per cent of the eligible Negroes in the South voted.

Of added importance is the finding that southern Negroes were more likely to report ineligibility for the 1960 election than any other group. The May data indicate that

TABLE 8

PER CENT OF VOTERS IN 1952 AND 1960 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS FOR NEGROES AND NATIONAL SAMPLE

Voters	1952		1960—May		1960—November	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
National sample....	73	*1,614*	72	*1,505*	71	*1,358*
Negroes...........	32	*157*	57	*162*	53	*163*

Source: 1952, Survey Research Center data, Janowitz and Marvick, *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1955–56); May, 1960, unpublished data from National Opinion Research Center study, No. SRS-160, May, 1963; November, 1960, unpublished data from the National Opinion Research Center post-assassination study, No. SRS-350, November, 1963.

TABLE 9

PER CENT VOTING IN 1960 BY COMMUNITY AND SES

SES	Voting: Voted	Voting: Did Not Vote	Voting: Ineligible	Total: Per Cent	Total: *N*
	Washington Suburb				
Low	31	58	11	100	*26*
Medium.....	65	21	14	100	*68*
High........	75	12	13	100	*99*
Total......	65	21	13	99	*193*
	Detroit				
Low.........	88	8	4	100	*130*
Medium.....	75	17	8	100	*36*
High........	......	......	......	......	*6*
Total......	86	10	4	100	*172*

Source: Unpublished data from the National Opinion Research Center study of mental-health-related behavior, No. 485, 1963–66.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

southern Negroes were twice as likely as southern whites to be ineligible to vote in 1960, 15 per cent compared to 8 per cent.[26] This information bears out other evidence on the difficulties southern Negroes encountered in registering to vote prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.[27]

To complete this picture of Negro voter turnout, let us consider the relationship of race, education, and turnout within each region. Table 11 presents these data for registered voters. Both within and outside the South, we find that the difference in education almost completely explains the Negro-white difference in turnout of registered voters. More education, furthermore, has an appreciably greater effect on increasing turnout in southern areas. Looking at the vote of whites and Negroes combined, we see that the 22 percentage points differentiate voting among low- and high-education groups in the South, compared to 9 percentage points in areas outside the South. Since the majority of southern Negroes in this sample, as in general, are less well-educated than southern whites, they are therefore less likely to vote. In short, education appears to be an important explanatory variable of the Negro-white differential in turnout of registered voters, particularly in the South.

The reader should be cautious in interpreting the differences and trends in this section. The exaggerated proportions of respondents who claim to have voted—or at least to have been eligible to vote—reflect the difficulty of obtaining accurate voting data from public-opinion surveys, even from surveys conducted immediately after presidential elections (see n. 20). These limitations notwithstanding, several observations are warranted. Of utmost importance is the evidence in the past few elections of a positive shift in the nationwide voting turnout of Negroes. This shift is particularly remarkable in contrast to the stable turnout of the nation as a whole. Although this nationwide trend probably is due largely to an increase in the turnout of southern Negroes, positive shifts are also evident in some northern urban areas, for example, Detroit. The remaining gap between the turnout of whites and Negroes appears to be chiefly the result of two factors, both of which have been primarily in evidence in the South. The first is the difficulty that Negroes have had in registering to vote, presumably due to extra-legal restrictions on their registration. The second is the generally lower educational accomplishments of Negroes. With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the subsequent heavy registration of Negroes in the South, the second factor represents the major handicap that Negroes must overcome in order to make their political voice more effective.

Review of the findings.—Most, if not all, of the prior research on Negro participation in associations has failed to consider the known relationship between social class and membership. When we look at the effect of SES on the membership of Negroes and whites, we find that the relationship between class and membership is much less pronounced for Negroes. Thus, we find that lower-class Negroes are more likely to belong to organizations than lower-class whites, while middle-class whites

[26] Attention should be directed to the variation between the May and November figures for Negroes reporting either "not voting" or "ineligibility" to vote. While these differences are, in part, the result of sampling error, they may be due indirectly to Negro voter-registration drives in the South. Thus, the larger proportion who claim ineligibility in November would represent, in part, the recent realization of some Negroes that they did not vote in 1960 because they were prevented from registering to vote.

[27] We must caution against placing too much emphasis upon these figures since the survey data appear to inflate the proportion of registered Negro voters in the South. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, for instance, indicate that only about 28 per cent of the Negroes of voting age had registered to vote in the South for the 1960 election ("Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," *American Political Science Review*, LVII, No. 1 [March, 1963], 27; see also U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *1961 Report*, Vol. I: *Voting*).

TABLE 10

Per Cent Voting in 1960 by Region and Race

A. MAY, 1963

Vote in 1960	Whites		Negroes	
	Total	Eligible	Total	Eligible
	Non-South			
Voted	77	83	69	77
Did not vote	15	17	21	23
Ineligible	8	....	10	....
Total	100	100	100	100
N	*1,013*	*936*	*52*	*47*
	South			
Voted	62	67	51	60
Did not vote	30	33	34	40
Ineligible	8	....	15	....
Total	100	100	100	100
N	*330*	*305*	*110*	*93*

Source: Unpublished data from National Opinion Research Center study, No SRS-160, May, 1963.

B. NOVEMBER, 1963

Vote in 1960	Whites		Negroes	
	Total	Eligible	Total	Eligible
	Non-South			
Voted	78	83	62	68
Did not vote	15	17	29	32
Ineligible	7	....	9	....
Total	100	100	100	100
N	*873*	*814*	*63*	*57*
	South			
Voted	62	66	48	67
Did not vote	32	34	24	33
Ineligible	6	....	28	....
Total	100	100	100	100
N	*322*	*303*	*100*	*72*

Source: Unpublished data from the National Opinion Research Center post-assassination study, November, 1963.

are slightly more likely to belong than middle-class Negroes. Upper-class whites, in turn, are much more likely to be "joiners" than their Negro counterparts. Further comparisons of Negroes and whites within these same SES groups show that Negroes, without exception, are more likely to participate actively in their associations. Examining membership in different kinds of organizations, we find that Negroes are more likely to belong to political and church groups than their white counterparts and equally likely to belong to civic groups. Finally, data on Negro voting in presidential elections since 1952 point to a remarkable increase in voter turnout, especially in comparison with the stable turnout of the nation as a whole. The remaining difference between the Negro and the white turnout appears to be the result of extra-legal restrictions on Negro voter registration in the South and the generally lower educational attainment of Negroes. The enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 will undoubtedly aid in narrowing this gap between Negroes and whites.

TABLE 11

VOTING IN 1960 BY REGION, RACE, AND EDUCATION

(Per Cent of Registered Voters Who Voted in 1960)

Education	White		Negro		White-Negro Combined	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
			Non-South			
Part high school or less	76	*389*	70	*23*	76	*412*
High-school graduate or more	85	*545*	83	*24*	85	*549*
			South			
Part high school or less	56	*151*	55	*71*	56	*222*
High-school graduate or more	77	*153*	82	*21*	78	*174*

Source: Unpublished data from National Opinion Research Center study, No. SRS-160, May, 1963.

DISCUSSION OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF NEGROES

At the outset of this paper, we presented two interpretations of the social and political participation of Negroes. The two rest on contradictory findings. One point of view maintains that Negroes are less likely than whites to participate in organizations and elections, while the other contends that Negroes are more likely to participate in organizations. The former, the "isolation" thesis, has been the more popular explanation. That it remains in vogue is evidenced by its implicit inclusion in one of of the most recent analyses of "the Negro problem" in America. In *Crisis in Black and White*, Silberman writes, "Important as demonstrations have been to Negro morale, however, it would be a mistake to exaggerate their impact. They have contributed a great deal to Negro self-pride—but not enough to conquer apathy . . . mass apathy is too deeply rooted to be more than temporarily pierced by a single event, like the Birmingham demonstration, or even a series of events."[28] This kind of explanation argues that Negroes are "iso-

[28] Charles E. Silberman, *Crisis in Black and White* (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 141–44.

lated" from civic affairs since they are excluded from meaningful involvement in the larger society. As a consequence, Negroes are perceived as ignorant of and indifferent to civic affairs.

In light of the data presented here, the "isolation" argument demands serious reconsideration. Although it may be true, as Silberman points out, that the majority of Negroes are apathetic, it is also correct that the majority of the white population is apathetic. The significant point is rather that in terms of over-all organizational participation—membership and activity—Negroes are not any more apathetic than whites. In fact, we found that Negroes are more likely to be active in organizations. Voting trends, moreover, indicate that Negroes are less indifferent now to civic affairs than they were ten years ago. In short, it seems that present advocates of the "isolation" thesis may be mistaking a class condition of apathy for a race condition.[29]

The opposite view of Negro participation contends that Negroes compensate for social deprivations incurred by their minority-group status through intensive participation in organizations. As Myrdal stated his case: "Membership in their own segregated associations does not help Negroes to success in the larger American society. The situation must be seen as a pathological one: Negroes are active in associations because they are not allowed to be active in much of the other organized life . . . Negroes are largely kept out, not only of politics proper, but of most purposive and creative work in the trade unions, businessmen's groups, large-scale civic improvement and charity organizations and the like."[30] The findings of this paper on Negro membership and activity in organizations confirm Myrdal's observations of two decades ago.

Myrdal's chief contribution to an understanding of the racial differences in organizational participation is that organizations fulfil different purposes for whites and Negroes. In a phrase, associations are means of *collective membership* for Negroes, whereas they are means of *collecting memberships* for whites. Since Negroes are deprived of the usual social and psychological satisfactions of everyday life, they are compelled to seek such satisfactions collectively through other means. Opportunities for association are restricted by explicit or tacit observance of segregation in public places of entertainment. The oppressive atmosphere of slum dwellings also does not offer a congenial environment for social activity. Quite naturally, then, clubs and associations become focuses for Negroes' social life. For middle- and upper-class whites, on the other hand, organizations on the whole have only a nominal significance. This significance primarily derives from the enhancement of prestige that comes with membership in the "right" kinds of organizations.

If the early experience of other ethnic groups in America can be considered a useful guide, the participation of Negroes in associations represents a significant step toward integration. In this respect, the most important consequence of activity in associations is a kind of civic education. Ideally, if not always practically, voluntary associations are models of co-operative effort; decision-making follows discussion, debate, and the reaching of a consensus among the members. Participation in associations thus offers Negroes an opportunity to acquire an understanding of the processes of co-operation and compromise that are the foundations of democratic living.[31]

[29] On the remarkable degree of political "grief" that Negroes experienced after Kennedy's assassination, see: Norman Bradburn and Jacob J. Feldman, "Public Apathy and Public Grief," in B. S. Greenberg and E. B. Parker (eds.), *Communication and Crisis: Social Research on the Kennedy Assassination* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965).

[30] Myrdal *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 952–53.

[31] For the ways in which voluntary associations aided Polish immigrants in adapting to America, see: Helena Znaniecki Lopata, "The Function of Voluntary Associations in an Ethnic Community, 'Polonia,'" in Ernest W. Burgess and Donald J. Bogue (eds.), *Contributions to Urban Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

In the area of pure political activity, the increase in voting turnout of Negroes may be due to a greater awareness among Negroes of the effectiveness of organized political efforts. Assuming that the voting trends together with the syndrome of activity in political and civic associations are reliable indicators, we suggest that Negroes now are a major political force in American society.

The data in this paper are diverse; therefore, the inferences drawn should be regarded as only tentative. It is important that a more comprehensive study of the social and political participation of Negroes be undertaken. Future research in this area should consider not only the types of associations to which Negroes belong but whether these are associations of the larger society or associations of the Negro community. Such information should have obvious significance in determining whether Negroes in this respect are becoming more integrated into the larger society or whether their organizational memberships contribute to a continuing segregation from it.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Industrialization, Values, and Occupational Evaluation in Uruguay[1]

James R. Wood and Eugene A. Weinstein

ABSTRACT

The relationship between occupational evaluation and industrialization in high-school students is explored in seven Uruguayan communities. Industrialization of community was found to be related to occupational evaluation independent of traditionalism in general cultural attitudes.

The evaluation of occupational prestige is related to the industrialization of a country in at least two ways. On the one hand, the occupational-prestige hierarchy may constitute a barrier delaying the start or impeding the progress of industrialization. On the other, industrialization, once begun, may bring about marked changes in that hierarchy. The present study carried out in Uruguay explores both these facets of the relation between occupational evaluation and industrialization.

Little of a specific nature has been done to determine whether occupational evaluation does in fact serve as a barrier to industrialization.[2] It seems plausible to reason, however, that a prestige hierarchy unfavorable to industrial pursuits will interfere with capital investment and what Moore and Feldman call labor commitment, including "both performance and acceptance of the behaviors appropriate to an industrial way of life [along with] the norms of the new productive organization and social system."[3]

There is a large and growing body of empirical data dealing with the occupational-prestige hierarchies in many countries.[4] These data, however, do not present a clear and consistent picture of the relation of industrialization to the similarities and differences in the hierarchies from one country to another. Inkeles and Rossi, in one of the early comparisons, used only industrialized countries. After summarizing a large amount of cross-cultural evidence, they conclude, "This strongly suggests that there is a relatively invariable hierarchy of prestige associated with the industrial system, even when it is placed in the con text of larger social systems which are otherwise differentiated in important respects."[5] While they are aware that other factors (e.g., the national state, values such

[1] This study is part of the senior author's Master's thesis (James R. Wood, "Occupational Evaluation and Industrialization: The Case of Uruguay" [Vanderbilt University, 1965]).

[2] This study is part of the senior author's Masreported below. See also John Knox, "Las bases sociales de la industrialización," *Revista mexicana de sociologia*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (December, 1961). The same data are reported in John Knox, "The Corporation: Some Argentine and American Attitudes," *Journal of Social Psychology,* LXIII (1964), 221–32.

[3] Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman, *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), p. 1.

[4] The best summary of this field is: Robert W. Hodge, Donald G. Trieman, and Peter H. Rossi, "A Comparative Study of Occupational Prestige," to be included in a forthcoming revision (New York: Free Press, 1966) of Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset's *Class, Status, and Power* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953).

[5] Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXI (January, 1956), 329–39.

as health) are important, their stress is upon the contribution made by the industrial occupational system to cross-national similarities in occupational prestige. Other researchers, however, have since shown that the similarity in structures of occupational prestige is not confined to industrialized countries, thus putting in doubt the degree of influence of industrialization upon occupational prestige. Rank correlations between prestige rankings in non-industrialized and industrialized countries average in the .90's.[6]

While it must be granted that industrialization is not the only factor involved in the similarity of prestige structures in the many countries studied, Lewis and Haller demonstrate that within Japan there is a traditional structure that persists in the rural areas but that has largely disappeared in the urban centers.[7] Perhaps Inkeles and Rossi overestimate the place of industrialization. Yet the presence of the factory system likely does introduce a prestige structure that tends to supplant the traditional one. Little is known, however, about the way in which industrialization brings about modifications of the traditional prestige hierarchies. Does it change the occupational-prestige hierarchy by changing the system of values that underlies that hierarchy? Or does industrialization simply create new kinds of jobs which find their place in the old hierachy according to their relation to the traditional value system? And, whether one of these or some other explanation is accepted, does the evaluation of occupational prestige constitute a barrier to industrialization? The present study of Uruguay was undertaken to shed some light on these questions.

There have been studies comparing occupational-prestige rankings in South America, and in Uruguay in particular, with modern industrialized societies.[8] The results show the same patterns as Inkeles and Rossi's; correlations between prestige rankings in the .90's are modal. Most of the studies, however, draw on the most modern and industrialized cities of South America. Furthermore, the studies in other areas of the world also tend to concentrate upon the most modern and industrialized cities of the countries being studied. What is lacking is a comparison of prestige in these "industrialized" cities with that in the rest of the country. In other words, studies are called for which look more carefully *within* a given country at areas differentially exposed to industrialization. Such is the present study.

THE PRESENT STUDY OF URUGUAY

The approach taken in the present study is to look at a society in which there is (1) a traditional culture that does not favor industrialization and (2) differential exposure to industrialization among the communities of the society. We compare preindustrial and industrial sections of the same society in order to clarify how the coming of the factories brings about a change in the occupational-prestige hierarchy.

Like Latin America generally, Uruguay traditionally has been characterized by a "Spanish cultural orientation." By this orientation is meant (1) an intense disdain for manual labor and (2) the related but

[6] Edward A. Tiryakian, "The Prestige Evaluation of Occupations in an Underdeveloped Country: The Philippines," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (March, 1962), 390–99; E. Murray Thomas, "Reinspecting a Structural Position on Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (March, 1962), 561–65.

[7] David M. Lewis and Archibald O. Haller, "Rural-Urban Differences in Pre-industrial and Industrial Evaluations of Occupations by Japanese Adolescent Boys," *Rural Sociology*, XXIX (September, 1964), 324–29.

[8] Carmen Gloria Cucullu de Murmis, *Estudio sobre el prestigio de las occupaciones* (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1961), p. 14; Roy E. Carter, Jr., and Orlando Sepulveda, "Occupational Prestige in Santiago de Chile," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VIII (September, 1964), 20–24; Bertram Hutchinson (ed.), *Mobilidade e trabalho* (Rio de Janeiro: Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Educacionais, 1960), pp. 23–27; Carlos M. Rama, *Las clases sociales en el Uruguay* (Montevideo: Nuestro Tiempo, 1960), pp. 197–98.

more inclusive (the former is a specific case of the latter) orientation toward leisure, intellectual pursuits, enlargement of one's self as contrasted to an orientation toward work, "busyness," achievement, and the conquest of the material environment. In one form or another this Spanish orientation is repeatedly referred to by historians of Latin America. Bradford vividly contrasts the Spanish American and North American points of view:

> Calvinist North Americans find it difficult to understand the aversion of the Spanish aristocrat to manual labor. In a country that believes with Benjamin Franklin that people should always be doing something, leisure seems laziness. But Spanish leisure is not laziness. It reflects the belief that man's aim is not only to do things, but civilize himself. . . . The Spaniard educates himself to become a better man, not to make it possible to do more work. The true aristocrat is not interested in working with his hands in order to prove that he is busy. Nor is he interested in "business" and "efficiency" and similar middle class ideas. . . . Nor does the educated young Spaniard or Spanish American care for technical work if it is painstaking in nature. If he needs to work for a living, he educates himself for a profession. . . . The traditional young Spanish American selects the career of government bureaucrat, army officer, lawyer, doctor, or priest, or he may prefer to be a poet or a painter. These occupations offer social status. They are achieved by education, and the end of higher educational institutions is to provide training for them.[9]

Bradford's contentions are supported by Whyte's more systematic data from Peruvian high-school students.[10] He asked them for their preference between manual (*obrero*) and salaried white-collar (*empleado*) jobs. Predictably, preferences were overwhelming for the latter when equal pay was involved. Only by offering completely unrealistic pay differentials were these preferences changeable. Even then, any kind of manual work, skilled or not and regardless of pay differential, would not be acceptable to over a third of his sample. Whyte offers two points in interpreting his findings: (1) The notion of being a skilled *obrero* has not yet affected much the low social status of the category of *obrero*. (2) The educational pyramid in Peru tends to reinforce the cultural barrier against manual work. Only fifty-one of every thousand children who enter first grade ever graduate from high school. And nearly everyone who finishes high school applies for admission to a university.

Such an important value orientation as this Spanish cultural orientation—so contradictory to the accepted notions of industrialized values—may be an important factor resisting industrialization. The model of prestige evaluation suggested by Hatt led us to see this traditional orientation as an intervening variable. Hatt's position is that the prestige of an occupation is "a sort of sum of all rewards accruing" to it.[11] In our attempts to describe occupational prestige we are attempting a synthesis of the total reward system. Weinstein has stated a similar position: "Two functions are performed by the ascriber in the evaluation of occupational prestige: 1. The ascriber must estimate the amount or increment of each of the criteria associated with a given occupation. 2. The ascriber must weigh each criterion in accordance with its importance in his own value system."[12]

This study seeks to explore whether industrialization first has to change some of the traditional Spanish values before changing the prestige structure. We expected that this would be the case and that these values and, in particular, the prestige structure based upon them would constitute barriers to industrialization (to the com-

[9] Sax Bradford, *Spain in the World* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962), pp. 93–94.

[10] William F. Whyte, "Culture, Industrial Relations, and Economic Development: The Case of Peru," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XVI, No. 4 (July, 1963), 583–94.

[11] Paul Hatt, "Occupation and Social Stratification," in Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (ed.), *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 248.

[12] Eugene A. Weinstein, "Weights Assigned by Children to Criteria of Prestige," *Sociometry*, XIX, No. 2 (June, 1956), 126–32.

mitment both of labor and of capital). Our logic is as follows: (1) The traditional values result in underevaluation of manual labor jobs (including skilled manual labor) and other non-traditional occupations (such as the industrial entrepreneur) in comparison to their position in industrial societies. (2) In communities that have been sufficiently industrialized, people have been exposed to new values and therefore cling less to the old value system. (3) This means that persons in industrialized communities will evaluate occupational status differently from persons in communities that have not been exposed to industrialization.

TABLE 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE COMMUNITY TYPE

Social Class*	Metropolitan (Montevideo)	Commercial Center (Salto)	Industrialized (Paysandú)	Rural-Dominated (Trinidad, Melo, Rosario, Colonia Valdense)
I........	100	38	18	39
II.......	40	19	28	62
III......	23	2	27	39
IV.......	6	1	6	14
Total..	169	60	80	154

* Based on data from students on father's occupation.

Our central hypotheses may then be stated as follows: (1) There is an inverse relation between the degree of industrialization of the community and the strength of traditional values within the community. (2) Accordingly, there is an inverse relation between the degree of industrialization and the traditional evaluation of occupations.

We also wish to explore the relation of religion (Catholic, Protestant, and other) and social class (determined by father's occupation) to traditionalism in occupational evaluation. Regarding religion, we hypothesize: Protestants are less traditional than Catholics in their evaluation of occupational prestige. The logic underlying this hypothesis is that the Protestant ethic runs counter to the "Spanish cultural orientation," while the Catholic church in Latin America is a bulwark of the traditional values. There are several hypotheses regarding social class: (1) The upper middle and upper classes (Class I) are more traditionally oriented. (2) Members of these classes are less influenced by residence in an industrialized area. (3) The lower middle (Class II) and lower classes (Classes III and IV) are more deeply affected by residence in an industrialized community. (4) The sharpest contrast will be between those portions of the lower middle class that are in different categories with respect to the industrialization of their communities, that is, a class-community interaction effect.

METHODS

The sample consists of 463 fourth-grade *liceo* students from seven cities in the country of Uruguay. Fourth-grade *liceo* is the tenth year in school and in that respect compares to the tenth grade in high school in the American system. However, since fourth grade is the final year of *liceo*, it is here that the student must face the decision of taking a job or beginning some sort of advanced training or higher education. In this latter respect the fourth-grade *liceo* student may be compared with the senior in an American high school.

The sample was drawn in an attempt to include *liceos*, both public and Catholic, from all social-class levels and from cities and areas varying in size and level of industrialization. The principal characteristics of the complete sample appear in Table 1.

The main weakness of the sample is that the number of students in social Class IV is less than is desirable for statistical purposes.[13] This lack was a result of the very

[13] Class was based on student reports of father's occupation. Class I would range from upper middle to upper, containing professionals, major public officials, and medium-to-large land-owners and entrepreneurs. Class II is the middle class contain-

small percentage of fourth-grade *liceo* students who are in the lower lower class. Thus, extreme caution must be used in generalizing our findings to the Uruguayan society as a whole. Not only is the lower lower class underrepresented in the final year of *liceo,* but it is also probable that members of that social class who do reach the fourth grade are themselves hardly representative of their class. Among other things we would expect them to have higher mobility aspirations than the members of their social class who have already dropped out of school.

Questionnaires were administered to students in their classrooms. The questionnaire consisted of three parts. The first part asked for information relating to the independent variables of sex, religion, class, and community. The second part was a paired-comparisons test designed to measure the dependent variable, occupational evaluation. Here the students were asked to choose the occupation in each of thirty-two pairs of occupations having the "higher social standing." Each pair contained one "traditional" occupation and one "industrial" occupation. The more traditional occupations chosen by the student, the higher his score on this variable. The first step in the preparation of this paired-comparisons instrument was to make a list of traditional occupations and one of industrial occupations. By traditional occupations we mean simply those that belong to the pre-industrial structure. By industrial occupations, we mean those added to the occupational structure with the coming of factories and the development of technology. Care was taken to have in each list a wide range with respect to social class. For instance, the traditional list contains office worker and clerk in a store as well as head of a government bureau and merchant. The industrial list includes machine operator in a factory as well as manager of an industrial enterprise and industrialist.

These lists were used to generate thirty-two pairs of occupations, with one industrial and one traditional member. In choosing the pairs, we attempted to secure pairs of occupations more or less within the same socioeconomic level, vis-à-vis the United States. Both members had the same, or as nearly the same as possible, North-Hatt scale scores.[14] The twenty-four homogeneous items used in our analysis appear as Appendix I.

The third part of the questionnaire was a twenty-one item, Likert-type scale designed to measure our intervening variable —the "Spanish cultural orientation." Six of the items in this scale deal with manual labor (e.g., "Nothing would be more disagreeable to me than to have to earn a living working with my hands"). The other fifteen items deal with the more general Spanish orientation. Among these items were the following: "Action, not speculation is the mark of a great people"; "If I had all the money I needed for the rest of my life, there would be no reason for me to have a job"; "It is in leisure rather than work that man finds his true fulfilment." Some of these broader items were based on those aphorisms of Benjamin Franklin that Weber cited as definitive statements of the "Protestant ethic."

Initial inspection of the data indicated the possibility of non-homogeneity among the items. Consequently, an item analysis was run to refine the scale. The twelve items that remained discriminated between the upper and lower quartiles at the .01 level or better. Employing a similar procedure, the paired-comparisons test was reduced to twenty-four homogeneous items. The attitude items retained appear as Appendix II. High scores on the scale indicate a more traditional orientation.

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ing white collar, secondary professions, and small business. Class III is comprised principally of skilled and semiskilled labor. Class IV contains unskilled and service workers.

[14] There was a mean difference of five scale points between the two sets, favoring the traditional occupations.

FINDINGS

The principal findings for the relationship of traditional attitudes to industrial exposure (community type), class, and religion show no consistent patterns save one (Tables 2 and 3). They are uniformly nonsignificant with the exception of the class-community interaction.[15] This appears to be due to the low traditionalism of Class IV in relation to Class I in Montevideo as contrasted with higher traditionalism in this class in relation to those above it in the other communities. In a hunt for covariance, individual scale items were correlated with the independent variables as well as with occupational evaluation. Again, the results were all negative.

The principal hypothesis regarding degree of industrialization in the community and traditionalism in occupational evaluation on the paired-comparisons test was confirmed. The inverse relation between degree of industrialization of community and preferential evaluation of traditional occupations was significant at the .01 level for four categories of exposure to industrialization. The analysis of variance is presented in Table 4, community and class means in Table 5.

TABLE 2

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SPANISH CULTURAL ORIENTATION BY CLASS AND COMMUNITY

Source	Sum of Squares	d f.	Mean Square	F-Ratio	P
Community	34.759	3	11.586	0.563	.641
Class	68.855	3	22.952	1 115	.343
Interaction	363 759	9	40.418	1.964	.042
Error	9322.836	453	20.580	....	....

TABLE 3

MEAN SCORES ON SPANISH CULTURAL ORIENTATION BY CLASS AND COMMUNITY*

Social Class	Montevideo		Paysandú		Salto		Rosario, Valdense, Melo, Trinidad	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
I	27.26	100	27.33	18	28 05	38	27.51	39
II	26.85	40	26.00	28	27.58	19	26.56	62
III	28.87	23	27.07	27	28.00	2	26.41	39
IV	22.17	6	30.17	6	28.00	1	29.43	14

* High scores mean more traditional orientation.

These findings call for a review of our original logic. In including the intervening variable of Spanish cultural orientation in our design our reasoning was as follows: There may be attitudes toward certain characteristics of the jobs that will determine the prestige assigned. Since the attitudes of the industrial society run counter to the traditional attitudes, exposure to industrialization would be the important independent variable. We expected, then, that exposure to industrialization would break down the attitudes that underlay the ascribing of prestige. As the correlation we expected between the intervening vari-

[15] Data were analyzed by means of analysis of variance with unequal cell frequencies weighted by means of regression. It was possible to handle two but not three independent variables simultaneously in this manner. Analyses for each dependent variable were made for all combinations of pairs of independent variables.

able and the dependent variable did not appear ($r = .13$), we must re-evaluate this model. One way of explaining our findings is to say that persons learn the prestige of particular occupations rather than deciding prestige on the basis of attitudes toward the characteristics of the occupations. In fact, the ascriber of prestige may not know much about the characteristics of the job to which he is ascribing prestige. Evidence for this argument is found in a study of the prestige of dentists. Kriesberg points out in that study that "persons may well have a clearer and more definite perception of the prestige hierarchy than the income, skill, social importance, or other occupational hierarchies. We may find that explanations must give considerable importance to the direct and indirect interaction people have with incumbents of each occupation."[16]

It may be that the effect of exposure to industrialization upon occupational evaluation is independent of changes in attitudes toward manual labor or toward the conquering of the material world, etc. By changing the occupational structure, industrialization changes the experience that people have in interaction with the incumbents of various occupations. Accordingly, evolution of more "modern" occupations varies with the concentration of factories and, therefore, presumably with the presence of a sizable proportion of the workers in industrial occupations. As one begins to see skilled manual laborers, for example, adopting a higher standard of living or receiving higher regard by other workers, one begins to be uncertain about the low prestige ranking of manual laborers. This line of thought will be elaborated later in the discussion.

Table 4 shows the pattern of means of prestige evaluations by class and community. The patterns did not conform to our initial expectations. Over-all, Class I is the least traditional of the four. However, this is due principally to the least traditional

TABLE 4

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OCCUPATIONAL EVALUATION BY CLASS AND COMMUNITY

Source	Sum of Squares	d.f.	Mean Squares	F-Ratio	P
Community	1729.026	3	576.342	4.111	.007
Class	639.539	3	213.180	1.520	.208
Interaction	1141.243	9	126.805	0.904	.522
Error	63513.628	453	140 207	....	....

TABLE 5

OCCUPATIONAL EVALUATION BY CLASS AND COMMUNITY*

Social Class	Montevideo		Paysandú		Salto		Rosario, Valdense, Melo, Trinidad	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
I	48.21	100	54.44	18	51.53	38	52.38	39
II	51.88	40	50.82	28	51.84	19	55.45	62
III	49.83	23	46.59	27	46.50	2	52.44	39
IV	42.50	6	50.67	6	48.00	1	55.71	14

* High scores indicate higher evaluation of traditional occupations.

[16] Louis Kriesberg, "The Bases of Occupational Prestige: The Case of the Dentists," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII, No. 2 (1962), 238-44.

prestige evaluations of Montevideans in this class.

If we take each community separately, Class I ranges from most traditional within Paysandú, the industrial area of the interior, to least traditional within the four small communities. However, neither the over-all pattern of class differences nor the class-community interaction on prestige evaluation exceeded chance levels.

The low traditionalism of the elite in Montevideo may be due to their involvement in industry. This is somewhat reflected in the occupations of fathers of students in the two Class I Montevideo *liceos*. A commercial orientation also may yield a more cosmopolitan and less traditional outlook. Note that Class I in Salto, the foremost commercial center of the interior, is less traditional than that of Paysandú, an interior industrial center about the same size as Salto.

Significant religious differences in occupational evaluation were found. For the total groups across communities, Protestants were most traditional, followed by Catholics and then "all others." Since the "all-others" category consisted mostly of Jews and atheists, the finding that they are less traditional in occupational evaluation than Catholics and Protestants is not surprising. When comparing only Protestants and Catholics, the difference approaches but does not achieve statistical significance ($P < .20$), with Protestants more traditional. This difference is due principally to the very low traditionalism of Catholics in Montevideo, relative to both Catholics and Protestants in the remainder of the sample, a fact reflected in the significant religion-community interaction. It should be noted that about one-half of our Catholics in Montevideo were from a Catholic *liceo* that caters to the true elite of the country. (Our Class I is much broader than the elite alone.) These students were quite low in traditionalism. This fact is in keeping with Whyte's finding in Peru. "It is only as we get to the top social level, to the three schools for children of the social elite, that we find the factory exerting a strong appeal. . . . The hacienda has for generations been the primary field of economic activity for the social elite, and in recent years members of this elite have been branching out into industrial activities."[17]

The finding that Protestants are more traditional than Catholics, counter to hypothesis, is linked with the lack of support for the hypothesis regarding the intervening attitudes. We reasoned that, if prestige-ascribing is determined by cultural attitudes and if the "Protestant ethic" counters these attitudes, Protestants should be less traditional than Catholics in their evaluation of occupations. Since our results concerning attitudes indicate that exposure to industrialization may change occupational evaluation independently from changes in attitudes, a finding that Protestants are no less traditional than Catholics would now be plausible. Controlling for frequency of church attendance does not materially affect the Catholic-Protestant pattern.

Finally, sex was not related to traditionalism either in attitudes or occupational evaluation.

SOME IMPLICATIONS

Inkeles and Rossi thought that the industrial system generates changes in prestige structure which become incorporated in social consensus regarding occupational evaluation.[18] They based this conclusion only on the study of industrialized countries. Subsequent studies have shown that non-industrialized countries also have prestige structures similar to industrialized ones. It appears, then, that industry is not the direct cause of similarity of occupational-prestige structures in national comparisons. While our findings do not establish a causal base for cross-national similarities, they point again to the fact that in-

[17] Whyte, *op. cit.*, p. 589.

[18] Inkeles and Rossi, *op. cit.* The developmental implication can be inferred from their discussion of length and "maturity" of industrialization.

dustrialization *does* have an impact on the prestige structure. Respondents ascribed prestige to industrial occupations in direct relation to their exposure to industrialization (their residence in cities with factories).

Hodge, Treiman, and Rossi[19] conclude from an analysis of existing studies that there are no systematic differences in the prestige ratings accorded occupations by different subgroups of the population. They further conclude that representativeness of the samples of these studies is not a very important issue. They do concede, however, that "there possibly may be greater disagreement among raters in less developed places." Our finding a difference between respondents in communities with factories and those in communities without factories adds further weight to the Lewis and Haller contention that there are such subgroup differences. When we consider that many of the studies of non-industrial countries have been in the most industrialized areas of those countries (Buenos Aires, Argentina; São Paulo, Brazil; Santiago, Chile), this finding is especially important.

We started with a theoretical model of the ascribing of prestige in which each individual sums the rewards and prerequisites of an occupation and relates them to his value hierarchy.[20] Thomas later favored just this kind of model for explaining the similarity between countries. "Identifying common attitudes different societies hold toward subdimensions of prestige . . . offers the most profitable route toward explaining the similarity of occupational-prestige ratings in nations of rather advanced civilizations, whether they are highly industrialized or not."[21] Our data, however, seem clearly to contradict our own approach (if we can assume the validity of our measure of Spanish cultural orientation).

An alternative, less rationalistic-mechani-

TABLE 6

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OCCUPATIONAL EVALUATION BY COMMUNITY AND RELIGION

Source	Sum of Squares	d.f.	Mean Squares	*F*-Ratio	*P*
Community	1401.277	3	467.092	3.482	.016
Religion	1118.567	2	559.284	4.169	.016
Interaction	3394 003	6	565.667	4.217	.000*
Error	60770.090	453	134.150	....	....

* Less than .001.

TABLE 7

OCCUPATIONAL EVALUATION BY RELIGION AND COMMUNITY*

Religion	Montevideo		Paysandú		Salto		Rosario, Valdense, Melo, Trinidad	
	Mean	*N*	Mean	*N*	Mean	*N*	Mean	*N*
Catholic	48 98	118	52.68	66	50.46	52	54.15	118
Protestant	55.62	16	45.60	5	55.75	4	53.77	26
Other	46.51	35	32.50	8	63.00	3	51.80	10

* High scores indicate higher evaluation of traditional occupations.

[19] Hodge *et al.*, *op. cit.*

[20] Weinstein, *op. cit.*

[21] Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 565.

cal model may be more fruitful for future research. When we refer to an occupational-prestige structure, we are abstracting from social process. What underlies our abstraction are myriads of interactions among people with various occupations. It is from these interactions that an individual learns, or gets a feel for, the relative standing of occupations. There is not a great deal of rationality involved. Kriesberg puts this position concisely: "People have many more cues—from seeing how people actually defer to each other and how this is depicted in the mass media—about the relative prestige shown members of different occupations than about the relative standing of occupations according to other criteria. Almost by definition, deference must be visible."[22]

In the case of unfamiliar occupations, associative processes rather than direct learning of specific social evaluations come to the fore. As the Hodges note, "We suggest that the detailed knowledge of the work roles associated with occupational titles is not necessary for their evaluation. To effectively rate occupational titles, respondents need only be able to classify them and it is the *classes* of occupations and not particular work roles which respondents evaluate."[23]

Kriesberg has given an explanation of how attitudes may be maintained even though the ascribing of prestige changes. In those communities where industrial occupations have appeared on the scene, these occupations have begun to win acceptance on the basis of observation and interaction. Persons actually may have begun to attribute more prestige to skilled *obreros* than to *empleados*, for example, while still having the attitudes against manual labor which, if consciously thought out and consistently applied, might reverse the ascribing of prestige. In Kriesberg's terms the prestige of the new occupations (and perhaps all prestige) comes about through situational processes. But the attitude of disdain is a product of earlier enculturation.

> I would suggest that the more abstract the value, the more likely it is to be determined by cultural processes. This follows from the observation that the more abstract the value, the more difficult it is to test adherence to it; consequently deviance can occur without leading to a change in values. Relevance of behavior to the value is harder to assess if the value is very abstract, in part because an abstract value is general and related to a large number of behaviors. Thus, the more abstract the value, the more difficult it is to test the effectiveness of the behavior which is supposed to be implementing it.[24]

Kriesberg's theory of the change of cultural values reverses the model with which we started. In his view, prestige changes first, then the cultural values. General values persist, but as the situation changes and specific new ways of behaving are adopted, more specific values related to those behaviors may come to modify the old abstract values. Our data fit his model substantially better than our own initial framework. It offers a plausible explanation for the fact that in Uruguay the ascribing of prestige is changing with exposure to industrialization but out of relation to certain cultural values which would appear to be relevant to the ascribing of prestige. If Kriesberg is indeed correct, we may expect these values themselves eventually to change.

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[22] Kriesberg, *op. cit.*

[23] Patricia L. Hodge and Robert W. Hodge, "What Ever Happened to the Nuclear Physicist?" (paper read at the 59th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, August, 1964).

[24] Louis Kriesberg, "Entrepreneurs in Latin America and the Role of Cultural and Situational Processes," *International Social Science Journal*, XV, No. 4 (1963), 585.

APPENDIX I

REVISED (TWENTY-FOUR-ITEM) OCCUPATIONAL PAIRS

Industrialist or merchant
Industrialist or head of a government bureau
Musician in a symphony orchestra or physicist
Manager of an industrial enterprise or artist who paints pictures that are exhibited in galleries
Building contractor or newspaper columnist
Artist who paints pictures that are exhibited in galleries or industrial chemist
Manager of an industrial enterprise or head of a government bureau
Accountant for a large business or electronics technician
Manager of a commercial enterprise or newspaper columnist
Mechanical engineer or accountant for a large business
Public employee or machine operator in a factory
Industrialist or lawyer
Trained machinist or bookkeeper
Laboratory technician or office worker
Electrician or public employee
Priest or industrial chemist
Office worker or trained machinist
Mechanical engineer or welfare worker for a city government
Lawyer or scientist
Professor in an industrial school or musician in a symphony orchestra
Electronics technician or welfare worker for a city government
Manager of an industrial enterprise or priest
Laboratory technician or bookkeeper
Industrialist or rancher

APPENDIX II

REVISED (TWELVE-ITEM) ATTITUDE SCALE

I greatly admire those men whose work requires great physical strength.
It is in his daily work that a man fulfils the purpose of his life.
I greatly admire those men whose work requires great skill in making things with their hands.
Action, not speculation, is the mark of a great people.
A man who can earn twenty dollars per day but, instead, uses half the day in recreation, throws away ten dollars. "Time is money."
*Nothing would be more disagreeable to me than to have to earn a living working with my hands.
*It is easy to tell what kind of person a man is by the job he holds.
I greatly admire those men who work long, hard hours in order to get ahead in their jobs.
*If I had all the money I needed for the rest of my life, there would be no reason for me to have a job.
A shoemaker benefits the human race equally as much as a soldier, an orator, or a writer.
The work of a skilled worker is more appreciated than that of an office worker.
*It is in leisure rather than work that man finds his true fulfilment.

* Agreement indicates traditional orientation.

Segregation in Southern Cities[1]

Leo F. Schnore and Philip C. Evenson

ABSTRACT

The existing literature on southern cities suggests that the older ones are less segregated residentially than the newer ones. This generalization, however, has been based mainly on case studies of individual cities and upon impressionistic observations. This study examines current (1960) levels of residential segregation by color in seventy-six southern cities and finds that the popular generalization tends to be true. The historical pattern of "backyard" residence, which emerged in the ante bellum South under slavery, has apparently survived into the present, despite the passage of a hundred years. Even when other relevant variables are controlled, there continues to be a negative association between age of the city and current level of segregation.

The subject of residential segregation according to color has received increasing attention in recent years as the dimensions of "the Negro revolution" in the United States have become clear. It is fortunate that while this popular interest has mounted, methodological advances have made possible more rigorous definition and measurement of the phenomenon. The work of Taeuber and Taeuber, in particular, has clearly delineated the extent of residential segregation and has established some of its principal correlates.[2]

Among the main findings by Taeuber and Taeuber, those that document regional differences and trends over time have attracted special attention.[3] They show:

In the urban United States, there is a very high degree of segregation of the residences of whites and Negroes. This is true for cities in all regions of the country and for all types of cities. . . . Presentation of data for the various regions and divisions brings out some interesting patterns in the changes in residential segregation. Between 1940 and 1950, increases were slight in the Northeast and in the West, moderate in the North Central, and larger in the South. . . . In no region or division was there an average decrease in segregation. On the other hand, during the 1950–60 decade, cities in every Northern and Western division experienced average decreases in segregation, whereas cities in all of the Southern divisions again experienced average increases in segregation.[4]

Recent trends, then, have been in opposite directions in the South and in the non-South.

As for the South itself, one of the most frequently repeated notions concerns the role of a city's age in affecting the level of residential segregation. It has been stated again and again that relatively low levels of segregation were to be observed in larger cities of the ante bellum South, despite the existence of slavery. Speaking of Charleston, South Carolina, in the seventeenth century, for example, Green has mentioned that "to the rear of the main house stretched a series of outbuildings, the summer kitchen, the washhouse, and quarters

[1] This paper is the first report in a series devoted to "Ecological Patterns in American Cities: Quantitative Studies in Urban History," supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. GS 921 to the senior author. We are indebted to Karl E. Taeuber (University of Wisconsin) and Beverly Duncan (University of Michigan) for critical comments on an earlier version.

[2] Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965).

[3] See Karl E. Taeuber, "Negro Residential Segregation: Trends and Measurement," *Social Problems*, XII (Summer, 1964), 42–50, and Karl E. Taeuber, "Residential Segregation," *Scientific American*, CCXIII (August, 1965), 12–19.

[4] Taeuber and Taeuber, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 43.

for slaves."[5] A tourist guide to the same city, published in 1939, also called attention to the old pattern and to its survival over the decades: "Here in Charleston there never has been a zoning ordinance to separate the living districts for the two races. But Charlestonians were always accustomed to having their domestic servants in residence back of the house; and after 1865 the custom continued, even though the blacks were emancipated and might work for any other master if they pleased. Nowadays, however, the Charleston Negro is gradually moving into the sections of the city where his own people live. This is happening through natural conditions and desires rather than by law."[6]

Indeed, the pattern apparently was not unique to Charleston. In his classic study, Myrdal called attention to the fact that "in some Southern cities, especially in the older ones, Negroes usually live in side streets or along alleys back of the residences of whites."[7] More recently, Demerath and Gilmore observed that "the 'marble cake' or 'back-yard' pattern of scattered and comparatively little concentrated [Negro] residence seems especially characteristic of older cities in which accommodation to racial proximity in residence is part of local tradition. . . . In newer cities like Tulsa, Durham, Miami, and many others, the extent of residential segregation of the races appears much greater."[8]

A few years later, Frazier repeated essentially the same generalization, although he limited it to *larger* southern cities:

In the large cities the location of Negro communities reveals two general patterns. In the older cities, like Charleston, with a large Negro population, the Negroes are widely scattered. The location of the widely scattered Negro population in the older cities is due largely to historical factors. Small Negro settlements, comprised mostly of servants, have grown up close to the houses of the whites in which Negroes served. These settlements thus took root before the spatial pattern of the cities was affected by the economic forces which have shaped the pattern of our modern industrial and commercial cities. The second general pattern appears in the newer cities of the South, or in cities where industry and commerce have determined their spatial pattern. In these latter cities, there are several large concentrations of Negroes and the remainder of the Negro population is scattered lightly over a large area. The light scattering of Negroes over a large area is attributable, as was noted above, to historical factors, while the large concentrations of the Negro population reflect the increasing influence of economic and social forces inherent in the growth of the modern city.[9]

Finally, Taeuber and Taeuber have made the following comment:

Differences among Southern cities in the relative importance of "the light scattering of Negroes" and "the large concentrations" appear to be determined by *whether the city grew up before or after the Civil War. Important and continuing differences among Southern cities in current racial patterns can be traced to this distinction between "old" and "new" cities.* Southern cities that were large prior to the Civil War, such as New Orleans, Washington, Baltimore, and Charleston, tended to have the "backyard" or "alley dwelling" pattern of Negro residence described by Frazier. New cities that grew up after the Civil War never developed to any great extent a similar pattern of residential intimacy.[10] [Italics ours.]

In view of the apparent unanimity of opinion on the part of scholars who have dealt with the subject, it is especially sur-

[5] Constance McLaughlin Green, *American Cities in the Growth of the Nation* (London: John de Graff, 1957), p. 19.

[6] William Oliver Stevens, *Charleston* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1939), pp. 62–63; quoted in Taeuber and Taeuber, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[7] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944) I, 621.

[8] Nicholas J. Demerath and Harlan W. Gilmore, "The Ecology of Southern Cities," in Rupert B. Vance and Nicholas J. Demerath (eds.), *The Urban South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954), p. 157.

[9] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro in the United States* (rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 237.

[10] Taeuber and Taeuber, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

prising to find that this generalization, linking segregation to the sheer age of the southern city, has yet to be put to an empirical test with a large number of southern cities. It is the purpose of this paper to present the results of such a test, with appropriate attention to some other relevant variables.

DATA AND METHODS

The "sample" of cities considered in this study consists of all incorporated places of 50,000 or more inhabitants, having at least 1,000 non-white housing units, for which block statistics were collected in the 1960 Census of Housing. We have data (from Taeuber and Taeuber) for 76 out of the 91 cities over 50,000 in the South. Although primary attention is given to these 76 southern cities, we also refer to comparative data for an additional 116 cities outside the South.

The dependent variable.—In this analysis, the factor in which we are especially interested is the current (1960) *level of segregation*. The measure employed is the one utilized by Taeuber and Taeuber; it is formally identical with the "coefficient of dissimilarity" or the "coefficient of redistribution" discussed elsewhere in the literature on residential segregation.[11] Taeuber and Taeuber describe it as follows:

> The index of residential segregation can assume values between 0 and 100. The higher the value, the higher the degree of residential segregation, and the lower the value, the greater the degree of residential intermixture. The value of the index may be interpreted as showing the minimum percentage of non-whites who would have to change the block on which they live in order to produce an unsegregated distribution—one in which the percentage of non-whites living on each block is the same throughout the city (0 on the index) . . .
>
> . . . the index is an average measure representing the situation for an entire city, and thus intentionally glosses over the full complexity and detail of a residential pattern. Second, because of the nature of available data, the indexes have been computed in most cases for central cities only, excluding the suburban areas lying beyond the corporate limits.[12]

The values of the index for the seventy-six southern cities considered here range from 79.0 (Charleston, West Virginia) and 79.5 (Charleston, South Carolina) to 98.0 (Odessa, Texas) and 98.1 (Fort Lauderdale, Florida). *The fact that the city block is the areal basis of this index means that the persistence of a "backyard" pattern of Negro residence should yield lower scores for cities in which it has survived.*

The independent variable.—The factor in which we are chiefly interested as it may affect level of segregation is the sheer *age of the city*. The measurement of age, however, is not as simple a matter as it may seem upon first consideration. Should one employ the date of first settlement? Unfortunately, this item of information is not uniformly available on a standardized basis. Should one use the date of incorporation as a municipality? This information is available for most places,[13] but inspection of the data reveals that there are substantial variations from state to state with respect to incorporation practices; in some states, it is possible to incorporate a very small population, while in others a rather considerable size must be achieved before this legal action may be taken.

For these reasons, simpler alternatives have been selected here. First of all, we have counted the number of decades for which the Bureau of the Census has reported each city's population since the first Census in 1790. Next, we have counted the number of decades that have passed since each city reached three different "cutoff" sizes: 10,000, 25,000, and 50,000 inhabit-

[11] Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes," *American Sociological Review*, XX (April, 1955), 210–17.

[12] Taeuber and Taeuber, *op. cit.*, p. 30. For a fuller discussion, see *ibid.*, Appendix A ("The Measurement of Residential Segregation"), pp. 195–245. The index values themselves are given in *ibid.*, Table 1, pp. 32–34, and Table 4, pp. 39–41.

[13] The dates of incorporation of most American cities are reported in the *Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer.*

ants.[14] We use all four bases for the determination of a city's age in part of the analysis (see Tables 1 and 6 below), but we depend most heavily upon the first, that is, the number of decades since the city was first separately reported in the Census of Population. For one thing, the first measure yields the greatest number of "prewar" cities.

Alternative measures have been suggested, but it is reasonably clear that there is no one "perfect" measure of age, suitable for all research purposes.[15] In such a situation, we would argue for the simpler measures, such as those used here. We want our measure to represent the social, economic, and political era in which a city developed, and we believe that the "older" cities identified here are those most likely to have manifested the "backyard" pattern to which we have alluded.

[14] The source for all four measures is U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960*, Vol. I: *Characteristics of the Population*, Part A: "Number of Inhabitants" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), Table 5 ("Population of Incorporated Places of 10,000 or More from Earliest Census to 1960") for each state.

[15] The number of decades since a city reached 50,000 has been used as a measure of "age" in Donald J. Bogue and Dorothy L. Harris, *Comparative Population and Urban Research via Multiple Regression and Covariance Analysis* (Oxford, Ohio: Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, Miami University; Chicago: Population Research and Training Center, University of Chicago, 1954), and in Leo F. Schnore, *The Urban Scene: Human Ecology and Demography* (New York: Free Press, 1965), chaps. v, xi–xiii, xvii. Other alternatives suggested by Beverly Duncan and Karl E. Taeuber include: (1) the length of time in which a sizable Negro population has been present, (2) the proportions of a city's growth that occurred before and after the Civil War, and (3) the relative numbers of slaves and free Negroes before the Civil War. All of these have special reference to southern cities, of course, and it is desirable to develop more general measures. The senior author is currently engaged in a related project dealing with "The Age of Cities," exploring such possibilities as measuring the "half-life" of cities. One problem is the foreshortened time perspective employed by students of urbanization in the United States. Even our oldest cities are "young" compared to many in other parts of the world.

Control variables.—We are concerned chiefly with southern cities, of course, but it is possible that there may be systematic subregional variations *within* the South. For this reason, we have exercised a control over *subregional location* by reference to the geographic "divisions" utilized by the Bureau of the Census. (In working with cities outside the South, we also analyzed the data separately for the broad Census "regions": Northeast, North Central, and West.)

Another factor deserving of control is *city size*. In one sense, of course, this variable is already "controlled" in a crude way since we are dealing with a sample selected with a size cutoff. But there is still considerable variation in size within the sample, and there are also theoretical reasons for giving attention to this factor. Cities of radically different size probably present objectively different possibilities with respect to the scope of residential segregation. Moreover, it will be recalled that Frazier limited the generalization linking age of city and level of segregation to the larger cities of the South. On the other hand, Demerath and Gilmore have contended that "small southern cities probably display a higher degree of residential and institutional segregation along racial lines than do the larger cities, especially those which have grown rapidly in recent years."[16] In any case, size appears to warrant further attention.

A third variable deserving attention is the *proportion non-white* in the city as a whole. Taeuber has shown that this variable has at least some effect in influencing the level of segregation in cities considered on a nationwide basis. As he has noted,

> An extensive literature on prejudice and discrimination suggests the relevance of the "visibility" of a group to the perceived threat it arouses. Regardless of specific behavioral

[16] Demerath and Gilmore, *op. cit.*, pp. 154–55. Taeuber and Taeuber (*op. cit.*) found no relation between city size and level of segregation, but they were dealing with cities in all parts of the country and not with southern cities per se. See their Table 3, p. 38.

mechanisms, there is ample reason to expect the relative size of a minority population to be related to its social position. In 1940, nonwhites comprised small percentages of the population in most western and northern cities and much larger percentages in most southern cities.

The relationship between percentage nonwhite in 1940 and average segregation value . . . is slight, but systematic changes during the two intercensal periods produced a clear-cut pattern by 1960. . . . By 1960 there was a direct relationship between the two variables, so that the higher the percentage nonwhite, the higher the degree of residential segregation.[17]

We are faced, then, with the necessity for controlling three broad variables: subregion, city size, and proportion nonwhite.[18]

FINDINGS

Tables 1 and 2 suggest that there is indeed a direct association between age of city and current (1960) level of segregation in the South as a whole. Table 1 shows that the older the city, no matter which of our measures of age is used, the lower the level of segregation. This is the association posited in the literature on southern cities. It also appears in Table 2. The same association, however, is not to be observed among cities of the North and West.[19] It is clearly not age per se that influences current levels of segregation; rather, it is the survival of a pattern of residence that developed in only one part of the country in a particular era.

Table 3 presents evidence for two broad subdivisions within the South—the South Atlantic and the South Central.[20] It is clear that the relationship observed earlier for the South as a whole is seen in clear-cut fashion only in the South Atlantic division. In the South Central subregion, the association is not discernible.

Table 4 offers a rough control on the city-size factor. We want to control this variable because previous discussions have offered conflicting claims concerning its role. As noted above, Frazier limited the association between age and level of segregation to *larger* cities, while Demerath and

[17] Taeuber, "Negro Residential Segregation," *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48.

[18] Demerath and Gilmore have argued that the city's *economic base* might also play a role: "[It] would seem only in the large and comparatively new cities, functionally typed as diversified or manufacturing, that one finds the occupational structure and related class-caste distinctions sufficiently altered in fundamental respects to produce real change in segregation patterns now or in the future" (Demerath and Gilmore, *op. cit.*, p. 155). Mean index values for four "functional types" in a widely used scheme were as follows:

N	Type	Mean
9	Manufacturing cities	91.4
19	Diversified cities, with manufacturing dominant	91.4
31	Diversified cities, with retail trade dominant	89.9
15	Retail-trade cities	93.3

Two cities (Washington, D.C., a government city, and Midland, Texas, an oil-refining city) are ignored in this tabulation. There was also no apparent relation between "functional type" and the other variable characteristics of cities under examination. Moreover, there appeared to be no association between age and level of segregation *within* types. The source of the functional classification used here was Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold (eds.), *The Municipal Year Book, 1963* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1963), Table 3, pp. 114–22.

[19] We examined data for the Northeast, the North Central states, and the West, and found no relationship between age and level of segregation. In addition, the same three controls (subregion, size, and proportion non-white) were used in an analysis of cities outside the South, and the results were again essentially the same. Due to space limitations, the detailed results are not reported here.

[20] The states lying within the two southern divisions are as follows: *South Atlantic:* Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and the District of Columbia. *South Central:* Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.

TABLE 1

MEAN SEGREGATION INDEXES BY FOUR MEASURES OF CITY AGE FOR SEVENTY-SIX SOUTHERN CITIES OF 50,000 OR MORE, 1960

CENSUS YEAR	DATE FIRST REPORTED IN CENSUS		DATE FIRST REACHED 10,000		DATE FIRST REACHED 25,000		DATE FIRST REACHED 50,000	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1790-1800	} 88.8	12	}		}		....	....
1810-1820	}		} 88.7	9	} 87.3	7	....	....
1830-1840	89.6	11	}		}		}	
1850-1860	90.9	20	88.7	6	}	....	} 87.9	5
1870-1880	91 7	14	90.6	15	89.5	6	}	
1890-1900	91.9	14	91.2	22	91.9	14	88.4	7
1910-1920	94.9*	5	92.1	16	90.4	24	91.0	20
1930-1940	....	....	} 93.7	8	92.5	19	91.9	20
1950-1960	....	....	}		92.8	6	91.7	24

* Includes one city (Odessa, Texas) first reported separately in 1930.

TABLE 2

1960 SEGREGATION INDEXES BY AGE OF CITY (YEAR FIRST REPORTED IN CENSUS) FOR SEVENTY-SIX SOUTHERN CITIES

YEAR FIRST REPORTED IN CENSUS	SEGREGATION INDEX, 1960				N (= 100 PER CENT)
	Less than 85.0	85.0-89.9	90.0-94.9	95 0 and Over	
1790-1840	22	26	52	0	23
1850-1860	10	25	50	15	20
1870-1880	7	14	72	7	14
1890-1920	0	26	42	32	19
Total	10	24	53	13	76

TABLE 3

1960 SEGREGATION INDEXES BY AGE OF CITY (YEAR FIRST REPORTED IN CENSUS) AND SUBREGIONAL LOCATION FOR SEVENTY-SIX SOUTHERN CITIES

SUBREGION AND YEAR FIRST REPORTED IN CENSUS	SEGREGATION INDEX, 1960				N (= 100 PER CENT)
	Less than 85.0	85.0-89.9	90.0-94.9	95 0 and Over	
South Atlantic:					
1790-1840	33	13	53	0	15
1850-1860	17	17	50	17	6
1870-1880	0	14	72	14	7
1890-1920	0	22	22	56	9
South Central:					
1790-1840	0	50	50	0	8
1850-1860	7	29	50	14	14
1870-1880	14	14	72	0	7
1890-1920	0	30	60	10	10

Gilmore held that it was confined to *smaller* cities: "Segregation in the small city is modified by the 'back-yard' arrangements of White-Negro residences, a pattern which has survived from an earlier day of low-wage domestic servants [living] close at hand to their white employers."[21] Actually, Table 4 reveals that the association between age and level of segregation holds for only the smaller size class. Thus Demerath and Gilmore appear to be more nearly correct.

[21] Demerath and Gilmore, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

Table 5 introduces a control over the proportion non-white in the city's population. The association between age and level of segregation is particularly evident among those southern cities with a low proportion (25 per cent or less) non-white. The pattern is somewhat less clear, but still evident, among the other cities containing relatively larger numbers of non-whites.

Table 6 presents the zero-order correlation coefficients for all pairs of variables used in the analysis, including the four al-

TABLE 4

1960 SEGREGATION INDEXES BY AGE OF CITY (YEAR FIRST REPORTED IN CENSUS) AND 1960 CITY SIZE FOR SEVENTY-SIX SOUTHERN CITIES

1960 City Size and Year First Reported in Census	Segregation Index, 1960				N (=100 Per Cent)
	Less than 85.0	85.0–89.9	90.0–94.9	95.0 and Over	
112,000 and over:					
1790–1840	8	23	69	0	13
1850–1860	0	10	70	20	10
1870–1880	14	0	86	0	7
1890–1920	0	38	38	25	8
Under 112,000:					
1790–1840	40	30	30	0	10
1850–1860	20	40	30	10	10
1870–1880	0	29	57	14	7
1890–1920	0	18	46	36	11

TABLE 5

1960 SEGREGATION INDEXES BY AGE OF CITY (YEAR FIRST REPORTED IN CENSUS) AND 1960 PER CENT NON-WHITE FOR SEVENTY-SIX SOUTHERN CITIES

1960 Per Cent Non-White and Year First Reported in Census	Segregation Index, 1960				N (=100 Per Cent)
	Less than 85.0	85.0–89.9	90.0–94.9	95.0 and Over	
High (26–55 per cent):					
1790–1840	22	17	61	0	18
1850–1860	9	18	46	27	11
1870–1880	0	0	80	20	5
1890–1920	0	0	75	25	4
Low (2–25 per cent):					
1790–1840	20	60	20	0	5
1850–1860	11	33	56	0	9
1870–1880	11	22	67	0	9
1890–1920	0	33	33	33	15

ternative measures of age. Few of the coefficients are very large. The four measures of age, of course, are rather highly correlated with each other. All four, in turn, show negative associations with levels of segregation. Finally, while there are modest associations (*a*) between age and per cent non-white and (*b*) between age and size, the remaining three coefficients are quite low.

TABLE 6

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SEVENTY-SIX SOUTHERN CITIES

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Segregation index	....	−.038	.053	−.309	−.341	−.281	−.240
(2) City size	....	....	.146	.240	.455	.595	.702
(3) Per cent non-white	....	....	....	.447	.485	.452	.366
(4) Age A*	....	....	....	....	.835	.658	.532
(5) Age B†	....	....	....	....	....	.919	.811
(6) Age C‡	....	....	....	....	....	....	.913
(7) Age D§	....	....	....	....	....	....	....

* Decades since city was first reported in census.
† Decades since city first reached 10,000 population.
§ Decades since city first reached 50,000 population.
‡ Decades since city first reached 25,000 population.

TABLE 7

SUMMARY OF PARTIAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS: 1960 SEGREGATION INDEX, 1960 CITY SIZE PER CENT NON-WHITE, AND AGE OF CITY (YEAR FIRST REPORTED IN CENSUS) FOR SEVENTY-SIX SOUTHERN CITIES

Independent Variable	Controlled Variables	Partial Correlation Coefficient	β-Coefficients	*t*-Statistics
Size	Per cent non-white and age	.031	.029	0.259
Per cent non-white	Size and age	.223	.237	1.942
Age	Per cent non-white and size	−.371	−.422	−3.392

Note.—Dependent variable: 1960 segregation index; multiple correlation coefficient (*R*): .326 (corrected for 72 d f.).

Table 7 summarizes the results of a multiple-regression analysis utilizing the first measure of age—the number of decades in which each city has appeared in the census. It will be seen that age "survives" the control of city size and per cent non-white. Although tests of significance are not really appropriate here, it may be worth noting that a *t* of −3.392 is well above that specified at the .01 level. In any case, despite the passage of a century since the Civil War, we can be reasonably confident that age of the city is a rather potent factor in affecting its current level of segregation.[22]

One last fact concerns the direction and extent of change in levels of segregation in southern cities according to age. Index values for 1940, 1950, and 1960 are available in the Taeuber and Taeuber volume for a smaller number of southern cities. Table 8 reveals that there is not a perfectly regular pattern according to age of city in the average extent of change in segregation over the past two decades. For the 1940–50 interval there is a suggestion of greater

[22] Actually, the second measure of age (number of decades with a population of 10,000 or more) shows even higher values. For example, *R* is .411, and the partial correlation of age and segregation (holding constant size and per cent non-white) is — .446, or — .567 in standardized form.

increases among the newer cities. Between 1950 and 1960, however, no such pattern appears; indeed, the only cities to show declining index values are the newest ones. In general, then, one would be well advised to conclude that there is no clear-cut tendency. Whether a southern city is old or young, segregation has been increasing over the last two decades.

CONCLUSIONS

We found that older southern cities are generally less segregated residentially than the newer ones in the same broad region. Moreover, this differential tends to persist when other relevant factors are controlled. The direction of differences found in levels of segregation by age is that expected on the basis of most discussions of the topic in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, however, this study presents the first large-scale statistical documentation of a relationship that previously had been based mainly on case studies of individual southern cities or on impressionistic observation.

TABLE 8

MEAN CHANGES IN SEGREGATION INDEXES, 1940–50 AND 1950–60, BY AGE OF CITY (YEAR FIRST REPORTED IN CENSUS), FOR FORTY-FIVE SOUTHERN CITIES

Year First Reported in Census	Mean Changes in Segregation Index		N
	1940–50	1950–60	
1790–1820	+2.4	+2 6	9
1830–1840	+3.4	+2.9	7
1850–1860	+4.4	+2.4	12
1870–1880	+3 2	+2.7	12
1890–1900	+5.8	−0 9	5
All	+3.7	+2.2	45

What are the implications of these findings? Residential segregation is fundamental to other patterns of separation of subgroups in a population; this holds for different social strata and other pairs of ethnic groups as well as for whites and nonwhites.[23] With respect to whites and Negroes, Myrdal long ago observed that "residential segregation is basic in a mechanical sense. It exerts an influence in an indirect and impersonal way: because Negro people do not live near white people, they cannot —even if they otherwise would—associate with each other in the many activities founded on common neighborhood."[24] The operation of a factor like the age of a city operates in an even more "indirect and impersonal way." It is a factor over which there is no control; patterns established decades in the past continue to exert an influence. We would not argue that older southern cities actually manifest a substantially higher degree of white-Negro interaction because of their somewhat less segregated patterns. The potential is there, however, and it may register in a subtle fashion. Casual observation leads to the impression that racial turmoil has been somewhat less pronounced in older southern cities than in newer ones.[25]

The sheer age of a city may exercise an influence in many ways. It is our conviction that numerous contemporary effects of past

[23] Alan B. Wilson, "Residential Segregation of Social Classes and Aspirations of High School Boys," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December, 1959), 836–45.

[24] Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 618.

[25] The role of conscious policy decisions is unknown. A recent discussion of ante bellum southern cities describes the low level of segregation in "every city in Dixie" early in the nineteenth century and holds that "the purpose of this residential mixture was not, of course, to integrate the community but rather to prevent the growth of a cohesive Negro society. Local authorities used every available weapon to keep the blacks divided; housing was simply the physical expression of this racial policy." We are asked to believe that this policy of residential integration changed, however, for by 1860 "a system of segregation had grown up in the cities. Indeed, the whites thought some such arrangement was necessary if they were to retain their traditional supremacy over the Negroes" (Richard C. Wade, *Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820–1860* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1964], pp. 75, 277). Despite this unexplained contradiction, Wade's account is the most thorough and perceptive account available of Negro life in prewar southern cities.

developments can be assessed in meaningful ways:

One can conceive a model of "incremental growth and residues," wherein *the timing of major periods of growth* may be the crucial factor in accounting for the differences and similarities among metropolitan communities and their areal parts. The growth rings observable in a tree's trunk tell us not only its age, but also something of its year-to-year experience, whether favorable or unfavorable. It is commonplace to remark on the differences between pre- and post-auto cities, at least with respect to general form and physical structure. If one adds some attention to the historical variations in the style and architectural design of homes, shops, and factories, much of the physical appearance of contemporary metropolitan communities can be understood by reference to their periods of florescence.[26] [Italics in original.]

At a time when urban historians are being exhorted to give heed to research and theory generated by social scientists,[27] it is at least equally appropriate to suggest that economists, political scientists, and sociologists might pay closer attention to history.

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[26] Leo F. Schnore, "Urban Form: The Case of the Metropolitan Community," in Werner Z. Hirsch (ed.), *Urban Life and Form* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), p. 181.

[27] Eric E. Lampard, "American Historians and the Study of Urbanization," *American Historical Review*, LVII (October, 1961), 49–61, and Eric E. Lampard, "Urbanization and Social Change: On Broadening the Scope and Relevance of Urban History," in Oscar Handlin and John Burchard (eds.), *The Historian and the City* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press and Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 225–47.

Command, Control, and Charisma: Reflections on Police Bureaucracy

David J. Bordua and Albert J. Reiss, Jr.

ABSTRACT

This paper examines several features of American police systems that account for some variation and change in command structures and the personal charisma of the chief. Ways that the bureaucratization of the police have served to commit officers to an occupational organization, to an occupational community, and to norms of subordination and service in such a way that these commitments take precedence over extra-occupational ones are also examined. The significance of status honor and occupational prestige for the American police is discussed in this context.

Bureaucratization can be regarded as an organizational technique whereby civic pressures are neutralized from the standpoint of the governing regime. In the development of the modern police, bureaucratization has been a major device to commit members to the occupational organization, to the occupational community, and to its norms of subordination and service to a degree where these commitments take precedence over extra-occupational ones to family and community.

The political neutrality and legal reliability of the police in modern societies are less a matter of the social sources of their recruitment than of the nature of internal organization, training, and control. While this, of course, is true for all government organizations under a civil service or tenure system, it is true for the police not primarily because they are civil servants in the restricted sense but because of their allegiance to an occupationally organized community that sets itself apart. The situation is particularly crucial for the police since they often are called upon to enforce laws that are unpopular with the public or for which they have no personal sympathy, while at the same time they are armed and organized. Perhaps this fundamental significance of police bureaucratization can be seen by the fact that given a well-organized, well-disciplined, and internally well-regulated police, civil authorities can count on the police if they are assured of the political loyalty or neutrality of the commander. Indeed, the modern police emerged under conditions whereby they were an organized source of stability between the elites and the masses, serving to draw hostility from the elites to themselves and thereby permitting more orderly relations among the elites and the masses.[1]

COMMAND SYSTEMS

To our knowledge, there is no detailed empirical description of command processes in a police department. It is necessary, therefore, to rely largely on published discourses that give information on the rhetoric of command and control and that are of variable and unknown validity as descriptions of behavior.[2]

Police literature emphasizes the quasi-military nature of police-command relations, and casual observation in metropoli-

[1] Alan Silver, "On the Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of Urban Crime, Police and Riot in England" (to be published in David J. Bordua [ed.], *The Police* [New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966]), p. 11.

[2] See, for example, Bruce Smith, *Police Systems in the United States* (2d rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), esp. chaps. vii–ix.

tan police departments indicates that police officials are highly sensitive to "orders from above" and to probabilities of official disapproval of behavior. In principle and in rhetoric, a police organization is one characterized by strict subordination, by a rigid chain of command, by accountability of command, and more doubtfully, by a lack of formal provision for consultation between ranks.

Before accepting this description of its structure uncritically, it is necessary to say that such statements are meaningful only by comparison. We have relatively little data comparing the operating as opposed to the rhetorical nature of command in different types of organizations. In many ways, policing is a highly decentralized operation involving the deployment of large numbers of men alone or in small units where control by actual command, that is, by issuing orders, is difficult. This problem is generally recognized by top police administrators, leading to their stressing the importance of accountability of command to achieve control. O. W. Wilson puts it this way:

> Authority is delegated by some form of command; responsibility is effectively placed by some form of control. . . . The effective placing of responsibility or the act of holding accountable involves an evaluation of the manner in which the authority was exercised, hence the rule of control: *He who gives an order must ascertain that it has been properly executed.*
>
> It is relatively easy to delegate authority by giving a command, but to ascertain the manner in which the order was carried out so that the subordinate may be held responsible is often difficult.[3]

Other evidence from the police literature suggests that the description is overdrawn, that both internal and external transactions structure the effective range of command and control. Moreover, as J. Q. Wilson points out, it seems clear that the variations between "system-oriented" as opposed to "professionalized" departments includes fundamental differences in styles of control.[4]

Historical changes in the nature of police work and organization have increased the importance of more subtle and perhaps more important developments in methods of control. In the dialectic of dispersion versus centralization of command, every development in the technology for police control of the population is accompanied by changes in the capacity of the organization to control its members. Originally the bell, creaker, or rattle watches were limited in summoning help to the effective range of their "noise"; the addition of "calling the hours" served to monitor the behavior of the patrol (quite generally open to question).[5] Here we see evidence of a classic and continuing dilemma in organizations—that to control subordinates they must be required to make themselves visible. For the police, this means that when they become visible they likewise become more calculable to potential violators. Control of the dispersed police was really difficult before the call box that simultaneously enabled patrolmen to summon help and enabled commanders to issue calls and require periodic reporting.[6] The cruising car with two-way radio enabled still greater dispersion and flexibility in the allocation of patrols, while at the same time bringing the patrolman or

[3] O. W. Wilson, *Police Administration* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950), p. 59.

[4] James Q. Wilson, "The Police and Their Problems: A Theory," in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris (eds.), *Public Policy, XII* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 189–216.

[5] Selden D. Bacon, "The Early Development of American Municipal Police: A Study of the Evolution of Formal Controls in a Changing Society" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1939).

[6] The innovation of the police patrol and signal service in Chicago in 1880 brought forth considerable resistance and indignation from the police patrol precisely because it made possible closer supervision of the patrol (see John Joseph Flynn, *History of the Chicago Police: From the Settlement of the Community to the Present Time* [Chicago: Police Book Fund, 1887], chap. xx).

team more nearly within the range of constant control. It is now a fundamental duty of the radio patrol officer to remain "in contact," that is, controllable.

More important, perhaps, is the fact that a centralized radio communication system, where telephoned complaints are received and commands given, makes it possible for top management to have independent knowledge of complaints and of who is assigned to them before either subordinate commanders or the patrol team does. A minimum of centralized control is available, then, not simply by the the direct issuance of commands from superior to subordinate but by means of a paper-matching process whereby the complaint board's written record can be matched with the written record the patrolman is required to generate. This pattern of control by centralized communication and internal organizational audit is highly dependent upon the distribution of telephones in the population. The citizen's telephone enables the police commander to enlist the complainant—on a routine basis—as part of the apparatus for control of the policeman. A citizen's opportunity to mobilize the police is intricately balanced with that of the commander.

Added to these matters of task organization, in large police departments, the chief's power to command and control is limited by a complex system of "due process" that protects subordinates. This, of course, is true of all civil service organizations. The strong interest in keeping the police "out of politics" coupled with the interest of the rank and file in job security, however, creates a situation where, formally, the department head must contend with legally empowered authorities in the selection, promotion, and discharge of personnel. Even in matters of internal assignment and definition of task, decisions may impinge on the civil service classification system. Police employee organizations, likewise, are quite effective in seeing to it that the system of "due process" continues to protect them. The individual officer, furthermore, when accused of wrongdoing or a crime, demands all the legal safeguards he may deny to those whom he accuses of committing a crime.

Not all police operations are constituted in the fashion of this highly oversimplified picture of so-called routine patrol. Detectives, for example, are less subject to such control. But these considerations of due-process barriers to centralized command and historical changes in control procedures that rely less on actual command as a form of control are intended to raise questions about the sociological meaning of the stress generally placed on command and to lay the ground for a somewhat more systematic analysis of it.

FORMS OF LEGITIMATION

Thus far, "command" has been used in two senses. In one, "command" refers to a technique of control in organizations that consists of "giving commands." The directive communication between superior and subordinate may be called "a command," or, if more impersonally clothed, "an order." In another sense, however, "command" means neither a specific technique of control nor an instance of its use, but something more general—a principle that legitimates orders, instructions, or rules. Orders, then, are obeyed *because* they are "commanded."

Sociologists are familiar with discussions of this type ever since Weber.[7] In Weberian terms, the police department "as an order" is legitimated by the principle of command. Each form of legitimation, however, as Weber so clearly saw, has a correlative requirement of "attitude" on the part of those subject to its sway. In the case of "an order" legitimated by a rhetoric of command, the correlative expectation is "obedience"—again not as a situational expectation in the case of a given specific command but as a principle relating member to organization. To be "obedient" in this sense carries the same general sense of principle as in the "poverty, chastity, and obedience"

[7] Talcott Parsons (ed.), *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 324 ff.

of the monk's vow. In a system so legitimated, we can expect that commitment to obedience will be displayed as a sign of membership.

It is not surprising, then, that social scientists who are based in organizations where independence is legitimated, rehabilitation workers based in those where professional discretion and supportiveness are legitimated, and police who are based in organizations where obedience is legitimated so often fail to communicate with one another when they are engaged in exchanges of ideologies.

We may point out as well that in orders legitimated by command and exacting obedience, the classic status reward is "honor." The morale and public-relations problems of the American police can be more clearly understood as an attempt to substitute public prestige sought in an occupational performance market for the Weberian status regard sought and validated in the "honor market." The American police are denied both, for the public seems unwilling to accord the police status either in the European sense of status honor as representatives of the State or in the more typically American sense of prestige based on a claim to occupational competence.

Command as a basis for legitimacy can be located under any of the three basic types of legitimation discussed by Weber—the rational-legal, the traditional, and the charismatic. Inherently, however, command as a principle focuses on the commander, and the exact nature of the concrete "order" legitimated by the principle of command will depend on the role of the specific commander. Because of this commander focus, the command principle is likely to lead to a mystique of the personal commander and an organizational stress on legitimating specific orders or even general rules as emanating from him.

COMMAND AND TASK ORGANIZATION

To regard a metropolitan police system solely in terms of the classic features of the hierarchically oriented command bureaucracy would be mistaken, however. Although the more traditional police departments in American cities are organized on quasi-military command principles, modernized ones display features of other control systems, particularly those of centralized and professional control structures.

The core of the modern metropolitan police system is the communications center, linking as it does by radio dispatch the telephoned demands of a dispersed population with a dispersed police in mobile units. The technology of the radio, the telephone, the recorder, and the computer permits a high degree of central control of operating units in the field. The more modern police departments, for example, have tape records of all citizen phone complaints, the response of dispatch to them, and the action of mobile units. This technology also makes possible reporting directly to a centralized records unit. Indeed, the more rationalized police-command systems make extensive use of the computer as a centralized intelligence system to which mobile units can make virtually direct inquiry, as a "decision-maker" about which units are to be dispersed for what service, and as a source of intelligence on the output of personnel and units in the department. Such a centralized and direct system of command and control makes it possible to bypass many positions in the hierarchical command structure, particularly those in the station command. More and more, those in the line of authority assume work supervision or informal adjudicatory rather than strictly command roles.

There undeniably is considerable variability among internal units of a police department in the degree to which they are centrally commanded such that routine patrol is more subject to central command than are tactical or investigation units. Yet, all in all, there is a growing tendency for all internal units to operate under programed operations of a central command rather than under local commanders. Orders not only originate with the central command but pass directly from it.

The centralization of command and control is one of the major ways that American police chiefs have for coping with the tendency toward corruption inherent in traditional hierarchically organized departments. Chiefs no longer need rely to the same extent upon the station commander to implement the goals of the department through the exercise of command. Indeed, a major way that corrupt departments are reformed these days is to reduce the command operations of local commanders, replacing them with centralized command and control. Yet it is precisely in those operations where corruption is most likely to occur, namely, the control of vice, that a centralized command is least effective. The main reason for this is that a centralized command lends itself best to a reactive strategy, whereas a prefessionalized or hierarchically organized command lends itself to a proactive strategy. Vice requires an essentially proactive strategy of policing in the modern metropolis, whereas the citizens' command for service demands an essentially reactive strategy and tactics.

A central command not only bypasses traditional hierarchical command relations but, like the hierarchical command, creates problems for the developing professionalized control in police systems. A professionalized model of control respects a more or less decentralized decision-making system where the central bureaucracy, at best, sets general policy and principles that guide the professional. Indeed, many police tasks and decisions would appear to lend themselves to a professional as well as technical role relationship with the client.

Yet, the institutionalized and legally defined role of the police formally denies professional discretion to them in decisions of prosecution and adjudication, granting them to professional lawyers. The "professionalizing" police, therefore, are formally left only with certain decisions regarding public order, safety, service, and arrest. These formal prohibitions coupled with the new technology and centralized command (developed under the banner of professionalization of the police) both serve to decrease rather than enhance discretionary decision-making by subordinates. Police organizations become "professionalized," not their members.

COMMAND AND OCCUPATIONAL CULTURE

The internal organizational life of American police departments displays features which distinguish the police from other organizations and which have important implications for the nature of organizational command. These features are the familial and/or ethnic inheritance of occupation, the almost exclusive practice of promotion from within, the large number of formal voluntary organizations that cut across organizational membership, and, finally, the existence of legal protections for tenure which inhere in civil service regulations.

Specific police jobs differ; yet it is quite important to recognize that, fundamentally, police status overrides these differentiations. Not only does the basic status override lateral differentiations, but it also tends to override differences in rank. Police occupational culture, unlike the situation in industry, unites rather than divides ranks.

This is perhaps the most fundamental significance of the practice of promoting from within. The fact that all police-command personnel came up through the ranks means not only that there is relatively little class distinction among police but that the sharp differences between managers and workers in industry is less apparent for the police.[8]

In addition to the vertical spread of police occupational culture due to promotion from within, local recruitment tends to entrench any specific department's version of the more general occupational culture.

[8] The more professionalized a police department, however, the more it displays manager-worker differences common in industry. The police in the line symbolize this by referring to those on the staff as "empty holster———." The occupational culture holds, nevertheless, for police personnel in staff and line versus the non-sworn personnel, the latter commonly being referred to as "civilians."

This combination of occupational culture and organizational culture produces what J. Q. Wilson referred to as "system-oriented" departments.[9]

Interlinked with the features of local recruitment and internal promotion is the factor of familial and ethnic inheritance of the police occupation. Many occupations are strongly based in ethnicity, and many organizations have widespread kinship bonds; indeed, some companies advertise the fact. The consequences, however, are more exaggerated in the police, partly because police culture emphasizes distance between the occupation and the general community but, more importantly we suspect, because of the relative lack of vertical differentiation. Thus, police corruption can become spread up precisely because of this lack of differentiation.

Finally, the development of civil service can mean that a rather rigid formal, legal shell is erected around occupational and organizational cultures in a way that makes the exercise of command from the top even more difficult than it would otherwise be. The reform chief must choose his command from among those who began tenure under his predecessors. And except for retirement, "resignation," or formal dismissal proceedings, he is left with the cadre of the "old department."

It should be noted, however, that occupational and organizational cultures and the reinforcing solidarities provided by formal organizations like the Fraternal Order of Police and by the legal protections of civil service have another side. They make possible the existence of police systems which function at least moderately well over long periods in a society notoriously inhospitable to police; indeed, they are partially a defensive response to that inhospitability. While they may inhibit modernization and reform, they do insure that the job will get done somehow. More importantly, they provide the irreplaceable minimum structural conditions for at least the basic elements of status honor. They provide the essential precondition for a sense of honor—a relatively closed, secure community (not just organization) of functionaries who can elaborate and apply honor-conferring criteria.

These internal solidarities create special barriers to the effective exercise of command over and above the features of task organization previously discussed. They become particularly significant in attempts at modernization or reform. The police commander ignores this internal culture at his peril. It can confront him with an opposition united from top to bottom.

The modernizing chief is constrained, therefore, to make at least symbolic obeisance to police solidarity by demonstrating that he is a "cop's cop" as well as a devotee of systems analysis and psychological screening of applicants. One of the ways he does so is by emphasis in his dress and bearing—the policeman's chief social tool—the ability to command personal respect.[10] At least during a period of change, personal charisma and "presence" are of particular significance. He must also make his orders stick, of course.

The reform chief's charisma is of special significance because of the objective uncertainty of obedience but also because reform depends on the co-operation of a cadre of immediate subordinates whose careers may depend upon the chief's success. His certainty becomes their hope.

COMMAND AND CIVIL ACCOUNTABILITY

The structure of command is affected not only by elements of task organization and technology and by the features of occupational and organizational culture discussed above but also by the relationship between the chief and his civil superiors. In the case of the American municipality, police chiefs, at least traditionally, both at law and in practice, are politically accountable officials

[9] James Q. Wilson, *op. cit.*

[10] The ability to command respect personally is more necessary in America than in Britain where police command more respect officially (see Michael Banton, *The Policeman in the Community* (New York: Basic Books, 1965).

who ordinarily stand or fall with the fortunes of their civilian superiors (who are lodged in external systems). Given the often controversial nature of police work, and the often "irrational" and unpredictable nature of political fortunes in municipal government, the American police chief who is responsible to a politically elected official comes close to the position of a "patrimonial bureaucrat" in Weber's terms. His tenure as chief, though not necessarily his tenure in the department, depends on continuing acceptability to the elected official(s).

We have alluded to some of the dimensions along which police departments and their command processes seem to vary—using terms like "modernized," "rationalized," "reformed." It would be possible to indicate other dimensions which intersect these by referring to department age, growth rate, and other variables as well as environmental context variables such as variations in civic culture—comparing, for example, Los Angeles and San Francisco. It is not our intention, however, to attempt a systematic comparative scheme. In the case of the problem of civic accountability, however, it is possible to use some of the material presented thus far to begin development of such a scheme.

The relations of police commanders to civil superiors are actually more varied and complex than those depicted above. We shall discuss briefly only the two most important dimensions of variation: the security of tenure of the chief commander and the degree to which he is held strictly accountable by a mayor. Given strict accountability plus insecurity of tenure, we can expect a kind of obsession with command and a seemingly "irrational" emphasis on the twinned symbols of the visibility of the commander and the obedience of the force. Some of the rhetoric of command in the police literature likely arises from an attempt to "protect" the chief by the compulsive effort to "overcontrol" subordinates, almost any of whom can get him fired. This amounts to saying that as civil superiors increase the formal accountability of the police chief *without changing* the tenure features of the role, the increasing bureaucratization of the American municipal police stressed by J. Q. Wilson leads to the development of an organization animated by a principle of the commanding person.[11] This "personalized subordination" to the "Hero Chief" can become an operating, if not a formal, principle of organization.[12]

Increased professionalization can be another accommodative strategy in such a situation, but this time aimed not at control of the force but at control of the mayor by changing the grounds of accountability. One of the first jobs of the "professionalizing" police chief often is to convince his civil superior that "you can't win 'em all" and that it is irrational and "unprofessional" to dismiss a police chief or commissioner because of failure to solve some particular crime. Perhaps, in the long run, it is hard to have a professionalized police without a professionalized mayor. Perhaps also, this would lead us to expect different kinds of command styles where a professional city manager intervenes between the chief and the mayor.

If the civil superior, for whatever reason, does not demand accountability from the chief, the quasi-formalized obsession with "command" as a principle of control may be replaced by a complex system of feudal loyalties. In this situation, ties of personal political fealty between chief and mayor—or between chief and the local "powers"—may become prominent and "keep your nose clean" the principle of subordination.

[11] James Q. Wilson, *op. cit.*

[12] One study reports that, as compared with welfare workers and school teachers, policemen were more likely to personalize authority (Robert L. Peabody, "Perceptions of Organizational Authority: A Comparative Analysis," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VI [March, 1962], 477–80; see also Elaine Cumming, Ian M. Cumming, and Laura Edell, "Policeman as Philosopher, Guide and Friend," *Social Problems*, XII [Winter, 1965], 276–97).

When this trend goes beyond a certain point, the department is commonly described as politically corrupt. Finally, to the degree that the chief is secure in his tenure, we would expect the obsession with command and the emphasis on personalized subordination to decrease.

On the basis of this analysis of command and the position of the chief we may distinguish the four types of departments (Table 1).

We have consciously chosen words such as "feudality" with outrageously large quotas of surplus meaning since the concern here is to direct attention to features of police organization that receive relatively little attention and to questions of fundamental differences in the consequences of organizational membership between police and other organizations.[13]

A word about two of these types seems in order. The command-feudality type seems a contradiction in terms (and indeed derives from the cross-classification itself). Some small municipal and sheriff's departments, where the tenure of the chief in the local "feudal political structure" is secure, may fall here. Because everyone is secure in a relatively non-bureaucratic system, the operating principle of subordination can be command. Such an arrangement possibly characterizes the exceptionally long-tenure chiefs discovered in Lunden's study in Iowa.[14]

The "personalized command bureaucracy" seems likely to occur where an insecure reform head is in office. To reform successfully he must bureaucratize and rationalize administrative operations. To do this against the inevitable internal resistance he must emphasize the principle of command. To make clear that status quo-oriented commanders have been superseded he must emphasize *his* command and his *capacity* to command. In *short*, he must exercise what Selznick defines as one of the crucial functions of leadership in administration. He must define the emerging character of the institution.[15]

CONCLUSION

We have discussed features of American police systems that may account for variations in and possible changes in command structures and also features that account for both a rhetorical and behavioral emphasis not on one or the other formal command system but on something which seemingly appears as alien and contradictory—the personal charisma of the chief and the emphasis on personalized command as a symbolic, if not actual, principle of order.

TABLE 1

TYPES OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS

RELATION TO MAYOR	TENURE OF CHIEF	
	Secure	Insecure
Strictly accountable..........	Command bureaucracy	Personalized command bureaucracy
Feudal allegiance	Command feudality	Personalized "political" feudality

Command, obedience, and honor ring strangely in analysis of organizational life in America except, perhaps, for the military. Yet it seems to us that meaningful analysis of the police must touch upon them as well as upon duty, courage, and restraint. The self-image of the police is different because of them. We have already alluded to the fact that the status reward for obedience is honor and that the maintenance of honor requires a status com-

[13] This typology owes much to the analysis of labor unions in Harold L. Wilensky, *Intellectuals in Labor Unions* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956).

[14] Walter A. Lunden, "The Mobility of Chiefs of Police," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science,* XLIX (1958), 178–83.

[15] Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957).

munity—not simply a formal organization.[16]

The significance of honor is that it lies at the heart of the necessary police virtues —courage, devotion to duty, restraint, and honesty. In the absence of ritually symbolic auspices such as the European State or the English Crown, the personal charisma of chiefs is a necessary transitional step to an occupationally based community of honor. In the long run, such status honor, not only occupational prestige, is one fundamental answer to police corruption.[17] In the short run, it means that successful police commanders must attempt not to have the police reflect the society but transcend it.

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[16] Military honor is similarly communal and not just organizational (Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960], esp. chaps. iv and v).

[17] M. McMullen, "A Theory of Corruption," *Sociological Review*, IX (1961), 181–201.

Loyalty to Immediate Superior at Alternate Hierarchical Levels in a Bureaucracy

V. V. Murray and Allan F. Corenblum

ABSTRACT

Blau and Scott's hypothesis that loyalty to superiors in a hierarchical organization tends to be pronounced at alternate levels was tested in a large staff department of a public-utility head office. In addition, the relationship of subordinate loyalty to the degree of the superior's hierarchical independence and superior's source of social support was also examined. Blau and Scott's hypothesis was found not to hold, nor was there any relationship between loyalty and superior's hierarchical independence. A significant positive relationship was found between loyalty and perception by the superior of the subordinate group as the primary source of social support.

One of the more intriguing of the numerous untested hypotheses developed by Blau and Scott in their recent book is the following:

> . . . *loyalty to superiors in a hierarchical organization would be pronounced on alternate levels.* If a manager does not command the loyalty of the section chiefs under him, it will be particularly important for them to obtain social support by commanding the loyalty of their subordinates, the first line supervisors. And if a section chief is successful in establishing supportive working relationships with the supervisors under him, the incentive of these supervisors to win the allegiance and respect of their subordinates will be reduced. Hence, *the orientations of alternate hierarchical levels would be similar and those of adjacent levels different.*[1] [Italics ours.]

This loyalty-at-alternate-levels hypothesis is based primarily on two prior hypotheses tested and supported by the authors' own research in two social service agencies: (1) supervisors who had the loyalty of their subordinates were less likely to look to their superiors for social support; (2) supervisors who were hierarchically independent tended to have more loyal subordinates than those who were not.

In both cases the underlying rationale for deriving the alternate-levels hypothesis seems to be that, if a supervisor has subordinates who express loyalty to him, he will have (*a*) little need to seek social support from his superior and (*b*) little need to be dependent upon his superior. Thus he will not need to express loyalty to him. Because he does not *need* to express loyalty he will not *feel* it. His superior, on the other hand, if deprived of the loyalty of most of his subordinate supervisory group in this way, will feel dependent on *his* superior and will seek his social support. Consequently he will both need to express loyalty to him and feel it. Proceeding up the hierarchy, therefore, loyalty to an immediate superior will tend to be high, low, high, low, etc., that is, to be pronounced on alternate levels.

The following study was designed to test this alternate-levels hypothesis as well as attempt to replicate several other findings of Blau and Scott having to do with relationships between loyalty and various aspects of supervisory behavior.[2]

[1] Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 162–63.

[2] The complete study is reported in A. F. Corenblum, *Loyalty in a Formal Organization* (unpublished M.B.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, June, 1964). Only those variables that Blau and Scott relate to the alternate levels hypothesis are discussed here.

METHOD

The data for the study were gathered in a questionnaire survey of a single, large (360 employees) staff division in the headquarters of a publicly owned utility. The division contained seven hierarchical levels and twenty-five groups or discriminable units of a superior and five or more immediate subordinates. Questionnaires were sent to the homes of all division members with the exception of: those working in units of five employees or fewer; those who could not be readily identified as to their hierarchical level; and those for whom there was some ambiguity as to the identity of their immediate supervisor. A total of 152 usable questionnaires were returned. Responses were distributed throughout the divisional hierarchy as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES BY HIERARCHICAL LEVEL

	LEVEL						
	1 (N=1)	2 (N=7)	3 (N=30)	4 (N=48)	5 (N=118)	6 (N=103)	7 (N=53)
No. of respondents...	1	7	24	32	42	38	8

There are two reasons that the response distribution does not show a steady increase in numbers from levels 1 to 7 as one might expect it to do if it were a proportional sample of a pyramid-shaped organization structure:

1. Questionnaire returns were proportionately greater from personnel at the top of the hierarchy and fewer from those at the bottom, the latter being comprised primarily of large numbers of junior clerical and outside- and building-maintenance employees who responded poorly to the home-mailed questionnaire. In addition, those employees who had to be excluded from the survey because of confusion as to the identity of their immediate supervisor tended to be at the lower hierarchical levels; this was an especially difficult problem in the case of secretaries, for example.

2. Seven separate departments within the division were surveyed. These departments varied greatly in the number of hierarchical levels within them. Some had as few as two levels—that is, a department manager and some non-supervisory subordinates—while others had as many as six. Thus at level 3, for example, the total of twenty-four respondents might be comprised of two superintendents in a multilevel department, eight supervisors from several departments with no superintendent position interposed between them and the department manager, and fourteen non-supervisory employees from two departments in which the manager had no subordinate supervisory staff. The possible implications for the results of study of this differential distribution of authority and responsibility at the various hierarchical levels are considered in the "Discussion" section below.

Prior to the Blau and Scott analysis, the concept of subordinate loyalty to his immediate superior never had been explicitly discussed in the context of organization theory or investigated in research on organizational behavior. The meaning of the concept, therefore, has not been rigorously defined in earlier literature. Unfortunately, *Formal Organizations* does not define it in any explicit fashion either in spite of the role the concept plays as an important research variable. The closest the authors come is a list of synonymous terms inserted parenthetically in an other-

wise non-relevant sentence. The synonyms used are: "liking," "acceptance," and "respect" for one's supervisor.[3] Taken together they convey an affect-based definition of loyalty.

One can, of course, think of other common definitions of the term. At least two others come to mind: It may be used to mean a cognitive orientation to a supervisor in terms of holding a set of beliefs that embody an unquestioning faith and trust in him as a leader. Or it may be given a behavioral definition—loyalty as an actual or expressed willingness to remain with or follow one's supervisor.

Interestingly enough, from personal correspondence between the junior author and Professor Blau, it appears that in their *research*, the concept of loyalty was operationalized in behavioral terms. Subjects were asked to what extent they would be willing to move if they had the chance to do the same work for the same pay in another work group under the direction of another supervisor. Those preferring to stay were classed as loyal. Unfortunately this operationalization overlooks the attraction of other aspects of the present work setting, such as preference to remain with fellow workers or one's own group of subordinates, location of desk or office, etc.

It can be seen, then, that subordinate loyalty can be given an affective, cognitive, or behavioral definition. Furthermore, these conceptualizations might not vary concomitantly in an empirical investigation and also may have different determinants and effects on subordinate attitudes and behavior. To check this possibility in the study, loyalty was operationalized in four different ways in a questionnaire administered to the research sample:

1. The desire to remain under the influence of one's present supervisor[4]
2. Liking for one's supervisor (two questions)
3. Degree of faith and trust in the supervisor's ability (3 questions)
4. A direct expression of feeling of loyalty (1 question: "How much loyalty do you feel toward your boss?")

All were Likert-type questions with five response alternatives given scale values of 1–5.

Table 2 shows the intercorrelations of responses to the various loyalty measures. It can be seen that, although in general there are relatively satisfactory positive correlations between the items, they are far from perfect. They are highest between similarly worded items covering the same basic definition, that is, liking for and satisfaction with the boss (questions 3 and 4) and general confidence and trust in the boss and faith that he keeps subordinate's interests in mind in decision-making (questions 5 and 6). The most unambiguous behavioral definition of the concept (question 2—see n. 4) is least perfectly correlated with the affective and cognitive items. It is also interesting to note how relatively poorly it correlates with the Blau and Scott operationalized behavioral definition (question 1).

RESULTS

Loyalty at alternate hierarchical levels.—If loyalty to immediate superior should alternate between high and low according to the hierarchical level of the respondent, then the mean score of respondents at a given level should be significantly different from those on the levels immediately above and below. It follows that the scores for those respondents at alternate levels should be similar. One thus can test the alternate-levels hypothesis by combining the loyalty

[3] Blau and Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[4] Two questions were asked here. The first paralleled the Blau and Scott question: "If you had a chance to do the same kind of work for the same pay in another work group under the direction of another supervisor, how would you feel about moving?" The other attempted to control for other attractive aspects of the present work setting and get more directly at action orientations vis-à-vis the supervisor only: "If your boss was transferred and only you and you alone in your work group were given a chance to move with him (doing the same work at the same pay), how much would you feel like making the move?"

scores of hierarchical levels 1, 3, 5, and 7 and comparing them to the combined scores from levels 2, 4, and 6 using a *t*-test to estimate the significance of difference between the means. This comparison is shown in Table 3.

From Table 3 it can be seen that the hypothesis does not hold for any of the definitions of the loyalty concept. The only point at which it appears to hold is at the top of the hierarchy, where department heads (level 2) appear to be highly loyal to the division head on all measures, while the head, in turn, feels somewhat less loyal to his immediate superior. Unfortunately, a sample of eight is not quite sufficient as a basis for any generalizations regarding the validity of the alternate-levels hypothesis for top hierarchical levels only.

Loyalty of subordinates and supervisor's primary source of social support.—One of the bases of Blau and Scott's derivation of the alternate-levels hypothesis was their finding in a city social service agency that supervisors with loyal subordinates did not tend to look toward their superiors for social support, while the reverse held true for supervisors with low-loyalty subordinates. An attempt was made to replicate this finding by relating subordinate-loyalty scores to the following question asked of all those in supervisory positions: "With you at work are people at higher levels, lower levels, and the same level as you in the organization. If you were forced to choose, which group's friendship and respect would you say you value most (check *one* only): (1) my superior's; (2) my subordinates'; (3) those at the same level in the organization as I."

It was assumed that choice of the first alternative would indicate primary social support was seen as coming from the superior. Choices on this question were related to a loyalty score based on both the behavioral definition of the concept (Q1) and a composite loyalty score comprising mean responses to the seven questions based on the affective and cognitive definitions. The

TABLE 2

INTERCORRELATION AMONG MEAN SCALE VALUES ON QUESTIONS MEASURING LOYALTY TO IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR ($N = 152$)

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8
	Behavioral Definition							
Q1 Working in another group	....	.48	.65	.65	.63	.52	.42	.50
Q2 Moving with present boss	....	....	.49	.55	.47	.37	.29	.39
	Affective Definition							
Q3 Like working for boss	....	....	....	.82	.72	.64	.57	64
Q4 Satisfaction with boss	....	....	....	....	.73	.68	.51	.64
	Cognitive Definition							
Q5 Confidence and trust in boss	....	....	....	....	....	.78	.61	.64
Q6 Faith in boss keeping subordinate's interests in mind	....	....	....	....	....	....	.54	.51
Q7 Extent to which boss is seen as responsible for mistakes	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	.40
Q8 Amount of loyalty felt toward boss	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....

twenty-five supervisor-subordinate groups were dichotomized as loyal or not loyal depending on whether the mean group loyalty score fell above or below the middle score (3) on the 5-point scale.

Table 4 shows the results of this analysis. It can be seen that for both operationalizations of loyalty the results tend to support the Blau and Scott findings. There is a strong tendency for supervisors with loyal subordinates to value the friendship and respect of their subordinates over that of their superiors and peers.

Loyalty of subordinates and supervisor's hierarchical independence.—Another of the reasons Blau and Scott felt that subordinate loyalty would be pronounced on alternate hierarchical levels was due to the hypothesized effect of a supervisor's independence from his immediate superior. It was felt that authority figures whose subordinates behaved independently of them

TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF MEAN LOYALTY-TO-IMMEDIATE-SUPERVISOR SCORES ON ALTERNATE HIERARCHICAL LEVELS (BASED ON FOUR DEFINITIONS OF LOYALTY)

Hierarchical Level	Mean Loyalty Scores: Behavioral Definition (Q1)	Affect Definition (Q3,4)	Cognitive Definition (Q5,6,7)	Direct Definition (Q8)
1 ($N=1$)	2.5	2 5	3.5	4 0
2 ($N=7$)	4.5	4.1	3.9	4.7
3 ($N=24$)	3.3	4.0	3 8	4.3
4 ($N=32$)	3 0	3.3	3.7	4.2
5 ($N=42$)	3.6	3.6	3 8	3.9
6 ($N=38$)	3.5	3.8	3 5	4 4
7 ($N=8$)	3.7	3.5	3.5	3 6
Mean score:				
Levels 1, 3, 5, 7 ($N=75$)	3.3	3.4	3.6	3 9
Levels 2, 4, 6 ($N=77$)	3.7	3.7	3.7	4 4
t	0 16	0	0	0.20
p	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

TABLE 4

RELATIONSHIP OF SUBORDINATE GROUP LOYALTY TO SUPERVISOR'S PERCEIVED SOURCE OF SOCIAL SUPPORT ($N = 25$ GROUPS)

Source of Social Support	Behavioral Definition: Loyal ($N=11$)	Behavioral Definition: Not Loyal ($N=14$)	Composite Affective-Cognitive Definition: Loyal ($N=9$)	Composite Affective-Cognitive Definition: Not Loyal ($N=16$)
Superior	2	6	2	8
Subordinates	7	2	6	3
Peers	2	6	1	5
	$X^2=6.39$	$p<.05$	$X^2=6.13$	$p<.05$

would be forced to become dependent on their superiors and hence develop feelings of loyalty toward them, whereas the reverse would hold true for those with dependent subordinates. Results from the city-agency study supported this hypothesis—independent supervisors had more loyal subordinates than dependent supervisors.

Blau and Scott measured hierarchical independence in terms of the degree of perceived difference between a supervisor and his superior on five characteristics of role performance: rule boundedness, closeness of supervision, degree of formality in dealings with subordinates, knowledge of rules and procedures, degree of strictness.[5] A person was considered independent if he differed from his superior on two or more of the five characteristics.

In the present study hierarchical independence was measured in somewhat different fashion through the following question: "To what extent are you willing to change existing procedures without consulting your superior?" Alternatives ranged from "Never willing to change them" (scored 1) to "Never hesitate to change them" (scored 5). The relationship between the two measures of group loyalty and mean supervisory scores on this question is shown in Table 5. It can be seen that the hypothesis is not supported for either loyalty measure.

In addition to relating loyalty and hierarchical independence Blau and Scott were careful to cite Pelz' discussion of the influence of subordinate perception of the "goodness" of supervisory style in modifying the impact of the hierarchical independence variable.[6] Employee job satisfaction was maximally affected when considerate, helpful supervisory behavior was *combined* with "enough influence to make these behaviors pay off in terms of actual benefits for employees,"[7] that is, a high degree of hierarchical independence in decision-making. Perhaps, therefore, subordinate loyalty would be positively related to hierarchical independence only in those cases where the latter variable is combined with "good" supervisory practices.

TABLE 5

SUBORDINATE LOYALTY AND MEAN HIERARCHICAL INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERIORS (N = 25 GROUPS)

	BEHAVIORAL DEFINITION		COMPOSITE AFFECTIVE-COGNITIVE DEFINITION	
	Loyal (N = 11)	Not Loyal (N = 14)	Loyal (N = 9)	Not Loyal (N = 16)
Mean hierarchical-independence score	3.78	3.57	2 83	3 15
	t = .42	p = n.s.	t = 0.78	p = n.s.

To test this possibility, an attempt was made to estimate the "goodness" of a supervisor's style by combining responses to three questions dealing with: degree of subordinate liking for his superior; extent to which he feels his boss keeps him "fully and frankly informed"; and the extent to which his supervisor seeks his opinion in making decisions or solving problems. For

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 150.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 155.

[7] Donald C. Pelz, "Influence: A Key to Effective Leadership in the First Line Supervisor," *Personnel*, XXIX (1952), 209–17, esp. p. 215.

each supervisor this composite "goodness-of-supervision" score was then multiplied by his hierarchical-independence score. The closer the product of these two scores approached the maximum possible score of 25, the better Pelz's conditions for obtaining maximum employee satisfaction (and hence, presumably, loyalty) were met.

Table 6 shows the relationship of group loyalty to the style-independence scores. Although the differences are in the hypothesized direction, they do not approach acceptable levels of statistical significance utilizing a one-tailed *t*-test. Apparently the combination of hierarchical independence with perceived goodness of supervision has no more effect on subordinate loyalty than independence alone.

TABLE 6

RELATIONSHIP OF SUBORDINATE LOYALTY TO COMBINED MEASURE OF SUPERVISORY STYLE AND HIERARCHICAL INDEPENDENCE (N = 25 GROUPS)

	Behavioral Definition		Compositive Affective-Cognitive Definition	
	Loyal (N = 11)	Not Loyal (N = 14)	Loyal (N = 9)	Not Loyal (N = 16)
Style-independence scores.....	15.0	12.5	11.0	9.0
	t = .43	p = n.s.	t = .45	p = n.s.

DISCUSSION

What seemed to be a most useful hypothesis with wide generalizability in the organizational behavior field—that loyalty in a bureaucracy will tend to be pronounced at alternate levels of the hierarchy—was found to be invalid when tested in one large division of a public-utility organization.

The main reasons for this failure of the alternate-levels hypothesis seem to lie in the Blau and Scott analysis of the two major findings from which it was derived. The first of these was that subordinate loyalty is related to the supervisor's perception of "social support" (defined in affectual terms as liking for or approval of another). Blau and Scott's research and the present study found that supervisors who saw their subordinates as the primary source of social support tended to have more loyalty expressed toward them. This finding was used as a rationale for the alternate-levels hypothesis as follows: "Social support from subordinates probably lessens the supervisor's need to seek the support and approval of his supervisor";[8] that is, loyal subordinates obviate the need for a supervisor to feel loyalty toward his superior, hence such loyalty will not be felt. This reasoning overlooks the effects of pressure from the other direction—pressure on the supervisor from his superior to express loyalty to him regardless of the loyalty of the supervisor's subordinates. That such downward pressure does in fact exist has been widely postulated in other theoretical writings dealing with such concepts as role conflict,[9] compliance,[10] and "dual loyalty."[11] It has been demonstrated in

[8] Blau and Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

[9] See, e.g., Neal Gross, A. W. McEachern, and W. S. Mason, *Explorations in Role Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957).

[10] Etzioni discusses various kinds of pressures exerted by "elites" on "lower participants" in organizations. See Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1961).

[11] Purcell was one of the first to conclude that an employee could maintain generally positive feel-

empirical research by studies such as Dalton's participant-observation study of managerial behavior in three West Coast business organizations.[12]

Blau and Scott themselves recognize the tendency of superiors to press for expressions of personal loyalty from their subordinates in another section of their book in which they identify a positive relationship between loyalty and the use by the supervisor of "informal authority" (i.e., creating feelings of obligation among subordinates by selective differential enforcement of standing rules and controls). Studies by French and Snyder, by Lippitt, and the authors' city-agency study are cited to support the hypothesis that the greater the use of techniques of informal authority, the higher the subordinate loyalty.[13] The present study also found a positive relationship between these two variables. This relationship held irrespective of the fact that certain of the subordinates were also supervisors and themselves had loyal or disloyal subordinates.[14]

The other basis for the alternate-levels hypothesis was the relationship between subordinate loyalty and supervisory independence. The reasoning here was that a supervisor whose subordinates were dependent on him would not need to be dependent on his supervisor and that this hierarchical independence would obviate any need to feel loyal toward him. Conversely, independent (and hence low-loyalty) subordinates will cause a supervisor to form a dependent relationship with his superior with concomitant feelings of loyalty toward him. It can be seen that this rationale for the alternate-levels hypothesis is similar to that involving the social-support variable and therefore suffers from the same weaknesses. A superior may exert many pressures to create or sustain dependence and loyalty on the part of subordinate supervisors irrespective of the degree of dependence or loyalty of the supervisors' subordinates.

In the case of the hierarchical-independence variable, of course, not only is there a weakness in the rationale linking it to the alternate-levels hypothesis but the validity of the basic relationship between independence and subordinate loyalty itself may be questionable. In the city agency Blau found that four of the five supervisors classed as independent commanded high loyalty in their work group while only one of the seven others did. In the present study no difference was found between subordinate loyalty and the degree of the supervisor's dependence on his superior even when the possible modifying variable of supervisory style was taken into account. What might account for these divergent findings?

The most obvious explanation is the different operationalizations of the independence variable: Blau and Scott conceive it as the degree of similarity between superior and subordinate on five dimensions of supervisory style. Our measure was more broad in that it asked the supervisor to indicate the extent to which he made decisions and took actions without consulting his superior. In a sense both definitions are weak: dissimilarity in supervisory style is not necessarily the same as being free from a superior's control and domination; nor does infrequent consultation with a superior fully reflect freedom from his domination due to the possibility that the subordinate's behavior may be severely constrained by "impersonal" rules and controls originally designed by the superior. In any case, the two definitions of the hierarchical-independence variable are distinctly dissimilar, and this easily could be the cause of the divergent findings.

ings toward two entities which were frequently in conflict with one another and which exerted conflicting expectations on him. See Theodore Purcell, *The Worker Speaks His Mind on Company and Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).

[12] Melville Dalton, *Men Who Manage* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959).

[13] Blau and Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[14] Complete data on this finding can be found in Corenblum, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–76.

The other major explanation for the divergence is the possible effect of uncontrolled intervening or antecedent variables operating in the two organizations. Perhaps, for example, both degree of supervisory independence and degree of subordinate loyalty are affected by structural factors such as the nature of the tasks performed in the groups studied. Though space limitations prohibit pursuing this line of thought, it is clear that technological variables such as work-flow position, task complexity and conjunctivity, speed and control of work pace, permitted and required interaction in task completion, etc., have been shown recently to have a broader and deeper impact on almost all facets of organizational behavior than previously realized.[15] Again, there might be relatively consistent differences in background or personality characteristics of personnel in the two organizations which could manifest themselves in different values, goals, or needs which in turn could affect loyalty reactions to a given degree of hierarchical independence. Vroom, for example, has already shown how differential needs for independence in subordinates can affect their satisfaction with a participative supervisory style.[16]

A third general consideration bearing on the failure of the alternate-levels hypothesis in the present study is a methodological one. It was noted in the discussion of the structure of the particular organizational division studied that the various departments within it varied in the number of hierarchical levels each contained. Thus, in the seven levels found within the division, several of those in the middle contained a mixture of nonsupervisory, first-line supervisory, and higher-level executives. It is possible, therefore, that the differential amounts of responsibility and authority represented in these "mixed" levels could affect the felt loyalty to superior and thus distort the mean loyalty score for the level. Such a possibility implies, of course, that loyalty to superior is determined at least in part by the extent of the respondent's formal responsibility or authority or both. Such a hypothesis was not suggested by Blau and Scott as a potential modifying influence on the alternate-levels hypothesis. Nor was it possible to test it in the present study due to our inability to identify specific respondents to the survey questionnaire and thus categorize them in terms of their responsibility and authority. It therefore remains an as-yet-untested possibility.

One final and particularly instructive reason for the failure of the alternate-levels hypothesis lies in the authors' unwarranted *overgeneralization* of the research findings that dealt with loyalty between superiors and subordinates at the lower levels of the hierarchy only. (The Blau and Scott research dealt primarily with first-line supervisors, their non-supervisory subordinates—case workers—and their immediate superiors.) Ironically it has been Blau, himself, in a recently published article, who has drawn attention to the fact that the determinants of characteristics of whole organizations (such as over-all loyalty patterns) cannot be predicted from studying only a few of the organizational units or hierarchical levels.[17]

York University
and
British Columbia Telephone Company

[15] See Joan Woodward, *Management and Technology* (London: Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1958), and P. E. Breer and E. A. Locke, *Task Experience as a Source of Attitudes* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1965), for two of the more startling studies of little known effects of technology. Martin Meissner, in *Behavioral Adaptation to Technology* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1963), provides an excellent general survey of relationships between various aspects of technology and behavior.

[16] Victor H. Vroom, *Some Personality Determinants of the Effects of Participation* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960).

[17] P. M. Blau, "The Comparative Study of Organizations," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XVIII (April, 1965), 323–28, esp. p. 324.

Party Identification at Multiple Levels of Government[1]

M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi

ABSTRACT

Data from a local and a national survey suggest that mixed party identifiers—persons with divergent party identifications at different levels of government—represent an analytically useful addition to current party-identification classifications. Local identifications contribute disproportionately to these mixed patterns. Mixed identifiers are a hybrid type. They tend to be as highly politicized as strict partisans, but they vote more like consistent Independents. More mixed than consistent identifiers seem to be changing their basic party identifications. Federalism appears to be a contributing factor in weakening partisan loyalties and in shifting party affiliations.

Party identification—the degree of attachment to a political party—has come to play an important part in our understanding of political behavior, ranging from the individual's political attitudes and voting decisions to the stability of political systems.[2] The standard nomenclature includes such terms as "partisans" (or "party identifiers") and "Independents," "strong and weak partisans," "leaners," and "changers." In survey research, party identification has typically been determined by ascertaining the respondent's subjective affiliation with the party. One of the most widely used questions (developed by researchers at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center) runs as follows: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Subsequent questions tap the intensity of partisan feeling and the partisan inclinations of Independents.

Notice that the root question and others of a similar nature are not directed to any specific level of the governmental system. Presumably the individual has perfect, or nearly perfect, crystallization of party identification with respect to all electoral systems of which he is a member. Most commonly this means that a "generally speaking" identifier with either party will possess a feeling of attachment to that party at national, state, and local levels. Alternatively, it might be argued that the "generally speaking" identification refers to the governmental level generally most salient and pervasive in American politics, namely, the national level. Furthermore, it could be argued that the national level of identification tends to order and determine the identification held with respect to lower levels.

In either event, the question remains as to what extent there are mixed patterns of party identification in the United States. If there are such mixed patterns, a number of questions immediately arise—the kinds of mixtures which exist, their distribution

[1] The authors wish to acknowledge the suggestions made on an earlier draft of this paper by Lewis Froman, Jr., Donald R. Matthews, and Abraham Miller.

[2] Examples from the voluminous literature include Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), especially chaps. vi and vii; Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), chap. v; Philip Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVI (Spring, 1962), 1–23; Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIV (Fall, 1960), 397–418; David Wallace, *First Tuesday* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1964), especially chaps. vii–xiv; and William McPhee and W. A. Glazer (eds.), *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections* (New York: Free Press, 1962), especially chaps. ii–iv.

in the population, their temporal or permanent nature, their social correlates, their relationships to political attitudes and behavior, and their significance for party and electoral systems. In what follows, we shall report on a preliminary investigation which seeks to answer some of these questions.

The data are drawn from two studies which utilized quite different samples. One is a random sample of registered voters in Ann Arbor, Michigan, interviewed in March, 1964 ($N = 212$).[3] The second is a national cross-section sample drawn by the Survey Research Center (SRC) of the University of Michigan and interviewed immediately after the 1958 election ($N = 1,822$).[4] Although we move from one sample to the other quite freely in the first half of our presentation, it should be borne in mind that Ann Arbor differs considerably from a national cross-section, particularly in regard to its socioeconomic status (high) and voting behavior (traditionally Republican).

Party-preference information sought from the two samples differed in some respects. In the national sample, respondents were first asked the standard (SRC) party-identification questions. To keep our terminology clear, the response to this question will be called the respondent's "general or basic party identification." Each respondent, including those whom we will shortly call "mixed identifiers," has a general identification. After several intervening questions, the respondent was asked if his reply to the general party-identification question referred to the national or state level, or to both. If the reference was to only one level—predominately the national level (84 per cent)—he was then asked about his identification at the other level (ordinarily, the state). Thus party identification at two levels was ascertained. In the Ann Arbor study, party identification was obtained for three levels—first local, then state, and finally the national level. These questions were asked in sequence with a question wording similar to that used by the SRC in its national study.[5] In the local sample, however, the general identification question was not asked. Since general identification in the SRC sample is usually identical to national identification, we will sometimes use the latter as a surrogate for general partisan attachment when dealing with the Ann Arbor sample.

INCIDENCE AND VARIETY

Table 1 contains the raw frequencies for multiple-level identifications within both samples. First, let us examine the two samples in regard to the occurrence of mixed ("split" and "inconsistent" will be used as synonyms) patterns of identification at two levels—national and state. These patterns are represented by all pairings except the Democrat-Democrat, Republican-Republican, and Independent-Independent cells in each half of the table. In the local sample, twenty-five respondents, or 12 per cent, were inconsistent at the two levels, while the same was true of eighty-eight respondents, or 5 per cent, of the national sample.[6] Each of the six pos-

[3] The sample was drawn from the official alphabetic list of registered voters. Using a randomly selected starting point, every one-hundredth entry of the 26,800 registered total was included in the original sample. This produced a sample of 268, of whom 36 were either deceased, had moved away, or were temporarily out of the city. From this reduced total of 232 eligibles, 91 per cent were successfully interviewed by trained, advanced undergraduate and graduate students. We acknowledge the considerable contribution of Noel Beyle in preparing the interview schedule and supervising the field work.

[4] The data and tabulations were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research. Neither the SRC nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

[5] The phrasing was as follows: "Generally speaking, at the local level of politics, do you generally think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" "How about at the state level of politics?" "Finally, at the national level of politics?"

[6] Mixed identifiers occur in various sections of the country in proportions roughly similar to the regional proportions of the total sample.

sible pairs of mixed preferences (combinations of Republican, Democrat, and Independent) occurred in both samples. For both samples, the likelihood was extremely high that these mixed-identification pairings contained an Independent identification at one level or the other—84 per cent in each sample. Inconsistency, then, in the sense of opting for Republicanism at one level and Democracy at another is rare. Slightly over half of the cases in the national sample involved Independent identification at the state level, while the same was true of one-third of the local sample. Inconsistency is not just being Independent in regard to national politics and partisan at the state level.[7]

This is the picture when party identification at two levels is ascertained. The Ann Arbor data, by adding identification at the level of local politics, strongly suggest that mixed patterns are yet more complex and numerous in the American polity. In Table 1, these patterns occur in all triplets except the Democrat-Democrat-Democrat, Republican-Republican-Republican, and Independent-Independent-Independent cells in the Ann Arbor half of the table. The inclusion of a third level of party preference increases the mixed identifiers in the Ann Arbor sample from twenty-five to forty-six individuals, or from 12 to 22 per cent. There were twenty-four different split patterns which could have occurred, that is, all combinations of Republican, Democrat, and Independent at three different levels. Sixteen of these possible patterns were represented; the most respondents with any one pattern were six. Only two individuals had a different identification at each of the three levels. While the combinations found are extensive, extreme inconsistency, that

TABLE 1

FREQUENCIES FOR PARTY IDENTIFICATION AT MULTIPLE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

	Ann Arbor: National				SRC: National			
	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Total	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Total
State Democrat	53	0	5	58	831	10	19	860
Local Democrat	45	0	4	49	....	....	....	....
Local Republican	3	0	0	3	....	....	....	....
Local Independent	5	0	1	6	....	....	....	....
State Republican	4*	70	8	82*	4	459	4	467
Local Democrat	1	0	0	1	....	....	....	....
Local Republican	1	67	3	71	....	....	....	....
Local Independent	1	3	5	9	....	....	....	....
State Independent	5	3	59	67	28	23	316	367
Local Democrat	3	0	6	9	....	....	....	....
Local Republican	0	1	4	5	....	....	....	....
Local Independent	2	2	49	53	....	....	....	....
Total	62	73	72	207†	863	492	339	1,694†

* Includes one who is "don't know" at the local level.

† Differences between these N's and the total sample N's are "no answers," "don't knows," and apolitical individuals.

[7] As one would expect, the mixed identifiers in the national sample include a higher proportion of general (or basic) Independents and fewer general partisans, especially strong partisans, than the rest of the sample.

is, three different preferences, is uncommon.

In the national survey, the mixed patterns of identification tend to "cancel out" in the sense that the over-all distributions of party identification at both the national and state levels are very similar. No more than two percentage points separate gross national and state identification figures for a given identification. Parallel findings occurred in the Ann Arbor survey, although the Republicans are in a slightly better position at the local and state levels than at the national level. Even though the proportion of inconsistent identifiers may be fairly substantial, as in the case of Ann Arbor, the mixes tend to cancel out the net advantage which might accrue to one of the parties at a given governmental level.

The Ann Arbor mixed identifiers can be grouped according to "party" or "level" deviations. By deviation we mean that an individual identifies with the same party (or is Independent) at two levels and deviates at a third. For example, a person who calls himself an Independent at the state and local levels but a Democrat at the national would be both a Democratic and a national deviate. By "party," fifteen of the mixed identifiers were Republican deviates; that is, they were Republican at *one* level and something else (the same something) at both of the other two levels. Another ten were Democratic deviates, while nineteen were Independent deviates. Even though there were more Independent deviates than either Republican or Democratic, there were more partisan deviates combined than Independents. Nevertheless, the importance of the "Independent" identification for producing mixed patterns is great—87 per cent of the mixed identifiers were Independents on at least one level. Only 15 per cent split their preferences (in some combination) between the two major parties. As with the "two-level" case, mixed patterns are largely a product of a combination of Independent and major-party identification.[8]

By "level," about half of the mixed identifiers (twenty-one of forty-four) were local; that is, they held the same identification at the state and national levels, but a different one at the local level. The balance were almost equally divided between state and national deviates. Among the twenty-one local deviates, the "party" deviation is almost equally spread among Independents, Republicans, and Democrats.

The question arises as to why there are roughly twice as many deviates at the local level as at either the state or national. One immediate suggestion would be that non-partisanship is practiced at the local level.[9] However, Ann Arbor's elections (except for the Board of Education) are held on a partisan basis, and local contests are now fiercely contested. Thus the vagaries of a non-partisan local system are not muting the partisan identifications held for state and national politics. At the same time, it seems likely that the personal politics so characteristic of local political systems do act to permute the allegiances held in regard to national politics in particular. The impact of '"friends-and-neighbors" politics and local traditions are sufficiently great in small- to medium-sized towns to create a disproportionate amount of both partisan and Independent deviation at this level. Moreover, the belief that there is no Republican or Democratic way of "laying

[8] For more on the nature of Independent voters, see Robert E. Agger, "Independents and Party Identifiers: Characteristics and Behavior in 1952," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), chap. xvii; Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Independent Voter," *American Political Science Review*, XLVI (September, 1952), 732–53; and Allan Meyer, "The Independent Voter," in William McPhee and W. A. Glazer (eds.), *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections*, chap. iii.

[9] At first blush, one might hypothesize that the Goldwater nomination produced short-term deviations in the party-identification structures of Ann Arbor respondents. Inasmuch as the survey was executed well in advance even of the Republican nominating convention (to say nothing of the election campaign), it hardly seems likely that more than a trace of identification movement could be attributed to the Goldwater phenomenon.

sewers" (for example) undoubtedly pushes some individuals toward an Independent identification even in a partisan local system.

Given the increment in mixed identifications achieved by adding the level of local politics, it seems likely that the 5 per cent figure found in the national sample for mixed patterns at two levels understates the size and complexity of inconsistent party-identification patterns in the nation. This is so despite the fact that (as we shall see) Ann Arbor's atypical educational profile, coupled with the tendency for mixed identifiers to be relatively highly educated, tends to inflate that city's proportion of inconsistents. After "correcting" the 22 per cent figure for mixed identifiers in Ann Arbor according to the national education distribution, we still obtained a figure of 17 per cent for mixed identifiers, a figure well above the two-level pattern in the national sample (5 per cent).[10]

Two factors make it difficult to estimate the national three-level proportion, however. First, there is the form of the party-identification questions. The national study format, which used the general identification query followed up later by a question about distinctions by national and state levels, probably minimizes the number of split identifiers, especially since the entire interview was couched primarily in terms of national politics. On the other hand, asking for the respondent's identification one level at a time, as was done in the Ann Arbor study, probably maximizes the number of split responses.

More important than question form is the matter of extreme variations in local politics and party systems. To judge from the Ann Arbor sample, in which the number of mixed identifiers was approximately doubled by the inclusion of local identification, the proportion of mixed identifiers in the national population is around 10 per cent. However, the complicating factor of non-partisan electoral systems must be considered in any such easy extrapolation.[11]

Unfortunately, little is known about the affective relationships between individuals and the parties in formally non-partisan locales.[12] A wide range of such relationships probably exists. Just as parties vary from playing almost no role at all to playing a very large role in non-partisan systems,[13] so we would expect to find some de jure non-partisan communities in which individuals are not affectively oriented toward the parties and others in which individuals do align themselves behind one or another party. To complicate matters further, there is probably a very imperfect

[10] The "correction" is made by multiplying the percentage of mixed identifiers at each education level (grade school, high school, college, or more) in the Ann Arbor sample by the percentage of the respondents in the corresponding education levels in the national sample. Freeman's Bay City study indicated that highly educated people were more consistent, but the local identification question in that study concerned local counterparts ("Progressives" and "Non-partisans") of the two national parties (see J. Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV [November, 1958], 282–89).

[11] A further complicating factor, although less important, is that the Ann Arbor sample includes registered voters only. Since mixed identifiers tend to come from the more involved portion of the electorate, as we shall show presently, this may inflate the proportion of mixed identifiers compared with what would emerge from a less restricted adult sample.

[12] Most research in this area has emphasized the nature of correlations between party registration or party vote in partisan elections with voting results in non-partisan elections. See, e.g., Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics under the Non-partisan Ballot," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (December, 1959), 1052–63; Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (September, 1963), 584–92; and M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, "Class, Party, and Race in Four Types of Elections: The Case of Atlanta," *Journal of Politics*, XXVIII (May, 1966), 391–407.

[13] A range of this type is suggested by Charles Adrian in "A Typology for Non-partisan Elections," *Western Political Quarterly*, XII (June,

correlation between the extent of party activity and the extent of affective orientation toward local parties.

These sorts of difficulties notwithstanding, it is almost certain that non-partisan systems tend to increase the number of individuals professing "Independence" at the local level. This would also be probable in very strong one-party localities where local elections are essentially non-partisan even though all or most candidates are presumed to be of the dominant party. In these and other de facto non-partisan systems, party is simply not very salient or meaningful—either in a cognitive or affective sense—for local politics. In terms of the Ann Arbor data, then, we are suggesting that the proportion of Independents at the local level would have increased dramatically if the local system were de facto non-partisan and that the net result would have been an increase in the number of mixed identifiers. On a national scale, by adding many individuals who are local Independents due to such non-partisan systems but who nevertheless identify with a party at the state and national levels, we would expect the mixed-identification segment of the national population to be somewhat over the projected 10 per cent.

SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL CORRELATES

The distinctions involved in the mixed patterns are rather subtle ones. We would, therefore, expect the inconsistents to be relatively more educated, more aware of political affairs, and more interested and involved in politics—in other words, people who are generally more attuned to such distinctions as those between the parties and electoral systems at different levels.

1959), 449–58. Where the national parties are disguised by local counterparts with different names, the effect is undoubtedly to increase the number of inconsistent identifiers. In Freeman's Bay City study, if "Progressives" are equated with Democrats and "Non-partisans" with Republicans, 26 per cent of the respondents have inconsistent preferences considering *only* national and local identifications (Freeman, *op. cit.*, p. 286).

The data from both studies tend to support these expectations. In the Ann Arbor survey, for example, although the entire sample is skewed toward the upper end, the inconsistent identifiers are clearly more highly educated than partisans or Independents. While 70 per cent of the inconsistents received at least some college training, the same was true of 53 per cent and 45 per cent of the partisans and Independents, respectively. Similarly in the national sample, 36 per cent of the inconsistents went to college, whereas the percentages were 21 and 19 for the partisans and Independents, respectively. Mixed identifiers also tend to have slightly higher status occupations, more of them holding white-collar jobs than do the partisans or Independents. Other social characteristics distinguish the mixed and consistent identifiers little, if at all. In the local survey, the inconsistents tended to be younger and newer to the community, but no such patterns were found in the national sample.

In turning to the behavioral correlates of split identifications, we should first be very explicit about possible erroneous assumptions which might be built into our analysis. The mixed identifiers in the national sample, if grouped by their general party identification, contain individuals along the entire spectrum of strong and weak partisans and Independent leaners and non-leaners. In addition, mixed identifiers ordinarily combine a party and Independent identification. Therefore, it would not be unexpected if they simply fell midway between the partisans and Independents on various political characteristics. If this were the case, split identifications would not be particularly exciting analytically, though still useful. Moreover, it is demonstrably true that the inconsistent individuals are likely to be weak rather than strong partisans and leaners rather than non-leaners; thus one might argue that by using all categories in the standard party-identification spectrum, or by collapsing categories, any peculiarities among the

mixed group would be accounted for anyway.

Neither of these arguments, as we will demonstrate, is entirely satisfactory. Rather than being uniformly midway between partisans and Independents, the mixed identifiers are sometimes more like partisans, sometimes more like Independents, and sometimes clearly distinguished from both. These differences are not random. Furthermore, we will show that using all categories in the standard party-identification spectrum does not adequately account for the observed patterns. The mixed identifiers, then, represent systematic departures from patterns observed using only the general identification questions.

In each survey a number of measures are available to show the extent of awareness of and interest and involvement in political affairs. Illustratively, in the Ann Arbor survey the inconsistents are about as politically active as partisans, and more active than Independents, in several local-issue arenas—public schools, civil rights, and other local-government or community matters. Approximately one-half of the partisans and the split identifiers were active in at least one of these areas, compared with one-third of the Independents. They are also more aware of "issues, problems, or projects" in the city than are partisans or Independents. While 20 per cent of the mixed group were unable to name three problems facing the community, the same was true of 29 per cent of the partisans and 35 per cent of the Independents. Likewise, fewer mixed identifiers than partisans or Independents were unable to name people they regarded as influential in various areas of community life. Finally, the proportion of "don't knows" on a wide range of other questions was lower for them than for the Independents and generally about the same as for partisans.

This is the picture when the mixed identifiers as a whole are compared with the consistent partisans and Independents. But what would result if mixed identifiers were controlled for their general or national party identification and then compared with counterpart consistent identifiers? In the Ann Arbor sample, the general party-identification question was not used. However, if we group the mixed identifiers according to their national identification, we find that those inconsistents with an Independent national identification differ from the consistent Independents in that they are considerably more politicized. Those inconsistents with a partisan national identification do not differ from the consistent partisans. In other words, on these characteristics of involvement and awareness, the inconsistents who are Independent at the national identification are the deviant cases. Attachment to a party at another level serves to sensitize these national-only Independents to the political game in greater proportion than is true of consistent Independents.

In the national sample, the patterns are much the same. Mixed identifiers in general are more like the partisans than Independents in their concern over election outcomes: only 7 per cent of the inconsistents reported they did not "care at all" how elections come out compared with figures of 14 per cent for partisans and 26 per cent for Independents. Similarly, with regard to interest in the campaign, the mixed identifiers are much closer to partisans than Independents, and, according to their own report, they have voted more frequently than either partisans or Independents.[14] In Table 2 we see that frequency of voting is particularly more likely among mixed identifiers who are national Independents than among consistent Independents.

The Ann Arbor study provides one further datum which clearly distinguishes the national-only Independents among the mixed identifiers on involvement dimensions. Respondents were asked if they had taken an active part in local party matters, other than voting, during the past two

[14] In Ann Arbor the mixed identifiers remain similar to partisans on these measures when education is controlled. This is less true of the national sample.

years. As expected, few consistent Independents reported such activity, compared with a fifth to a quarter of the consistent partisans and split identifiers, respectively (Table 3). Allocating the mixed identifiers according to their national identification, we find that just as many of the national Independents as national partisans had been active in a local party. Once more, the attachment to party at another level produces greater politicization among mixed identifiers who are national Independents than among consistent Independent identifiers.

with a party on at least one governmental level is what sets off the mixed identifiers from the consistent Independents. Without the anchorage to a party, and all that the party symbolizes, the consistent Independent typically finds it difficult to generate as much concern and activity as the strict partisan and the split identifier.

In terms of the direction of voting behavior, however, we will see that the mixed identifiers as a whole differ a great deal from partisans but only moderately from Independents. Furthermore, those mixed identifiers with a general partisan attach-

TABLE 2

VOTING FREQUENCY AMONG CONSISTENT AND MIXED IDENTIFIERS*
(SRC 1958 STUDY)

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AT TWO LEVELS	GENERAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION				TOTALS†
	Partisans		Independents		
	Strong	Weak	Leaners	Non-leaners	
Consistent identifiers....	78 (656)	69 (616)	64 (187)	58 (120)	Partisans 74 (1,272) Independents 62 (307)
Mixed identifiers........	75 (16)	75 (44)	84 (19)	100 (5)	79 (84)

* The entry in each cell is the percentage who voted in "all" or "most" presidential elections. The number in parentheses is the number of cases on which the percentage is based. A similar format will be used in succeeding tables.

† Separate totals are given for partisans and Independents among the consistent identifiers so that the three major groupings may be easily compared. This format will be followed on succeeding tables. Tests of significance are not reported in this paper for a variety of methodological reasons. However, given the N's and percentages most frequently involved in our basic comparisons, differences of 10–20 per cent are statistically significant at the 95 per cent level of probability, depending upon whether the comparisons are between the three large groupings or subdivisions thereof.

VOTING BEHAVIOR

To this point we have shown that in general orientation and involvement the mixed identifiers as a whole are more politicized than are consistent Independents and about the same as consistent partisans. Additionally, we have indicated that those mixed identifiers considering themselves Independent by general (or national) party identification are also more politicized than the consistent Independents. Those mixed identifiers who are general partisans register about the same degree of politicization as consistent partisans. It seems reasonable to infer that the presence of identification

TABLE 3

PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL POLITICAL PARTY MATTERS*
(ANN ARBOR STUDY)

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AT THREE LEVELS	NATIONAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION		TOTALS
	Partisans	Independents	
Consistent identifiers	20 (109)	6 (46)	16 (154)†
Mixed identifiers....	22 (23)	26 (23)	24 (46)

* The entry in each cell is the percentage who reported taking an active part in local party matters.

† Since this cell combines partisans and Independents, it is relatively meaningless.

ment also differ from the corresponding consistent partisans. Dealing first with the SRC data, the mixed identifiers in the aggregate are, as expected, less regular than partisans in their electoral support of a party at the presidential level. They fall midway between Independents and partisans in their tendency to support the same party in election after election. But grouping the mixed identifiers by general identification reveals that those considering themselves partisans deviate from consistent partisans in the direction of *less* regularity while those self-classified as Independents deviate from consistent Independents in the direction of greater regularity. Even after dividing the partisans into weak and strong categories and the Independents into leaners and non-leaners, as is done in Table 4, the mixed identifiers still depart from the pattern of the consistents.

Looking at the respondent's recall of his 1956 presidential vote, we again observe that the mixed identifiers, when classified according to their general party identification, represent deviant cases. For example, among the consistent Republicans, less than 3 per cent voted for Adlai Stevenson; among the mixed identifiers classified as Republican partisans by their general identification, 9 per cent recalled voting for Stevenson. In the gubernatorial voting in 1958, the deviant nature of the mixed identifiers prevails once more even though the number of cases diminishes because some states had no election. For example, among the consistent Democrats, 6 per cent voted for a Republican gubernatorial candidate; among the mixed identifiers who are general Democrats, 35 per cent voted for a Republican. We should note in passing that the relationship between party identification and gubernatorial voting is slightly stronger if we group the mixed identifiers by their state identification rather than by their general identification. Later we shall see that this difference, based on a small number of cases, is consonant with analogous results in the Ann Arbor sample.

TABLE 4

REGULARITY OF PARTY VOTING AMONG CONSISTENT AND MIXED IDENTIFIERS*
(SRC 1958 STUDY)

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AT TWO LEVELS	GENERAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION				TOTALS	
	Partisans		Independents			
	Strong	Weak	Leaners	Non-leaners		
Consistent identifiers ...	83 (597)	56 (528)	31 (157)	22 (95)	Partisans	70 (1125)
					Independents	28 (252)
Mixed identifiers	80 (15)	45 (38)	44 (18)	40 (5)		51 (76)

* The entry in each cell is the percentage who voted "always" for the same party in presidential elections

By definition, the mixed identifiers are persons whose party identifications vary between "levels." It would follow that mixed identifiers as a whole should split their tickets more than consistent partisans and about as often as the Independents. A more crucial question is whether mixed identifiers, when classified by their general identification, will deviate from the patterns of the corresponding consistent partisans. Table 5 presents several sets of voting acts. Let us first examine voting at different electoral levels—senatorial-gubernatorial, congressional-gubernatorial, and state-local voting. The results indicate that the mixed identifiers as a whole do split their tickets more than the consistent partisans and about as frequently as Inde-

pendents.[15] And mixed identifiers with general partisan attachments split more than the corresponding consistent partisans. This tendency is especially pronounced in congressional-gubernatorial voting.

We hypothesized that inconsistent patterns of identification, besides increasing split-ticket voting *between* electoral levels involved in the mixed patterns, would tend to weaken one's partisanship and thereby heighten one's propensity to split his ticket within as well as between levels. In the measure that senatorial-congressional elections are a single-level phenomenon, this proves true (Table 5).

Clearly, inconsistent identifications are not merely disguises for covert yet consistent party allegiances. Split identifications are matched by split voting at the same level and in a variety of multilevel situations. Being an Independent on at least one level pushes the split identifier—regardless of his general identification intensity—into a more selective choice pattern than either the strong or weak strict partisans. The latter are less free—because of their subjective ties—to indulge in such options.

We do not have exactly comparable data from the Ann Arbor survey on party loyalty and split-ticket voting. However, we did gather material which may be considered analogous to the SRC data. Respondents were asked to evaluate a number of prominent national, state, and local officeholders of both parties on a five-step scale running from "strongly approve" to "strongly disapprove." For purposes of analysis, we combined the "strongly approve" and "approve" responses as indicating general approval of the incumbent. The other responses were taken as indicative of general disapproval. In a sense, the

TABLE 5

SPLIT-TICKET VOTING AMONG CONSISTENT AND MIXED IDENTIFIERS*
(SRC 1958 STUDY)

INTERLEVEL VOTING AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION AT TWO LEVELS	GENERAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION: Partisans		Independents		TOTALS
	Strong	Weak	Leaners	Non-leaners	
Senatorial-gubernatorial vote:					
Consistent identifiers	4 (255)	19 (199)	25 (69)	24 (25)	Partisans 10 (454) Independents 24 (94)
Mixed identifiers	14 (7)	30 (10)	22 (9)	†	23 (26)
Congressional-gubernatorial vote:					
Consistent identifiers	4 (321)	16 (245)	29 (80)	18 (33)	Partisans 10 (566) Independents 26 (113)
Mixed identifiers	25 (8)	47 (15)	64 (11)	†	47 (34)
State-local vote:					
Consistent identifiers	10 (415)	39 (307)	60 (94)	62 (50)	Partisans 22 (722) Independents 60 (144)
Mixed identifiers	38 (8)	60 (20)	75 (12)	†	57 (42)
Congressional-senatorial vote:					
Consistent identifiers	4 (322)	13 (243)	18 (74)	23 (30)	Partisans 8 (565) Independents 19 (104)
Mixed identifiers	11 (9)	23 (13)	27 (11)	†	24 (34)

* The entry in each cell is the percentage who voted a split ticket at the given levels The small and variable *N*'s in this table are due to the absence of senatorial and/or gubernatorial races in many states.

† Two or fewer cases.

[15] When there was a sufficient number of cases, we controlled for education. The mixed identifiers still reported less regular party support and more split-ticket voting at various education levels.

opinion expressed about these incumbents is analogous to the act of voting. Therefore, the mixed identifiers (and consistent Independents) should split their tickets of approval and disapproval more than the consistent partisans do. That is, they should more frequently approve of office-holders of different parties and more often approve of one and disapprove of another office-holder of the same party.

In the aggregate, the mixed identifiers behave as expected, splitting their preferences more often than the consistent identifiers and resembling the consistent Independents in the rate of split tickets. More significantly, the mixed identifiers with a partisan national identification tend to stand apart from their consistent partisan counterparts. That is, the mixed identifiers who are national partisans more frequently divide their approval than do consistent partisans. Being a non-partisan at another level weakens the national partisan's positive affect toward his party's incumbents at all levels. In general, however, the results of this analysis are not as persuasive as those from the national sample, partly because of the awkward surrogate we have employed for authentic voting decisions.

The Ann Arbor data reveal an interesting property of split identifications. In the comparisons which the few cases allow us to make, grouping the mixed individuals by their state or local party identification, rather than by national identification, strengthens the relationship between identification at a given level and feelings expressed about incumbents at that same level. For example, if we group the mixed identifiers by their local identification, 43 per cent of the local Democrats approved of the Republican mayor. This still exceeds the 30 per cent approval of the consistent Democrats, but it is a better fit than the 50 per cent approval of the mixed group who are national Democrats. Also, grouping the inconsistents by their state identification yields 54 per cent approval of the Republican governor among state Democrats compared to 71 per cent among national Democrats.

The results are similar for a question which asked the respondent how he thought he would vote in a hypothesized gubernatorial contest (which later materialized) between George Romney and Neil Staebler. When grouped by state identification, the votes of 78 per cent of the mixed identifiers are consistent with their partisan inclination compared to 59 per cent when grouped by national identification. These few comparisons, while not conclusive evidence, do suggest that relationships between identification and voting (or approval) are strengthened by level-specific information. They also imply the fragile bases of at least some inconsistent patterns, namely, attachment to particular office-holders (in this case, the attachment of some Democrats to Republican Governor Romney).

To sum up, our results indicate that mixed identifiers have many properties attributed to a variant of the classic "Independent citizen-voter." It has often been noted, here as well as in other places, that Independents as a whole typically fall below partisans in their involvement in matters political. Our mixed identifiers are not to be confused with this breed of Independents. Although he is typically an Independent identifier at one governmental level, the mixed identifier is likely to be more informed, more active, and more involved than the consistent Independent. He is, rather, much more like the consistent party identifier in these regards. On the other hand, he does not share the partisan's general devotion to party. Unlike the consistent partisan, he is more selective in his voting preferences and office-holder evaluations; in this respect he resembles the Independent identifier. The mixed, inconsistent identifier is thus a true hybrid and comes closer to the model of the involved, information-seeking, selective "citizen-voter" than do other occupants in the party-identification spectrum usually posited.

THE DYNAMICS OF MIXED IDENTIFICATIONS

Given the presence of this unique pattern of party identification, it becomes of some importance to ascertain the permanent or transitory nature of these allegiances. It might be that the mixed pattern is an intermediate stage for some people in the process of change. Or, the configuration may spring from the appeal of particular candidates and personalities: as soon as these pass from the scene the inconsistent identifier may move back to a pattern of congruity. Alternatively, change may not be at work at all, with the mixed loyalties being relatively stable. In examining these possibilities, we shall rely exclusively on SRC material inasmuch as information of this type was not solicited from the Ann Arbor respondents.

First, let us try to determine to what extent the mixed identifiers tend to be changers in identification over time. Initially, we can examine the recall data concerning past changes in general party identification as found in the 1958 SRC survey. The respondents were asked whether they had ever considered themselves as identifying with a party other than their current one (or with either party, in the case of Independents). In the entire sample, less than a fifth of the respondents had ever changed their general identification, but the mixed identifiers had changed as frequently as the Independents (40 per cent each) and much more frequently than the strong (9 per cent) or weak (15 per cent) partisans. Such changes, of course, may have occurred at any time in a person's life. Responses to a recall question reveal that the mixed identifiers have, on the whole, changed more recently than partisans and Independents. Almost three-quarters of them (compared to one-half of the consistent identifiers) switched in a period that encompassed Truman's full term and the first five Eisenhower years, a period covering only two Presidential elections.

Data on current change can be found in the SRC's panel study over the four-year period 1956–60. Respondents from the SRC 1956 national survey, excluding those who could not be located, were reinterviewed in 1958. Two years later, in 1960, they were interviewed yet another time.[16] In each interview, the respondent was asked the general party-identification question, and in 1958 the question on identification at the national and state levels was included. After eliminating "don't know" and "apolitical" responses, there are 1,162 respondents for whom we have a general identification in each of three years.

The change in basic identification among the panel respondents yields substantially the same picture as does the recall data mentioned above.[17] Overall, the mixed identifiers changed much more than did the consistent partisans but not as often as the consistent Independents (Table 6). As we would expect, there is a general tendency for those more strongly identified with a party to change the least. However, controlling for initial strength of identification does not wholly account for the overall greater amount of change among the mixed identifiers. Although the pattern in Table 6 is not as clear as we might like, at least among those who considered themselves partisans in 1956 the mixed identifiers changed at a higher rate than the consistents. Movement from strong to weak partisan identification also supports our argument of greater stability among the consistent identifiers. Among the consistent

[16] There is considerable overlap between the respondents in the 1958 panel and the 1958 cross-sectional sample which we have been using to this point. However, the latter is a representative cross-section of the nation, whereas the 1958 panel is, by its very nature, somewhat less representative.

[17] For present purposes, change has been defined as movement between two of the basic three categories—Democratic, Independent, and Republican—without regard to intensities or leaning characteristics. Thus, for example, a strong partisan who became a weak partisan of the same party was not considered to have changed his basic identification, but the weak or strong partisan who became an Independent or a partisan for the other party was considered as a changer.

identifiers who strongly identified with a party in 1956, over half retained their strong identification over the four-year period; among the mixed identifiers who strongly identified with a party in 1956, only a quarter remained strongly identified with the same party four years later. Holding a split identification tends to undermine the intensity of basic identification with a party.

Some short-term "changes" may be only temporary fluctuations, the respondents later reverting to their earlier identification. Such was the case with a number of the panel respondents. About a third of those who changed party identification from 1956 to 1958 returned to their 1956 identification in 1960. However, no more—in fact, about 5 per cent fewer—of the mixed group than of the consistent identifiers reverted to their old loyalties. Thus, so far as we can tell, the change within the mixed identifiers was at least as permanent as that among the consistent group.

Having shown that close to one-half of the mixed identifiers underwent a change during the 1956–60 period, the next question is, why do they change their basic party identification without always keeping their national and state identifications congruent? Part of the answer lies in the fact that the mixed identifiers are relatively highly educated and highly interested in and involved in politics. Besides being more attuned to political affairs in general, the mixed identifiers are more aware of and more sensitive than others to the distinctions between the parties at different levels in the federal system. They are probably more alert to the activities, policies, and personalities at each party level and are more capable of keeping these levels conceptually distinct. Furthermore, they observe significant differences between levels. Consistent identifiers who change their party identification see each major party as a single unit or at least as three units moving in lockstep fashion. Failing to make distinctions between the parties at multiple levels of government, or failing to observe what they consider significant differences, these latter individuals do not react differentially to multiple levels.

These findings regarding change in party identification take on added significance if we consider the proportion of the "changers" who are mixed identifiers. Of the 1,162 panel respondents for whom we have sufficient information, 6 per cent were mixed identifiers.[18] Of those who changed over the four-year period, however, 11 per cent were mixed identifiers. If the original sample had a better estimate of the proportion of mixed identifiers in the population (that is, at all

TABLE 6

CHANGE IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION AMONG CONSISTENT AND MIXED IDENTIFIERS*
(SRC PANEL STUDY)

Party Identification at Two Levels	General Party Identification				Totals	
	Partisans		Independents			
	Strong	Weak	Leaners	Non-leaners		
Consistent identifiers....	8 (415)	26 (404)	66 (170)	46 (100)	Partisans	17 (819)
					Independents	59 (270)
Mixed identifiers........	32 (16)	38 (32)	65 (20)	100 (5)		48 (73)

* The entry in each cell is the percentage who changed their general party identification at least once between 1956 and 1960.

[18] This figure is slightly above the 5 per cent figure for the 1958 cross-section because of differential dropout rates in the panel study between consistent and mixed identifiers.

three levels), we would expect to find that a fifth to a quarter or more of those who changed their basic party identification are mixed identifiers.[19] It may be that, while apathetics account for a large slice of the surges and declines of a party's electoral support, a smaller core of internal shifting is occurring among relatively attentive mixed identifiers.

The impact of the federal system—and of the decentralized party system—on party identification takes on an added dimension from the foregoing. Federalism has often been singled out as a stabilizing force of the party system and, inferentially, for party identification. Multiple levels of government and the multiplicity of elective offices at each level mean, in practice, that neither major party suffers obliteration even in what are considered serious national defeats. Thus, the losing party is never totally deprived of leaders or of forums from which to preach and practice its policy alternatives. For the individual, this means that even if his party suffers defeat at one level he is not without a party leadership and electoral winners on whom to focus his hopes for a resurgence and from whom to derive support for his own position.

While not gainsaying this argument, we are emphasizing that for some people the federal system contributes to instability and change in party identification rather than serving to bolster partisan feelings. For these individuals, the varying stimuli from multiple levels of government cause them to vacillate and, for a time, to avoid a unitary position on the party-identification spectrum. Eventually they may resolve their conflicting identifications, sometimes reverting to their original identification but more often changing their basic partisan orientation. Note, however, that while the federal system may thus contribute to instability of party identifications, it need not thereby lead to instability of the party system. Conflicting stimuli from different levels of government to some extent result in compensating changes. Precisely because some offices are captured by each major party, some individuals are drawn in each direction. Federalism, even while promoting individual change and instability, need not be a disruptive source for the party system. The kind of argument being developed here might also apply, *mutatis mutandis,* to changers among consistent identifiers; that is, the multiple stimuli provided by federalism may erode their commitments and eventually produce realignment.

We have demonstrated that persons with mixed party loyalties tend to be changers more so than strong or weak partisans and at least as much as Independents. This still leaves approximately one-half of the mixed identifiers who report no changes in their general party identification either in the past or during the time covered by the panel study (1956–60). For these people, split identifications appear to be a relatively permanent state of affairs, largely dependent upon particular cognitive and affective orientations the individual has developed about national and state politics. It seems highly likely that the juxtaposition of the state party image vis-à-vis the national party image plays a role here for the more discerning respondents.

CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding analysis we have discussed the kinds of mixed or inconsistent patterns of party identification which exist, their distribution in a local and national sample, their social and behavioral correlates, and the dynamics of mixed patterns. The mixed identifier has been shown to be a distinctive type in the party-identification spectrum. We have argued that in many respects he is a variant of the classic "Independent citizen-voter." While his in-

[19] That is, if the mixed identifiers were 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the total population, 11/6 times these percentages gives 18 per cent and 27 per cent. Certainly these figures (even as approximations) have to be qualified. They would probably not be correct, for example, in a national crisis such as the Depression.

terest, awareness, and participation correspond to that of the partisan, his preferences and selectivity parallel that of the Independent. These patterns are laid bare when mixed identifiers are subdivided according to their general or national identifications and then compared with counterpart consistent identifiers. When this is done, it is clear that the party attachment facilitates the split identifier in having a politicized state as high as that of the strict partisan, while his Independent status moves him toward the voting direction variability of the strict Independent.

These findings strengthen and support the reports of earlier research concerning the impact of subjective identification on political attitudes and behavior.[20] The presence of the mixed identifiers, whose partisan feelings vary according to the level of government under consideration, alters somewhat the underlying patterns when only a general measure of party identification is used. If inconsistent identifiers are analytically distinguished from their consistent brethren, already impressive findings are further enhanced.

The impact of the federal system on party structures is clearly operative in encouraging mixed patterns. The fragmented, decentralized political parties are conducive to such splitting of loyalties, albeit these are typically splits involving an Independent identification mixed with a partisan one. The contribution of the federal structure to shifting party loyalties is also apparent. By inhibiting fixation on a single level of party and government, it encourages flexible partisan attachments which can be readily adapted to multiple stimuli.

The Ann Arbor study, by ascertaining party identification on three levels, indicates that the local level of government is likely to produce the most deviation from otherwise consistent patterns of identification. Given the great range of local party and electoral systems, the effect of local preferences on over-all patterns undoubtedly varies considerably from community to community. In areas where congruence with higher levels is practically invariant, we should expect local manifest or latent partisan political structures and an intensification of party feeling on the part of individuals. Where incongruity is more frequent, it seems likely that non-partisan politics would be more prevalent with some diminution in the party-like feeling of individuals. Because of the peculiarities of local politics in the nation, and because the statistical possibility of producing mixed patterns of identification increases geometrically with the addition of another level of government, we have contended that the incidence of mixed identifications is considerably higher than the 5 per cent revealed in the 1958 SRC sample which obtained party identification at only two levels.

Whatever the importance of the mixed patterns of party identification, we do not feel that they diminish the over-all utility of the concept of general party identification. Although we have argued that mixed identifiers generally constitute more than the 5 per cent found in the SRC's 1958 sample, 20 per cent is probably an upper limit in most areas. While this is a large enough group to be important, especially if many of them are changing their party identification, the smallness of the group is the crucial datum for many purposes. That partisan feeling cuts across local and state lines for a large majority of the party identifiers seems to enhance rather than detract from the concept of general identification and the relatively simple way of measuring it. The paucity of Democratic-Republican splits attests further to the generalizing power of the general party identification.

Despite this caveat, we feel that the mixed pattern phenomenon adds a meaningful analytical category to conventional modes of classification. In addition to what has already been said, mixed patterns of identification may also reflect and affect

[20] See the references cited in n. 2 above.

attitudes and behavior in ways which we have not examined. For example, the "discrepancies" sometimes noted between local and national voting behavior[21] may be partly attributable to such inconsistent identification structures. State and local surveys probably offer the best vehicles for gaining a better purchase on the mixed-pattern phenomenon. By having all respondents in a restricted number of local or state governments, one is in a better position to study the effects—as well as causes—of mixed patterns on the citizen's attitudes and behaviors vis-à-vis local and state as well as national politics. In this fashion, future studies would contribute to a further understanding of individuals' relationships with the three levels of party and government.

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[21] See the references cited in n. 12. For a general discussion see Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and M.I.T. Press, 1963), chap. xvi.

Social Class and Church Participation[1]

Erich Goode

ABSTRACT

Church activity, particularly church attendance, has been found by researchers to vary significantly with social class; individuals of the middle status levels tend to be more active in the church than those of lower status levels. Although several attempts have been made to test this relationship for spuriousness, no effort has been successful. The data presented in this essay demonstrate that over-all associational participation influences the relationship between class and church activity to a significant degree, so much so that when this general factor is controlled the original correlation between these variables is appreciably weakened. Several implications of this finding are discussed.

Social class and church participation have been found to be strongly and significantly related. Numerous studies have revealed a positive association between these two variables.[2] Despite variation in the use of indicators used, whether for class[3] or for church participation;[4] despite random fluctuations which occur in any set statistics

[1] This research was supported by Public Health Service grant 1-F1-MH-23, 474-01. I would like to thank Professors William J. Goode and Terence K. Hopkins for critical comments. I am grateful, in addition, to the research directors of the studies whose data this essay employs. They will be refered to when the data are cited.

[2] To cite only those studies, a few of which use church attendance as their indicator of the dependent variable: Anton T. Boisen, "Factors Which Have To Do with the Decline of the Rural Church," *American Journal of Sociology,* XXII (September, 1916), 187; William G. Mather, Jr., "Income and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review,* VI (June, 1941), 381; Harold F. Kaufman, *Religious Organization in Kentucky* (Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 524 [Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1948]), p. 43; John A. Hostetler and William A. Mather, *Participation in the Rural Church* (Agricultural Experiment Station Paper 1762 [State College, Pa.: Pennsylvania State College, October, 1952]), p. 55; Wendell Bell and Maryanne T. Force, "Religious Preference, Familism and the Class Structure," *Midwest Sociologist,* IX (May, 1957), 84; Bernard Lazerwitz, "Some Factors Associated with Variation in Church Attendance," *Social Forces,* XXXIX (May, 1961), 306. At least one study demonstrated little or no association between these variables: Louis Bultena, "Church Membership and Church Attendance in Madison, Wisconsin," *American Sociological Review,* XIV (June, 1949), 348-89. An attempt has been made to "integrate" the contradictory findings of a positive and negative association between them: Harry C. Dillingham, "Protestant Religion and Social Status," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXX (January, 1965), 416-22. Since the relationship is, according to my own survey of the literature, overwhelmingly found to be positive, no such procedure appears to me to be necessary. With regard to his point that there is a difference between examining church activity and social status on the individual level and comparing these variables using denominations as the unit of analysis, our own data point to the lack of importance that denominational differences have in this relationship.

[3] The most common indicators of this variable are education, occupational level, and income. The number of categories employed, the points at which the classes are divided from one another, and the labels used to characterize the groups depend on the theoretical and methodological characteristics of any given study in question. It is not our intention to enter into the controversy over definitions and indicators of social class.

[4] The various indicators of church participation that have been used by these and other studies are: church attendance, church membership, number of church-association memberships, attendance at meetings of church associations, financial contributions to the local church, total number of religious activities within a specified period of time, etc. What is important to note about these various indicators is that the same empirical relationships should obtain, regardless of the specific indicator used.

as a result of sampling, and despite differences in the sociological traditions of the various researchers involved in these studies, this regularity obtains: the higher the class level, the greater the degree of church participation; the lower the class level, the less the degree of church participation.

Much recent research on the topic of the relationship between religion and social status is concerned with the fact that several of the dimensions of religiosity vary positively by class, while others vary inversely.[5] This essay is concerned with only one of these dimensions—the ritualistic or "cultic"—yet conceives of it as being part of a more general dimension which includes all aspects of formal church activity. As will be demonstrated, religious ritual, such as church attendance, relates to other variables in a manner almost identical to nonritualistic forms of church participation, such as church leadership or church organizational activity. They will be conceived of, therefore, as being parts of the same dimension. It must be kept in mind, however, that this will be demonstrated empirically and will not be "proved" by being assumed in the first place.

The main area of disagreement centers, not around whether the association exists or whether it is positive or negative—the data are too clear-cut for such a controversy to be long sustained—but around *why* this regularity should obtain. As to what the causal factors behind the relationship are is a question that has elicited some serious disagreement. One position is that the greater middle-class participation reflects a greater degree of religiousness and religious concern.[6] Others hold that the relationship is due to factors *extrinsic* to religion itself and that the greater level of church activity exhibited by the middle classes[7] is an artifact of some third variable.[8] An example of this position is that taken by Gerhard Lenski,[9] who maintains that the observed regularity is a function of the fact that members of the middle classes demonstrate a higher level of *overall* associational activity. They participate more in organizations of *all* kinds, the church being merely one specific example of a voluntary association.

This is a crucial question, and it deserves detailed exploration. It is, however, a complicated one; it contains several subtopics and relates behavior in a number of social spheres. There are at least two important conclusions of a study that demonstrates the dependence of the relationship between social status and church activity on general formal organizational participation.

[5] For a discussion of these dimensions, see Charles Y. Glock, "On the Study of Religious Commitment," *Review of Recent Research Bearing on Religious and Character Formation*, research supplement to the July–August, 1962, issue of *Religious Education*, pp. S-98–S-110. For empirical tests of the relationship of these dimensions with social class, see: Yoshio Fukuyama, "The Major Dimensions of Church Membership," *Review of Religious Research*, II (Spring, 1961), 154–61, and Nicholas J. Demerath, "Social Stratification and Church Involvement," *Review of Religious Research*, II (Spring, 1961), 146–54.

[6] Michael Argyle, *Religious Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 147, and Rodney Stark, "Class, Radicalism and Religious Involvement in Great Britain," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (October, 1964), 698–706.

[7] Some researchers claim that there is a decline in church participation when the upper class is compared with the middle classes. It must be stressed here that methodological questions of stratification are not at issue. Our own data will stress the differences between the white-collar and the manual classes and avoid altogether the questions of what comprises the "upper class" and what their possibly unique religious-participation patterns are.

[8] Paul F. Lazarsfeld has pioneered in the theoretical development of three-variable analysis. See his "Interpretation of Statistical Relations in a Research Operation," in Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (eds.), *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), pp. 115–25, and Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," *Daedalus*, LXXXVII (Fall, 1958), 117–24.

[9] *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961), p. 44 n., and "The Sociology of Religion in the United States," *Social Compass*, IX (1962), 313–14.

One is that church activity ought not to be treated as a separate, distinct, and unique aspect of social behavior, unconnected with other behavioral spheres of life which, because they are ostensibly non-religious in content, are assumed to be unrelated to "purely" religious manifestations. A demonstration of the more general position—that much religious behavior is secular in origin—would reduce the supposed insulation of societal institutions.

The second implication of this demonstration is a theoretical as well as a methodological one. Church activity cannot be seen as an indicator of religiosity if its relationship to other variables is dependent on non-religious factors. This means, in practical terms, that when measuring degree of religiousness, church attendance should not be used; but it also points to the source of the causality of an important sociological relationship. In knowing this, we know a little more about the nature of social reality.

Unfortunately, Lenski, who introduced this hypothesis, presents no empirical evidence to support his assertion; until such time as data are brought to bear on this question, it will remain an unsupported assumption. It is, however, a reasonable one. A number of findings point to this conclusion, although they do not support it directly. For example, there is a clear and marked relationship between social class, again, regardless of the indicator used, and participation in non-church associations.[10] There is also a significant correlation between church and non-church activity.[11] It would seem reasonable, therefore, to assume that the latter two variables associate with social class in the same manner and to the same degree. This must remain an unsupported assumption, however, until the relationship of each is tested independently with other variables in such a way that "contamination" is eliminated. Two variables may be associated positively with one another, yet related in the opposite direction with a third variable. This kind of complex configuration of relationships is by no means rare in the sociological literature.

Several studies have attempted to test this three-variable relationship empirically, but in our opinion they fail to establish the precise nature of the association. One study holds that the link between social class and church activity is a function of the fact that individuals of middle-class status *attend* church more because they are far more likely to be church *members* than is true for those of laboring-class status.[12] That is, when the factor of *church membership* is controlled, the original relationship between social class and church participation will

[10] Mirra Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," *American Sociological Review*, XI (December, 1946), 688; Leonard Reissman, "Class, Leisure and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (February, 1954), 76–84; Basil G. Zimmer, "Participation in Urban Structures," *American Sociological Review*, XX (April, 1955), 219; John M. Foskett, "Social Structure and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, XX (August, 1955), 433–36; Morris Axelrod, "Urban Structure and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (February, 1956), 15; John C. Scott, Jr., "Membership and Participation in Voluntary Associations," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (June, 1957), 321–23; Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (June, 1958), 289.

[11] Harold F. Kaufman, *Participation in Organized Activities in Selected Kentucky Localities* (Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 528 [Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1949]), pp. 20–21, 48; Louis Albert Ploch, "Factors Related to the Persistences and Changes in the Social Participation of Household Heads" (M.S. thesis Pennsylvania State College, 1951), p. 78; Basil G. Zimmer and Amos H. Hawley, "Suburbanization and Church Participation," *Social Forces*, XXXVII (May, 1959), 353; Bernard Lazerwitz, "Membership in Voluntary Associations and Frequency of Church Attendance," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, II (Fall, 1962), 74–84; Earl D. C. Brewer, "Religion and the Churches," in Thomas R. Ford (ed.), *The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), p. 214.

[12] Lee G. Burchinal, "Some Social Status Criteria and Church Membership and Church Attendance," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XLIX (February, 1959), 53–64.

disappear. This thesis may be true by itself, but this particular question must be seen as a special case of a broader one; these figures are an artifact of another set of figures. Church membership should be seen as one measure of church activity, rather than regarded as the test variable itself. In order to determine the true nature of the relationship between these three variables, social class and church and non-church participation, we must find a study employing the last variable as the test variable which is seen as influencing the relationship between the first two variables.

Bernard Lazerwitz[13] has set out to explore the interrelationships existing between these three variables. He states: "With frequency of church attendance clearly associated with social status, questions still remain about the place of church attendance within the totality of an individual's activity in voluntary associations. Since church attendance and activity in voluntary associations both show increased frequencies with greater amounts of education, and more occupational status, several researchers have suggested studying church attendance within the context of all sorts of voluntary associations and trying to explain variations in church atendance by the same factors found to influence activity in voluntary associations."[14] This statement of purpose is followed by a number of empirical tests that purport to show that church and non-church activity both increase as the same set of sociological factors determining them increases.

The trouble is that the question of "contamination" still remains. The same sets of factors may increase together, but their relationship with one another has not been tested *independent* of third variables. More specifically, the relationship between social class and church activity has not been tested independent of over-all associational activity. Only parallel two-variable-relationship tables were run. Since Lazerwitz has not tested any relationship for spuriousness, the real causal connections between these variables is left unexplored. *Descriptively*, of course, his position is upheld by the data presented; analytically, however, no thesis is either supported or refuted by his tests.

One study, by Rodney Stark,[15] does make such a three-variable test of the relationship in question. Stark concludes from his data that, when the factor of general organizational participation is taken into account, the relationship between occupational level and church participation remains. At each level of associational activity, individuals of the white-collar occupational level attend church more than do those of the blue-collar occupational level.[16] The relationship, he claims, is therefore not a spurious one. Middle-class individuals actually do display a higher level of religiousness, a greater degree of religious concern, and their higher level of church activity measures this religiosity.

Unfortunately, Stark's methological errors mar his analysis. They are so serious that his conclusions cannot be accepted as definitive; they must be regarded as untested. Some of these errors are: (1) The main locus of interest in the three-variable test lies in the degree of *reduction* of the strength of the original relationship. Stark does not present a table showing the original relationship between social class and church participation. (2) The differences between the levels of church attendance of the two occupational levels in Stark's tables are actually quite small—from 4 to 8 percentage points of difference in weekly church atendance. (3) Only one indicator of each of the three variables used in the test is employed. For a relationship as complex as this, several indicators should have been used. Stark, in short, has not presented us with a true test of the actual relationship between social class and general associational participation and church activity.

[13] Lazerwitz, "Membership in Voluntary Associations and Frequency of Church Attendance."

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[15] Stark, *op. cit.*

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 700.

I have recomputed Stark's figures so that his uncontrolled two-variable table can be presented and compared with the controlled three-variable table we presented originally.[17] The recombined figures and percentages for the uncontrolled relationship are presented in Table 1. Table 2 is the original one presented by Stark. Not one of the independent "controlled" tests in Table 2 is significant at any level (with 2 degrees of freedom χ^2 is 0.6, 3.8, and 5.7), whereas the uncontrolled relationship is significant at the .001 level ($\chi^2 = 14.3$). Using *h* as another measure of association,[18] the same picture emerges. For the respondents with no non-church organizations, the association between occupational level and church activity is .12; for those with one such organization it is .18, and for those with two or more it is .16. For the original uncontrolled relationship $h = .21$.

TABLE 1

CHURCH ATTENDANCE BY OCCUPATION

Church Attendance	White Collar		Blue Collar	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
Attended in past week	55	145	46	255
Attended in past year	38	101	38	211
Not attended for year or more..........	7	19	16	91
Total............	100	265	100	557

Unfortunately, a serious difficulty with both of these tests of significance is that the outcome of the test is determined in large part by the number of cases in each of the cells.[19]

We can see that the original percentage differences in the church activity of the two class levels is slightly greater (9 per cent for weekly church attendance) than is true for the three variable relationships (an average of 6.7 per cent), but the differences are small in either case.

TABLE 2

CHURCH ATTENDANCE BY OCCUPATION, HOLDING VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY CONSTANT

Church Attendance	Number of Organizations Participated in (Per Cent)					
	None		One		Two or More	
	White Collar	Blue Collar	White Collar	Blue Collar	White Collar	Blue Collar
Attended in past week..........	53	45	54	46	56	52
Attended in past year...........	34	38	39	40	38	31
Not attended for year or more...	13	17	7	14	6	17
Total.....	100	100	100	100	100	100
N..........................	*22*	*367*	*139*	*132*	*103*	*58*

THE DATA

Because of the inadequacies and gaps in the available literature on this question, we set out to explore the relationship and provide a test of its precise nature in such a way that its findings may be accepted as

[17] There was a slight error in Stark's computations, since no figures can be 53 per cent, 34 per cent, and 13 percent of 22.

[18] W. Allen Wallis and Harry V. Roberts, *Statistics: A New Approach* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 282–84.

[19] Hanan C. Selvin, "A Critique of Tests of Significance in Survey Research," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (October, 1957), 524.

more or less definitive. A secondary analysis of the data collected in two studies was made. We shall call these two the "Appalachian" and the "Congregational" studies. The Appalachian study is one phase of a general attitude survey conducted in the southern Appalachian area. The specifically religious phase of it was done in 1959. The headquarters of the broader project was Berea College, and it was conceived and designed by Thomas R. Ford, W. D. Weatherford, Earl D. C. Brewer, and Rupert B. Vance. The religious phase of the study was Emory University. It was designed and directed by Brewer. Six metropolitan areas, three of central cities, three of county areas outside central cities, and eighteen rural or non-metropolitan areas were chosen by a "modified area sample stratified by state economic areas, counties and subdivisions of counties or cities."[20] Within each of these areas, ten churches were chosen randomly. Five "church leaders" and five non-leader church members were selected for interviewing. In addition those selected designated five known non-members. Thus, the final sample was made up of one-third church leaders, one-third non-leader church members, and one-third non-members.

The final sample consisted of 1,078 individuals. It was almost entirely white and Protestant in composition, was largely rural, and was made up largely of blue-collar workers—manual laborers and farmers.[21] The Congregational study was made up entirely of church members.[22] In 1956 the Department of Urban Churches, a unit within the division of the National Council of Churches of Christ, authorized a study to determine the factors relating to the "effectiveness" of churches.[23] A schedule of topics to be covered was worked out by church-associated social researchers and sociologists. The actual questionnaire, originally designed for members of the United Lutheran denomination, was constructed by a group of researchers under the guidance of Charles Y. Glock, then director of the Bureau of Applied Social Research. It was adapted for Congregational use, making some changes in doctrinal questions.

In the fall of that year the thirty-seven superintendents of the Congregational state conferences were asked to "nominate" churches in their conferences considered by them to be "effective" urban churches. Twenty-seven eventually were chosen. The ministers of these churches were then invited to participate in the study. Some declined, others were eliminated, and the final total of the first sample was reduced to twelve churches. Every church member in all except two churches was sent a mailed questionnaire; in the other two, every third member was asked to participate. The first sample was composed of 4,095 respondents. One suburban church was added a few years later and was made up of about 800 members.

The return rate varied from quite low to moderately high—from 27 per cent to 71 per cent—depending on the church in question. Because of the totally metropolitan makeup of the respondents, as well as the traditionally high status of Congregationalists, an abnormally high proportion of the respondents were white collar, college-educated, and high in income. The sample is therefore not representative of any general population, any urban population, or even any urban church population. This sample neatly complements the predominantly rural, southern, less well-educated sample included in the Appalachian study.

[20] The following account was given to me in a personal letter from Professor Brewer.

[21] Other details about the study may be found in Brewer, *op. cit.*, pp. 201–18. The author wishes to thank Professor Brewer for his generosity in sharing the data cards from this study.

[22] One methodological consequence of this is that the difference in the church activity among the class levels is smaller than is true of general population samples.

[23] This account was taken from Yoshio Fukuyama, "The Major Dimensions of Church Membership" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago Divinity School, 1960), pp. 216 ff. We would like to express our appreciation to Dr. Fukuyama for letting us use the data cards from this survey.

The results of these two studies agree and demonstrate the following empirical regularities:

1. *Church participation is significantly related to social class.*—The Appalachian study employed seven indicators of church activity: church attendance, participation in the Lord's Supper, money contributed to the church, number of memberships in church organizations, the holding of leadership positions in church organizations, attendance at church meetings of all kinds, and total number of religious activities within a period of time. Two measures of class were used: education and occupational level. These fourteen tables were all significant at the .001 level, with differences between high and low status levels in their church activity ranging from 8 to 43 percentage points. The second study, the Congregational study, employed three measures of church participation: church attendance, number of church financial contributions, and holding officerships in church organizations. The two indicators of class were: education and occupation. Of the six tables produced, five were significant at the .001 level; one was not significant. The percentage-point differences were from slightly negative to 17 points. These tables are collapsed and presented in Tables 3–6 to show the strentgth of the original uncontrolled relationship between social class and church activity.

2. *Non-church activity is significantly related to social class.*—The Appalachian study used number of non-church organizational memberships as its measure of non-church associational activity. The tables produced by a cross-tabulation with the status measures were significant at the .001 level and represented from about 40 percentage points of difference. The Congregational study used as its indicator of non-church activity a number of non-church organizational memberships. When cross-tabulated with the two status measures, the differences were significant at the .001 level from 15 to 30 points of difference.

3. *Church participation is significantly related to non-church participation.*—The seven tables produced by the Appalachian study's indicators represented from about 15 to 30 points of difference, all significant at the .001 level. The Congregational study produced two tables, significant at the .001 level, the differences being from about 15 points.

These relationships corroborate previous findings that have related these variables. Our contribution, however, was to test the three-variable relationship between status and church and non-church activity:

4. *When general non-church formal organizational participation is controlled, the original uncontrolled relationship between class and church activity is greatly attenuated.*—In the Appalachian study's data, when education measured status, the mean point difference between the most and least educated levels with regard to their church activity—an average of all seven indicators —was 17.4 per cent. When the non-church-associational-participation control was applied to the relationship, this dropped to 9.9 per cent. When occupation was an indicator of status the original mean difference between white- and blue-collar workers (farmers excluded) in their church activity was 24.0 per cent after the control, the drop was small, to 19.4 per cent. The Congregational study's data agreed in substance with these findings. The original difference between the highest and lowest educational levels in their church activity was 7.0 per cent; this was reduced to 4.0 per cent after controlling for non-church organizational activity. The comparable figures when occupation measured status were 12.7 per cent and 10.5 per cent. The figures for these relationships are presented in Tables 3–6.

The reduction that resulted from this control was greater the greater the specificity of the control. Where the exact number of non-church organizations or the number of organization meetings was specified, the reduction in the relationships increased. Naturally, tables incorporating this degree of specificity are too clumsy to present in a paper of this scope.

One qualification must be registered here. This is the role of additional variables.[24] Clearly age, sex, denominational affiliation, and degree of urbanness all play some role in determining both religious and non-religious activity as well as in affecting the stratification variables. Does this regularity hold for women as well as for men? For urban and for rural dwellers? For Catholics and Protestants, for sects and "old-line" denominations? For all age groups? Clear-

[24] It is interesting that in a recent article on religious activity and social status which stressed the importance of controlling additional third variables, over-all associational activity was not even mentioned as one important enough to control (see Dillingham, *op. cit.*, pp. 416, 421–22).

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE "HIGH" IN CHURCH PARTICIPATION, BY EDUCATION: APPALACHIAN SAMPLE

	Disregarding Non-Church Activity		"Low" Non-Church Activity		"High" Non-Church Activity	
	Grade School	High School	Grade School	High School	Grade School	High School
Church attendance	43	63	38	49	58	71
Church associations	27	50	21	39	46	56
Church contributions	37	53	32	38	53	62
All church meetings	34	47	29	35	47	54
Lord's Supper	45	66	39	55	63	73
All religious activities	21	29	18	18	30	35
Church leadership	33	54	27	45	50	60
*N**	*511*	*567*	*380*	*208*	*125*	*355*

Note —Indicator for a "high" level of church participation: church attendance: once a week or more; church associations: three memberships or more; church contributions: one hundred dollars or more given in the past year; all church meetings: one hundred or more attended in the past year; Lord's Supper: partaken at least once in the past year, all religious activities: six or more in the past week. Indicator for non-church activity: "low": attended no meetings of non-church organizations in the past year; "high": attended at least one meeting of non-church organization in the past year.

* *N's for all of the following tables vary somewhat due to non-response.*

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE "HIGH" IN CHURCH PARTICIPATION, BY OCCUPATION:* APPALACHIAN SAMPLE

	Disregarding Non-Church Activity		"Low" Non-Church Activity		"High" Non-Church Activity	
	Blue Collar	White Collar	Blue Collar	White Collar	Blue Collar	White Collar
Church attendance	49	77	40	65	62	82
Church associations	39	56	27	46	55	60
Church contributions	44	67	38	53	53	73
All church meetings	38	61	29	54	50	64
Lord's Supper	51	80	41	71	66	84
All religious activities	20	45	15	36	27	49
Church leadership	41	64	31	54	54	69
N	*522*	*254*	*295*	*78*	*223*	*176*

* Farmers were eliminated because of their ambiguous occupational status. They were not eliminated from the education table because they could be arranged educationally. *N*'s and percentages in the two tables do not match perfectly, therefore.

ly an entire monograph, and not merely a paper of this scope, would be necessary to answer these quetsions. The author cannot go into these complex questions because of space limitations, except to point out that the Congregational study's sample was limited to urban and suburban dwellers and to a single denomination, the Congregational Christian Church; naturally, this does not eliminate the influence of all of the variables mentioned, but it does suggest that they might not make our conclusions invalid.

A second qualification that must be entered here is the fact that the class differences in church activity did not entirely disappear; they were only reduced significantly. Clearly, then, the relationship is not completely spurious. Class still affects church activity to some degree even when this crucial third variable is controlled. We therefore cannot eliminate its role in the relationship, though it can be seen as less determining than was true previously.

The last qualification relates to the *direction* of the relationship. Although we have designated over-all organizational participation as the general dimension under which we may subsume church participation, it is conceivable that church activity causes non-church activity, that is, that because one attends church one feels compelled to participate in other organizations as well. Although our thesis is a more plausible one,

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE "HIGH" IN CHURCH PARTICIPATION, BY EDUCATION: CONGREGATIONAL SAMPLE

	Disregarding Non-Church Activity			"Low" Non-Church Activity			"High" Non-Church Activity		
	No College	Some College	College Graduate	No College	Some College	College Graduate	No College	Some College	College Graduate
Church attendance	56	55	55	55	53	55	57	56	55
Church contributions	43	45	51	39	35	43	50	53	54
Church leadership	29	36	43	26	26	37	34	43	45
N	*1,658*	*1,288*	*1,811*	*789*	*454*	*347*	*688*	*752*	*1,372*

Note.—Indicator for a "high" level of church participation. church attendance: attendance three times a month or more; church contributions: contributes regularly to at least three church funds, church leadership: holds an officership in at least one church organization Indicator for non-church activity: "low": mentions membership in fewer than two non-church organizations; "high": mentions membership in two or more non-church organizations.

TABLE 6

PERCENTAGE "HIGH" IN CHURCH PARTICIPATION, BY OCCUPATION: CONGREGATIONAL SAMPLE

	Disregarding Non-Church Activity				"Low" Non-Church Activity				"High" Non-Church Activity			
	Lab	Sales	Mgr	Prof	Lab	Sales	Mgr	Prof	Lab	Sales	Mgr	Prof
Church attendance	49	55	52	58	49	56	50	57	53	53	52	59
Church contributions	38	45	52	50	33	38	39	42	43	52	58	54
Church leadership	25	33	42	42	22	29	32	36	30	36	48	46
N	*570*	*931*	*714*	*1,921*	*319*	*474*	*249*	*678*	*244*	*457*	*458*	*1,231*

Note.—Prof = professional; mgr = managerial; sales = sales and clerical; lab = manual labor.

within the confines of this paper we cannot eliminate the alternative argument.

IMPLICATIONS

Our findings strongly suggest that church activity, such as attendance at church ritual, cannot be seen as an unambiguous reflection of religiosity, that is, as a measure of religious feeling. Church participation clearly means something quite different for members of the white-collar occupational level than it does for manual laborers. To judge by the evidence, for the former it is in part an extension of their over-all associational participation. It appears that church activity has become secularized to such an extent that it can be subsumed, at least partially, under general associational activity; it is quite possible that to this extent religious activity has lost much of its uniqueness historically, much of its separateness from the other institutions in society. It does not seem to be experienced as a special and exclusive form of sociation.

Working-class church members, however, display a quite different pattern of religiosity. They participate less in formal church activities, but their religious activity does not appear to be nearly so secularized. It is more specifically religious in character. This is indicated by the fact that on a number of other religious dimensions, dimensions not dependent on extraneous non-religious variables, individuals of manual-status levels appear to display a considerably higher level of religious response. This is true particularly of psychological variables, such as religious "salience," the greater feeling that the church and religion are great forces in the lives of respondents.[25] It is also true for "religiosity" as measured by a higher level of religious concern,[26] and for religious "involvement," the extent to which the individual is psychologically dependent on some sort of specifically religious sociation in his life.

This is not to say that these two measures of religion, formal church participation and religious "involvement," are different and equally valid indicators of religiosity, each one measuring a different type of religiousness, each one bearing a different relationship to stratification variables. It is to say, rather, that some of the traditional measures of religiousness, such as church attendance, ought not even to be used at all. Church activity is not really a "pure" measure of one particular kind of religiosity; it is not a measure that can be considered specifically religious in character. Its strength and degree depend in such a large measure on non-religious factors that it cannot be said to measure a purely religious variable; secular variables are intertwined with it.

This also means that we must now shift a large part of the burden of the explanation of the different levels of church activity of the various class levels from religiousness specifically to organizational activity per se. Instead of asking: "Why are the middle classes more religious than the laboring classes?" or "Why do those of middle-class status attend church more?" we must ask, rather: "Why are the middle classes more active in voluntary organizations?" or "Why do they participate more in social activities of all kinds?" This makes the question a more general one, one less tied to one specific institution. We should seek the explanation at a higher level of generality than has been true in the past. This is not an explanation, of course, but it does point to where one might be found. What we have done is not to solve a question but to reroute questions about a specific relationship to a more fruitful area of inquiry.

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[25] Demerath, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

[26] Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Religion and Humanitarianism," *Psychological Monographs*, LXIII, Whole No. 304 (1949), 13.

BOOK REVIEWS

Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change. By KARL E. TAEUBER and ALMA F. TAEUBER. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xvii+284. $9.95.

This is an important book. It is not only a well-written report of highly competent research, but it also focuses upon the critical feature of the current racial scene in our cities—housing.

Residential segregation is rapidly becoming *the* principal barrier to racial progress in the United States. It severely limits neighborly, equal-status contact between Negro and white Americans, and it determines segregated patterns in many other realms as well. Yet residential segregation has proved to be the most resistant to change of all realms, perhaps, because it is so critical to racial change in general. Fortunately, then, the Taeubers have skilfully blocked out for us the enormous dimensions of this problem, the current trends, and where we must go from here.

The Taeubers employ a block index of residential segregation that ranges from zero to one hundred and indicates the percentage of a city's Negro households that would have to be relocated on predominantly white blocks if the city were to achieve completely unsegregated housing. This "index of dissimilarity" is derived as follows: first, identify each block where the percentage of non-white households is greater than that of the city as a whole; second, calculate the percentages of the city's non-white and white households which reside on these blocks; and, third, obtain the index score by subtracting the white from the non-white percentage. The relevant 1960 block data for these calculations exist for 207 cities with more than one thousand non-white households; for 1940, 1950, and 1960 comparisons, the data exist for 109 such cities.

The findings generated by this realistic index are stark. "A high degree of racial residential segregation is universal in American cities" (p. 2). For 1960, the median score is 87.8 with a range of 60.4 (Sacramento, California, where Asian Americans lower the index) to 98.1 (Fort Lauderdale, Florida). Within this narrow range, northeastern (particularly New England) and western cities tend to have the lowest indexes, midwestern cities somewhat higher indexes, and southern cities the highest of all. From 1940 to 1950, housing segregation increased throughout the nation; but from 1950 to 1960, it continued to rise in the South while decreasing slightly outside of the South.

Indeed, there is something especially devastating about the separation of Negroes. Index comparisons reveal that Negro Americans are far more segregated residentially than those in low-status occupations, any nationality group, or even other victims of discrimination —Japanese, Chinese, Puerto Rican, or Mexican Americans. Nor can the Negro's relative poverty begin to account for this potent pattern of separation. "Economic factors," the Taeubers state flatly, "cannot account for more than a small portion of observed levels of racial residential segregation" (p. 2). Consequently, "improving the economic status of Negroes is unlikely by itself to alter prevailing patterns of racial residential segregation" (p. 95).

The book also probes into the processes of neighborhood change. "Tipping points" are found to be more closely linked with the supply and demand for housing in interracial areas than with white racial attitudes. Indeed, "traditional accounts of the process of racial residential succession, which stress the low socioeconomic status of the Negro population entering a new neighborhood, the overcrowding and deterioration of housing, the declines in property values, and the flight of whites from the neighborhood are outdated oversimplifications. Expansion of Negro residential areas in recent years has been led by Negroes of high socioeconomic status. . . . The invaded areas tend to be occupied by whites of moderately high socioeconomic status, and the housing is predominantly in good rather than substandard condition" (p. 7).

The authors conclude: "Patterns of residential segregation have yet to show signs of significant weakening. Continuing conflict over residential segregation thus seems inevitable, not only because of Negro dissatisfactions over housing, but because residential segregation is a particularly tenacious barrier to the full participation of Negroes in the general society" (p. 8). Little wonder, therefore, that federal officials are taking a greater interest in direct legislative efforts to alleviate this problem.

This volume, then, is essential reading for all students of both American race relations and American cities. It will be regarded as the definitive work to date on urban residential segregation by race.

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The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public: Social Communication in Crisis. Edited by BRADLEY S. GREENBERG and EDWIN B. PARKER. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi+392. $8.95.

Children and the Death of a President: Multidisciplinary Studies. Edited by MARTHA WOLFENSTEIN and GILBERT KLIMAN. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1965. Pp. xxix+256. $4.95.

President Kennedy was shot at 12:30 P.M. on November 22, 1963, and pronounced dead one-half hour later. By then, according to the NORC, two out of three adults in the United States had heard of it; an hour later, 92 per cent knew, and by 6 P.M. it was 99.8 per cent. No item of news has ever traveled so fast nor been so promptly and thoroughly studied.

In the anthology by Greenberg and Parker, twenty-six papers appear, of which the first seven tell about events as reported and presented to the people over the "Black Weekend." Tom Wicker of the *New York Times'* Washington bureau begins it with the best account of a top-notch reporter at work since television entered the news field. In subsequent sections, research findings describe how the public found out, how people felt, and what they did, as learned by social scientists —in Baltimore and Boulder, Colorado, in Manhattan and, of course, in hapless Dallas— who questioned schoolchildren, women, Negroes, university undergraduates, and other sample populations, sorted by occupation, education, region, and so on. Those Cinderellas of the pollsters—women, Negroes, and the unlettered—show up, as usual, as the laggards and the extremists. Coleman and Hollander find that fear and anxiety increase at first, then normally abate. But this did not happen among the Negroes (p. 267). Already an uneasy and restless public, they saw themselves made leaderless in an unfriendly world, and in their ranks fear waxed. Noting that the opinions of the educated are not found at the extremes, the Baltimore team concludes: "Formal education is the principal civilizing device."

In a concluding section, four papers discuss the political effects of the weekend's two strangely linked murders, neither of which is supposed to "happen here." Wilbur Schramm and others argue that if this national disaster was integrative it was because the speed and completeness with which the public learned the news gave it a sense of itself and its oneness.

This is an informative compilation and a credit to sociology. But if Friedman and Pierce-Jones's method for studying response to disaster is, as they hope, adopted by others, we could wish that the borrowers rephrase the statement, "The idea of collective responsibility for the killing of President Kennedy must be applied [*sic!*] to all the citizens of Texas." An idea may be hot, but it is not a mustard plaster!

Beginning with the tenet that the mature personality is a continuous development from birth onward, Wolfenstein and Kliman's collection of studies assess in various ways the role in the socialization of children of their reactions to the news of the president's death and to the presence of grieving adults. The papers consider the experiences of pupils in public and in private schools, of university undergraduates, of the normal and the mentally disturbed, as learned through observation, interviews, projective techniques, and psychoanalytic disclosures by psychologists, psychiatrists, and political scientists—thirteen in all—who saw in the assassination and what followed a political event which penetrated the world of children.

To select a few details: Roberta S. Sigel,

sampling schoolchildren in Detroit, found the somaticized emotional reactions of the younger pupils resembled those the NORC found among adults more closely than did those of adolescents. She wonders if the teen-agers are striving to look "cool." Observing a group of children already bereft of a parent, Martha Wolfenstein suggests that grieving for the president provides a safe outlet to the child who denies his own parent's death and does not permit himself to mourn it. In what forms a good compliment to Friedman and Pierce-Jones's piece in the volume reviewed above, Greenstein noted that undergraduates look to their age-mates to learn how to "handle" grief, and that college athletes—like the young teen-agers studied by Ginsparg, Moriarty, and Lois Murphy and the grade-school pupils observed by Sigel—dwell on the ways Oswald should have been tortured.

This very readable compilation should be widely useful.

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The Social Psychology of Social Movements. By HANS TOCH. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965. Pp. xiv+257. $6.50.

Whether you consider this book important and interesting or merely sometimes interesting but often pedestrian, depends, in part, on your assessment of the present state of the field. In Toch's view, the psychological study of individual participation in social movements is terribly neglected. He is more interested in demonstrating the psychological significance of the subject matter and the rich supply of data in the real world than he is in advancing the rigor of the field. For him, the neglect of this field justifies an antiquarian and eclectic approach.

Toch's approach is antiquarian in that he avidly collects illustrations of exotic movements, or pseudomovements, exemplifying the range of appeals inducing people to participate —from the lonely widows who find solutions to their problems at Arthur Murray's Dance Studios to the members of Cargo Cults caught in "dead-end" situations, from the fat ones who join TOPS (Taking Off Pounds Sensibly) to the disaffectors leaving the Communist Party. His approach is eclectic in that he uses a commonsense psychology drawn from many sources—here a little Freud, there a dab of Rokeach (aha!), a little cognitive inconsistency, plus a pinch of authoritarianism.

Since my own view is that the relevance of social movements to social science hardly needs stating—if psychologists have not studied them, others have—the evaluation of the book must rest on its contribution to the systematic study of social movements, not on its general readability or plausibility. From this perspective, I find the volume wanting.

The book is divided into three loosely connected parts, "The Nature of Social Movements," "The Careers of Members," and "Determinants and Consequences." But only the second section is of a piece; in it he treats the process of joining a social movement—including a discussion of conversion experiences, the consequences of membership, and the process of disaffection.

Throughout, two themes are central: the psychological functions for individuals of belonging and the transactional processes by which movements exercise their appeal. His analysis in using these themes is often quite penetrating. For instance, he nicely argues the way in which paranoid mechanisms for interpreting society fit in with authoritarianism, and at the same time he gives a simple solution to a terribly confusing world of events. Or again, his discussion of social movements as sources of legitimating authority is superb.

Toch also makes interesting distinctions among some borderline phenomena. *Latent* social movements are those where the hidden appeals of an organization solve the social problems of the joiner. If the hidden appeal was made manifest, it might fail. Thus, people taking repeated lessons at an Arthur Murray Studio do not learn for dancing's sake, but to end their isolation. However, if the appeal was made manifest, Toch thinks many people would not join.

In spite of these merits, the author's attitude toward data and his conceptual frame of reference limit the value of his work. His psychological orientation leads to major limitations in his explanation of specific cases. To take but one case, his explanation of McCarthyism is solely in terms of America's experience of loss of status and power connecting up with author-

itarian personalities and paranoid reactions. There is no attention to the societal norms and institutions (as in E. A. Shils's *The Torment of Secrecy*) that provides the context for McCarthyism.

On the empirical side, it is discouraging that he absolutely refuses to use quantitative data that are *already available* or to take a critical stance toward those which he does use. On the one hand, he naïvely generalizes to the nation from a finding that in Bennington, Vermont, small businessmen were likely to support McCarthy. On the other hand, he refuses to track down the systematic data collected by pollsters and others, that would buttress his analysis. For instance, there are systematic bodies of data on conversion to both religious movements and communism.

Two final criticisms: First, he takes a typical liberal position toward the relation of the larger society to social movements. The larger society ought to be tolerant, for people have needs which will out! This position is a simplification of the complex problem of societal self-defense; furthermore, it ignores the conditions under which societies are or are not "tolerant." Second, his tendency to deal with the esoteric leads him away from the massive body of literature on the central social movements of our time—from Nazism to socialism to the civil rights movements, and from their historical precursors. Possibly Toch thought these would provide less interesting material for his psychological interpretation. If so, he was wrong.

In sum, this is a sometimes interesting book on an important topic that missed the chance to be an important contribution.

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Volunteers for Learning: A Study of the Educational Pursuits of American Adults. By JOHN W. C. JOHNSTONE and RAMON J. RIVERA. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xxviii+624. $12.50.

The continuous participation of adults in further education is generally considered to be indispensible in modern society. That some adults do participate is well known, but how many or what kinds of educational activities has not been known on a national scale. Numerous descriptive and analytic surveys of participation in adult education have been made on a local level or within specific institutions, but these have not supplied any general overview of the total extent of this activity. Here then, for the first time, is a survey on a national scale that is inclusive of all forms of further education at all levels.

The concepts and definitions established for the survey are precise so as to differentiate between adult education and self-education in a manner not achieved in previous surveys. Furthermore, the use of a role concept as an indicator of adult status is more functional than age in identifying the clientele for adult education. It is in the determination of an educational activity that the study may be questioned for it has included Sunday school as an educational activity. This leads to an imbalance in the analysis of the data which is reminiscent of earlier studies of social participation where church attendance was measured as comparable to organizational participation. This is misleading with respect to any precise measure of further education and the role of institutions or agencies in the provision of educational opportunities.

At the same time that it seems to overemphasize the role of the church, this study appears to underrate adult education in rural areas. It is difficult to determine whether this has resulted from sampling procedures or from the identification and classification of the sponsorship of educational activities. Certainly, the role of the Cooperative Extension Service in rural adult education is well known, but it does not appear here as a significant force either with respect to rural areas or the more recent moves into suburban and even urban areas.

The data provided about participants in adult education is more detailed and informative than any that has been available previously. This reinforces many generalizations about participation that have been derived from earlier scattered surveys, but it supplies more specific details than were available heretofore. Such information emphasizes the fact that adult education is educating the segment of the population that needs it most. This should be helpful in planning for adult education by identifying the kinds of people most likely to participate in various kinds of educational activities and by helping to identify the conditions necessary to reach those not now involved. These data, then, hold many implica-

tions for adult educators about the form and content of educational programs that should not be ignored.

In studying the facilities for adult education, NORC made a detailed inventory of programs and resources in "the Middle-Sized City" which illustrates the diversity of educational opportunity one can expect to find in any community. In spite of the wealth of available opportunity for education, however, too few adults in a community were aware of the specific activities at hand. This certainly is a measure of institutional performance in making known the programs offered.

The final section of the report deals with the education of the late adolescent, and it does much to explain the relationship of this group with the school and with the idea of continuing education. This should be of particular interest to school personnel and it is relevant to adult education by providing insights into the origins of resistance to further learning on the part of certain segments of the adult population.

For practicing adult educators, this NORC study is both an evaluation of present practices and a prophecy for the future. It indicates clearly the need to rethink and redesign certain aspects of adult education so as to increase participation from the lower socioeconomic levels which are not now involved extensively and which need it most. With respect to the future, "America is likely to experience an adult education explosion during the next few decades," and "the potential audience for adult education is increasing at a much faster rate than the population as a whole." With this warning at hand, it behooves adult educators to prepare for the future.

The Carnegie Corporation is to be commended for supporting this research. NORC and John W. C. Johnstone are to be congratulated for producing this study, which will long be a benchmark for future research in this area. Such a study will surely bring adult education into focus as a large and important activity that warrants increasing attention from the social sciences.

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Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. I: *England*. By MOSEI OSTROGORSKI. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Pp. lxxxii+350. $7.50.

Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. II: *The United States*. By MOSEI OSTROGORSKI. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Pp. xv+418. $8.95.

First published in 1902, these two volumes by the distinguished Russian student of politics, Mosei Ostrogorski (1854–1919), are among the few works that can claim with some justice to be indispensable for the understanding of modern democracy in general and American democracy in particular. They thus suggest comparison to the books of Tocqueville and Bryce; indeed, the latter graced them with an appreciative preface. Yet Ostrogorski has suffered from neglect of late: these two volumes have long been unavailable. This is a matter of profound regret and not only because of the author's seminal influence on later social scientists, including—as one is informed in the introduction by Seymour Martin Lipset—Max Weber and Robert Michels. It is a matter of regret primarily because Ostrogorski's work is *more* than an influential curiosity; it is a model of its kind, a work from which one can learn as much today as one could sixty years ago.

Ostrogorski carefully studied the consequences of universal suffrage and the ensuing mass democracy in the two most democratically oriented societies of his time: England and the United States. He traced the development of the modern party system in these countries and the evolution of various concomitant phenomena: bureaucracies, party hacks, political conventions, etc. Presenting a wealth of detailed information, Ostrogorski revealed himself as a shrewd historian: he had an unerring sense of relevance, and he knew how to bring the past to life. Presenting a view of political phenomena as they are, he revealed himself the very model of a social scientist, allowing the subject matter he investigated to emerge with maximum clarity. Yet at the same time he managed to do more than to describe: one can gather from him a good idea of the problems of democracy—its perils and its promises. In other words, Ostrogorski goes beyond description to evaluation. In this especially the work can serve as a model for social science, a discipline that sometimes is tempted to assume that description pre-

cludes evaluation. Ostrogorski could describe democracy so forcefully *because* he could evaluate: to describe corruptions such as rigged conventions—which he did—for what they are, one has to have standards of what ought to be.

For these and many other reasons, one wants to have these books available. Ordinarily it would be a pleasure and a duty to commend their editor, Mr. Lipset, for a great service performed. He is, however, not merely their editor, but also their abridger. It is difficult to justify any abridgment of a classic at all, and Lipset has nowhere attempted such justification. At the very least, the reader has a right to know where and how cuts have been made. He is not informed by the editor, nor is he given any scholarly apparatus, except a lengthy introduction that is interesting—and, for all its length, somewhat perfunctory. That introduction is printed in both volumes; this reviewer must be forgiven for wondering about this procedure. Much of Ostrogorski he is not even permitted to read once; all of Lipset he has the opportunity to read twice. But one must in fairness add that the abridging has been done with some measure of insight: the cut version is only slightly more difficult to read than the original—and classic—text.

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The Mass Consumption Society. By GEORGE KATONA. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964. Pp. viii+343. $7.95.

It is strange that sociologists do not pay more attention to consumer behavior, since it plays an important part in people's lives. For the knowledge we do have of the American consumer, what he does with his income and why, we owe a good deal to the economist, George Katona, and is colleagues at the Survey Research Center at Michigan. Based on the findings of almost two decades of research, this book vigorously defends our materialistic, consumption-oriented society that has been attacked by such critics as Galbraith, Packard, and Toynbee. The title is meant to capture the essence of America today—its emergence as the first society in history in which the masses have discretionary income—income beyond that needed for subsistence. This fact, Katona argues, makes the consumer a powerful force in the economy. Consumer investment (expenditures) must be considered along with business investment and government policy if the economy is to be understood.

A basic proposition in Katona's economic theory is that consumption is not determined solely by income. In addition to ability to buy, the psychological factor of willingness to buy must be taken into account, and this, in turn, rests upon the motives, attitudes, and beliefs of consumers. Katona argues the case for psychological economics by showing how changes in consumers' sentiments—their level of optimism about their own future and the state of the economy—help predict business cycles.

Katona delights in reporting findings that disprove common sense assumptions about consumer behavior. For example, it is not true that affluence leads to complacency—the more people have, the more they want. (In fact, ever rising aspirations is the driving force in the mass consumption society; the pursuit of consumer goods makes for prosperity and, in the long run, promises to bring about world peace.) Pension plans and old age insurance do not discourage saving—they may even stimulate saving. Instead of panic buying in times of rising prices, consumers may react to inflation by restricting consumption.

The only villians in this rosy picture of American society are the aforementioned social critics. Poverty is decreasing and gets scant attention; consumer credit is good, an important stimulus to economic growth; advertising is not the evil that it is often made out to be; businessmen are not motivated only by profits—they also worry about their public image and are concerned with the general welfare. The consumer may not be a totally rational man, but he is not an irrational man either. He is portrayed by Katona as a "sensible," "conservative," "discriminating" person who tries to keep himself informed but is slow to learn. (He is woefully ignorant of economic principles, equating public debt with private debt, both of which are bad; he thinks inflation is bad and fails to link it with prosperity.) The consumer's psychology, Katona

claims, helps stabilize the economy. In good times the consumer does not let his consumption desires get out of hand but behaves cautiously for fear that the good times will not last; likewise, he soon adjusts to bad times and becomes more optimistic about the future, thus stimulating the economy.

Although Katona approves of consumers' efforts to keep themselves informed and to act more rationally, there is one area in which his data show that consumers are not informed, and, futhermore, Katona is not sure that they should be. This is the matter of the cost of consumer credit. Unlike the findings about almost any other item of information, the better educated and better paid are just as ignorant of the costs of credit as the poorly educated and poorly paid. He interprets his finding as meaning that consumers do not care about the costs of credit since they do not take the trouble to find out about them. What he fails to mention is that the business community goes to great lengths to misinform the consumer by stating interest charges in ways that are almost impossible to interpret.

In a footnote we learn that in 1960 Katona testified at a Senate hearing against the "truth in lending" bill that would have forced creditors to disclose credit costs in terms of a simple annual interest rate. In contrast with his opinion that consumers do not care about this issue, Katona defends his position at the hearing on the grounds that a disclosure of the true cost of credit at that time would have had harmful effects on the economy, since consumers might have been reluctant to use credit if they knew how much it cost. The intent of Senator Douglas' bill is to make credit costs competitive by permitting consumers to shop for credit, something that they cannot easily do now. Apparently Katona's stress on the importance of the consumer does not always include a concern for the consumer's interest.

This book is a gold mine of facts; for example, how many families own stock and the size of their holdings, the number of people who hold more than one job, the number of adults who travel each year, the number of families that buy cars, appliances, and furniture each year, etc. And there are even some observations that have implications for sociological research. Thus Katona links the increasing security-mindedness of the population —the reduction of risk-taking—to the growth of contractual obligations. For people who must make payments on mortgages, insurance, and installment debt, a reduction in income can be catastrophic. At another point, Katona observes that the government should concern itself with the social and psychological problems of consumers (as well as their economic ones) since these might damage the optimism which is so important for economic growth. Perhaps in his future research Katona will follow up this idea and show how other areas of life interact with consumer behavior.

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Reputation and Resources in Community Politics

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the role of reputational leaders in influencing the outcome of issues in eighteen New England communities. When such leaders are both active and united, they are on the winning side three-fourths of the time. This is not merely a function of their participation on the more active side, for they have as high a proportion of victories when they support the less active side. Furthermore, the side supporting change wins only 30 per cent of the time without the united support of reputational leaders but two-thirds of the time with it. There seems to be some reality to reputation, and this reality is consistent with a theoretical interpretation of reputation as a resource.

In the post mortem which accompanies any political defeat, the losing group will typically take itself to task for various failures. There is, in such analyses, a tendency to assume that the exercise of influence alone determines the outcome of a decision. The other side is seen as having been more effective—as having spent more resources or as having used its resources more efficiently. While this may be true, it is also possible in such cases that the losing side was quite effective while the winning side did little or nothing to further their cause. The exercise of influence is only one element in the outcome of political issues.

It is helpful, in speaking of influence, to start with the notion of a decision to be made. Influence can then be handled very well, as Dahl has suggested,[1] using the notion of conditional probability. The amount of influence a social unit has had on a decision is represented by the difference between the probability of the desired outcome before and after the influence attempt. To say that one has influenced a decision means simply that he has changed the probability of the desired outcome in the intended direction.[2] By such a definition, the presence or absence of influence cannot be clearly inferred from whether or not the would-be influencer is on the winning side of a decision. A partisan group in a community may start with little chance of an alternative being accepted. By waging a vigorous fight they may reach a point where acceptance or rejection is touch and go. Ultimately, of course, the measure will either pass or fail, but we should not judge this group to have had influence only if it passes. The move from an almost certain failure to a near-miss is a mark of their influence. Similarly, a victory cannot be taken as prima facie evidence of influence since a narrow victory by a partisan group in a situation in which they would have

[1] Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, II (July, 1957), 201–15. Herbert A. Simon and James G. March have suggested similar formulations.

[2] One might wish to talk of changes in an unintended direction as "negative influence," but this issue is not relevant for the discussion here.

won doing nothing is no indication of influence.

This paper is concerned with understanding the outcome of community issues and, in particular, with the role that those with a general reputation for influence play in such outcomes. Factors other than influence may, in some cases, put severe limits on the possible effects which partisan groups or individuals may have. Accordingly, it seems useful to take as a working assumption the asymmetry of the influence task for different partisan groups. Those on one side of an issue are likely to have a natural advantage over those on the other side, an advantage which will enable them to win if they simply hold their own in an influence contest.

What is the nature of this "natural advantage"? Most broadly, it is the advantage that falls to those who do not carry the burden of proof. In relatively stable situations, this advantage is held by those who would maintain a present arrangement against those who would alter it. Many community issues arise from the presentation of a proposal to alter some existing facility or service or to add some new facility. The burden of proof in such cases generally rests with the side proposing the change. For example, if a new school is proposed, those who oppose it may raise any number of questions about need, cost, design, site, and so forth. It is not necessary to resolve such questions in order to block action on this proposal; if they remain unanswered, this is generally sufficient.

The communities studied here are not undergoing acute crises. They are, then, a special case in which the natural advantage falls to those who would maintain existing conditions. To admit the existence of such an advantage is not to argue that those who desire change will fail but only that they will fail in the absence of influence no greater than that exercised by the other side. In the discussion which follows, special attention is given to the role of "reputational leaders" in such an influence process.

REPUTATION AND RESOURCES

A number of investigators interested in the operation of power in the community have elicited lists of names of community "leaders." Typically, a panel composed of heads of civic associations or some other group actively involved in public affairs is asked to nominate individuals and the nominees are in turn interviewed.[3] This "reputational method" of studying community power has been sharply attacked both for the interpretations that are made of the list of names obtained and, in more basic ways, for the use of such questions at all. To quote Polsby, "asking about reputations is asking, at a remove, about behavior. It can be argued that the researcher should make it his business to study behavior directly rather than depend on the opinions of second hand sources."[4]

What does it mean, we may ask, when an individual or group of individuals is frequently named as "influential" by those involved in community political affairs? Are such reputations meaningless in themselves, telling us no more at best than we might more efficiently learn from studying actual influence over decisions? Reputation, I will argue, is a resource; as such, it refers to potential influence rather than influence in use. Reputation is not simply the manifestation of the possession of large amounts of resources but is, itself, a resource in the same sense that money, wealth, or authority might be. This argument requires some discussion of the concept of resources.

What is it that an influencer uses to exercise influence? In any decision, there ex-

[3] It is not my intention to review or even cite such studies here. Nelson Polsby's *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963) has a reasonably complete list of citations and a highly critical review of these studies. See esp. pp. 45–68.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

ists some "thing" or "weight" such that if enough of this weight is applied to the decision-makers the probability of an alternative being accepted or rejected will be changed. This thing must satisfy two important conditions to be considered a resource. First, it must be possessed by or, more accurately, *controlled* by the influencer. He must be able to determine its use. Second, he must be able to bring it to bear on decision-makers in interaction with them.

Since in any society certain things are widely valued, certain resources are both of high applicability across a variety of decision-makers and of high stability of value over time within a particular set of decision-makers. It is the possession of such general resources rather than of more idiosyncratic ones that is of significance for understanding the stable potential to influence the outcome of decisions.

Many authors have distinguished among the ways that resources are used to produce influence.[5] The most relevant distinction for the present argument is implicit in a number of these discussions, but it is made most explicitly by Parsons. In the terms which will be used here, *sanctioning* influence is the addition of new advantages or disadvantages (conditional or not) to the situation of the decision-maker. *Persuasion* influence operates on the orientation of the decision-maker, changing the connection he sees between a decision outcome and his goals without the addition of any new advantages or disadvantages to the situation.

It is not difficult to conceive of sanctioning resources of high stability and generality. A person who holds a position of great potential influence in an elaborate network of institutional and interpersonal relationships possesses a powerful set of inducements. It is virtually certain that there will be some present or future alternative that he can influence that present decision-makers care about. Furthermore, it is a valuable political asset to have such a potentially influential person obligated to oneself.

Is it possible to talk about a similarly general basis of persuasion? Clearly, we can conceive of persuasion resources which are highly limited in scope. Expertness, for example, is only a resource for those areas in which the influencer is considered knowledgeable. Are there more generalized and stable persuasion resources?

A generalized reputation for "wisdom" or "good sense" is just such a stable persuasion resource. There are individuals who are respected by particular groups in a community not because of any *specific* expertness they may have on the issue at hand but because they are believed to be generally "knowledgeable," "sound," "reliable," "unselfish," "intelligent," and so forth. In other words, they are believed to possess certain stable personal qualities that transcend any given issue and make their opinion more convincing. A highly successful lawyer, for example, who actively participates in community affairs may find that his success is regarded by public officials as a sign of grace. While his persuasion resources on issues involving legal matters may be particularly great, he will carry with him a generalized reputation

[5] These include John R. P. French, Jr., and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," in Dorwin Cartwright (ed.), *Studies in Social Power* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1959), pp. 150–67; Herbert Kelman, "Processes of Opinion Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXV (Spring, 1961), 57–78; Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961); Franz L. Neumann, "Approaches to the Study of Political Power," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXV (1950), 161–80; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960); Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils, "Types of Power and Status," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (September, 1939), 171–82; John Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," *Behavioral Science*, VII (January, 1962), 67–80; and Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII (Spring, 1963), 37–62.

which acts as a resource—even on issues for which he has no special qualifications.

He has no persuasion resources, of course, among those who do not accept his reputation. Resources are categorized here in terms of their applicability to decision-makers. A spokesman who enjoyed the complete confidence of members of some solidary group would have a persuasion resource with respect to decisions made by his followers. However, his influence over this group might in turn be used as an inducement for public officials who wish the group's votes in an election.

A theoretical justification for identifying reputational leaders is being offered here. One asks about reputation simply to identify those who have reputation; such reputation is significant because it is a stable and generalized persuasion resource. Of course, we may quarrel with the method used to identify such people. One technique is to ask community decision-makers a question such as: "In many communities, there are people who are generally listened to when they take a position on community issues because they are believed to have good judgment. Are there any such people in ——?" Those who are frequently named form an operational definition of "people with stable persuasion resources." The validity of such a question concerns how well it measures reputation, not its connection with influence behavior.

Those who are named as "reputational leaders" simply comprise a pool of individuals with resources. No claim is made that they form a ruling elite or even a cohesive group of any sort; such claims must rest on demonstration of a number of additional characteristics. Those with resources may or may not be friendly with each other socially. If they all belong to the same clubs and organizations, this is an important additional fact about the organization of resources in the community. The list by itself tells us nothing about this fact.

Similarly, agreement on policy among reputational leaders is an empirical question. The list might contain, for example, political rivals who are never found on the same side. Or, it might contain individuals with different spheres of interest who tacitly or explicitly agree to remain neutral on issues outside of their major province. The only thing we wish to maintain about the list of reputational leaders is that, because they possess significant amounts of resources, their social organization is significant for the understanding of stable power relations in the community. The relations among members and their actions is a variable which will be related to the outcome of decisions in a variety of important ways.[6]

THE STUDY

The data to be presented here are drawn from a study of fifty-four issues in eighteen New England communities. The towns were generally small, ranging in population from 2,000 to 100,000 with the median size about 10,000. Seven of the communities were essentially suburbs of Boston, three were resort towns, and the remaining eight were more or less independent cities with some industrial base of their own. All but two of the communities were in Maine or Massachusetts.

Material on these communities was gathered through interviews with 426 informants, an average of twenty-four per town,

[6] The argument above focuses on persuasion resources. Most studies using the reputational method have not had such purposes in mind, and a variety of wordings have been used. What of asking for the names of people "who run the town," "who would be needed to get a new project across," or "who have a lot of influence on the outcome of decisions"? The responses to such questions may frequently include those who possess persuasion resources, but some individuals might be included for other reasons. It seems likely, although one would have to demonstrate this, that those frequently named individuals who do *not* possess persuasion resources do possess sanctioning resources. If this is true, then those who are named would still comprise a pool of individuals with resources and all of the above arguments for studying reputational leaders would apply.

supplemented by information from a variety of documents. Interviewing was done by teams of three or four individuals who stayed in each community for several days. Three issues were studied in each town, one of which—fluoridation—was common to all eighteen. The presence of a decision on fluoridation was, in fact, the basis of selection of these communities, and the eighteen include all those New England communities which made a fluoridation decision during an 18-month period of data collection.

Respondents were asked to name the most important issues that had arisen in their town in the previous 5 years. Of the fifty-four issues studied, twenty-six were mentioned by a majority of the respondents in the town.[7] In eleven of the eighteen towns, a majority mentioned a particular issue first or as most important and in all but one of these the issue was included in the fifty-four studied. Besides the eighteen fluoridation issues, eleven concerned schools, eleven were issues over the development of some new community facility or service, eight were zoning issues, and the final six were a miscellaneous assortment which included changes in the form of government and urban renewal.

The interviews themselves were with two categories of respondents—with active partisans on both sides of each of the three issues and with reputational leaders. The active partisans on the three issues studied were asked to name people in response to the following question: "In many communities, relatively few people are able to affect the outcome of issues sometimes because they are in a position to make key decisions or because they have the ability to persuade others to follow their leadership. Would you tell me the names of the most important and influential leaders in this community even if they do not hold public office?"[8] Those dozen individuals most frequently named were also interviewed and, in the course of the interview, asked this same question.

The criteria for inclusion on the list of reputational leaders should control for certain irrelevant variables between towns. Interviewers differed in the amount of probing they did for names, the total number of respondents interviewed in a town varied from nineteen to thirty-one, and the average number of people mentioned by respondents varied from town to town depending on the degree of consensus that existed and the volubility of respondents. By using as a base the total number of mentions,[9] we can control for all of the above variables. In communities where (1) the interviewers probed vigorously, (2) a large number of interviews were taken, and (3) the respondents were prolific in their naming, a large number of total mentions will emerge. Requiring a fixed proportion of the total for eligibility means that an individual must be named more frequently in such a town than in one where few names are mentioned over all.[10]

[7] Issues were selected for study through examination of community newspapers and some informal checking with newspaper editors and city clerks. It was possible to miss issues on whose importance there was considerable consensus since this could not be discovered until the interviews were completed. Thus, five issues named by a majority of respondents were not studied.

[8] Unfortunately, this question is not the one called for by the theoretical argument above nor is it directed, as it should be, to a sample of decision-makers. Thus, to treat our reputational leaders as a pool of resource holders we must assume that those named have some kind of stable and general resources, though not necessarily persuasion resources.

[9] That is, Σm_i, where m_i is the number of times the ith individual is mentioned.

[10] To be included, an individual must be mentioned more than some fixed proportion of the total mentions. The setting of such a fixed proportion is rather arbitrary, and I have set it here at 3 per cent of the total because such a figure yields an average of about 10 people per community. The number per town ranges from 6 people at the low end to 13 at the other extreme. The number of mentions required for inclusion ranges from 3 to 8, with an average of about 4½. Since the average number of respondents per town is about 24, this means that a reputational leader is named

Before we can assess the influence of reputational leaders on the outcome of the fifty-four issues, we must examine other aspects of these issues. Each is characterized by campaigns by one or both sides, but the intensity of these campaigns varies considerably. Furthermore, some of these efforts have as their object the adoption of some new proposal while others have the maintenance of existing arrangements as their goal. It is only against this backdrop that we can meaningfully connect winning efforts with influence. We must show that the active participation of reputational leaders on a side has some effect over and above the sheer amount of campaign activity and the natural advantage of defending the status quo.

CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY

All of those who were active on either side of an issue were asked a series of questions about the nature of campaign activities. These questions varied from such open-ended ones as "What did those in favor (opposed) actually do to promote their side, that is, what kinds of activities?" to a specific check list of sixteen activities. On several items respondents were asked to compare the campaigns of the two sides. From these descriptions of activities, we characterized each side's campaign on two dimensions—the magnitude of total activity and the degree of organization.

For the first of these dimensions, each respondent's description was culled for statements characterizing the extent of particular activities or characterizations of the campaign as a whole (e.g., "they spent a tremendous amount of money on advertising and literature," "we spent a whole year trying to convince people with a tremendous campaign in the last four weeks"). Independent coders were asked to classify the amount of activity for each partisan group as either "great," "some," or "little."[11]

For the degree of organization, heavier reliance was placed on the check list of activities. Many of the activities, such as holding meetings to decide and plan what to do, distribution of literature to the general public, circulating petitions, and raising money to support activities, require some degree of formal organization. They are typically carried on by groups that establish an ad hoc organization for the purpose with publicly identifiable leaders or else are carried on by some existing organization in the community. Other kinds of activities require less formal organization but do require interaction among those implementing them. These include telephone campaigns, selective distribution of literature, and participating at meetings or discussions. Finally, there are activities that require neither formal organization nor interaction—for example, writing and answering letters to newspapers, attending or testifying at council meetings or other official proceedings, or simply talking informally to people one encounters. Each campaign was characterized by the highest degree of organizational activity carried on. If the first category of activities occurred, then the campaign organization was characterized as formal regardless of what semiformal and informal activities occurred as well. Thus, an informal campaign was one in which *only* informal activities occurred. Each of the 108 campaigns was coded as either formal, semiformal, or informal.

With each partisan group's campaign characterized in this way, it is possible to compare the two sides on each issue. Interestingly enough, the winning side has only

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by a minimum of about ⅕ of the respondents in his town, a figure obtained by dividing the average number of mentions required for inclusion (4.6) by the average number of respondents (24). This figure of ⅕ of the respondents provides some interpretation for the, by itself, meaningless criterion of 3 per cent of the total mentions.

[11] Initial coding plans were more ambitious, but difficulties in achieving satisfactory reliability forced resort to this crude classification. Intercoder agreement for these three categories was above 80 per cent for the 108 campaigns being coded.

a modest advantage in amount of activity and organization; it had either more activity or more organization on only 48 per cent of the issues while the losing side had more on 33 per cent.[12] For the remainder, the two sides were equal in activity and organization or, in one case, the winning side was higher on one criterion while the losing side had the advantage on the other.

On forty-eight of the issues it was possible to identify one side with an effort to change the status quo in some fashion while the other side favored postponement of action, further study of need, a counter alternative requiring less change, or simply the maintenance of existing arrangements. The side identified with change was victorious in 42 per cent of these cases against 58 per cent for those who opposed the immediate action proposed.

It was hypothesized above that it takes more effort[13] to change the status quo than to maintain it, and Table 1 supports this. In almost two-thirds of the cases in which the side supporting change won, they made a greater campaign effort than the other side. However, when the side supporting no change won, they made a greater effort only a third of the time; two-thirds of the time they were able to win with no more effort than the losing side.

REPUTATION AND SUCCESS

There are two prior questions which we must ask about reputational leaders before we can examine their impact on issue outcome. First, to what extent are they actively involved as partisans on the issues studied? Second, to what extent do they act in unison when they are active; that is, how often are they predominantly on the same side? Having answered those questions, we can examine their impact when they are both active and relatively united.

Activity.—Activity is measured in two ways. Respondents were asked, for each issue studied, if they were at all active. If they answered affirmatively, they were asked to describe such activity; only efforts to affect the outcome are included here or, in other words, non-partisan activities are excluded. Respondents were also asked for the names of the people "who have done most of the work in favor (against)." There were some individuals who, out of circumspection or modesty, did not rate themselves as active but were named as active by others. An individual will be considered active on an issue either if he rates himself as active and can describe some confirming partisan activity or if two or more other people rate him as active in favor or against.

A total of 161 reputational leaders were interviewed, 92 per cent of those identified as such. How frequently are they active? First, it is worth asking what a finding of inactivity might mean. Only three issues

TABLE 1

CAMPAIGN EFFORT AND SUCCESS IN CHANGING THE STATUS QUO

Winning Side	Supported Change		Supported Status Quo		Change Issue Irrelevant
	Per Cent	(*N*)	Per Cent	(*N*)	(*N*)
Made greater campaign effort.....	65	(13)	32	(9)	(3)
Made same campaign effort*....	10	(2)	29	(8)	(0)
Made smaller campaign effort.....	25	(5)	39	(11)	(1)
Total (*N*=52)...	100	(20)	100	(28)	(4)

* Includes one case in which the winning side was higher on amount of activity but lower on amount of organization.

[12] The base for these figures and for the subsequent analysis is actually 52 rather than 54 issues. Two of the issues are excluded because of ambiguity over the outcome, which made it impossible to designate a winner.

[13] The phrase "campaign effort" refers to the measure of amount of activity and degree of organization taken in combination. A side will be characterized as having greater effort if it is at least equal on one of these measures and greater on the other.

were studied in each town. These were salient and controversial issues, but many decisions which affect large numbers of individuals never become controversial or attract widespread interest. Thus, the absence of signs of activity by reputational leaders does not preclude their activity on many other issues which were not studied. As it turns out, however, these cautions are largely unnecessary because 82 per cent of the reputational leaders were active on at least one of the issues studied! Enlarging the number of issues studied per town could only have the effect of further cutting the already small pool of non-active reputational leaders. Furthermore, 41 per cent of the reputational leaders were active on a majority of the issues studied. All in all, there can be little doubt that reputation for influence is highly associated with activity on issues in these communities.

Unity.—Do those reputational leaders who engage in partisan activities act as a cohesive force or do they compete to determine the outcome of the issue? There were thirty-four issues on which at least three reputational leaders were active; with less than three, it makes little sense to ask about the extent of agreement. The active reputational leaders are unanimous on only nine of the thirty-four issues. If we use a less stringent criterion than unanimity, we still find that there is two-thirds or less agreement on eleven of the thirty-four issues.

Caution is necessary in interpreting this evidence of disagreement among reputational leaders. Among the many decisions that arise in a community, it is those few which produce serious competition that are likely to become salient. A proposal on which reputational leaders were united in opposition might have difficulty reaching a stage where it would become salient enough to be cited as an "important" community issue. Similarly, a proposal on which reputational leaders were united in favor with no significant amounts of competing resources arrayed on the other side is also unlikely to have high salience or high ratings of community concern. Thus, our method of selecting issues may contain a heavy bias toward those issues in which there is a substantial amount of disagreement among major resource-holders.

Nevertheless, the amount of disagreement revealed here tends to discourage any view of the reputational leaders as a cohesive group united behind common objectives. While there may be unstudied issues on which unanimous agreement existed, there are also likely to be others on which significant disagreement existed. There were only two among the eighteen communities studied in which active reputational leaders were undivided on all three issues; in only five of the eighteen towns was there as much as 80 per cent agreement on all three issues.

There is other evidence that the reputational leaders fail to comprise any sort of cohesive political force. In twelve of the eighteen towns, the list of reputational leaders contains individuals who are known to be political rivals or even political enemies. In some cases, there are individuals with a long history of political combat; in others, there are spokesmen for rival solidary groups. In the remaining six communities where the pool of reputational leaders did not contain clear protagonists, there were many instances of no more than casual acquaintance among members of the list. All in all, with the exception of three towns with both issue agreement and no evidence of sustained political rivalry among members of the pool, reputational leaders fail to form anything resembling a cohesive united political clique.

Success.—When the reputational leaders are active and united, do they end up on the winning side? They do about 75 per cent of the time on the issues studied here (17 of 23 issues). But perhaps they are simply fellow travelers, joining with the more active and organized side. It turns out, in fact, that they support the more active side only 56 per cent of the time

but are on the winning side about three-fourths of the time. Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, when the side with the smaller effort is victorious, it is just as likely to have reputational leader support as is the side with greater effort when it wins (35 per cent versus 36 per cent).

It might be argued that reputational leaders are associated with successful outcomes mainly because they support the status quo and thus gain the natural advantage of such support. This is decidedly not the case; reputational leaders, when united and active, support the side favoring change more than twice as often as they support the side favoring the status quo (15 versus 6 times). This means that, to achieve victories, they must typically overcome the natural advantage of the other side. As Table 3 indicates, they are able to do this with some success. In fact, the side proposing change has considerable difficulty without the active support of the reputational leaders and their opposition amounts to a virtual veto. In half the cases where the winning side supported change, they had the support of the reputational leaders and only one success occurred against reputational leader opposition. When the winning side supported the status quo, they had the support of the reputational leaders only 18 per cent of the time.

Is the support of reputational leaders or a stronger campaign effort more likely to produce a victory for the side favoring change? With so few cases, it is not easy to disentangle variables. However, Table 4 has some suggestive evidence that reputational leader support may be most critical. With such support, the side favoring change is successful two-thirds of the time *regardless* of relative campaign effort. However, such campaign efforts clearly make an important difference when reputational leaders are divided or inactive. The side favoring change wins almost half the time with a greater campaign effort but only one-sixth

TABLE 2

REPUTATIONAL LEADER SUPPORT AND CAMPAIGN EFFORT

Winning Side	Made Greater Campaign Effort		Made Same Campaign Effort		Made Smaller Campaign Effort	
	Per Cent	(*N*)	Per Cent	(*N*)	Per Cent	(*N*)
Had reputational leader support	36	(9)	20	(2)	35	(6)
Had divided or inactive reputational leaders......	56	(14)	80	(8)	41	(7)
Had reputational leader opposition.....	8	(2)	....	....	24	(4)
Total ($N=52$)..........	100	(25)	100	(10)	100	(17)

TABLE 3

REPUTATIONAL LEADER SUPPORT AND SUCCESS IN CHANGING THE STATUS QUO

Winning Side	Supported Change		Supported Status Quo		Change Issue Irrelevant
	Per Cent	(*N*)	Per Cent	(*N*)	(*N*)
Had reputational leader support...	50	(10)	18	(5)	(2)
Had divided or inactive reputational leaders....	45	(9)	64	(18)	(2)
Had reputational leader opposition	5	(1)	18	(5)	....
Total ($N=52$)...	100	(20)	100	(28)	(4)

of the time when it fails to make a greater effort.

It is instructive to look at the six cases in which the reputational leaders were united and active on the losing side. Two of these were efforts to have comprehensive zoning plans adopted, one involved the approval of a new high school, one a major change of land use in the central business district, and one an ambitious and expensive harbor-development project. In four of these five cases, the leaders of the defeated forces felt that they had lost a round but that the fight was not over. However, they spoke of modifying the alternative in important ways—of asking the town for half a loaf or of toning down the proposal in various ways.

TABLE 4

REPUTATIONAL LEADER SUPPORT AND CAMPAIGN EFFORT BY SUCCESS IN CHANGING THE STATUS QUO

Side Favoring Change	Had Reputational Leader Support				Had No Reputational Leader Support*			
	Had Greater Effort		Had No Greater Effort†		Had Greater Effort		Had No Greater Effort	
	Per Cent	(*N*)	Per Cent	(*N*)	Per Cent	(*N*)	Per Cent	(*N*)
Won	67	(6)	67	(4)	47	(7)	17	(3)
Lost	33	(3)	33	(2)	53	(8)	83	(15)
Total (*N* = 48‡)	100	(9)	100	(6)	100	(15)	100	(18)

* Cases where reputational leaders were opposed and where they were divided or inactive are combined here.
† Cases of equal effort and of smaller effort are combined here.
‡ Four cases in which change was not an issue are omitted here.

None of the variables discussed here illuminate the sixth defeat. It involved the rezoning of a considerable area of land from residential use to business use. Reputational leaders were active and united against the proposal, participated in a campaign which was apparently *more* extensive in both organization and activity than the other side, and were beneficiaries of the natural advantage of defending the status quo. I can do no more with this case than present it as evidence that the arguments above are not tautological.

CONCLUSION

Reputational leaders are not presented here as a ruling elite. They are presented as an aggregate of individuals with resources. In particular, I have argued that their reputation is itself a resource and not simply an indicator of resources. If this argument is correct, then we ought to find that they have some success in influencing the outcome of issues when they are active and united. Unfortunately, we cannot simply look at whether they are on the winning or losing side because other factors besides their influence are affecting the outcome. The factors focused on here were the amount of campaign effort and whether the campaign aimed at changing or preserving the status quo. The data indicated that a more active or more organized campaign was necessary to change the status quo than to maintain it.

Reputational leaders are, with few exceptions, active on at least one of the three issues studied in their respective communities. However, they are frequently active on opposite sides, although this may mere-

ly reflect a method of issue selection which emphasized controversy. When they are both active and united, they are on the winning side about three-fourths of the time. This is not merely a function of their participation on the more active side, for they have as high a proportion of victories when they support the less active side. Furthermore, they may be making a contribution to the campaign effort and thus exercising additional influence through their contribution to this variable. Nor is their success an artifact of the natural advantage gained from supporting the status quo. On the contrary, they achieve their success *against* this advantage. They are united and successful in support of change two-thirds of the time.

In short there seems to be some reality to reputation. This reality is consistent with a theoretical interpretation of reputation as a resource. I have no desire to defend the past uses and abuses of the reputational method, but neither am I inclined to heed Wolfinger's "plea for a decent burial."[14] A decent convalescence seems more in order.

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[14] Raymond E. Wolfinger, "A Plea for a Decent Burial," *American Sociological Review,* XXVII (December, 1962), 841–47.

Racial Integration in the Armed Forces[1]

Charles C. Moskos, Jr.

ABSTRACT

The transformation of the armed forces from a totally segregated to a fully integrated institution is an impressive achievement in directed social change. Yet within the military establishment there is cross-service variation in the distribution of Negro personnel. Concomitant with desegregation have come more favorable attitudes by white soldiers toward integration, improved performance of Negroes, and careers at enlisted levels becoming avenues of Negro mobility. Contrasting with on-duty integration, however, racial separatism is the general rule off-duty in both United States and foreign assignments. Differences in combat between whites and Negroes appear to have been eliminated by military integration. Finally, aspects of the armed forces' experience offer clues as to what one might expect in a racially integrated America.

On July 28, 1948, President Truman issued an executive order abolishing racial segregation in the armed forces of the United States. By the middle 1950's this policy was an accomplished fact. The lessons of the racial integration of the military are many. Within a remarkably short period the makeup of a major American institution underwent a far-reaching transformation. At the same time, the desegregation of the military can be used to trace some of the mutual permeations between the internal organization of the military establishment and the racial and social cleavages found in the larger setting of American society. Further, because of the favorable contrast in the military performance of integrated Negro servicemen with that of all-Negro units, the integration of the armed services is a demonstration of how changes in social organization can bring about a marked and rapid improvement in individual and group achievement. The desegregated military, moreover, offers itself as a graphic example of the abilities of both whites and Negroes to adjust to egalitarian racial relations with surprisingly little strain. Also, an examination of the racial situation in the contemporary military establishment can serve as a partial guideline as to what one might expect in a racially integrated America. It is to these and related issues that this paper is addressed.[2]

[1] Many persons have given the writer invaluable assistance during his collection and analysis of the materials for this paper. I would especially like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Roger W. Little, U.S. Military Academy, John B. Spore, editor of *Army* magazine, Philip M. Timpane, staff assistant for civil rights, Department of Defense, and Morris Janowitz, University of Chicago. Also, the writer's access to military personnel at all levels was made possible by the more than perfunctory co-operation of numerous military information officers, men who perform a difficult task with both efficiency and good humor. Financial support was given by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation. Additional funds for travel were made available by the University of Michigan, and the Council for Intersocietal Studies of Northwestern University. It must be stressed, however, that the usual caveat that the author alone accepts responsibility for the interpretations and conclusions is especially relevant here.

[2] The information on which the observations presented in this paper are based is of a varied sort. A primary source are Department of Defense statistics and those United States government reports dealing with racial relations in the armed forces: President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces ("Fahy Committee"), *Freedom To Serve: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950); U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, "The Negro in the Armed Forces," *Civil Rights '63* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

DESEGREGATING THE MILITARY[3]

Negroes have taken part in all of this country's wars. An estimated 5,000 Negroes, some scattered as individuals and others in segregated units, fought on the American side in the War of Independence. Several thousand Negroes saw service in the War of 1812. During the Civil War 180,000 Negroes were recruited into the Union army and served in segregated regiments.[4] Following the Civil War four Negro regiments were established and were active in the Indian wars on the Western frontier and later fought with distinction in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. In the early twentieth century, however, owing to a general rise in American racial tensions and specific outbreaks of violence between Negro troops and whites, opinion began to turn against the use of Negro

1963), pp. 169–224; President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces ("Gesell Committee"), "Initial Report: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity for Negro Personnel Stationed within the United States" (mimeographed; June, 1963), and "Final Report: Military Personnel Stationed Overseas and Membership and Participation in the National Guard" (mimeographed; November, 1964). Also, participant observations were made by the writer while on active duty in the Army and during field trips to military installations in Germany, Viet Nam, and Korea in the summer of 1965 and in the Dominican Republic in the spring of 1966. Additionally, during the field trip in Germany, sixty-seven formal interviews were conducted with soldiers who made up nearly all of the total Negro enlisted personnel in two Army companies. Another source of data is found in Operations Research Office ("ORO"), *Project Clear: The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army* (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, April, 1955). The ORO surveys queried several thousand servicemen during the Korean War on a variety of items relating to attitudes toward racial integration in the Army. The findings of Project Clear, heretofore classified, have now been made available for professional scrutiny. Some comparable data were obtained from the section dealing with Negro soldiers in Samuel A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life*, Vol. I (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 486–599.

[3] This background of the Negro's role in the American military is derived, in addition to the sources cited above, from Seymour J. Schoenfeld, *The Negro in the Armed Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Associated Publishers, 1945); Paul C. Davis, "The Negro in the Armed Services," *Virginia Quarterly*, XXIV (Autumn, 1948), 499–520; Herbert Aptheker, *Essays in the History of the American Negro* (New York: International Publishers, 1945); Arnold M. Rose, "Army Policies toward Negro Soldiers," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXLIV (March, 1946), 90–94; Eli Ginzburg, "The Negro Soldier," in his *The Negro Potential* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 61–91; David G. Mandelbaum, *Soldiers Groups and Negro Soldiers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952); and Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the Making of America* (New York: Collier Books, 1964), *passim*. A good account of the early days of military desegregation is Lee Nichols, *Breakthrough on the Color Front* (New York: Random House, 1954).

Though the last several years have seen little social science research on racial relations in the armed forces, there has recently been a spate of novels dealing with this theme. See, e.g., John Oliver Killens, *And Then We Heard the Thunder* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1963); James Drought, *Mover* (New York: Avon Books, 1963); Webb Beech, *Article 92* (Greenwich, Conn.: Gold Medal Books, 1964); Gene L. Coon, *The Short End* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964); Hari Rhodes, *A Chosen Few* (New York: Bantam Books, 1965); and Jack Pearl, *Stockade* (New York: Pocket Books, 1965).

It should be noted that Negroes have not been the only ethnic or racial group to occupy a unique position in the American military. Indians served in separate battalions in the Civil War and were used as scouts in the frontier wars. Filipinos have long been a major source of recruitment for stewards in the Navy. The much decorated 442nd ("Go For Broke") Infantry Regiment of World War II was composed entirely of Japanese-Americans. Also in World War II, a separate battalion of Norwegian-Americans was drawn up for intended service in Scandinavia. The participation of Puerto Ricans in the American military deserves special attention. A recent case of large-scale use of non-American soldiers are the Korean fillers or "Katusas" (from Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army) who make up roughly one-sixth of the current personnel of the Eighth Army.

[4] A particularly insightful contemporary report on Negro soldiers in the Civil War is Thomas Wentworth Higgins, *Army Life in a Black Regiment* (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

soldiers. Evaluation of Negro soldiers was further lowered by events in World War I. The combat performance of the all-Negro 92nd Infantry, one of its regiments having fled in the German offensive at Meuse-Argonne, came under heavy criticism. Yet it was also observed that Negro units operating under French command, in a more racially tolerant situation, performed well.

In the interval between the two world wars, the Army not only remained segregated but also adopted a policy of a Negro quota that was to keep the number of Negroes in the Army proportionate to the total population. Never in the pre–World War II period, however, did the number of Negroes approach this quota. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, Negroes constituted 5.9 per cent of the Army; and there were only five Negro officers, three of whom were chaplains. During World War II Negroes entered the Army in larger numbers, but at no time did they exceed 10 per cent of total personnel. Negro soldiers remained in segregated units, and approximately three-quarters served in the quartermaster, engineer, and transportation corps. To make matters worse from the viewpoint of "the right to fight," a slogan loudly echoed by Negro organizations in the United States, even Negro combat units were frequently used for heavy-duty labor. This was highlighted when the 2nd Cavalry was broken up into service units owing to command apprehension over the combat qualities, even though untested, of this all-Negro division. The record of those Negro units that did see combat in World War II was mixed. The performance of the 92nd Infantry Division again came under heavy criticism, this time for alleged unreliability in the Italian campaign.

An important exception to the general pattern of utilization of Negro troops in World War II occurred in the winter months of 1944–45 in the Ardennes battle. Desperate shortages of combat personnel resulted in the Army asking for Negro volunteers. The plan was to have platoons (approximately 40 men) of Negroes serve in companies (approximately 200 men) previously all-white. Some 2,500 Negroes volunteered for this assignment. Both in terms of Negro combat performance and white soldiers' reactions, the Ardennes experiment was an unqualified success. This incident would later be used to support arguments for integration.

After World War II, pressure from Negro and liberal groups coupled with an acknowledgment that Negro soldiers were being poorly utilized led the Army to reexamine its racial policies. A report by an Army board in 1945, while holding racial integration to be a desirable goal and while making recommendations to improve Negro opportunity in the Army, concluded that practical considerations required a maintenance of segregation and the quota system. In light of World War II experiences, the report further recommended that Negro personnel be exclusively assigned to support rather than combat units. Another Army board report came out in 1950 with essentially the same conclusions.[5] Both reports placed heavy stress on the supervisory and disciplinary problems resulting from the disproportionate number of Negroes, as established by Army examinations, found in the lower mental and aptitude classification levels. In 1950, for example, 60 per cent of the Negro personnel fell into the Army's lowest categories compared with 29 per cent of the white soldiers. From the standpoint of the performance requirements of the military, such facts could not be lightly dismissed.

After the Truman desegregation order of 1948, however, the die was cast. The President followed his edict by setting up a committee, chaired by Charles Fahy, to pursue the implementation of equal treatment and opportunity for armed forces personnel.

[5] The 1945 and 1950 Army board reports are commonly referred to by the names of the officers who headed these boards: respectively, Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., and Lieutenant General S. J. Chamberlin.

Under the impetus of the Fahy committee, the Army abolished the quota system in 1950, and was beginning to integrate some training camps when the conflict in Korea broke out. The Korean War was the coup de grâce for segregation in the Army. Manpower requirements in the field for combat soldiers resulted in many instances of *ad hoc* integration. As was true in the Ardennes experience, Negro soldiers in previously all-white units performed well in combat. As integration in Korea became more standard, observers consistently noted that the fighting abilities of Negroes differed little from those of whites.[6] This contrasted with the blemished record of the all-Negro 24th Infantry Regiment.[7] Its performance in the Korean War was judged to be so poor that its divisional commander recommended the unit be dissolved as quickly as possible. Concurrent with events in Korea, integration was introduced in the United States. By 1956, three years after the end of the Korean War, the remnants of Army Jim Crow disappeared at home and in overseas installations. At the time of the Truman order, Negroes constituted 8.8 per cent of Army personnel. In 1964 the figure was 12.3 per cent.

In each of the other services, the history of desegregation varied from the Army pattern. The Army Air Force, like its parent body, generally assigned Negroes to segregated support units. (However, a unique military venture taken during the war was the formation of three all-Negro, including officers, air combat units.) At the end of World War II the proportion of Negroes in the Army Air Force was only 4 per cent, less than half what it was in the Army.

Upon its establishment as an independent service in 1947, the Air Force began to take steps toward integration even before the Truman order. By the time of the Fahy committee report in 1950, the Air Force was already largely integrated. Since integration there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of Negroes serving in the Air Force, from less than 5 per cent in 1949 to 8.6 per cent in 1964.

Although large numbers of Negroes had served in the Navy during the Civil War and for some period afterward, restrictive policies were introduced in the early 1900's, and by the end of World War I only about 1 per cent of Navy personnel were Negroes. In 1920 the Navy adopted a policy of total racial exclusion and barred all Negro enlistments. This policy was changed in 1932 when Negroes, along with Filipinos, were again allowed to join the Navy but only as stewards in the messman's branch. Further modifications were made in Navy policy in 1942 when some openings in general service for Negroes were created. Negro sailors in these positions, however, were limited to segregated harbor and shore assignments.[8] In 1944, in the first effort toward desegregation in any of the armed services, a small number of Negro sailors in general service were integrated on ocean-going vessels. After the end of World War II the Navy, again ahead of the other services, began to take major steps toward elimination of racial barriers. Even in the integrated Navy of today, however, approximately a quarter of Negro personnel still serve as stewards. Also, despite the early steps toward integration taken by the Navy, the proportion of Negro sailors has remained fairly constant over the past two decades, averaging around 5 per cent.

The Marine Corps has gone from a policy of exclusion to segregation to integra-

[6] These evaluations are summarized in ORO, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–19, 47–105, and 582–83.

[7] The notoriety of the 24th Infantry Regiment was aggravated by a song—"The Bug-Out Boogie"—attributed to it: "When them Chinese mortars begin to thud / The old Deuce-Four begin to bug / When they started falling 'round the CP [command post] tent / Everybody wonder where the high brass went / They were buggin' out / Just movin' on."

[8] A lesson in the rewriting of history is gained from the movie *PT-109*, a dramatization of John Kennedy's war exploits. In this film, released in the early 1960's, the Navy is portrayed as racially integrated in World War II.

tion. Before World War II there were no Negro marines. In 1942 Negroes were accepted into the Marine Corps but assigned to segregated units where they were heavy-duty laborers, ammunition handlers, and anti-aircraft gunners. After the war small-scale integration of Negro marines into white units was begun. In 1949 and 1950 Marine Corps training units were integrated, and by 1954 the color line was largely erased throughout the Corps. Since integration began, the proportion of Negroes has increased markedly. In 1949 less than 2 per cent of all marines were Negroes compared with 8.2 per cent in 1964.

TABLE 1

NEGROES IN THE ARMED FORCES AND EACH SERVICE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PERSONNEL, 1962 AND 1964

Service	1962	1964
Army	11.1	12.3
Air Force	7.8	8.6
Navy	4.7	5.1
Marine Corps	7.0	8 2
Total armed forces	8.2	9 0

Source: U S Commission on Civil Rights, *op. cit*, p 218; Department of Defense statistics.

Although the various military services are all similar in being integrated today, they differ in their proportion of Negroes. As shown in Table 1, the Negro distribution in the total armed forces in 1962 and 1964, respectively, was 8.2 per cent and 9.0 per cent, lower than the 11–12 per cent constituting the Negro proportion in the total population. It is virtually certain, however, that among those *eligible,* a higher proportion of Negroes than whites enter the armed forces. That is, a much larger number of Negroes do not meet the entrance standards required by the military services. In 1962, for example, 56.1 per cent of Negroes did not pass the preinduction mental examinations given to draftees, almost four times the 15.4 per cent of whites who failed these same tests.[9] Because of the relatively low number of Negroes obtaining student or occupational deferments, however, it is the Army drawing upon the draft that is the only military service where the percentage of Negroes approximates the national proportion. Thus, despite the high number of Negroes who fail to meet induction standards, Army statistics for 1960–65 show Negroes constituted about 15 per cent of those drafted.

Even if one takes account of the Army's reliance on the selective service for much of its personnel, the most recent figures still show important differences in the number of Negroes in those services meeting their manpower requirements solely through voluntary enlistments; the 5.1 per cent Negro in the Navy is lower than the 8.2 per cent for the Marine Corps or the 8.6 per cent for the Air Force. Moreover, the Army, besides its drawing upon the draft, also has the highest Negro initial enlistment rate of any of the services. As reported in Table 2, we find in 1964 that the Army drew 14.1 per cent of its volunteer incoming personnel from Negroes as compared with 13.1 per cent for the Air Force, 8.4 per cent for the Marine Corps, and 5.8 per cent for the Navy. As also shown in Table 2, there has been a very sizable increase in Negro enlistments from 1961 to 1965 in all four of the armed services.

TABLE 2

NEGROES IN EACH OF THE ARMED SERVICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF INITIAL ENLISTMENTS 1961, 1963, AND 1965

Year	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine Corps
1961	8.2	9 5	2 9	5.9
1963	11.2	10.5	4.3	5.5
1965	14.1	13.1	5.8	8.4

Source: Department of Defense statistics.

There are also diverse patterns between the individual services as to the rank or

[9] Department of Labor ("Moynihan Report"), *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 75.

grade distribution of Negroes. Looking at Table 3, we find the ratio of Negro to white officers is roughly 1 to 30 in the Army, 1 to 70 in the Air Force, 1 to 250 in the Marine Corps, and 1 to 300 in the Navy. Among enlisted men, Negroes are underrepresented in the top three enlisted ranks in the Army and the top four ranks in the other three services. We also find a disproportionate concentration of Negroes in the lower non-commissioned officer ranks in all of the armed forces, but especially so in the Army. An assessment of these data reveals that the Army, followed by the Air Force, has not only the largest proportion of Negroes in its total personnel, but also the most equitable distribution of Negroes throughout its ranks. Although the Navy was the first service to integrate and the Army the last, in a kind of tortoise and hare fashion, it is the Army that has become the most representative service for Negroes.

TABLE 3

NEGROES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PERSONNEL IN EACH GRADE FOR EACH SERVICE, 1964

Grade	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine Corps
Officers:				
Generals/admirals	....	0.2	....	....
Colonels/captains	0.2	0.2	....	....
Lt. cols./commanders	1.1	0.5	0.6	....
Majors/lt. commanders	3.6	0.8	0.3	0.3
Captains/lieutenants	5.4	2.0	0.5	0.4
1st lieutenants/lts. (j.g.)	3.8	1.8	0.2	0.4
2d lieutenants/ensigns	2.7	2.5	0.7	0.3
Total officers	3.4	1.5	0.3	0.4
Enlisted:*				
E-9 (sgt. major)	3.5	1.2	1.5	0.8
E-8 (master sgt.)	6.1	2.2	1.9	1.2
E-7 (sgt. 1st class)	8.5	3.2	2.9	2.3
E-6 (staff sgt.)	13 9	5.3	4.7	5.0
E-5 (sgt.)	17.4	10.8	6 6	11.2
E-4 (corp.)	14.2	12.7	5.9	10.4
E-3 (pvt. 1st class)	13.6	9.7	6.6	7.8
E-2 (private)	13.1	11.7	5 7	9.5
E-1 (recruit)	6.8	14.4	7.1	9.1
Total enlisted men	13.4	10.0	5.8	8.7

* Army and Marine Corps enlisted titles indicated in parentheses have equivalent pay grades in Navy and Air Force.

Source: Department of Defense statistics.

CHANGING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND NEGRO OPPORTUNITIES

A pervasive trend within the military establishment singled out by students of this institution is the long-term direction toward greater technical complexity and narrowing of civilian-military occupational skills.[10] An indicator, albeit a crude one, of this trend toward "professionalization" of military roles is the changing proportion of men assigned to combat arms. Given in Table 4, along with concomitant white-Negro distributions, are figures comparing the percentage of Army enlisted personnel

[10] Morris Janowitz with Roger Little, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965), pp. 17–49; and Kurt Lang, "Technology and Career Management in the Military Establishment," in Morris Janowitz (ed.), *The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), pp. 39–81.

in combat arms (e.g., infantry, armor, artillery) for the years 1945 and 1962. We find that the proportion of men in combat arms—that is, traditional military specialties—dropped from 44.5 per cent in 1945 to 26.0 per cent in 1962. Also, the percentage of white personnel in traditional military specialties approximates the total proportional decrease in the combat arms over the seventeen-year period.

For Negro soldiers, however, a different picture emerges. While the percentage of Negro enlisted men in the Army increased only slightly between 1945 and 1962, the likelihood of a Negro serving in a combat arm is almost three times greater in 1962 than it was at the end of World War II. Further, when comparisons are made between military specialties *within* the combat arms, the Negro proportion is noticeably higher in line rather than staff assignments. This is especially the case in airborne and marine units. Put in another way, the direction in assignment of Negro soldiers in the desegregated military is testimony to the continuing consequences of differential Negro opportunity originating in the larger society. That is, even though integration of the military has led to great improvement in the performance of Negro servicemen, the social and particularly educational deprivations suffered by the Negro in American society can be mitigated but not entirely eliminated by the racial egalitarianism existing within the armed forces.[11] These findings need not be interpreted as a decline in the "status" of the Negro in the integrated military. Actually there is evidence that higher prestige—but not envy—is accorded combat personnel by those in non-combat activities within the military.[12] And taken within the historical context of "the right to fight," the Negro's overrepresentation in the combat arms is a kind of ironic step forward.[13]

TABLE 4

TOTAL NEGRO ARMY ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND WHITE AND NEGRO ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN COMBAT ARMS, 1945 AND 1962

Category	1945*	1962
Negroes as percentage of total personnel	10.5	12.2
Percentage of total personnel in combat arms	44.5	26.0
Percentage of total white personnel in combat arms	48.2	24 9
Percentage of total negro personnel in combat arms	12.1	33.4

* Excludes Army Air Force.

Source: ORO, *op cit*, pp. 563–64; U.S. Civil Rights Commission, *op. cit.*, pp. 219–22.

Moreover, the military at the enlisted ranks has become a major avenue of career mobility for many Negro men.[14] As shown earlier in Table 3, in all four services, and especially in the Army, there is some overrepresentation of Negroes at the junior NCO levels (pay grades E-4–E-6). The disproportionate concentration of Negroes at these levels implies a higher than average re-enlistment as these grades are not

[11] World War II evidence shows much of the incidence of psychoneurotic breakdown among Negro soldiers, compared to whites, was associated with psychological handicaps originating before entrance into military service (Arnold M. Rose, "Psychoneurotic Breakdown among Negro Soldiers," *Phylon*, XVII, No. 1 [1956], pp. 61–73).

[12] Stouffer *et al., op. cit.*, II, 242–89; Raymond W. Mack, "The Prestige System of an Air Base: Squadron Rankings and Morale," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (June, 1954), 281–87; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), pp. 31–36.

[13] There are, as should be expected, differences among Negro soldiers as to their desire to see combat. From data not shown here, interviews with Negro soldiers stationed in Germany revealed reluctance to go to Viet Nam was greatest among those with high-school or better education, and northern home residence. This is in direct contrast with the findings reported in *The American Soldier*. In the segregated Army of World War II, northern and more highly educated Negro soldiers were most likely to want to get into combat, an outcome of the onus of inferiority felt to accompany service in support units (Stouffer, *op. cit.*, I, 523–24).

[14] The emphasis on academic education for officer careers effectively limits most Negro opportunity to the enlisted levels (Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 62).

normally attained until after a second enlistment. This assumption is supported by the data given in Table 5. We find that in 1965 for all four services the Negro re-enlistment rate is approximately twice that of white servicemen. Indeed, about half of all first-term Negro servicemen chose to remain in the armed forces for at least a second term. The greater likelihood of Negroes to select a service career suggests that the military establishment is undergoing a significant change in its NCO core. Such an outcome would reflect not only the "pull" of the appeals offered by a racially egalitarian institution, but also the "push" generated by the plight of the Negro in the American economy.[15] At the minimum, it is very probable that as the present cohort of Negro junior NCO's attains seniority there will be a greater representation of Negroes in the advanced NCO grades. The expansion of the armed forces arising from the war in Viet Nam and the resulting opening up of "rank" will accelerate this development.

ATTITUDES OF SOLDIERS

So far the discussion has sought to document the degree of penetration and the kind of distribution characterizing Negro servicemen in the integrated military establishment. We now introduce certain survey and interview data dealing more directly with the question of soldiers' attitudes toward military desegregation. Commenting on the difficulties of social analysis, the authors of *The American Soldier* wrote that few problems are "more formidable than that of obtaining dependable records of attitudes toward racial separation in the Army."[16] Without underestimating the continuing difficulty of this problem, an opportunity exists to compare attitudes toward racial integration held by American soldiers in two different periods. This is done by contrasting responses to equivalent items given in World War II as reported in *The American Soldier* with those reported in Project Clear a study sponsored by the Defense Department during the Korean War.[17]

In both *The American Soldier* and Project Clear (the surveys under consideration were conducted in 1943 and 1951, respectively) large samples of Army personnel in segregated military settings were categorized as to whether they were favorable, indifferent, or opposed to racial integration in Army units. We find, as presented in Table 6, massive shifts in soldiers' attitudes over the eight-year period, shifts showing a much more positive disposition toward racial integration among both whites and Negroes in the later year. A look at the distribution of attitudes held by white soldiers reveals opposition to integration goes from 84 per cent in 1943

TABLE 5

FIRST-TERM RE-ENLISTMENT RATES IN THE ARMED FORCES AND EACH SERVICE BY RACE, 1965
(Per Cent)

Race	Total Armed Forces	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine Corps
White.......	21.6	18.5	27.4	21.6	12.9
Negro.......	46.6	49.3	50.3	41.3	50.3

Source: Department of Defense statistics.

[15] Documentation shows the gap between Negro and white job opportunities has not diminished appreciably, if at all, in the past twenty years (Department of Labor, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–21; Thomas F. Pettigrew, *A Profile of the Negro American* [Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1964], pp. 168–74).

[16] Stouffer *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 566.

[17] What methodological bias exists is that the Korean War question was a stronger description of racial integration than the item used in World War II. Compare "What is your feeling about serving in a platoon containing both whites and colored soldiers, all working and training together, sleeping in the same barracks and eating in the same mess hall?" with "Do you think white and Negro soldiers should be in separate outfits or should they be together in the same outfits?" (respectively, ORO, *op. cit.*, p. 453, and Stouffer *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 568).

to less than half in 1951. That such a change could occur in less than a decade counters viewpoints that see basic social attitudes in large populations being prone to glacial-like changes. Yet, an even more remarkable change is found among the Negro soldiers. Where in 1945, favorable, indifferent, or opposing attitudes were roughly equally distributed among the Negro soldiers, by 1951 opposition or indifference to racial integration had become negligible. Such a finding is strongly indicative of a reformation in Negro public opinion from traditional acquiescence to Jim Crow to the ground swell that laid the basis for the subsequent civil rights movement.

TABLE 6

ATTITUDES OF WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS TOWARD RACIAL INTEGRATION IN THE SEGREGATED ARMY, 1943 AND 1951

Attitude toward Integration	White Soldiers (Per Cent)		Negro Soldiers (Per Cent)	
	1943	1951	1943	1951
Favorable	12	25	37	90
Indifferent	4	31	27	6
Oppose	84	44	36	4
Total	100	100	100	100
(No. of cases)	(4,800)	(1,983)	(3,000)	(1,384)

Source: Stouffer *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 568; ORO, *op. cit.*, pp. 322, 433.

While the data on Negro attitudes toward integration given in Table 6 were elicited during the segregated military of 1943 and 1951, we also have evidence on how Negro soldiers react to military integration in the contemporary setting. As reported in Table 7, the Army is overwhelmingly thought to be more racially egalitarian than civilian life. Only 16 per cent of sixty-seven Negro soldiers interviewed in 1965 said civilian life was more racially equal or no different than the Army. By region, as might be expected, we find southern Negroes more likely than northern Negroes to take a benign view of racial relations in the Army when these are compared to civilian life. The data in Table 7 support the proposition that, despite existing deviations from military policy at the level of informal discrimination, the military establishment stands in sharp and favorable contrast to the racial relations prevalent in the larger American society.

One of the most celebrated findings of *The American Soldier* was the discovery that the more contact white soldiers had with Negro troops, the more favorable was their reaction toward racial integration.[18] This conclusion is consistently supported in the surveys conducted by Project Clear. Again and again, comparisons of white soldiers in integrated units with those in segregated units show the former to be more supportive of desegregation. Illustrative of this pattern are the data shown in Table 8. Among combat infantrymen in Korea, 51 per cent in all-white units say outfits are better segregated as compared to 31 per cent in integrated units. For enlisted personnel stationed in the United States, strong objection to integration characterizes 44 per cent serving in segregated units while less than one-fifth of the men in integrated units feel the same way.

TABLE 7

ATTITUDES OF NEGRO SOLDIERS IN 1965 COMPARING RACIAL EQUALITY IN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LIFE, TOTAL AND BY HOME REGION

Where More Racial Equality	Per Cent		
	Total	Home Region	
		North	South
Military life	84	75	93
Civilian life	3	6	0
No difference	13	19	7
Total	100	100	100
(No. of cases)	(67)	(36)	(31)

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 594.

Seventy-nine per cent of officers on segregated posts rate Negroes worse than white soldiers as compared with 28 per cent holding similar beliefs on integrated posts.

OFFICIAL POLICY AND ACTUAL PRACTICE

For the man newly entering the armed forces, it is hard to conceive that the military was one of America's most segregated institutions less than two decades ago. For today color barriers at the formal level are absent throughout the military establishment. Equal treatment regardless of race is official policy in such non-duty facilities as swimming pools, chapels, barbershops, post exchanges, movie theaters, snack bars, and dependents' housing as well as in the more strictly military endeavors involved in the assignment, promotion, and living conditions of members of the armed services.[19] Moreover, white personnel are often commanded by Negro superiors, a situation rarely obtaining in civilian life. Recently the military has sought to implement its policy of equal opportunity by exerting pressure on local communities where segregated patterns affect military personnel. This policy deserves careful examination owing to its ramifications on the traditional separation of civilian and military spheres in American society. A measure of the extent and thoroughness of military desegregation is found in comparing the 1950 President's committee report dealing with racial integration and the 1963 and 1964 reports of a second President's committee. Where the earlier report dealt entirely with internal military organization, the recent reports address themselves primarily to the National Guard and off-base discrimination.[20] Along this same line, Congressman Adam Clayton Powell has said that up to the middle 1950's he used to receive 5,000 letters a year from Negro servicemen complaining of discrimination in the military. In recent years, he receives less than 1,500 such letters annually and these largely pertain to off-base problems.[21] In brief, military life is characterized by an interracial equalitarianism of a quantity and of a kind that is seldom found in the other major institutions of American society.

In their performance of military duties,

TABLE 8

RACIAL ATTITUDES OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN SEGREGATED AND INTEGRATED SETTINGS, 1951

Racial Attitudes	All-White Units		Integrated Units	
	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.
Combat infantrymen in Korea saying segregated outfits better	51	(195)	31	(1,024)
Enlisted personnel in the U.S. strongly objecting to racial integration	44	(1,983)	17	(1,683)
Officers rating Negroes worse than white soldiers	79	(233)	28	(385)

Source: ORO, *op. cit*, pp. 141, 322, 333, 356.

[19] The comprehensive scope of military integration is found in the official guidelines set forth under "Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel," in *Army Regulation 600-21*, *Air Force Regulation 35-78*, and *Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5350.6*.

[20] Cf. the Fahy committee report (1950), with the Gesell committee reports (1963 and 1964). The Moynihan Report comments, "Service in the United States Armed Forces is the only experience open to the Negro American in which he is truly treated as an equal. . . . If this is a statement of the ideal rather than reality, it is an ideal that is close to realization" (Department of Labor, *op. cit.*, p. 42).

[21] In an interview with the *Overseas Weekly*, a newspaper published in Germany with a large readership among American servicemen. Personal communication with staff members.

whites and Negroes work together with little display of racial tension. This is not to say racial animosity is absent in the military. Racial incidents do occur, but these are reduced by the severe sanctions imposed by the military for such acts. Such confrontations are almost always off-duty, if not off-base. In no sense, however, is the military sitting on top of a racial volcano, a state of affairs differing from the frequent clashes between the races that were a feature of the military in the segregated era. Additionally, it must be stressed that conflict situations stemming from non-racial causes characterize most sources of friction in the military establishment, for example, enlisted men versus officers, lower-ranking enlisted men versus non-commissioned officers, soldiers of middle-class background versus those of the working-class, conscriptees versus volunteers, line units versus staff units, rear echelon versus front echelon, combat units versus non-combat units, newly arrived units versus earlier stationed units, etc.

Yet the fact remains that the general pattern of day-to-day relationships *off the job* is usually one of mutual racial exclusivism. As one Negro soldier put it, "A man can be my best buddy in the Army, but he won't ask me to go to town with him." Closest friendships normally develop within races between individuals of similar educational background. Beyond one's hard core of friends there exists a level of friendly acquaintances. Here the pattern seems to be one of educational similarities overriding racial differences. On the whole, racial integration at informal as well as formal levels works best on-duty vis-à-vis off-duty, on-base vis-à-vis off-base, basic training and maneuvers vis-à-vis garrison, sea vis-à-vis shore duty, and combat vis-à-vis non-combat. In other words, the behavior of servicemen resembles the racial (and class) separatism of the larger American society, the more they are removed from the military environment.

For nearly all white soldiers the military is a first experience with close and equal contact with a large group of Negroes. There has developed what has become practically a military custom: the look over the shoulder, upon the telling of a racial joke, to see if there are any Negroes in hearing distance. Some racial animosity is reflected in accusations that Negro soldiers use the defense of racial discrimination to avoid disciplinary action. Many white soldiers claim they like Negroes as individuals but "can't stand them in bunches." In a few extreme cases, white married personnel may even live off the military base and pay higher rents rather than live in integrated military housing. On the whole, however, the segregationist-inclined white soldier regards racial integration as something to be accepted pragmatically, if not enthusiastically, as are so many situations in military life.

The most overt source of racial unrest in the military community centers in dancing situations. A commentary on American mores is a finding reported in Project Clear: three-quarters of a large sample of white soldiers said they would not mind Negro couples on the same dance floor, but approximately the same number disapproved of Negro soldiers dancing with white girls.[22] In many non-commissioned officer (NCO) clubs, the likelihood of interracial dancing partners is a constant producer of tension. In fact, the only major exception to integration within the military community is on a number of large posts where there are two or more NCO clubs. In such situations one of the clubs usually becomes tacitly designated as the Negro club.

Although there is almost universal support for racial integration by Negro soldiers, some strains are also evident among Negro personnel in the military. There seems to be a tendency among lower-ranking Negro enlisted men, especially conscriptees, to view Negro NCO's as "Uncle Toms" or "handkerchief heads." Negro

[22] ORO, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

NCO's are alleged to pick on Negroes when it comes time to assign men unpleasant duties. Negro officers are sometimes seen as being too strict or "chicken" when it comes to enforcing military discipline on Negro soldiers. As one Negro serviceman said, "I'm proud when I see a Negro officer, but not in my company."

One Negro writer, who served in the segregated Army and now has two sons in the integrated military, has proposed that what was thought by soldiers in all-Negro units to be racial discrimination was sometimes nothing more than harassment of lower-ranking enlisted personnel.[23] In fact, the analogy between enlisted men vis-à-vis officers in the military and Negroes vis-à-vis whites in the larger society has often been noted.[24] It has been less frequently observed, however, that enlisted men's behavior is often similar to many of the stereotypes associated with Negroes, for example, laziness, boisterousness, emphasis on sexual prowess, consciously acting stupid, obsequiousness in front of superiors combined with ridicule of absent superiors, etc. Placement of white adult males in a subordinate position within a rigidly stratified system, that is, appears to produce behavior not all that different from the so-called personality traits commonly held to be an outcome of cultural or psychological patterns unique to Negro life. Indeed, it might be argued that relatively little adjustment on the part of the command structure was required when the infusion of Negroes into the enlisted ranks occurred as the military establishment was desegregated. It is suggested, in other words, one factor contributing to the generally smooth racial integration of the military might be due to the standard treatment—"like Negroes" in a sense—accorded to all lower-ranking enlisted personnel.

Looking at changes in Negro behavior in the integrated military we find other indications of the immediate effects of social organization on individual behavior. Even though I am fully cognizant of the almost insurmountable difficulties involved in comparing crime statistics, the fact remains that students of the problem agree Negro crime is far higher than white crime.[25] There is no consensus, however, on what amount of the difference is due, on the one hand, to Negro cultural or psychological conditions or, on the other, to structural and class variables. Presented here, in a very preliminary fashion, is some evidence bearing on the consequences arising from changes in social organization on Negro crime. Reported by Project Clear are Negro-white crime differentials for three segregated posts in 1950. Proportionately, Negro soldiers committed four times more crime than white soldiers.[26] In 1964, in the integrated military, statistics of a major Army Command in Europe show Negroes accounting for 21 per cent of the crime while constituting 16 per cent of the total personnel. In a large combat unit in Viet Nam, for a three-month period in the summer of 1965, Negroes received 19 per cent of the disciplinary reports but made up 22 per cent of the troop assignment. These are the only Negro-white crime ratios in the integrated military that the writer has seen.[27] Although these findings, of course, are incomplete, they do point to a marked drop in Negro crime as compared with both

[23] James Anderson, "Fathers and Sons: An Evaluation of Military Racial Relations in Two Generations" (term paper, University of Michigan, December, 1965).

[24] Stouffer and his associates, for example, report enlisted men as compared to officers, as Negro soldiers to white soldiers, were more prone to have "low spirits," to be less desirous of entering combat, and to be more dissatisfied than perceived by others (Stouffer *et al.*, *op. cit.*, II, 345, and I, 392–94, 506, 521, and 538.

[25] Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Crime and Race* (New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1964); and Department of Labor, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–40.

[26] ORO, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

[27] The data reported here are from offices of the Military Police, private communication.

the earlier segregated military as well as contemporary civilian life.[28]

THE NEGRO SOLDIER OVERSEAS

Some special remarks are needed concerning Negro servicemen overseas. Suffice it to say for prefatory purposes, the American soldier, be he either white or Negro, is usually in a place where he does not understand the language, is received with mixed feelings by the local population, spends the greater part of his time in a transplanted American environment, sometimes plays the role of tourist, is relatively affluent in relation to the local economy, takes advantage and is at the mercy of a *comprador* class, and in comparison with his counterpart at home is more heavily involved in military duties.

In general, the pattern of racial relations observed in the United States—integration in the military setting and racial exclusivism off-duty—prevails in overseas assignments as well. This norm is reflected in one of the most characteristic features of American military life overseas, a bifurcation of the vice structure into groups that pander almost exclusively (or assert they do) to only one of the races. A frequent claim of local bar owners is that they discourage racially mixed trade because of the demands of their G.I. clientele. And, indeed, many of the establishments catering to American personnel that ring most military installations are segregated in practice. To a similar degree this is true of shore towns where Navy personnel take liberty. Violation of these implicit taboos can lead to physical threat if not violence.

The pattern of off-duty racial separatism is most pronounced in Japan and Germany, and less so in Korea. A major exception to this norm is found in the Dominican Republic. There all troops are restricted and leaving the military compound necessitates soldiers collaborating if they are not to be detected; such ventures are often as not interracial. In certain off-duty areas on Okinawa, on the other hand, racial separatism is complicated by interservice rivalries and a fourfold ecological pattern shows up: white-Army, Negro-Army, white–Marine Corps, and Negro–Marine Corps. Combat conditions in Viet Nam make the issue of off-duty racial relations academic for those troops in the field. In the cities, however, racial separatism off-duty is already apparent. It is said that the riverfront district in Saigon, Kanh Hoi, frequented by American Negro soldiers was formerly patronized by Senegalese troops during the French occupation.

In Germany one impact of that country's economic boom has been to depress the relative position of the American soldier vis-à-vis the German working man. In the German of ten or fifteen years ago (or the Korea of today) all American military personnel were affluent by local standards with all that implied. This was (and is in Korea) an especially novel experience for the Negro soldier. The status drop of American soldiers stationed in Gergany has particularly affected the Negro serviceman, who has the additional handicap of being black in a country where there are no Negro girls. The old "good duty" days for Negro soldiers in Germany are now coming to an end as he finds his previous access to girls other than prostitutes severely reduced. The German economic boom has affected Negro soldiers in another way. In recent years there has been some friction between foreign laborers (mostly Mediterranean) and Negro soldiers. Both groups of men apparently are competing for the same girls. At the same time, the foreign workers have little contact with

[28] A caution to be introduced in assessing these findings is that the Army discharged many personnel of limited potential as determined by aptitude tests in 1957–58. Negroes were disproportionately represented in the released personnel (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *op. cit.*, pp. 176–77). Although Negroes are still overrepresented in the lower classification levels, there are probably proportionately fewer in these categories today than in 1950, and this most likely has some effect on the drop in Negro crime in the Army.

white American soldiers who move in a different segment of the vice structure.

Nonetheless, overseas duty for the Negro serviceman, in Germany as well as the Far East, gives him an opportunity, even if peripheral, to witness societies where racial discrimination is less practiced than it is in his home country. Although the level of Negro acceptance in societies other than America is usually exaggerated, the Negro soldier is hard put not to make invidious comparisons with the American scene.[29] In interviews conducted with Negro servicemen in Germany, 64 per cent said there was more racial equality in Germany than America, 30 per cent saw little difference between the two countries, and only 6 per cent believed Negroes were treated better in the United States.

Observers of overseas American personnel have told the writer that Negro soldiers are more likely than whites to learn local languages (though for both groups of servicemen this is a very small number). Evidence for this supposition is given in Table 9. Three German-national barbers, who were permanently hired to cut the hair of all the men in one battalion, were asked by the writer to evaluate the German language proficiency of the individual personnel in that battalion.[30] When these evaluations were correlated with race, it was found that Negro soldiers were five times more likely to know "conversational" German, and three times more likely to know "some" German than were white soldiers.[31] Actually, the likelihood of Negro soldiers compared to whites in learning the language of the country in which they are stationed may be even greater than indicated in Table 9. Several of the German-speaking white soldiers, were of German ethnic background and acquired some knowledge of the language in their home environments back in the United States. These data testify, then, that the Negro soldiers overseas, perhaps because of the more favorable racial climate, are more willing to take advantage of participation at informal levels with local populations.[32]

TABLE 9

COMMAND OF GERMAN LANGUAGE BY WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS IN A GERMAN-BASED U.S. ARMY BATTALION, 1965

COMMAND OF GERMAN*	PER CENT	
	White Soldiers	Negro Soldiers
Conversational	1.4	7.4
Some	3.0	7.4
Little or none	95.6	85.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(No. of cases)	(629)	(98)

* Based on evaluations of German-national battalion employees.

CIVIL RIGHTS AT HOME AND WAR ABROAD

It is important to remember that the military establishment was desegregated before the current civil rights drive gained momentum. In the segregated military, embroilments between Negro units and whites were an ever present problem. In the light of subsequent developments in the domestic racial picture, it is likely that severe disciplinary problems would have occurred

[29] A social-distance study conducted among Korean college students found the following placement, from near to far: Chinese, Europeans and white Americans, Filipinos, Indians (from India), and Negroes (Man Gap Lee, Seoul National University, personal communication).

[30] These barbers were focal points of much of the battalion's gossip and between themselves saw every man in the battalion on the average of at least twice a month.

[31] The same data, in tables not shown here, reveal that there is an *inverse* correlation between formal education (as ascertained from battalion personnel records) and likelihood of learning German! This reflects the greater likelihood of Negro soldiers, compared to whites, to learn German while averaging fewer years of formal education.

[32] In 1965 a widely seen German television commercial portrayed two American soldiers, one white and the other Negro. Only the Negro soldier spoke German.

had military integration not come about when it did. The timing of desegregation in the military defused an ingredient—all-Negro military units—that would have been potentially explosive in this nation's current racial strife.[33]

It is also probable, however, that military experience contributes to an activist posture on the part of Negro servicemen returning to civilian life. The Negro ex-serviceman, that is, may be less willing to accommodate himself to second-class citizenship after participation in the racially egalitarian military establishment. Further, especially in situations where Negroes are intimidated by physical threat or force, techniques of violence and organizational skill acquired in military service may be a new factor in the Negro's quest for equality. Robert F. Williams, the leading advocate of armed self-defense for Negroes, explicitly states that his Marine Corps experience led to his beliefs.[34] It also seems more than coincidence that the ten founders of the Deacons for Defense and Justice, a paramilitary group organized in 1964 to counter Ku Klux Klan terrorism, were all veterans of Korea or World War II.[35]

One must also take into account the possible consequences of the civil rights movement on Negro military behavior. Much attention has been given to a convergence of an important segment of the civil rights movement with the movement against the war in Viet Nam. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee has formally denounced American action in Viet Nam as aggression. Civil rights organizers claim they find Negroes who do not want to fight "whitey's war." A Negro is barred from taking his seat in the Georgia legislature because he condones violations of the draft law. Rumors are heard of isolated incidents of Negro insubordination in the armed services. Despite this chain of events, however, the main stream of the civil rights drive has remained largely removed from those groups highly critical of this country's recent military policies. Indeed, the antiwar movement will likely aggravate an already existing cleavage between moderate and radical leaders—between those who accept versus those who reject the legitimacy of the American political system—in the civil rights movement itself. The more pertinent question at this time appears to be not what are the implications of the civil rights movement for the military establishment, but what will be the effects of the Viet Nam war on the civil rights movement itself. Although it would be premature to offer a definitive statement on any future interpenetrations between the civil rights and antiwar movements, a major turning away of Negroes per se from military commitment is viewed as highly doubtful. Most likely, and somewhat paradoxically, we will witness more vocal antiwar sentiment within certain civil rights organizations at the same time that the military is becoming an avenue of career opportunity for many Negro men.

Nevertheless, there has usually been and is today a presumption on the part of America's military opponents that Negroes should be less committed soldiers than whites. Whether for tactical or ideological reasons, the Negro serviceman has been frequently defined as a special target for propaganda by forces opposing America in military conflicts. In World War II the Japanese directed radio appeals specifically to Negro servicemen in the Pacific theater. The Chinese in the Korean War used racial arguments on Negro prisoners of war. Yet a careful study of American POW

[33] Although non-violence is the hallmark of the main thrust of the modern civil rights movement, there is, nevertheless, the leitmotiv of a Negro insurrection in the thinking of such Negro figures as James Baldwin, Malcolm X, William Epton, Warren Miller, and LeRoi Jones. Congruent with the idea of armed conflict between the races are the gothic endings—whites and Negro soldiers engaging in a bloodbath—in recent Negro-authored novels (see Killens, *op. cit.*, and Rhodes, *op. cit.*).

[34] Robert F. Williams, *Negroes with Guns* (New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1962).

[35] *The Militant*, November 22, 1965, p. 1.

behavior in Korea made no mention of differences in Negro and white behavior except to note that the segregation of Negro POW's by the Chinese had a boomerang effect on Communist indoctrination methods.[36]

The current military involvement of the United States on the international scene raises again the question of the motivation and performance of Negro soldiers in combat. A spokesman for the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam has recently asserted that "liberation forces have a special attitude toward American soldiers who happen to be Negroes."[37] Up to now at least, however, efforts to test the loyalty of Negro soldiers have not met with success. This writer, as well as others, detected no differences in white or Negro combat performance in Viet Nam.[38] In the Dominican Republic, where the proportion of Negroes in line units runs as high as 40 per cent, a pamphlet was distributed to Negro soldiers exhorting them to "turn your guns on your white oppressors and join your Dominican brothers."[39] Again, personal observation buttressed by comments from Dominicans revealed no significant differences between white and Negro military performance.[40]

The writer's appraisal is that among officers and NCO's there is no discernible difference between the races concerning military commitment in either the Dominican Republic or Viet Nam. Among Negro soldiers in the lower enlisted ranks, however, there is somewhat greater disenchantment compared to whites as to the merits of America's current military ventures. Such unease, however, has little effect on military performance, most especially in the actual combat situation. The evidence strongly suggests that the racial integration of the armed forces, coming about when it did, effectively precluded any potential success on the part of America's military opponents to differentiate Negro from white soldiers.

CONCLUSION

Although the military was until recent times one of America's most segregated institutions, it has leaped into the forefront of racial equality in the past decade. What features of the military establishment can account for this about-face? There is a combination of mutually supporting factors that operate in the successful racial integration of the armed forces. For one thing, the military—an institution revolving around techniques of violence—is to an important degree discontinuous from other areas of social life. And this apartness served to allow, once the course had been decided, a rapid and complete racial integration. The path of desegregation was further made easier by characteristics peculiar or at least more pronounced in the military compared to other institutions. With its hierarchical power structure, predicated on stable and patterned relationships, decisions need take relatively little account of the personal desires of service personnel. Additionally, because roles and activities are more defined and specific in the military than in most other social arenas, conflicts that might have ensued within a more diffuse and am-

[36] Albert D. Biderman, *March to Calumny* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 60.

[37] *The Minority of One*, October, 1965, p. 9.

[38] "Only One Color," *Newsweek*, December 6, 1965, pp. 42–43; Robin Moore, *The Green Berets* (New York: Avon Books, 1965), *passim;* and Herbert Mitgang, "Looking for a War," *New York Times Magazine*, May 22, 1966, pp. 114–15.

[39] A copy of the entire pamphlet is reproduced in the Dominican news magazine *Ahora* (No. 108, September 18, 1965). Although many whites were unaware of the pamphlet's existence, virtually every Negro soldier the writer talked to in Santo Domingo said he had seen the pamphlet. The effectiveness of the pamphlet on Negro soldiers was minimal, among other reasons, because it claimed Negro equality existed in the Dominican Republic, a statement belied by brief observation of the Dominican social scene.

[40] Similarly in an interview with a Negro reporter, the commandant of "constitutionalist rebel" forces in Santo Domingo stated that to his dismay Negro American soldiers fought no differently than whites (Laurence Harvey, "Report from the Dominican Republic," *Realist*, June, 1965, p. 18).

biguous setting were largely absent. Likewise, desegregation was facilitated by the pervasiveness in the military of a bureaucratic ethos, with its concomitant formality and high social distance, that mitigated tensions arising from individual or personal feelings.

At the same time it must also be remembered that the military establishment has means of coercion not readily available in most civilian pursuits. Violations of norms are both more visible and subject to quicker sanctions. The military is premised, moreover, on the accountability of its members for effective performance. Owing to the aptly termed "chain of command," failures in policy implementation can be pinpointed. This in turn means that satisfactory carrying out of stated policy advances one's own position. In other words, it is to each individual's personal interest, if he anticipates receiving the rewards of a military career, to insure that decisions going through him are executed with minimum difficulty. Or put in another way, whatever the internal policy decided upon, racial integration being a paramount but only one example, the military establishment is uniquely suited to realize its implementation.

What implications does the military integration experience have for civilian society? Although it is certainly true that the means by which desegregation was accomplished in the military establishment are not easily translated to the civilian community, the end result of integration in the contemporary armed forces can suggest some qualities of what—if it came about—an integrated American society would be *within the context of the prevailing structural and value system*. Equality of treatment would be the rule in formal and task-specific relationships. Racial animosity would diminish but not disappear. We would expect a sharp improvement in Negro mobility and performance in the occupational sphere even taking into consideration on-going social and educational handicaps arising from existing inequities. Yet, because of these inequities, Negroes would still be overconcentrated in less skilled positions. We would also expect primary group ties and informal associations to remain largely within one's own racial group. But even at primary group levels, the integrated society would exhibit a much higher interracial intimacy than exists in the non-integrated society.

Such a description of the racially integrated society is, of course, what one finds in today's military establishment. Although the advent of the integrated society in this country is yet to occur, the desegregation of the armed forces has served to bring that day closer.

Northwestern University

Mass, Class, and the Industrial Community: A Comparative Analysis of Managers, Businessmen, and Workers[1]

Charles M. Bonjean

ABSTRACT

A rough test of the homogeneity-heterogeneity inconsistency between "mass society" and stratification theories was conducted by comparing 332 hourly paid workers, independent businessmen, and corporate managers on a number of variables selected because they had been used in discussions of both mass society and stratification. The research was conducted in a community having recently undergone urbanization, bureaucratization, and industrialization, processes usually associated with the development of a "middle mass."

The data suggest (1) the concept "middle mass" may have limited utility in the industrial community, and (2) that urbanization, industrialization, and bureaucratization may not completely homogenize or level, but they may enlarge the middle strata of the community and further modify its social structure by creating a new upper stratum.

Sociologists and social philosophers have set forth two contradictory theoretical perspectives in regard to the nature of stratification in contemporary American society.

The traditional perspective suggests that an increasing division of labor associated with differential rewards results in different societal levels, the members of which subscribe to different values and attitudes and engage in distinctive patterns of behavior.[2] Although one may identify different types of stratification theories—for example, conservative and radical, or those focusing on stability as opposed to those dealing with change—a feature shared by all is their concern with heterogeneity—different values, beliefs, attitudes or behavior at different levels in society.[3] Some investigators have even suggested that life styles of bureaucrats (sometimes termed the "new middle class") and entrepreneurs (sometimes termed the "old middle class") differ not only from those of the "working class" but from one another.[4] The concern here, then, is with status and situs *differences.*

Another theoretical perspective, in some respects contradictory to stratification the-

[1] Revision of a paper presented at the Community Research and Development section meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1965. This investigation was supported by a grant from the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, Austin, Texas. The investigator acknowledges with gratitude the valuable assistance of Robert Hancock, Joann S. Hayes, Lynda Painter, and Gary Vance. Most helpful in criticizing an earlier draft of the paper were S. Dale McLemore and Norval D. Glenn, the University of Texas; Richard L. Simpson, the University of North Carolina; and Atlee L. Stroup, the College of Wooster.

[2] Examples of such theories are too numerous to cite. Many are summarized in, and the perspective itself is explicit in, Joseph A. Kahl, *The American Class Structure* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1957), Leonard Reissman, *Class in American Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), and in many similar sources.

[3] Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix (eds.), *Class, Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), pp. 9–12.

[4] See, e.g., C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Daniel R. Miller and Guy E. Swanson, *The Changing American Parent: A Study in the Detroit Area* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), esp. pp. 30–58; and David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denny, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 21 ff.

ory, is that known as the "mass society" perspective. The central foci of theories classified as such are varied, but one common thread running through many of them is the idea that an increasing division of labor and its concomitants—industrialization, bureaucratization, and urbanization—has had a leveling effect, effacing, or at least blurring, social stratification.[5] Thus, the term "middle mass" has come to be used to refer to some elements formerly described as "middle class" and to some formerly described as "working class."[6] It has even been suggested that the traditional indicators of social class no longer discriminate among many of the attitudes and behavior patterns of the "middle mass."[7] The concern here, then, is with status and situs *similarities*.

The purpose of this investigation is to explore the relative descriptive utility of these two perspectives in a community setting recently and rapidly having undergone those processes that are usually considered the antecedents to the formation of a middle mass—urbanization, bureaucratization, and industrialization. More specifically, the research design called for a comparison of three "middle-mass" occupational categories—independent businessmen, corporate supervisors and managers, and hourly paid workers—on a number of sociopersonality and social-participation variables, selected because they have been used frequently in descriptions of the "middle mass." In short, if the middle mass is homogeneous, we would expect it to be such in regard to those characteristics of central concern to mass-society theorists. At the same time, this sampling design permits an analysis of the relative effects of class and bureaucratic work setting on these same dependent variables. Among the possible findings and their implications would be the following:

$\frac{M}{\frac{B}{W}}$ Significant differences between all three categories in the order (1) managers, (2) businessmen, and (3) workers (or reversed, depending upon the dependent variable) would give clear support to stratification theory and would question the utility of the concept "middle mass" in the industrial community setting, as indeed these groups (as will be shown below) rank in this order on socioeconomic characteristics.

$\frac{MB}{W}$ Significant differences between the working-class sample and the two middle-class samples would also support stratification theory, but would question the utility of the distinction sometimes made between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs—or the "new" and "old" middle classes, at least in the industrial community context.

$\frac{M}{BW}$ Significant differences between managers and the other two categories would suggest that the "middle mass" may consist of the "old middle class" and the "working class," but that bureaucratization has modified the social structure of the community by sharply differentiating the "new middle class" from the "middle mass."

$\frac{MW}{B}$ Significant differences between those employed in bureaucratic work settings (managers and workers) and those self-employed in non-bureaucratic set-

[5] See, e.g., Daniel Seligman, "The New Masses," in Philip Olson (ed.), *America as a Mass Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 249, 254; Daniel Bell, "The Theory of Mass Society: A Critique," *Commentary*, XXII (July, 1956), 76–77; Emil Lederer, *State of the Masses: The Threat of the Classless Society* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1940), pp. 30–31; and William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 27.

[6] See, e.g., Seligman, *loc. cit.*; Harold L. Wilensky, "Mass Society and Mass Culture: Interdependence or Independence?" *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (April, 1964), 173–97, and his "Orderly Careers and Social Participation: The Impact of Work History on Social Integration in the Middle Mass," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (August, 1961), 529; Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February, 1962), 20; Raymond A. Bauer and Alice H. Bauer, "America, 'Mass Society' and Mass Media," *Journal of Social Issues*, XVI, No. 3 (1960), 54–55; and Reissman, *op. cit.*, pp. 193 ff.

[7] Wilensky, "Orderly Careers . . . ," p. 539; Gusfield, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

tings (businessmen) would lend some support to the mass-society perspective in that it would suggest that bureaucratization is a leveling agent and that traditional indicators of social class no longer discriminate among those characteristics under investigation, at least not in the industrial community.

WBM No significant differences between the three categories would indeed justify viewing all three as a homogeneous "middle mass."

THE COMMUNITY AND THE SAMPLES

Before 1950 Gulftown[8] was an agricultural and fishing industries center with a population slightly in excess of 2,000. Since that time, two major corporations have located plants in the Gulftown area, changing the employment structure of the community and boosting its population to more than 11,000. Today, almost one-third of the community's labor force is employed by Plant X (a non-ferrous metal producer with 1,700 employees, some of whom are from nearby communities, rather than from Gulftown) and Plant Y (a chemical company with 850 employees, also including some from nearby communities). Slightly more than one-fifth of the labor force is engaged in wholesale and retail trade activities. In short, the community has experienced rapid growth as a consequence of industrialization, and the largest segment of the community's labor force is employed as managers or hourly paid workers in large formal organizations.

Lists of salaried managers, hourly paid workers, and independent businessmen living in Gulftown were compiled, and a random probability sample (and ordered alternate list) was drawn from each.[9] A total of 332 interviews were completed with 104 businessmen, 108 managers, and 120 workers.[10]

Managers.—Personnel departments in Plants X and Y identified all salaried employees as members of management. Their definition was accepted for this investigation and the personnel managers of each plant checked the sample lists to verify classifications. The management sample included both staff and line members of both plants. Department heads, professionals, and several levels of foremen and clerks were typical of the occupational positions represented in this sample. All, with the exception of line foremen, are "white-collar" employees. Top bureaucratic positions of Companies X and Y are not located in Gulftown. Furthermore, neither of the local plant managers were included in this sample which is thus primarily a middle management and front line supervisory sample. As Table 1 indicates, managers ranked higher than either of the other two groups on all socioeconomic characteristics investigated (items 1–5): income, education, self-classification, and class assignment by the Index of Social Position.[11] The managers were also compared with the other two categories on other characteristics (Table 1, items 6–9) that could possibly be related to the dependent variables selected for this analysis. Because managers were significantly younger than businessmen, included a significantly smaller proportion of the Spanish-surname population, fewer Catholics, and were better educated, these variables were used as controls in the data analysis to be described below.

Businessmen.—The independent businessmen in the sample possess those characteristics defined as entrepreneurial by

[8] A pseudonym, of course.

[9] A 1962 Gulftown city directory was brought up to date one week before the field work started by examining city water and sewage connect and disconnect slips which gave the name, address, and occupation of all individuals owning or renting homes or apartments who had moved in and out of the city since directory data were collected.

[10] Field work was done by fourteen graduate students and the investigator in September, 1964. Response rates for the three categories were: businessmen, 84.6 per cent; managers, 83.7 per cent; and workers, 88.3 per cent.

[11] August B. Hollingshead, "Two Factor Index of Social Position" (New Haven, Conn., 1957). (Mimeographed.)

other investigators: they were self-employed, gained at least half of their income in the form of profits or fees, or worked in an organization having only two (or fewer) levels of supervision.[12] They ranged from those operating small service businesses with no employees (e.g., beauty shops, watch repair shops, etc.) to three with more than thirty employees (e.g., the owner-manager of a chain of five drive-in restaurants). The median number of employees (including the respondent) was four. As is shown in Table 1 (items 1–5), businessmen ranked second on all socioeconomic characteristics.

Workers.—The hourly paid employees of Plants X and Y are included in this sample—operators, mechanics, potmen, machinists, power attendants, etc. Workers ranked lowest on all socioeconomic status characteristics investigated (Table 1, items 1–5). They were also significantly younger than the businessmen (item 7), included significantly more Catholics than the managers (item 9), and had a significantly greater proportion of Spanish-surname respondents than either of the other two samples (item 8).

TABLE 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF THREE OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES

Characteristic	Managers (N = 108)	Businessmen (N = 104)	Workers (N = 120)	Significant Differences
1. Median monthly income	$800 00	$661 00	$594.00	M−W, M−B, B−W*
2. Percentage having attended college	69.5	36.5	25.9	M−W, M−B
3. Percentage having graduated from college	38 9	8.6	1.7	M−W, M−B, B−W
4. Percentage classifying themselves "middle class"	69 0	54.0	35.0	M−W, M−B, B−W
5. Median index of social position class placement	2 8	3.1	4.1	M−W, M−B−B−W†
6. Percentage having lived in Gulftown less than 10 years	50 9	38 5	41.7	None
7. Mean age	40 6	45.2	39.3	M−B, B−W
8. Percentage with Spanish-surname	0.9	5.8	25 0	M−W, B−W
9. Percentage Catholic‡	14.8	21.2	26.7	M−W

* Median income for all three samples was $670 00 Significantly different proportions of the three samples had incomes above this grand median.

† The median index of social position score for all three samples was 3 28. Significantly different proportions of the three samples were found in Classes I–III.

‡ No respondents were of the Jewish faith.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND METHOD OF COMPARISON

All three samples were administered a standardized 23-page interview schedule consisting of 282 questions (both open-end and poll types).[13] Two types of variables often used in describing members of "mass societies" were selected as dependent variables for this analysis. Because of the attention given by "mass-society" theorists to "personal disorganization" and to "atomization" or a deterioration of social relationships, our concern was with sociopersonality characteristics and with various measures of social participation.

1. *Sociopersonality characteristics.*—Each of these variables concerns some perception or feeling state of the respondent in regard

[12] Respondents possessing any one of these characteristics were classified as entrepreneurial by Miller and Swanson (*op. cit.*, pp. 68–69). All Gulftown respondents in this category possessed at least two of these characteristics and most possessed all three.

[13] Because of the length of the schedule, appointments were arranged in advance with most respondents. Interviews lasted from 35 minutes to 2 hours and 40 minutes with the mean length being 1 hour and 19 minutes.

to some aspect of himself or his own social position. They were selected because (1) they have been used to describe members of "mass societies,"[14] (2) they have also been related to socioeconomic status,[15] and (3) some have been used in describing employees in complex organizations (and, at least by implication, are assumed to be less characteristic or not characteristic of members of small-scale organizations).[16] The research design outlined above permits us to assess the relative descriptive utility of each of these assertions. Sociopersonality characteristics considered here include alienation (and three subscales—powerlessness, normlessness, and isolation), anomia, self-actualization, self-esteem, self-estrangement, and status concern.

2. *Social participation and involvement.*—These variables were selected because (1) "mass societies" have been described as "atomized societies" where "personal relations" are lacking and where "intermediate relations of community, occupation and association are more or less inoperative,"[17] (2) different forms of social participation and social involvement are said to be characteristic of different socioeconomic strata,[18] and (3) some forms of social participation and involvement are said to be associated with bureaucratic as opposed to entrepreneurial work settings.[19] Those measures of social participation and involvement selected for this analysis include two measures of community attachment or involvement, neighborhood integration, participation in organized groups, religious participation, home visits with friends, visiting with relatives, political participation, and a general social participation scale.

The focus here, then, is to determine whether three occupational categories of the "middle mass" differ in regard to those sociopersonality characteristics attributed to this larger category and whether they differ in regard to (the absence of) personal and intermediate social relations. In short, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of "mass-society" characteristics will be explored within a stratification-bureaucratization context.

Similarities and differences between the three samples were assessed in one of the following ways:

1. Responses to a number of items, particularly the various scales, were ranked by scale score and divided into quarters. Then the proportions of each occupational group in the first or fourth quarter were examined to see if the differences were significant.[20]

2. In some cases it was not possible to divide response distributions into quarters because (1) some items had fewer than four response categories, and (2) a single scale score or response category sometimes applied to far more than one-fourth of the three samples. In such cases, either the largest response category or that category most descriptive of "personal disorganization" or lack of social participation was selected for analysis.

Because the samples differed in regard to age, ethnicity and religious affiliation (as well as socioeconomic status), (1) the responses of those who are forty years of age and younger were compared with those over forty within and between each category, and (2) the responses of the Spanish-surname workers were compared with those of the Anglo workers. Since nearly 80 per cent of

[14] See, e.g., most of the sources cited in n. 4 and Gusfield, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[15] The direction of the relationship and sources are cited in the Appendix.

[16] See esp. Chris Argyris, *Understanding Organizational Behavior* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1960), pp. 14–18.

[17] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 74, 90.

[18] The direction of the relationship and sources are cited in the Appendix.

[19] See, in particular, Miller and Swanson (*op. cit.*) as well as other sources to be cited below and in the Appendix.

[20] When the differences between the categories are described as "significant," the .05 level of statistical significance has been employed in making the evaluations.

the Spanish-surname workers were also Catholics, the ethnicity control also served as a control for religion. Although education is ordinarily considered an indicator of socioeconomic status, non-status aspects of educational differences could be related to differences in the sociopersonality and social participation variables discussed above. Thus, (3) the responses of those managers having less than a college education were compared with the other two occupational categories. The effects of age, ethnicity, and education are not reported below unless they *significantly* alter the original relationship found between occupation and the dependent variable in question.

TABLE 2

SOCIOPERSONALITY CORRELATES OF OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

Variable	Managers ($N = 108$)	Businessmen ($N = 104$)	Workers ($N = 120$)	Significant Differences
1. Alienation—percentage scoring in first quarter (low scores)	38 9	22.1	16.7	M−W and M−B
2. Alienation, isolation subscale—percentage scoring in first quarter	37.0	22.1	19.2	M−W and M−B
3. Alienation, normlessness subscale—percentage scoring in first quarter	48.1	21.2	22.5	M−W and M−B
4. Alienation, powerlessness subscale—percentage scoring in first quarter	31.5	25.9	13.3	M−W and B−W
5. Anomia—percentage scoring low (0) on the scale	51.9	26.9	23 3	M−W and M−B
6. Self-actualization—percentage scoring in first quarter	5.6	14.4	23.3	M−W
7. Self-esteem—percentage scoring high (0–1 on six-item Guttman scale)	70 4	54.8	57.5	M−W and M−B
8. Self-estrangement—percentage scoring in first quarter	37.0	27.9	17.5	M−W
9. Status concern—percentage scoring in fourth quarter	10 2	28.8	40.8	M−W and M−B*

* Differences between all three groups were significant among those respondents forty years of age or younger.

RESULTS

Sociopersonality characteristics.—Table 2 shows a consistent pattern of differences among the three samples in regard to those sociopersonality characteristics sometimes used to describe members of the "middle mass." In most cases the managers differ significantly from the other two categories. Although the general pattern is (1) managers, (2) businessmen, and (3) workers, the differences between the latter two samples were in most cases not of sufficient magnitude to reject the hypothesis that these categories were a part of the same universe.

Indeed the "new middle class" in Gulftown fails to display the personal disorganization that allegedly accompanies bureaucratization and mass society. Managers are most likely to have strong, favorable self-images (item 7) and to believe their occupational roles permit relatively full expression of their individual potential as well as opportunities to expand this potential (item 6).[21] The six measures of alienation

[21] The source of this definition of self-actualization is Argyris, *Integrating the Individual and the Organization* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 32. Age may also be an important independent variable here. Among those respondents under forty, businessmen experience no significantly different degree of self-actualization than managers. Among those over forty, managers experience significantly greater self-actualization than members of either of the other two categories. This may be explained in part by the observation that the older managers occupy positions of higher rank in the organizations than do the younger managers.

and related phenomena (items 1–5 and 8) raise some questions in regard to the following observation: "Whether the emphasis of the writer is on estrangement from work, the normlessness of contemporary culture or the powerless feelings of the individual in large scale organization, mass conditions are described as producing feelings of malaise and insecurity."[22] Such feelings, in fact, are less characteristic of the "new middle-class" bureaucrats than of the other two occupational categories. Managers are least likely to:

1. Feel a "generalized, pervasive sense of . . . 'self-to-others' alienation" (item 5)[23]
2. Feel that their goals and the means they use in pursuing these goals are determined by social entities with which they do not feel "intimately identified" or by forces which they "may be unable to recognize" (item 4)[24]
3. Experience a "lack of clear norms or a conflict among norms" (item 3)[25]
4. Feel they are "losing effective contact with significant and supporting groups" (item 2)[26]
5. Feel that they must engage in behavior in which they are compelled by social situations to do violence to their own "nature" (item 8)[27]
6. Receive high scores on Dean's composite alienation scale, consisting of the sums of scores from the subscales listed as items 2–4 (item 1)[28]
7. Be concerned with status or social mobility (item 9)[29]

Businessmen ranked between the managers and workers on all but two characteristics (they experienced the greatest amount of normlessness and had the lowest self-esteem) but more closely resembled the workers than the managers. In fact, they differed significantly from the workers on only one characteristic—the powerlessness dimension of alienation.

Thus, workers *and* independent businessmen were more likely than managers to possess those sociopersonality characteristics often identified with the concept "mass": social isolation, normlessness, anomia, low self-esteem, and general alienation.

Social participation and involvement.—The patterns of differences found among the social participation and involvement variables investigated were not as consistent as those differences outlined above. Table 3 indicates that businessmen were least likely to participate or be involved in seven of the ten characteristics investigated, and they differed significantly from at least one of the other two groups on five of these characteristics. From the opposite standpoint, managers were most likely to participate in eight of the areas investigated, differing significantly from one of the other two groups on seven of these. Again, workers were more likely to

[22] Gusfield, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[23] Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," *American Sociological Review,* XXI (December, 1956), 711.

[24] Dwight G. Dean, "Alienation and Political Apathy," *Social Forces,* XXXVIII (March, 1960), 185 (quoting Alvin Gouldner).

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 186. [26] *Ibid.*

[27] This definition of self-estrangement is suggested by Lewis Feuer, in "What Is Alienation? The Career of a Concept," in Maurice Stein and Arthur Vidich (eds.), *Sociology on Trial* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 143.

[28] The Spanish-surname workers were significantly more likely to have high scores on the alienation scale and its three subscales than were the Anglo workers. Still, if one compares only the Anglo workers with the managers, the differences remain statistically significant.

[29] Status concern was more characteristic of respondents over forty in all three samples. Among those over forty, managers were significantly less likely to display status concern than either of the other two categories. In regard to those under forty, workers were significantly more likely than businessmen, who in turn were significantly more likely than managers, to score high on the status-concern scale. The Spanish-surname workers were significantly more concerned with status than were the Anglo workers. When only Anglo workers are considered, they more closely resemble the businessmen but remain significantly different from managers.

TABLE 3

SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT CORRELATES OF OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

Characteristic	Managers (N=108)	Businessmen (N=104)	Workers (N=120)	Significant Differences
1. Community attachment—percentage with low scores on Wilensky's community involvement scale	4.1	15.6	29.7	M−W, M−B, W−B*†
2. Community attachment—percentage offering "unfavorable" evaluations of Gulftown	18.5	6.8	10.3	M−B†‡
3. Neighborhood integration—percentage of respondents knowing two or fewer neighbors well enough to call on them	5.6	28.8	15.8	M−B, M−W, W−B§
4. Organized groups—percentage belonging to no organized groups	27.8	31.7	29.8	None
5. Religious participation—percentage with low scale scores (do not attend religious services)	28.7	40.4	28.4	None‖
6. Visiting friends—percentage visiting with two or fewer friends during previous month (at respondent's home or friend's home)	12.0	26.9	16.7	M−B, W−B
7. Visiting relatives—percentage seeing no related families during previous month	26.9	14.4	10.8	M−W, M−B†‡
8. Political participation:				
a) Percentage not voting in 1960 presidential election	6.5	8.7	15.8	M−W#**
b) Percentage not voting in last school election	56.5	67.3	71.7	M−W#**
9. General social participation—percentage scoring in first quarter (low) on Teele's scale	18 6	26.9	21.7	None

* Difference between workers and businessmen is not significant among those over forty years of age.
† Difference between managers and businessmen is not significant when education is controlled.
‡ Differences are not significant among those respondents forty and younger.
§ Difference between workers and managers is not significant among those over forty.
‖ M − B, W − B approaches significance
\# Differences are not significant among those over forty.
** Difference between managers and workers is not significant when education is controlled.

resemble businessmen, but the similarity was not as marked as it was in regard to the sociopersonality characteristics. Further examination of Table 3 indicates that different types of social participation and social involvement are characteristic of the different occupational categories. That the categories may differ more in regard to type of participation than in level of participation is also supported by the observation that they do not differ significantly on Teele's general measure of "voluntary social isolation" (item 9).[80]

Managers were least likely to have seen related families during the month preceding the interview (item 7),[81] and they were

[80] James E. Teele ("Measures of Social Participation," *Social Problems*, X [Summer, 1962], 31–39) has also noted that there may be different types of social participation. Data he gathered from a sample of 649 former mental patients indicated that "seeing friends, visiting relatives, and going to church represent three different types of social participation" (p. 37).

[81] This finding, at first glance, appears to support Parsons' assertion that career mobility and the extended family may be antithetical. That this may be an incorrect interpretation is suggested by the further observation that managers ranked lowest on the status-concern measure and by the fact that age complicates this relationship. Among those respondents forty or under, there were no significant differences in the number of related families seen during the previous month, a finding that lends some support to the arguments sets forth by Eugene Litwak ("Occupation Mobility and Extended Family Cohesion," *American Sociological Review*, XXV [February, 1960], 9–21). The significant differences between the managers and the

the least likely to offer a favorable evaluation of Gulftown (item 2).[32] Their religious participation was almost as great as that of the workers, and they were the most likely to participate or be involved in:

1. Community attachment as measured by local political participation and contributions to church and charities (item 1)[33]
2. Neighborhood integration (item 3)[34]
3. Organized groups (item 4)[35]
4. Home visits with friends (item 6)
5. Political participation at both the local and national levels (items 8*a* and 8*b*)[36]
6. General social participation (item 9)

The "loneliness" and "isolation" allegedly characteristic of members of the "mass" do not describe members of this occupational category in which the average respondent knew seven neighbors well enough to call on them, had visited with friends at his home or their homes seven times during the month preceding the interview, had attended church three times during the month prior to that during which the field work was conducted, and belonged to and attended regularly the meetings of organized groups. In short, the participation of managers in both personal and intermediate relationships was relatively high.

Workers were more likely than managers and businessmen (although they did not differ significantly from the latter) to have seen related families during the month preceding the interview (item 7) and they were the most likely to have attended religious services (item 5), although this is probably a consequence of the relatively large number of Catholics in this category.[37] Workers ranked lowest on both measures of political participation (items 8*a* and 8*b*) and displayed less community involvement than the other two categories (item 1). They were the intermediate category in regard to neighborhood integration (item 3), participation in organized groups (item 4), community attachment (item 2), home visits with friends (item 6), and general social participation (item 9). Thus, workers display relative-

other two groups were a consequence of a much larger difference found between the groups among those respondents over forty. Spanish-surname workers were significantly more likely to have visited relatives than Anglo workers, but when only the Anglo workers were compared with the managers, the difference remains significant.

[32] There were no significant differences among those forty or younger, who in all three categories were more likely than those over forty to offer unfavorable evaluations.

[33] Attachment increased with age among the businessmen and managers, but the reverse was true among the workers. Among those over forty, there was no significant difference between the businessmen and the workers. Furthermore, Spanish-surname workers were significantly more likely than Anglo workers to score low on this involvement measure. The community involvement of Anglo workers does not differ significantly from that of the businessmen.

[34] Among those respondents forty or under, differences between all three occupational categories were significant. Among those over forty, the worker-manager difference was negligible. Ethnicity also accounts for part of the worker differences. When only Anglo workers are considered, 17.4 per cent know two or less neighbors well enough to call on them.

[35] Non-membership in organized groups is more characteristic of those forty or under in all three categories. Among those over forty, there is a nearly significant difference between managers and the other two categories. Spanish-surname workers were more likely to belong to organized groups than Anglo workers. Of the Anglo workers, 36.0 per cent belong to no organized groups.

[36] In all three occupational categories, the older respondents were more likely than those forty or under to have voted in both local and national elections. In fact, the differences between the older workers, businessmen, and managers were not significant. Anglo workers were less likely to have voted in the 1960 presidential election than Spanish-surname workers. Of the Anglo workers, 22.8 per cent did not vote in the 1960 presidential election, a significantly greater proportion than the proportion of the non-voting businessmen or managers. The education control washes out the significant difference between managers and workers.

[37] Among the Anglo workers, 36.0 per cent had not attended religious services during the month preceding the interview. Thus, Anglo workers more closely resembled the businessmen than the managers, but differed significantly from neither category.

ly high participation and involvement in personal relationships (the average worker knew five or six neighbors well enough to call on them, visited with friends almost seven times per month, attended church three times a month,[38] and saw an average of three related families per month), but were less active in "intermediate" social relationships (they were less likely to vote in local and national elections, were not likely to attend regularly the meetings of organized groups, and were the most likely to display low community involvement).

Businessmen, in general, displayed the least social participation and social involvement. Although less likely than the other two categories to offer an "unfavorable" evaluation of the community (item 2), they were less involved in the community than managers (item 1). They were least likely to display neighborhood integration (item 3), to home visit with friends (item 6), to attend religious services (item 5), or to belong to organized groups (item 4), and they were the most likely to score low on the social participation scale (item 9), although some of these differences were not statistically significant. In short, the businessmen ranked lower than the managers in most areas of social participation and involvement and, more often than not, ranked lower than the workers on these measures. Although social isolation may be more characteristic of businessmen than the other two categories, the central tendencies of this sample—knowing more than six neighbors well enough to call on them, home visiting five times per month, attending religious services once a month, occasionally attending the meetings of organized groups, and visiting with related families three times a month—seem to fall short of "isolation" and "loneliness."

[38] Religious participation may be more meaningfully classified as a "personal" rather than as an "intermediate" relationship among workers (see, e.g., J. Milton Yinger, *Religion, Society and the Individual* [New York: Macmillan Co., 1957], pp. 166–73).

Although the age and education controls did not significantly modify the differences found between the occupational categories in regard to sociopersonality characteristics, they appear to be associated with many of the social participation variables. Thus, many of the social participation differences outlined above should be interpreted with special caution.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

The differences found between salaried managers and the other two occupational categories, but not between workers and businessmen, on a number of social integration and participation variables suggest that the "middle mass" in a rapidly industrializing community may consist of those individuals also described as "old middle class" and "working class," but that industrialization and its concomitants may modify the social structure by creating a new upper stratum in the community (upper, relative to the other two categories investigated). Thus, the traditional indicators of social class indeed differentiate and discriminate among attitudes and behavior patterns in the industrial community but perhaps at different levels in the status structure than was the case earlier.

Although beyond the stated purpose of this report, the observation that local businessmen, traditionally regarded as "middle class," more closely resemble hourly paid workers than they do the managers (on the variables examined) invites further comment of a speculative nature.

The relationship of the businessmen to Gulftown's changing social structure, particularly the development of a new upper stratum, suggests one reason for their relative disenchantment. Before the arrival of Plants X and Y in the community, Gulftown's economy was based primarily on agriculture, fishing, and oil. In regard to agricultural employment, it is perhaps significant to note that the farm-operator family level-of-living index for Gulf County in 1950 was lower than both the national

and state averages.[39] The presence of the fishing industry meant the presence of a fairly large number of low-status occupational positions including shrimpers, commercial fishermen, deckhands, packers, and pickers. Oil was found in Gulf County some years before 1950, which meant those employed in that industry were more likely to have been poorly educated, low-paid "roustabouts" rather than the fairly well-paid "roughnecks" needed when a field is first located. In short, the local businessman possessed relatively high socioeconomic status compared with the largest occupational groups prior to 1950.[40]

When Plants X and Y moved to Gulftown, they brought with them no small number of well-paid, well-educated employees and placed them, along with a smaller number of local citizens, in positions of authority. Since roughly 20 to 25 per cent of all Plant X and Y employees are classified as "management," the impact of this occupational category would certainly have been noticeable. Table 1 indicates that, although the businessmen fall between managers and workers on all socioeconomic-status characteristics, they more closely resemble the workers in income and education than they do the managers. Apparently, the arrival of industry in Gulftown lowered the entrepreneurs' *relative* socioeconomic status and perhaps influenced their power position as well.[41] Feelings of normlessness and isolation, experiencing anomia, low self-esteem, relatively high status concern, and, to some extent, social isolation may be the entrepreneurs' responses to the change in community structure.

To suggest cautions in regard to the conclusions and especially the theoretical implications of this report should be unnecessary. Still, the following limitations should be stressed:

1. These implications in regard to the nature of stratification in contemporary American society are based on a single community study. The limitations and fallacies associated with viewing the community as a societal microcosm have been discussed adequately elsewhere.[42] Thus, at best, these findings may be representative of communities of roughly the same size experiencing the same processes.

2. Plants X and Y may not be representative of new installations in other growing communities. The ratio of managers to workers may be higher or lower and the workers themselves may be better educated or better paid (or the reverse) than those employed in other industries. To the degree that these characteristics may differ in similar communities, new industry would have a different impact on the stratification system. Thus, caution should be exercised in generalizing to other communities.

3. The dependent variables selected for analysis may not be representative of the universe of variables under investigation. Furthermore, should a different criterion for selection have been imposed, different conclusions may have been likely. In short, it should not be assumed that workers generally have more in common with businessmen than managers, but, at best, they more closely resemble businessmen than managers on those characteristics frequently used to describe members of mass societies.

[39] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1962* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962).

[40] Further discussion of relative satisfaction and deprivation in the context of reference-group theory may be found in several sources including, of course, Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 225–80.

[41] See, e.g., Robert O. Schulze, "The Role of Economic Dominants in Community Power Structure," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (February, 1958), 3–9.

[42] See, e.g., Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Some Logical and Methodological Problems in Community Research," *Social Forces*, XXXIII (October, 1954), 54.

APPENDIX

SOCIOPERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION MEASURES USED IN THE STUDY

I. SOCIOPERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS

Alienation (including powerlessness, normlessness, and isolation).—The scales used were those set forth by Dwight G. Dean.[43] Among the studies which have shown an inverse relationship between alienation and socioeconomic status are those by Thompson and Horton and by Middleton.[44]

Anomia.—The scale used was that set forth by Leo Srole.[45] He found an inverse relationship between anomia and social status, as have a number of others.[46]

Self-actualization.—Self-actualization is the degree to which an individual's predispositions are expressed in his work. It has been found to be negatively related to bureaucratization but positively related to one's position in the organizational hierarchy. Argyris used a lengthy semistructured schedule to measure self-actualization,[47] but his technique was found to be too time-consuming for the purpose of this investigation. Thus, a structured schedule was developed by the investigator and Gary Vance to measure the same phenomenon. A number of pretests and validation procedures indicated the new technique was valid and probably more reliable than Argyris' method. The items are available upon request.

Self-esteem.—The scale used was that set forth by Morris Rosenberg.[48] It has been suggested that self-esteem is inversely related to bureaucratization and directly related to socioeconomic status.[49]

Self-estrangement.—In the process of selecting alienation scales, a number of previously used scales were pretested on the same sample. Scale correlations (measured by gamma) were low, suggesting that different alienation scales may measure different phenomena. A review of much of the alienation literature seemed to indicate that self-estrangement may be the underlying dimension of all forms of alienation. Thus, the investigator and Joann S. Hayes developed a seven-item Guttman type self-estrangement scale which, indeed, when pretested with seven other alienation scales, was found to be more closely related to the seven other scale scores than any of these scales were with the other seven (including self-estrangement).

Status concern.—According to Daniel Bell[50] the mass-society theorists see status concern as a consequence of spatial and social mobility in which individuals assume a multiplicity of roles and feel that they must prove themselves in a succession of new situations. The status-concern scale used here is a short form of the one set forth by Walter C. Kaufman.[51] The same short form has been used by Putney and Middleton.[52] Inverse relationships between status concern and socioeconomic status have been

[43] "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (October, 1961), 753–58.

[44] Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (March, 1960), 192, 195; Russell Middleton, "Alienation, Race and Education," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (December, 1963), 976.

[45] *Op. cit.*, pp. 709–16.

[46] Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social Isolation and the Class Structure," *Sociometry*, XX (June, 1957), 114; Lewis M. Killian and Charles M. Grigg, "Urbanism, Race and Anomia," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (May, 1962), 664; E. H. Mizruchi, "Social Structure and Anomia in a Small City," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (October, 1960), 647–48; Richard L. Simpson and H. Max Miller, "Social Status and Anomia," *Social Problems*, X (Winter, 1963), 256–64.

[47] See his *Understanding Organizational Behavior*.

[48] "Parental Interest and Children's Self-Conceptions," *Sociometry*, XXVI (March, 1963), 35–49.

[49] Argyris, *Integrating the Individual and the Organization*, esp. pp. 26–28, 54–57; J. Bieri and R. Lobeck, "Self-Concept Differences in Relation to Identification, Religion and Social Class," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LXII (January, 1961), 94–98.

[50] *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

[51] "Status, Authoritarianism and Anti-Semitism," *American Journal of Sociology*, LII (January, 1957), 379–83.

[52] Snell Putney and Russell Middleton, "Dimensions and Correlates of Religious Ideologies," *Social Forces*, XXXIX (May, 1961), 285–90.

suggested by Sewell and Haller and Roach and Gursslin.[53]

II. SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT

Community attachment and involvement.—One measure of community involvement was that set forth by Wilensky.[54] The second measure was based on responses to the question, "All things considered, what do you think of Gulftown as a place to live?" Coders classified responses as strongly favorable, moderately favorable (included a qualification), neutral, moderately unfavorable (including a qualification), and strongly unfavorable. Previous investigations have shown inverse relationships between community attachment and socioeconomic status.[55]

Neighborhood integration.—The measure used was that used by Fellin and Litwak.[56] This measure is the number of neighbors (defined as families within walking distance of the respondent's residence) known well enough to call on. Fellin and Litwak suggest that bureaucrats display greater neighborhood integration than entrepreneurs or manual workers because they have been trained to deal with change and integration.[57]

Participation in organized groups.—Respondents were asked if they attended club, lodge, union, civic organization, or other organizational meetings regularly, occasionally, rarely, or never. Nine studies showing a direct relationship between membership in voluntary associations and socioeconomic status are summarized by Kornhauser.[58]

Religious participation.—A religious-participation index was constructed from responses to three questions: (1) Are you a member of a church or other religious organization? (2) How often have you attended religious services in the past month? (3) Do you hold any elective or appointive offices in your church, such as deacon, choir member, Sunday school teacher, etc.? Index scores ranged from 0 (not a member, attended no services, and holds no office) to 6 (a member holding an office who attended services every week during the month preceding the interview). A number of studies have shown a direct relationship between religious participation and socioeconomic status.[59]

Home visits with friends.—Respondents were asked how often they visited with friends at friends' homes each month and how often they had friends to their homes each month. Respondents were assigned a total score that was simply the sum of the two answers. A direct relationship between socioeconomic status and this form of social participation has been demonstrated in previous research.[60]

Visiting with relatives.—Respondents were asked how many related families they had seen in the past month. It has been suggested that extended family relations may not be harmonious with the career orientation of the bureaucrat.[61] Others state that the extended family is viable because (among other reasons) class differences are moderate or shrinking (a view consistent with the mass-society perspective).[62] Still other investigators have found family participation to be more characteristic of the working class than the middle class.[63]

Political participation.—Two measures of political participation were used: (1) the respondent was asked if he voted in the 1960 presidential election and (2) when the last school election was held and if he voted in it. Only if the answer to the first part of the

[53] W. H. Sewell and A. O. Haller, "Factors in the Relationship between Social Status and the Personality Adjustment of the Child," *American Sociological Review,* XXIV (August, 1959), 516; Jack L. Roach and Orville R. Gursslin, "The Lower Class, Status Frustration, and Social Disorganization," *Social Forces,* XLIII (May, 1965), 501–10.

[54] "Orderly Careers . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 528.

[55] See, e.g., Arthur Kornhauser, *Detroit as the People See It* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1952), pp. 12–13.

[56] Phillip Fellin and Eugene Litwak, "Neighborhood Cohesion under Conditions of Mobility," *American Sociological Review,* XXVIII (June, 1963), 365.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 370.

[58] William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–72.

[59] See, e.g., Bernard Lazerwitz, "Some Factors Associated with Church Attendance," *Social Forces,* XXXIX (May, 1961), 306–8.

[60] Leonard Reissman, "Class, Leisure, and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review,* XIX (February, 1954), 78–79.

[61] See Talcott Parsons, "Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in Lipset and Bendix (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 116 ff.

[62] See Litwak, *op. cit.*

[63] See, e.g., Reissman, "Class, Leisure, and Social Participation," *op. cit.*

second question was correct or nearly correct (within one month of the actual date) was it assumed the respondent had, in fact, voted in the election. Numerous studies have shown a direct relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation.[64]

General social participation.—The scale used was that set forth by James E. Teele.[65] This is a three-point "partly cumulative" scale based on visits with friends, participation in social hobbies, and participation in voluntary associations. Previous research suggests that middle-class respondents rank higher than working-class respondents in all areas of social participation (explored here) except visits to and by relatives.[66]

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[64] See, e.g., Kahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 209–10.

[65] *Op. cit.*

[66] See Kahl, *op. cit.*, chap. v; and Reissman, *Class in American Society*, pp. 186–87.

Values and Post-College Career Change[1]

Ralph Underhill

ABSTRACT

Longitudinal data on college Seniors are employed in an effort to determine whether occupational values determine career choice, or career choice determines values, or both. Cross-lagged partial correlations are used to assess the direction of causation in the year following college graduation with the result that values are found to be "stronger" for three careers and career is found to be "stronger" for four careers. The possibility that values may be relatively weaker for those careers requiring greater undergraduate specialization is considered. The major conclusion is that there is substantial variation across careers in the nature of the relationship between career choices and values.

This paper deals with the relation of occupational values to career change after college. We shall consider whether college graduates change their careers to make them consistent with values, or whether they change their values to make them consistent with careers, or whether both these processes occur. We shall examine these processes for particular careers and speculate on variations in the findings across careers.

Occupational values may be conceived as the rewards and satisfactions, tangible and intangible, which a person hopes to derive from his work. He may, for example, want money, or an opportunity to be helpful to others, or the chance to exercise his creativity, or he may want all these things.

The use of attitude measures as a predictor of career choice is not a new endeavor. "Vocational interest inventories" have long been used by psychologists in advising students about which careers are consistent with their interests and values. Although there is a large body of literature by many researchers on this subject,[2] the work of Edward K. Strong[3] is the most notable. In his 1943 work he showed that the average profile of answers to a large number of attitudinal items differed substantially for groups of people engaged in different occupations. Moreover, in his 1955 book Strong reports sizable correlations between the vocational interest profile scores of students in college and the occupations in which they were actually engaged eighteen years later.

Among sociologists, Morris Rosenberg[4] demonstrated conclusively the strong relationship between values and career choice and provided the stimulus for subsequent National Opinion Research Center (NORC) investigations in this area, including the present investigation. Rosenberg made use of the following values in his analysis: (1) provide an opportunity to use my special abilities or aptitudes; (2) provide me with a chance to earn a good deal of money; (3) permit me to be creative and original; (4) give me social status and prestige; (5) give me an opportunity to work with people rather than

[1] The research reported herein was supported through the Cooperative Research Program of the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

[2] See Lee J. Cronbach, *Essentials of Psychological Testing* (2d ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), pp. 405–39; and Anne Roe, *The Psychology of Occupations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956), for detailed discussion of this subject.

[3] *Vocational Interests of Men and Women* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1943) and *Vocational Interests 18 Years after College* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955).

[4] *Occupations and Values* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).

things; (6) enable me to look forward to a stable, secure future; (7) leave me relatively free of supervision by others; (8) give me a chance to exercise leadership; (9) provide me with adventure; (10) give me an opportunity to be helpful to others.

Through cluster analysis of intercorrelations of these ten values he identified three relatively independent dimensions of value orientation: (1) the people-oriented value complex (values 5 and 10); (2) the extrinsic-reward-oriented value complex (values 2 and 4); (3) the self-expression-oriented value complex (values 1 and 3). These value complexes were shown to be strongly related to the choice of particular careers. For example, social work, medicine, and teaching were especially likely to be high on "people orientation," while engineering and natural science were quite low. Business careers and law were disproportionately likely to be high on "extrinsic-reward orientation," while teaching and social work were low. Architecture, journalism-drama, art, and natural science were high on "self-expression," whereas business careers were at the bottom.

Panel data on 712 Cornell graduates suggested that, for the people-oriented value complex and a group of people-oriented occupations, students changed their occupational choices to coincide with their values to a somewhat greater degree than they changed values to coincide with occupational choices. Since Rosenberg used only the people-oriented value complex for this purpose and did not control for sex, which is related to both values and occupational choices, his findings must be considered suggestive rather than conclusive.

Our approach in this is somewhat different from Rosenberg's. The basic finding that there are strong correlations between career choices and values implies: (1) there are variations across careers in the proportions indorsing various values; (2) when combinations or configurations of values are specified, there are variations across value configurations in the proportions entering various careers. Since there is not a one-to-one relationship between a particular career and a particular pattern of values, two different analytic strategies are possible, corresponding to the above two propositions.

Rosenberg's strategy was to define an aggregation of different careers as "consistent" with a particular value. Thus he speaks, for example, of "people-oriented occupations." Our strategy is to define an aggregation of value patterns as "consistent" with a particular career. This enables us to speak of "business values" or "education values." Thus, our approach permits examination of variations across careers in the nature of the relationship between occupations and values, whereas Rosenberg's approach permits examination of variations across values in this relationship.

Joe L. Spaeth[5] investigated the relationship of occupational values to the choice of academic careers among arts and sciences graduate students. Using a two-stage probability sample of 2,842 graduate students from twenty-five universities and a list of values slightly modified from Rosenberg, he found that the choice of academic careers was related to "altruistic" values and to "self-expressive" values. The relationship became even stronger when altruism and self-expression were used in combination. The National Opinion Research Center, in its present series of studies on 1961 college graduates, again made use of a list of values slightly modified from Rosenberg with a more representative and much larger sample of students.

James A. Davis,[6] in the primary analysis of these data, again found strong correlations between values and occupational choices. In addition, using the three largely independent values of "work with peo-

[5] "Value Orientations and Academic Career Plans" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1961).

[6] *Undergraduate Career Decisions* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965).

ple," "original and creative," and "money," Davis was able to cross-tabulate all three values simultaneously against particular occupations and thus to establish value patterns or configurations appropriate to each of ten occupational groupings.

In sum we may say of these studies that it has been empirically established that there is a strong correlation between occupational values and career choice among college students. However, it is not known whether values determine career choice, or career choice determines values, or both. We shall employ longitudinal data on college Seniors in an effort to clarify these matters.

THE PRESENT STUDY

In June, 1961, NORC collected self-administered questionnaires from 33,782 college Seniors in 135 colleges and universities who constituted 83 per cent of the names in a national probability sample of recipients of Bachelor's degrees in June, 1961. The entire sample received a second-wave questionnaire in the spring of 1962; 85 per cent of the first-wave respondents also responded to the second wave. Taken together, 70 per cent (28,713 cases) of the original sample participated in both waves.

Although this is a fairly respectable response for a panel study, it may be asked whether there is likely to be a non-response bias large enough to affect our findings. Davis, in an unpublished memorandum, has analyzed the first-wave correlates of non-response to subsequent waves in this study. He finds that, of 522 separate items (IBM punches), 0.3 per cent deviated from the total sample response rate to the second wave by 10 per cent or more, 6.5 per cent deviated by 5 per cent or more, and 55.0 per cent were within 2 per cent of the total sample response rate. Of seven items which showed a consistent deviation of 5 per cent or more on two followup waves, none is relevant to the findings reported in this paper. These results suggest that it is extremely unlikely that response bias could affect our findings.

From this large sample we have selected, for the purposes of the present investigation, a random subsample of males who responded to both the first- and second-wave questionnaires with $N = 1,712$. The tables have variable grand totals somewhat less than 1,712 due to the exclusion of "no answers."

MEASURES

1. *Career choice.*—In both waves respondents were asked to select "your anticipated long-run career field and ignore any school, stop-gap job, or temporary military service which might precede it." Selections were made from a detailed list of approximately one hundred careers. In this analysis related careers in the detailed list have been combined reducing the number of categories to ten: education, medicine, law, business, engineering, physical sciences, biological sciences, humanities,[7] social sciences, and other. Career-change data on biological and social sciences are not presented since the numbers of cases in these fields were considered too small to provide reliable measures. Career-change data on "other" are not presented since this is a heterogeneous residual category. These three categories are included in the tables, however, since they are a part of the group that is not in a particular career at a particular time.

2. *Occupational values.*—Values are measured in both waves by the following item:

> Which of these characteristics would be very important to you in picking a job or career? (Circle as many as apply.)
> (1) Making a lot of money.
> (2) Opportunities to be original and creative.
> (3) Opportunities to be helpful to others or useful to society.

[7] Education and humanities are limited to those who indicated on a separate question that teaching would be one of their career activities. Cases excluded under this criterion are classified as "other."

(4) Avoiding a high pressure job which takes too much out of you.
(5) Living and working in the world of ideas.
(6) Freedom from supervision in my work.
(7) Opportunities for moderate but steady progress rather than the chance of extreme success or failure.
(8) A chance to exercise leadership.
(9) Opportunities to work with people rather than things.
(10) None of the above.

From this list six were selected which were found to be related to the choice of particular careers: "money," "original," "helpful," "ideas," "leadership," and "people." In addition to the six values, two adjectives which were found to be related to the choice of particular careers were chosen from a "self-descriptive adjective check list" which was repeated on both waves. The adjectives were "intellectual" and "ambitious."

From the six values and two adjectives three indexes of value orientation have been constructed. The criteria used in the construction of the indexes were as follows:

1. The separate items entering the index must be correlated with one another.

2. Each item entering the index must be correlated with the same careers as are the other items entering the index.

3. These correlations must obtain both separately and in combination (i.e., there must be partial correlations between each item and the careers when the other items are used as controls).

The three indexes are: (1) "intellectualism," consisting of the values "ideas" and "original" and the adjective "intellectual"; (2) "enterprise," consisting of the values "money" and "leadership" and the adjective "ambitious"; (3) "people orientation," consisting of the values "people" and "helpful." When the three indexes are dichotomized the association between enterprise and intellectualism is $Q = +0.15$; between enterprise and people orientation, $Q = +0.15$; and between intellectualism and people orientation, $Q = +0.10$. On the basis of these small associations we may say that the three value dimensions are relatively independent of one another.

In the subsequent analysis the three indexes are dichotomized into "high" and "low" groups. A person scores high on people orientation if he checked both of the values "helpful" and "people." He scores high on enterprise if he checked any two of "money," "leadership," and "ambitious." He scores high on intellectualism if he checked any two of "original," "ideas," and "intellectual."

There are eight logically possible combinations of positions on the three indexes. Each of these combinations is considered to be a value configuration or value pattern.

CONSISTENCY

Table 1 cross-tabulates careers and value patterns as of June, 1961. Those patterns which are considered to be consistent with a given career are indicated by an asterisk. Table 1 shows that there is considerable variation among the several value patterns in the distribution of career choices. We find, for example, that 46 per cent of those who score high only on the enterprise index are planning business careers, while only 6 per cent of those who score high on intellectualism only are prospective businessmen. That such variation occurs enables us to specify the value patterns which are more or less consistent with each career.

Humanities.—The values, people orientation, and intellectualism in combination are the best predictor of choice of humanities. Other consistent patterns are intellectualism alone and all three value indexes in combination (i.e., high on all three indexes).

Education.—People orientation alone is the best predictor of education. Also consistent is people orientation in combination with intellectualism.

Law.—All three values in combination and two values, people orientation and enterprise, in combination, provide equally

satisfactory predictions of law. It thus appears that intellectualism is irrelevant to choice of law.

Business.—The only pattern consistent with business is enterprise alone.

Physical sciences.—Intellectualism alone is the best predictor of physical sciences. Also consistent, and only slightly less effective, is intellectualism in combination with enterprise.

Engineering.—Intellectualism in combination with enterprise is most consistent with engineering. Also consistent are intellectualism alone and enterprise alone.

Medicine.—All four people-oriented value patterns provide equally effective predictions of medicine. It appears that intellectualism and enterprise, at least in the absence of controls for other factors, are not relevant to the choice of medicine as a career.

Biological sciences.—High scores on none of the indexes and a high score on intellectualism alone appear equally effective as predictors of biological sciences. Thus intellectualism appears to be irrelevant to choice of biological sciences.

Social sciences.—Social sciences resemble the humanities in terms of values. Most consistent is people orientation in combination with intellectualism. Also consistent are all three values combined and intellectualism alone.

Other.—This is a very heterogeneous residual category. For this reason "consistent values" is not a meaningful notion for this category.

We have addressed ourselves to the question of which values are consistent with a given career. If the reader wished to know which career was most consistent with a given value pattern, he could first determine, using the total N's for the value patterns, the raw numbers for the cells of Table 1 and then calculate the percentages vertically rather than horizontally. This procedure would tell us (for example) that those choosing humanities are more likely to score high in intellectualism than those choosing education, and prospective businessmen score higher in enterprise than do future engineers.

When we combine the various "consistent" value patterns for each career, how

TABLE 1

VALUE CONFIGURATIONS BY CAREERS, JUNE, 1961

	Values								
People orientation	High	High	High	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	All Patterns
Enterprise	High	High	Low	Low	High	High	Low	Low	
Intellectualism	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	
Humanities	8*	1	13*	2	3	1	9*	3	4
Education	16	18	27*	33*	5	8	8	17	15
Law	12*	13*	5	6	4	8	5	4	7
Business	26	30	8	18	22	46*	6	27	26
Physical science	1	2	4	3	14*	5	18*	7	7
Engineering	8	4	4	2	29*	19*	20*	15	14
Medicine	8*	8*	7*	9*	3	1	2	5	5
Biological science	2	1	1	0	2	1	5*	5*	2
Social science	8*	3	11*	4	2	0	7*	2	4
Other	11	21	20	22	14	12	19	15	16
Σ Per cent	100	101	100	99	98	101	99	100	100
N	119	142	84	184	161	286	203	415	1,594

* Indicates that the career and value pattern in this cell are considered "consistent." The criterion is that the association between the particular career and the particular value pattern must be $Q \geq +0.20$.

good a prediction do we get of choice for that career? We find that the average coefficient of association (Q) between a particular career and its consistent values is $+0.57$. The range is from $+0.43$ for law to $+0.79$ for humanities.

THE SIXTEEN-FOLD TABLE

Since we collected identical measures on career plans and on values from the same individuals at two points in time, we are able to assess changes in careers and values over the one-year period following college graduation. The methodological tool which we shall use for assessing such changes is the "sixteen-fold table."[8] Such a table cross-tabulates four dichotomous items, career at time 1, career at time 2, values at time 1, and values at time 2. In the analysis we prepared a sixteen-fold table for each of seven careers. Lack of space prevents us from reproducing all these tables; instead, summary indexes from them will be presented. For purposes of discussion the sixteen-fold table for engineering (Table 2) is included.

TABLE 2

SIXTEEN-FOLD TABLE FOR ENGINEERING

		Values				
Values T_1		+	+	−	−	
Values T_2		+	−	+	−	Total
Career T_1	Career T_2					
+	+	81	33	32	37	183
+	−	19	4	5	6	34
−	+	8	8	9	14	39
−	−	235	216	158	609	1,218
Total		343	261	204	666	1,474

The rows of the table refer to the career of engineering. The first row contains the number who chose this career at both times, i.e., remained loyal. The second row contains the number who defected. The third row gives the number of recruits. Finally, the fourth row gives the number who chose engineering on neither occasion. The columns refer to the value patterns which are consistent with engineering. The first column gives the number who retained consistent values at both times, the second column the number who abandoned these values, the third column the number adopted the values, and the fourth column the number who indicated values consistent with engineering at neither time.

We have computed four summary measures of association from each sixteen-fold table as follows:

1. The association between values at time 1 and career at time 2 among those who were in the career at time 1 ($Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot C_1}$). This coefficient indicates the effect of values on career loyalty.

2. The association between values at time 1 and career at time 2 among those who were not in the career at time 1 ($Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot C^-_1}$). This measures the effect of values on recruitment to the career.

3. The association between the career at time 1 and values at time 2 among those with consistent values at time 1 ($Q_{C_1V_2 \cdot V_1}$). This measures the effect of the career on value retention.

4. The association between the time 1 career and the time 2 values among those without consistent values at time 1 ($Q_{C_1V_2 \cdot V^-_1}$). This measures the effect of the career on the adopting of consistent values.

Table 3 shows how these summary coefficients are derived from the sixteen-fold table for engineering. It will be noted that both the Q's measuring the effects of values on careers ($Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot C_1} = -0.11$ and $Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot C^-_1} = +0.08$) are smaller than either of the Q's representing the influence of

[8] This term was first used by Lazarsfeld in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Friendship as a Social Process: A Substantive and Methodological Analysis," in Monroe Berger, Theodore Abel, and Charles H. Page (eds.), *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1954), pp. 21–54.

careers on values ($Q_{C_1V_2 \cdot V_1} = +0.43$ and $Q_{C_1V_2 \cdot V^-_1} = +0.52$). Thus we may say that, for the career of engineering, career is stronger than values in the year following college graduation. In fact the negative $Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot C_1}$ means that those with inconsistent values were more likely to remain loyal to engineering than were those with consistent values.

The reader will recognize that this approach compares the size of partial associations. In terms of prediction this method asks whether we can predict time 2 career any better by using time 1 values in addition to time 1 career than we could by using time 1 career alone. Conversely we ask whether time 2 values can be predicted any better by using time 1 career in addition to time 1 values than they could by using time 1 values alone.

This is by no means the only way that sixteen-fold tables have been (or could be) analyzed. Rosenberg[9] uses a method which excludes from the analysis those who changed both values and career between the two times and those who changed neither values nor career between the two times. Donald T. Campbell[10] has advocated the comparison of cross-lagged zero-order correlations ($r_{C_1V_2}$ versus $r_{V_1C_2}$) as opposed to the partials which we use here. Donald C. Pelz and Frank M. Andrews[11] in a recent article also advocate the use of cross-lagged zero-order correlations and consider the question whether zero-order or partial correlations are more appropriate without reaching any conclusion.

In any case the discussion is academic for our purposes, since we computed zero-order coefficients (Q) and coefficients based

TABLE 3

SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS FOR ENGINEERING

C_1	C_2	C^-_2
V_1	(81+33=) 114	(19+4=) 23
V^-_1	(32+37=) 69	(5+6=) 11

$Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot C_1} = -0\ 11$

C^-_1	C_2	C^-_2
V_1	(8+8=) 16	(235+216=) 451
V^-_1	(9+14=) 23	(158+609=) 767

$Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot C^-_1} = +0.08$

V_1	V_2	V^-_2
C_1	(81+19=) 100	(33+4=) 37
C^-_1	(235+8=) 243	(216+8=) 224

$Q_{C_1V_2 \cdot V_1} = +0.43$

V^-_1	V_2	V^-_2
C_1	(32+5=) 37	(37+6=) 43
C^-_2	(9+158=) 167	(14+609=) 623

$Q_{C_1V_2 \cdot V^-_1} = +0.52$

[9] *Op. cit.*

[10] "From Description to Experimentation: Interpreting Trends as Quasi-Experiments," in Chester W. Harris (ed.), ***Problems in Measuring Change*** (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), pp. 212–42.

[11] "Detecting Causal Priorities in Panel Study Data," ***American Sociological Review***, XXIX (December, 1964), 836–48.

on Rosenberg's approach for each of the sixteen-fold tables. Neither of these alternative methods leads to any different results than those obtained using the partials.

A word of caution is in order about the power of these methods. Longitudinal data cannot prove that one variable is the cause of another. It can show which of two variables is causing the other, provided we know, or are willing to assume, that there is any causal relationship between them at all. In other words, longitudinal data do not eliminate the problem of spurious correlation. Furthermore, the results apply only to the time period in question. They do not necessarily apply to times prior to time 1 or subsequent to time 2.

THE FINDINGS

Table 4 gives the summary Q's for each of seven career fields. The derivation of columns (1)–(4) of Table 4 has been explained above. Column (5) is the average of "value effects," and column (6) is the average of "career effects." Column (7) is obtained by subtracting column (6) from column (5) and shows the balance of value effects over career effects. Where the entry in column (7) is positive, values have more influence; where it is negative, career has more influence.

The over-all results suggest that, if anything, the effects of career are very slightly greater than the effects of values. For the three careers—humanities, education, and law—values appear to have more effect, whereas for the four careers—business, physical sciences, engineering, and medicine—career appears to have more effect than values. The over-all average for column (7) is —0.21, indicating a slight average balance in favor of careers. This figure is more negative than it would be if the coefficients for medicine were less extreme. Moreover, the coefficient of —1.00 for recruitment to medicine cannot be considered reliable because there were so few recruits to medicine regardless of values. Our most reasonable conclusion in view of these considerations is that, on the average, the effects of values and careers are about equally potent.

More interesting than this, however, is the striking pattern of variations across career fields in Table 4. Examination of columns (1)–(4) indicates that columns (1) and (2) vary together and that columns (3) and (4) vary together and run in the

TABLE 4

RELATIVE INFLUENCES OF CAREERS ("CAL") AND VALUES ("VAL") IN THE YEAR FOLLOWING COLLEGE GRADUATION

	Val→Car "Loyalty" $(Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot C_1})$ (1)	Val→Car "Recruitment" $(Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot C^-_1})$ (2)	Car→Val "Retention" $(Q_{C_1V_2 \cdot V_1})$ (3)	Car→Val "Adopting" $(Q_{C_1V_2 \cdot V^-_1})$ (4)	Val→Car* Average ½(1)+(2) $(Q_{V_1C_2 \cdot avg})$ (5)	Car→Val* Average ½(3)+(4) $(Q_{C_1V_2 \cdot avg})$ (6)	Val−Car (5)−(6) (7)
Humanities	+0.57	+0.70	+0.35	+0.09	+0.64	+0.22	+0.42
Education	+ .46	+0.44	+ .10	+ .27	+ .45	+ .18	+0 27
Law	+ .38	+0.48†	+ .08	+ .35	+ 43	+ .22	+0.21
Business	− .07	+0 24	+ .19	+ .37	+ .08	+ .28	−0.20
Physical sciences	+ .19	+0 31	+ .25	+ .70	+ .25	+ .48	−0.23
Engineering	− .11	+0 08	+ .43	+ .52	− .01	+ .48	−0 49
Medicine	−0 63	−1 00†	+0 64	+0.66	−0.82	+0.65	−1 47
Average	+0.11	+0.18	+0 29	+0.42	+0.15	+0.36	−0.21

* Simple averages are used here rather than weighted averages or "net partials" because it was felt that a weighted average artificially exaggerates the importance of "recruitment" and "adopting" at the expense of "loyalty" and "retention."

† There was very little recruitment to law or medicine in this period. Thus the reliability of those coefficients is questionable.

opposite direction to columns (1) and (2). Thus it appears that (1) where values affect loyalty they also affect recruitment; (2) where career affects value retention, it also affects the adopting of values; (3) the greater the influence of values, the less the influence of career, or conversely, the greater the influence of career, the less the influence of values.

It will be recalled that column (5) is the average of the value effects and column (6) is the average of the career effects. The rank-order correlation between these columns is —0.84, a very substantial negative relation. In sum it appears that there is substantial variation across careers in the nature of the relationship between occupations and values.

It should be pointed out that the rank ordering of careers according to the strength of values as opposed to career is a reflection of differential degrees of loyalty to the various careers. The rank-order correlation between the percentage loyal to each career over the one-year period and column (7) of Table 4 is —0.96, with medicine having the highest percentage loyal (88 per cent) and humanities the lowest (49 per cent). The average for the seven careers is 72 per cent loyal. The effect of dividing those with consistent values from those with inconsistent values in each career is to reduce drastically the variations in percentage loyal among those with consistent values while increasing the variation among those without consistent values. It appears that consistent values raise the probability of loyalty for those careers which are relatively low in loyalty but not for those careers like medicine and engineering which are high in loyalty.

DISCUSSION

Having begun with the problem of whether values determine career choice or career choice determines values, we have been led to the conclusion that it depends in large part on what career is being considered. For humanities, education, and law, values appear stronger, while for medicine, engineering, physical sciences, and business the career choice predominates. While an interpretation of this finding is in order, it must be noted that only seven career-choice categories have been employed in the present analysis and this is too few to establish a reliable quantitative explanation of their ordering in terms of the relative strength of value as opposed to career effects. This being the case, any interpretation must be considered speculative.

It is our impression that the careers for which values have relatively less effect require rather more undergraduate specialization than do the careers where values have greater effect. Thus it may be the case that, for those careers which require a greater investment of time and energy in preparation, values have less effect over time. Why should this be the case? Rosenberg[12] noted a related phenomenon in his 1952 study of Cornell graduates. He found that careers that were more stable over time required on the whole more specialized undergraduate preparation. He argued that, when a person makes a substantial "investment" of time and energy in preparing for a career such as medicine or engineering, he is motivated not to change his plans because the change would be too costly. That is, the investment of time and energy would be, in a sense, wasted.

This argument is easily extended to our present findings. The individual who has prepared himself for medical school through an undergraduate premedical course of study is unlikely to "waste" this preparation because of little desire to help people. The prospective teacher, on the other hand, who has little investment in specialized preparation, is inclined to abandon teaching for a field more congenial to his preferences when he recognizes that he has little desire to help people.

In addition to reducing motivation to leave, specialized preparation also creates a barrier to entry into a field. A person's values may be perfectly consistent with a

[12] Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–66.

medical career, but if he lacks the requisite preparation, he can not enter medical school regardless of personal preferences. Such a person would find it considerably easier, however, to enter the field of education if his values inclined him in that direction.

These considerations do not mean that medical students are less likely to have consistent values than are teachers. Our data, in fact, show that medical students attain psychological consistency by changing their values.

Viewed in this light, specialized preparation represents the intrusion of a reality factor which inhibits the tendency to alter career intentions which are inconsistent with value dispositions. As the individual's career plans become increasingly constrained by reality the influence of values on those plans declines and the influence of the career choice on the values becomes correspondingly greater. If this is correct it would be reasonable to hypothesize that for stages of the career-choice process earlier than college graduation the effects of values on career plans would be greater than they appear in the present study. In high school values might be a strong determinant of career plans, becoming progressively weaker through college as the individual approaches actual labor market participation. Some years after college, values might have even less influence than they appear to have in this study, being by that time strongly determined by the individual's actual involvement in occupational activity.

In conclusion we wish to emphasize again the speculative character of this discussion. In further analysis with more cases and a more detailed career classification, we hope to move further toward explaining the ordering of careers according to the strength of value effects as opposed to career effects. Research is also needed on populations other than college graduates. We feel that the contribution of this paper lies in showing that there are variations across careers in the nature of the relationship between career choices and values.

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Role Distance, Sociological Ambivalence, and Transitional Status Systems[1]

Rose Laub Coser

ABSTRACT

Goffman's concept of "role distance" gains theoretical relevance if integrated into the theory of reference-group behavior. Taking "role distance" is seen as normative and as occurring in situations where the status occupant faces contradictory expectations.

Through a clarification of the concept of "role" and a distinction between role differentiation and division of labor, it is possible to identify two types of behavior which Goffman subsumes under one concept of "role distance": (1) pretense of detachment from some status prerogatives in order better to perform a role, as when humor is used to deny the conflict of contradictory expectations; (2) taking distance from one role in order to prepare for taking another role. The latter has an element of nonconformity to the expectations of some role partners in an attempt to live up to the expectations of others. It tends to occur primarily in transitional status systems, i.e., in the movement of a status occupant to another status, as when he moves up on the social ladder or grows up in age.

Consequently, "role distance" is identified as a mechanism at work during socialization, used for role articulation in the face of a progressively increasing number of expectations emanating from a progressively extending role-set.

With the concept of "role distance," Erving Goffman[2] has identified an important aspect of role behavior, namely, that individuals do not always live up to all the behavioral prescriptions regarding their status position. According to Goffman, the concept is meant to refer to the gap between role obligation and role performance and to the ability of the actor to blend the concrete demands of immediate situations with elements derived from a wider repertoire of internalized attitudes.

Goffman has provided a novel formulation for a problem that recently has captured the sociological imagination, that is, that of the actor's social creativity in the predefined situations he finds himself in.[3] Yet, perhaps Goffman's more enduring contribution is the one I want to address myself to in this paper: he programmatically, and more implicitly than explicitly, urges us to explore the structural conditions, the normative boundaries, and the social functions of the behavioral pattern he identifies.[4]

Sociologists would do less than justice to Goffman's incisive conceptualizations were they to ignore the challenge of analytical specifications which he leaves to others. We owe it to him as well as to the field

[1] Enlarged version of a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association in Chicago, August 31, 1965. It has profited much from critical readings of some earlier versions by Peter M. Blau, Fred Davis, and Robert K. Merton.

[2] Erving Goffman, *Encounters* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1961), pp. 85–152.

[3] See, e.g., Dennis Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (April, 1961), 183–93; Alvin Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (April, 1960), 161–78; William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (August, 1960), 483–96; Daniel Levinson, "Role, Personality, and Social Structure in the Organizational Setting," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LVIII (1959), 170–80; Lewis A. Coser, "Some Functions of Deviant Behavior and Normative Flexibility," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVIII (September, 1962), 172–81.

[4] In summarizing Goffman's contribution I have been immensely helped by a formulation by Fred Davis of the University of California Medical School (San Francisco), which he communicated to me in a personal letter.

of sociology, if it is to be a cumulative discipline, not merely to keep the brilliant essay among others on our bookshelves or to do obeisance to it in occasional footnotes; we must integrate the concept into a systematic body of theory so that the identified phenomenon be made understandable and predictable.

If the concept of "role distance" is integrated into the theory of *reference-group behavior*,[5] it turns out that it is mainly a property of the social structure of transitional status systems. I shall show that what Goffman calls "role distance" is normative, notwithstanding his statement to the contrary that "it is not part of the normative framework of role."[6] A specification of the structural determinants of such identifiable behavior will also lead to a respecification of different types of phenomena which Gogman mistakenly subsumed under one concept.

NORMATIVE ASPECTS OF ROLE DISTANCE

For Goffman, "role distance" refers to a measure of withdrawal from role expectations, that is, "to actions which effectively convey some disdainful detachment of the performer from a role he is performing."[7] The surgeon who jokes during the operation, the nurse who withdraws into the role of female for a moment, the older boy on the merry-go-round who refuses to sit nicely on his horse as expected, are some of Goffman's illustrations of "role distance" from expected role behavior. The persons who are described are said to be making use of the "leeway" they find in the structure to show that they are not subsumed under it. "Role distance" allegedly allows individualized behavior not actually included within the realm of normative expectations. While this type or behavior, in Goffman's scheme, is not conformist, it is not deviant either. However, I want to challenge the implication that "role distance" lies somewhere in "no-man's land" as far as social control is concerned and shall argue that it is normative.

To find out whether a type of behavior is normative, we examine the reactions of others when the behavior fails to occur or when it is exaggerated. When we apply this *social-sanction test* it immediately becomes clear that a person who does not show what Goffman calls "role distance" is accused of being a "stuffed shirt" or of "taking himself too seriously," and in more extreme cases of being a "fanatic." In contrast, a person who can assume "role distance" is congratulated for "having a good sense of humor" and for "showing detachment." Just as with any behavior that is subject to social control, sanctions exist against overconformity to the norm of "role distance" as well, as when a person is accused of being "blasé" or "cynical."

One of Goffman's main examples of "role distance" is that of eight-year-old boys on the merry-go-round who show by clowning their lack of interest in the activity. It would seem that at that age a boy is not expected to have unequivocal pleasure on the merry-go-round. If he did, his friends would ridicule him. Yet, he cannot afford to stand by and refuse to participate, for he would lay claim to a degree of maturity he does not have and would be accused of trying to be a "big shot."[8] Goffman senses the normative aspect of this type of clowning when he describes the behavior of the twelve-year-old "for whom maleness in boys has become a real *responsibility*."[9]

Goffman's main example of what he calls "role distance" is the use of humor in the medical, more specifically the surgical, set-

[5] Goffman is aware of the relevance of this theory for his conceptualization when once, in the beginning of the essay, he refers to Merton's theory of role-set (*op. cit.*, p. 86).

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

[8] Such negative sanctions against the non-participating, "more serious" boys must have been observed, just as the clowning, by many who have taken children to amusement parks or seen them in other settings.

[9] Goffman, *op. cit.*, p. 108; italics mine.

ting.[10] However, his own description shows that humor here serves to assure role conformity for all members of the team. He correctly notes that in this social setting "role distance is routinely expressed," and he devotes a whole chapter to "The Functions of Role Distance for Surgery."[11] He speaks of the significance of this behavior for the "effective conduct of the operation"[12] and shows that jocular talk helps the chief surgeon to live up to the "obligation" of maintaining the poise of the members of the team as well as his own.[13] It would seem, then, that the surgeon, faced with somewhat contradictory expectations, meets all of them and hence performs his role superbly. One wonders what it is that he takes *distance* from.

Indeed, a person who has a "good sense of humor" is congratulated for handling a difficult situation; he is able to perform his role well by adhering to its demands with flexibility. What is being positively sanctioned in these terms is the fact that through humor a status-holder is able to face and to resolve social ambiguities. The person who does not have this skill is negatively sanctioned by being called a "fanatic," and we know that a fanatic is a person who cannot *tolerate ambiguities*.[14]

The structural sources of ambiguity are to be found in situations in which a status-holder faces contradictory normative expectations. All the illustrations that Goffman gives, no matter how different in content—whether it is the "trivial" merry-go-round or the "dramatic" operating room, whether they refer to boys or girls, children or adults, subordinates or authority holders (and Goffman very astutely gave us such a random sample)—have one important structural element in common: *sociological ambivalence*[15] is built into the structure of statuses and roles. Thus, all of Goffman's various explanations—he speaks of "affiliative crosspressures,"[16] "claims of a multi-situated kind,"[17] "identification with one type of structure at the expense of another,"[18] "heterogeneous commitments and attachments"[19]—can be subsumed under the one concept of *sociological ambivalence.*

SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE

According to Robert K. Merton and Elinor Barber, sociological ambivalence "refers to incompatible normative expectations of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior assigned to a status or to a set of statuses in a society . . . or incorporated into a single social status."[20] It makes itself felt in those situations in which a status-holder faces contradictory expectations and where the social mechanisms that Merton identified in an earlier paper as securing "some degree of articulation among the roles in in the role-set"[21] do not suffice. In his earlier paper Merton had anticipated that "these mechanisms may not prove sufficient to reduce the [burden of conflicting expectations]."[22] It must be added that, not only may they not suffice, but they may not always operate, either because they are not firmly institutionalized or because the structure inhibits their smooth operation. For example, if graduate students who have a bull session are suddenly *intruded upon* by a faculty member

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 120 ff.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[14] Cf. the brilliant paper by Else Frenkl-Brunswick, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and Perceptual Personality Variable," *Journal of Personality,* XVIII (1949–50), 109–43.

[15] Robert K. Merton and Elinor Barber, "Sociological Ambivalence," in A. Tiryakin (ed.), *Sociological Theory, Values and Sociocultural Change* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 91–120. See also Robert K. Merton, "Resistance to the Systematic Study of Multiple Discoveries in Science," *Archives européennes de sociologie,* IV, No. 2 (1963), 237–82.

[16] Goffman, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 150.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 95.

[21] In Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 371 ff.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 380.

because student and faculty facilities are not sufficiently segregated, there will be embarrassment, sudden silence, and, typically, some joking in response to what is experienced as a *disturbance*. The mechanism of "insulation from observability" by role-partners differently located in the social structure fails to operate because of inadequate segregation of social space, and humor is one way of handling the ambivalence in this situation.

In Goffman's example of the lower-middle-class girls on horseback, each girl was observable by her friends. Each showed the others by clowning and emphasizing her lack of skill that she was not attached to the upper-middle-class activity of horseback riding. I believe that this behavior was called forth by the contradiction between the middle-class values concerning the activity and those of their own group, which would be likely to define horseback riding as "uppity." In full observability by peers, each girl must create the impression that she does not claim a right to a status that the others will not grant her. Goffman's observation that "participation with a group of one's similars can lend strength to the show of role distance"[23] must be understood to mean that it is because the peers are present, because each girl finds herself fully observable by them, that she feels she must show that she is not attached to the role. Were she to show skill and familiarity with the horses, or otherwise too much attachment to the activity, she would be accused of wanting to "pass." Goffman is right when he suspects that "if one of these girls were alone with a thorough-going horsewoman she would be less prone to flourish this kind of distance."[24] She would then not be observed by members of her own group. It is not that "this scene is just what they need in order to create a clear impression of what they choose not to lay claim to."[25] It is because there is a scene, that is, because the girls are observable by significant role-partners, that they have no choice but to deny the claim to a right not granted by their witnessing peers.

It is interesting to speculate what would have happened if some "thorough-going horsewomen" were present *at the same time* as the group of peers. This situation would be in one respect similar to that observed by many teachers, when an embarrassed student carries out the assignment of giving a lecture to the class: he faces the contradictory expectations of being a student in relation to the teacher and an instructor in relation to classmates by whom, moreover, he is ordinarily defined as a peer. The nature of the assignment requires a structure that precludes insulation from simultaneous observability by his different role-partners and hence calls forth embarrassment.

This example points to yet a third reason for the non-operation of the conflict-reducing mechanisms discussed by Merton. It will be remembered that these are predicated for their operation on the interplay between the status-holder's role-partners: their differential power over him, their differential access to his observability, and their differential involvement with his behavior.[26] How are these mechanisms to operate if contradictory expectations emanate from a single role-partner? In its original meaning, "psychological ambivalence" refers to contradictory feelings within the same person. Similarly, "sociological ambivalence," which is associated with the status position rather than with the inner feeling state, may also be a result of a contradiction emanating from *one* role-partner. In the above example, the teacher expects the student to handle the class *as if* he were a teacher while yet all the while remaining a student. The latter is faced, therefore, with contradictory expectations emanating from the same role-partner.[27]

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 112. [24] *Ibid.* [25] *Ibid.*

[26] Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, pp. 371 ff.

[27] This would seem to be a frequent situation in the modern American middle-class family, in which

The lack of availability of mechanisms for reducing sufficiently the burden of conflicting expectations emanating from the same role-partner is testified to, in this example, by the fact that students in this situation typically fail to perform to capacity.

The clowning boys in Goffman's example would seem to find themselves in a similar situation when they are not expected to enjoy the "kid stuff" by the same partners who will yet not grant them a claim to higher status. Similarly, in the operating room the surgeon is expected by the same role-partners and in their full visibility to exercise control "over a subordinate at the same time as he has to help him maintain his poise."[28]

In summary, sociological ambivalence is especially salient when it emanates from the same role-partner and is most difficult to cope with in his full visibility.

Max Gluckman has suggested that in primitive society the multiple role requirements a person faces in the absence of segmentation of time and place would be overwhelming were they not given social definition through rituals and ceremonies. "I am going to suggest that we may seek to explain this high ritualization of tribal society from the fact that each social relation in a subsistence economy tends to serve manifold purposes."[29] Gluckman goes on to describe a setting that lacks insulation from observability for the group members:

> A man plays most of his roles, as several kinds of productive workers, as consumer, as teacher and pupil, as worshipper, in close association with the people whom he calls father and son and brother, wife and sister; and he shares citizenship with them, that mediated citizenship which is so marked a feature of tribal constitutional law. Moreover, all these roles are played on the same comparatively small stage, of the village and its environs, where shrines are placed about the huts or in the cattle corral, where the baby is born and the dead are buried, where the year's provender is stored. . . . It is from this situation that I see emerging the relatively great development of special customs and stylized etiquette to mark the different roles which a man or woman is playing at any one moment.[30]

If Gluckman is correct, we would find in our own society a greater insistence on rituals and etiquette in settings in which separation of role-partners with their manifold expectations of one another cannot be carried out sufficiently for the articulation of their multiple roles through a proper distribution of space and time. Perhaps this explains the high insistence on ritual dress, taboos, and etiquette in hospitals generally and in the operating room in particular.[31] Yet, in the operating room, in spite of much ritualization, there cannot be, as in a simple society, clear-cut "rituals of avoidance" or "that exaggerated emphasis on differences between the sexes, to denote clearly their distinction,"[32] because of the combined emphasis on achievement, co-operation, and esprit de corps.[33] The ambivalence, therefore, is not entirely resolved through hospital etiquette.

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the structural position of the mother is a source for developing contradictory expectations of her children. See my paper, "Authority and Structural Ambivalence in the Middle-Class Family," in Rose Laub Coser (ed.), *The Family, Its Structure and Functions* (New York: St Martins Press, 1964), pp. 370–83.

28 Goffman, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

29 Max Gluckman, "Les rites de passage," in Daryll Forde, Meyer Fortes, Max Gluckman, Victor W. Turner, *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962), p. 26.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 27. From this perspective the present building boom both in suburban residence and in urban office space, while stemming from manifold economic and social sources and serving a variety of purposes, can be seen also as serving to maximize spatial segregation and spatial extension in a society that grows in complexity.

31 Cf. Julius A. Roth, "Ritual and Magic in the Control of Contagion," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (June, 1957), 310–14; Robert N. Wilson, "Teamwork in the Operating Room," *Human Organization*, XII (Winter, 1954), 15–20.

32 Gluckman, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

33 Cf. Wilson, *op. cit.*

In contrast to simple societies, in modern complex society the segmentation of roles and the differentiation in time and place where they have to be enacted make the dealing with multiple contradictory demands much easier. This leaves freedom of choice, yet it can be experienced as a burden, especially in those situations where insulating and segregating mechanisms do not operate and where the rites of passage of simpler or traditional societies are much less frequent.[34]

RESOLVING SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE

Once we have identified the sources of sociological ambivalence, we must ask what legitimate means there are available for a status-holder to deal with them. He can withdraw his interest and participation altogether, an act of last resort which Merton discusses in his earlier paper on role-sets.[35] He can avoid acting for the time being, through a momentary withdrawal, a stalling for time. He can bring about some redistribution of his time and space,[36] thus setting into motion one of the abovementioned mechanisms, that is, creating for himself the "insulation from observability" which the structure fails to provide. He can also "act to make the contradiction manifest" by redirecting "the conflict so that it is one between members of the role-set rather than between them and himself."[37] The extent to which he can do these things, that is, the extent to which he himself can set the conflict-reducing mechanisms into motion, depends, of course, on the power, authority, and influence associated with his position in the structure. But note that in all these cases he makes use of space and time. Yet, sociological ambivalence may have to be dealt with on the spur of the moment, under conditions of dire scarcity of time and space. Humor seems to be a useful means in such situations. A person using humor, by simultaneously highlighting and denying the ambivalence, is said to be "quick."[38] By doing so he unifies through consensual laughter role-partners threatened by the dissociation of contradictory expectations.[39] The resolution of sociological ambivalence has adaptational value. The use of humor, as a means to bring this about, makes better role performance possible. In the absence of humor, in the face of conflict, as in the earlier example of the student conducting a class in the presence of his teacher, performance is more likely to remain inhibited.

[34] I am reminded of a situation in which a group had to come to terms with the sudden death of a colleague. When his friends assembled in consternation, only one of them knew how to act: being religious, he turned to the wall and prayed. Others were nervous, anxious, and soon left. "Free choice," in this case, was paralyzing.

[35] Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, p. 379.

[36] Goode calls this "barriers against intrusion." On this point, and generally on what he calls "ego's manipulation of his role structure," see "A Theory of Role Strain," *op. cit.*

[37] Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, p. 377.

[38] On the functions of humor for "social economy," see my paper "Some Social Functions of Laughter," *Human Relations*, XII (May, 1959), 171–82.

[39] On this function of humor, see my paper "Laughter among Colleagues," *Psychiatry*, XXIII (February, 1960), 81–95. Humor in the operating room, as in some measure in all medical settings, helps those present to live up to the ambivalent role prescription of "detached concern" (cf. Robert K. Merton, "Some Preliminaries to a Sociology of Medical Education," in Merton, George G. Reader, and Patricia L. Kendall [eds.], *The Student-Physician: Introductory Studies in the Sociology of Medical Education* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957], p. 74; Merton and Barber, *op. cit.*). In the fine words of Henri Bergson: "Here I would point out . . . the absence of feeling which usually accompanies laughter. . . . Try, for a moment, to . . . give your sympathy its widest expansion: as though at the touch of a fairy wand you will see the flimsiest of objects assume importance, and a gloomy hue spread over everything. Now step aside, look upon life as a disinterested spectator: many a drama will turn into a comedy" (*Laughter* [New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956], p. 63). On the functions of humor in the medical setting, see also Renée C. Fox, *Experiment*

It is not surprising that humor is the most frequent form used in Goffman's illustrations of what he calls "role distance." Humor at once highlights and denies the existing ambivalence. Not only does humor help to maintain the level of performance in the operating room; the frequency of its use in a hierarchical setting, as I have shown elsewhere and Goffman also mentions, is associated with status. Senior members have more right to use this device than do junior members.[40] And with the right comes the obligation: in the absence of some other available mechanism for conflict resolution, such as insulation from observability of the team members from one another, the burden of this resolution for himself and for his staff rests on the chief surgeon. If he assumes it, he lives up to the strict expectations surrounding his status position.

If humor brings about better role performance, one is led to ask whether its use is an instance of "role distance" at all. It is not clear in Goffman's essay what the role expectations are that the joking surgeon takes distance from, but I surmise that he sees them as being focused on the serious act of operating. If we were to accept this behavioral definition of role, and if my interpretation, as well as Goffman's, of the role-adequate performance of the surgeon is correct, we have to face the logical contradiction that some measure of refusal to live up to role requirements makes for better rather than for worse role performance.[41] This contradiction arises, I submit, because the term "role distance" is misapplied in regard to the humorous behavior of the surgeon. This stems from some misconception in Goffman as in a good number of other sociologists, of what "role" refers to.

ROLE STRUCTURE AND DIVISION OF LABOR

Goffman fails to distinguish between functional role requirements and the behavior that is customarily associated with a role.[42] A father may customarily read to his children at night yet failure to do so on a particular night does not make him less of a father. The concept of "role" and the concept of "role distance" lose their analytical usefulness with statements as the following: "The surgeon may momentarily check engagement in the task to answer the loudspeaker's request about his plans for the next day, or to ask the circulating nurse to phone his office to rearrange some appointments, or he may briefly discuss with the nursing supervisor the effect of the current operation on the ward's schedule for the day. In all these ways in which the individual may properly act as a hospital staff man, he may find that he must express some small distance from the specific operation at hand."[43]

Note that Goffman is careful not to use the term "role" in this reference to activities a person performs while in offce. He senses the lack of theoretical relevance in his example, for he goes on to say that "there are other claims we must consider that are *more purely social* in character. In any work establishment, the individual becomes involved in *social relationships*."[44] Why would the involvement in social relationships be "more social in character" than a discussion about a "current operation"? Goffman does not dwell on the distinction he implicitly makes, but his use of the term "social relationship" serves us well here. Indeed, the concept *"role" always refers to a relationship.*

Perilous (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 76–85 and 170–77.

[40] R. L. Coser, "Laughter among Colleagues," *op. cit.*

[41] Goffman notes this when he says: "We see a paradoxical fact: one of the concerns that prevents the individual from fully accepting his situated self in his commitment to the situated activity system itself" (*op. cit.*, p. 121).

[42] In clarifying Goffman's use of the concept, I have much profited from discussions with Rachel Kahn-Hut of Brandeis University.

[43] Goffman, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[44] *Ibid.*; italics mine.

One theoretical advantage of limiting the concept of "role" to refer to relationships is that it makes abstraction and hence comparisons possible. When we analyze the role of patient, for example, we can compare it in some of its aspects to the role of client. Similarly, when we analyze the role of the surgeon in the operating room, we see him in his relation to his team as we see a leader, whether army commander or foreman in industry, who must maintain morale. The sociological ambivalence of the demands upon a leader generally consists in his having to maintain "cheerful submission to authority."[45] To both maintain the subordinates' submission and have them be cheerful are contradictory requirements. Once we are able to locate the sources of structural ambivalence facing the surgeon in his role of leader, it is possible to formulate hypotheses concerning the handling of sociological ambivalence in other leadership roles as well.

Role is the "aspect of what the actor *does in his relations with others seen in the* context of its functional significance for the social system."[46] We speak of the role of mother because it implies a relationship with her child, of wife because it implies a relationship with her husband, of teacher because it implies a relationship with students, of patients because it implies a relationship with physician or nurse. Parsons' distinction between task performance and role performance provides a useful example: "Somatic illness may be defined in terms of incapacity for relevant task performance . . . mental illness as incapacity for role performance."[47] The following excerpt from my field notes will illustrate this: "A polio patient, paralyzed from the shoulders down, the mother of three school-age children, is confined to a respirator tank. The social worker reports about her home visits that this patient is an excellent mother. The children know that they have to come to the tank before and after school; the mother makes sure they are properly fed and dressed. After school, she listens to what the children come to tell her, and if she does not always hear everything they say, it is because they all talk at once." This woman, who is unable to perform the tasks customarily associated with motherhood, can remain a mother in a way a psychotic patient cannot. A mentally disturbed person cannot be "mother," "wife," "husband," "teacher," in the relational sense that these terms imply.

To be sure, the adequacy of role performance is manifested through behavior. The analytical distinction emphasized here is that between division of labor and role structure. Workers may do different types of work without necessarily having different types of relationships with their foreman or one another. It is the relationships rather than specific behaviors that determine the role structure, and the latter furnishes "the primary focus of the articulation and hence interpenetration between personalities and social systems."[48] *Role requirements, therefore, refer to a set of expected behaviors that are geared toward maintaining or strengthening one or more patterned relationships.*

There is, of course, no strict dichotomy between behavior that is relevant for maintaining a relationship and behavior that is not. The extent to which the division of labor coincides with the role structure depends on the social structure and the cultural setting. In primitive society there would seem to be more overlap, for the division of labor is more often "mechanical" in Durkheim's sense. Tasks are more concretely defined in relation to specific roles.[49] Durkheim sees "organic solidarity"

[45] This definition of "morale" is derived from C. Wright Mills in *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 93–94.

[46] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 25.

[47] Talcott Parsons, *Social Structure and Personality* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 262.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

[49] It would seem that the model of primitive societies informs much of the current theory of role

as arising in a network of relationships governed by norms that "do not contract the sphere of action of the individual" but serve to maintain functional interrelationships.[50] We can agree with Talcott Parsons, who reads Durkheim's distinction to mean that in primitive society "there is a minute regulation of the details of action. With the progress of the division of labor this detailed regulation gradually falls away. The sanctions . . . no longer attach to particular acts . . . but only to very general principles and attitudes."[51]

The distinction between "particular acts" or *behavior* and *attitude*[52] is useful here because it helps to specify further the relation between role performance and division of labor. Some roles are maintained through conformity to expectations concerning behavior, others through conformity to expectations concerning attitudes.[53] The woman who admonishes her daughter, "It's not that I mind if you don't do the dishes, it's your attitude I object to" would not make the same statement to her maid. For the latter, the specific behavior is indispensable for role performance.

The relevance of a certain behavior pattern for the maintenance of role relationships may itself be a matter of sociological ambivalence. Driving a car or preparing a meal may be seen by the actors involved in a subsystem as role-irrelevant tasks to be accomplished by whomever is available, yet they may be looked upon as adaptive for the role structure by other role-partners. Or the actors involved in a system may themselves have different definitions of their roles. Thus, in the research reported by Melvin L. Kohn and Eleanor E. Carroll, working-class mothers want their husbands to relate to the children—they want the father to be "more encouraging"—while fathers tend to conceive of concern about children in behavioral terms and assign their behavior to their wives. They "see child rearing as their wives' responsibility."[54]

Whether role performance is defined primarily by behavioral or primarily by attitudinal prescriptions depends to some extent on class position in the society, at least in our own.[55] In comparison with the American middle-class family, in the working-class, family tasks tend to be more specifically prescribed and assigned to one

differentiation against which Slater argues cogently: "The main weight of [the] argument rests on the notion that role differentiation occurs because two discriminable types of behavior cannot be performed at the same time. One cannot, for example, work and play at once, although the universality of work songs suggest that even this statement must be qualified. . . . If a special person is required to lead the laughing and playing, . . , then it follows that still another person will be required to lead the weeping, since clearly a person cannot laugh and mourn at the same time. On the instrumental side, this role fragmentation becomes even more complicated. According to this view, the farm family must at all times send two persons to the well, one to lower the bucket and one to raise it up, since the bucket cannot be raised and lowered at the same time" (Philip E. Slater, "Parental Role Differentiation," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (November, 1961), 296–311.

[50] Émile Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1947), p. 302.

[51] Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: Free Press, 1937), p. 323.

[52] For the relevance of this distinction, see Robert K. Merton, "Discrimination and the American Creed," in R. H. MacIver (ed.), *Discrimination and National Welfare* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), pp. 94–126.

[53] On these different types of conformity, see Robert K. Merton, "Conformity, Deviation and Opportunity Structures," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (April, 1959), 177–88; Rose Laub Coser, "Insulation from Observability and Types of Social Conformity," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (February, 1961), 28–39.

[54] Melvin L. Kohn and Eleanor E. Carroll, "Social Class and the Allocation of Parental Responsibilities," *Sociometry*, XXIII (December, 1960), 372–92; see also Mirra Komarowsky, *Blue Collar Marriage* (New York: Random House, 1964), *passim* and pp. 122 ff.

[55] Melvin L. Kohn, "Social Class and Parental Values," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (January, 1959), 337–51; *idem*, "Social Class and the Exercise of Parental Authority," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (June, 1959), 352–66; Kohn and Carroll, *op. cit.*

of the spouses. If the family structure is defined by the participants as resting on a division of labor based on sex, a taking over by husband and wife of each other's activities would indeed threaten the role structure. In this case, the tasks assigned to each are seen as symbolic of the roles of husband and wife.

The high divorce and separation rates in our society can be related, not so much to the de-differentiation of roles in the modern family, as is often believed, but to the sociological ambivalence concerning behavioral or attitudinal prescriptions for role performance. It must be noted, however, that such ambivalence is a concomitant of a changing society and of social mobility, for only where the association between division of labor and role structure has been established once and for all would such discrepancies in social definitions never occur. It is because of such ambivalence-creating situations, that is, situations where there are contradictory expectations in regard to role-relevant and role-irrelevant behavior, that choices have to be made and that structural changes become possible.

If prescriptions surrounding the relevance of specific behavior for role performance differ in the class structure, it follows that ambivalence is endemic in social mobility within the society at large and, correlatively, in moving up in occupational status. Indeed, in hierarchical organizations, the extent to which behavioral conformity is expected is inversely related to status position.[56] This is another way of stating the familiar observation that the higher the status position in the hierarchy, the more leeway there is in the choice of behavior related to role performance. Not only is there more choice than in lower positions for being deviant,[57] there is a wider range of choice for conformity as well, for behavior is guided not by specific prescriptions but by the actor's conforming attitude.

The scope of a person's inner dispositions is broader than that of specific activities, and it is expected that he bring this broadness to bear upon his choice of behavior. Evidence of this broadness of scope is positively sanctioned. The executive who has a family picture on his desk, rather than taking "role distance" as Goffman implies,[58] could not be more conventional. The picture is a symbol of his good character in another role and can therefore be used as evidence, circumstantial though it is, that "proper" inner dispositions will inform his behavior in his present status position. Thus, rather than being an example of "role-irrelevant idiosyncrasy of behavior,"[59] it is a functional equivalent to a diploma on the wall.

It should be clear by now that, if the distinction is made between task and role, the sociological conception of living up to role requirements refers to a greater rather than to a lesser degree of freedom of choice. Thus the mother who interrupts her cooking activities in order to play games with her children when they need her most—for example, during the late afternoon lull between their independent activities and father's arrival—makes a choice and decides that her relationship with her children is more important than being on schedule in her task. In addition, her show of "disdain" for cooking and her turning toward her children, rather than being a show of role *distance,* could be called an instance of role *closeness*. The freedom she takes to live up to her role is concomitant with her awareness (an instance of an enlarged ego in psychoanalytic conceptualization) of the nature of the demand made on her. The trait is positively sanctioned by

[56] Melvin Kohn has suggested that the emphasis on behavioral conformity in the working-class family is related to the emphasis on behavioral conformity in the workers' occupational roles ("Social Class and Parent-Child Relationships," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXVIII [January, 1963], 471–80).

[57] Cf. L. A. Coser, *op. cit.*; George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1961), pp. 339 ff.

[58] *Op. cit.*, pp. 130, 137.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

being called "social sensitivity." In contrast, a person who, from the psychological perspective, is said to be "compulsive" is one who, from the sociological perspective, insists on adhering to customary behavior at the expense of weakening role relationships.

If Goffman's assumption were correct, that joking while operating is *taking role distance*, the most role-conforming person would be what Merton calls the "ritualist";[60] yet the notion that this is a deviant social type has been generally accepted.

CONFORMITY AND NON-CONFORMITY: TWO TYPES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

If a role were defined by concrete behavior as Goffman implies when he speaks of the "role of merry-go-round rider" or of "merry-go-round role distance,"[61] there would be as many social roles as there are verbs in the language. We would then speak of the eating role, the sleeping role, or the day-dreaming role. Absurd as this sounds, I once actually heard a reputable young sociologist refer to the "non-coping role" when describing a troubled man.

If we reserve the term "role" to express a relationship, it becomes at once clear that it refers to the rights and obligations surrounding a status position. The eight-year-old boys on the merry-go-round, then, do not take distance from the "role of merry-go-round rider" but from the status of the smaller child.[62] I propose that the term "role distance" be defined as "the type of expected role behavior that takes distance from status position."

I further propose that we distinguish between the case of taking distance from a *status one intends to abandon* or from a status one does not have a claim to and the case of temporarily relinquishing some prerogatives associated with status position, as when one lowers his claims for recognition *the better to maintain his status*. I suggest that the term "role distance" be applied only to the former. The two acts differ in several respects. The first occurs in the transition from one status position to another and serves to resolve the sociological ambivalence derived from two roles, the old one and the new. It is typical in situations of social mobility, either with respect to age or to class, and is illustrated here by the clowning of the eight-year-old boys and the adolescent girls. The latter occurs in many established status relationships and serves to maintain them as defined by removing the threat posed by sociological ambivalence. It is illustrated by humor in the operating room.

RESOLVING SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE THROUGH CONFORMITY

Enough has been said about the *conservative* function of humor in the first setting. I want to add here that, if used by a person in leadership position, it implies permissiveness in that he invites others to laugh with him. This pretense of equality, however, does not mean that the leader lowers his status even for a moment. He only gives up for an instant some prerogatives usually associated with his status the better to impress the fact that the decision for permissiveness rests with him. He minimizes the burden that his status symbolizes for his role partners the better to live up to the demands of his status position, much in "ladies-first" fashion. On the other hand, the person in the lower-status position, if he uses any humor at all, is more likely than the senior man to use self-aggressive humor. This is a bid for permissiveness, for being "let in," by offering himself as a target for laughter.[63] In contrast to the

[60] Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," in *Social Theory and Social Structure*, pp. 131–60.

[61] *Op. cit.* pp. 110 and 109, respectively.

[62] Peter M. Blau has called attention to the fact that the behavior of the boys described by Goffman is a display of superior status (see his *Exchange and Power in Social Life* [New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964], p. 40).

[63] At the psychiatric staff meetings where humor was studied, the most frequent targets of the senior staff were junior members; the humor of the lat-

senior man who pretends to give up prerogatives, the junior self-aggressive humorist requests them and is granted them through the laughing response of his colleagues.

The meaning of the behavior of the eight-year-old boys is quite different. They do not give up prerogatives; they mean to emphasize through their clowning that they do not occupy the lower-status position ordinarily associated with this activity.[64] They want to upset rather than maintain the status quo.

As to the lower-middle-class girls on horseback, they act just like the upward-mobile person would act if, in his old milieu, he were to practice as a means of anticipatory socialization an activity symbolizing the higher class. The upward-mobile person would try to make fun of such activity in the presence of those whom he is associated with at present, while at the same time "trying out" a behavior which he hopes one day to perform before a more sympathetic audience. The very act of imitating upper-class activity suggests that at least in fantasy the girls conceive of the possibility of moving across status lines.

The three examples have in common an element of make-believe.[65] The surgeon in the operating room, the boys on the merry-go-round, and the girls on horseback all pretend "not to care." But there is one basic difference between the stabilized role of the surgeon and the behavior that is being experimented with by the girls and boys. When the surgeon pretends detachment from his status by letting the barriers down, he makes it clear that it is only for "fun," not for "real." He invites the team members to pretend with him for a short moment. Unlike this situation, which is similar to that of actors on the stage who invite their audience to accept for a couple of hours the make-believe that is being enacted, the girls and boys want to convince their partners that their lack of commitment is for "real," and perhaps it actually is. The distinction between "pretending" detachment and "persuading" one's role-partner of it marks the difference between conformist behavior and a measure of non-conformity.

STATUS TRANSITION, DEVIANCE, AND THE PROCESS OF SOCIALIZATION

In changing from one status position to another, conformity with the requirements of one of these positions implies non-conformity with the requirements of the other. This simultaneity of conformity and non-conformity raises some issues in regard to the process of socialization.

If we view growing up as a continuous change in roles, it entails a measure of non-conformity either to the requirements of the status that has to be abandoned or to those of the status one aspires to but cannot claim. It follows that deviant behavior is endemic in the process of growing up. So-called bad behavior of a child, that is, behavior that is not role adequate, is often tolerated in our culture because there is pressure on him to grow out of childhood. It is said that the youngster is trying to "test reality" or that he "has growing pains." He is to some extent excused from living up to the prescriptions surrounding childhood if his non-conformity is a sign of exploring to become a "man" or "woman." Departures from role obligations, if they give a sign of change that is valued in the society, such as "personality growth" or "upward mobility," are permitted in a society that stresses achievement rather than ascription.

Yet, the mere fact of *tolerance* of an act implies that some measure of deviance is inherent in it. The ambivalence, then, remains. The emotional ambivalence of parents who rejoice in their child's growth at

ter, however, was more frequently directed against patients and their relatives, as well as against themselves. Not once (out of 90 witticisms) was a senior staff member present at the meeting a target of a junior member's humor (see R. L. Coser, "Laughter among Colleagues," p. 85).

[64] Blau, *op. cit.*

[65] Cf. Goffman, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

the same time as they sadden over the loss of his childish quality is the psychological counterpart to the sociological ambivalence embedded in a situation in which a person is not expected to remain what he still is.

If the growing youngster has much pleasure in play that is defined as belonging to the sphere of younger children, he will be ridiculed; but if he rejects the activity, he will be accused of pretending to be a "big shot." He has a thin line to tread, and the ambivalence he faces with his peers is similar to the one he faces with his parents who want him to be a child at the same time as they expect him to grow out of it.

In learning new roles, a person faces sociological ambivalence twice compounded: he faces different expectations from various reference groups who all have an interest in his growth, yet who define his growth in different ways; at the same time, each reference group expects him to live up to role requirements surrounding his present as well as his future status.

Different role-partners interested in a person's growth, though all expecting signs of abandonment of the earlier status, often differ in their prescriptions or preferences as to the manner in which this is done. For example, social control exercised by parents differs from that exercised by peers, for parents are deeply involved in signs of growing maturity in their children in a way that peers are not. Although parents as well as peers are interested in the child's giving up some of his "childish behavior," his friends are interested in whether, like them, he gives evidence of giving up "kid stuff" in order to be "one of the gang." His parents, however, are more interested in their children's growth. The manner of assuming distance differs in these situations. A ten-year-old taken to the zoo for the first time in several years may surprise his parents by manifesting restraint from feeding the animals but showing instead an interest in the various types of animals, their origins, and their various behaviors. He takes distance from a previous status by assuming that of observer and judge and thus wins the approval of his parents, who see in his new detachment a sign of his growing maturity.

In order to have his claim granted by his parents in their presence, the youngster must take distance from earlier behavior in a manner that persuades *them* of the legitimacy of his claim. With his peers, however, his "intellectual manner" of taking distance would invite ridicule for being a "smarty." With them, clowning is the way of "getting in," for it makes fun of the type of activity assigned to boys of lower-age status at the same time as it denies the claim to the reasonableness of the older child. Yet, if parents were to witness this behavior, they would criticize the youngster for "acting childish," thus highlighting the ambivalence by blaming him for behaving in a manner which his clowning is precisely meant to deny.

The advice given to parents "not to meddle in the children's play" appears to be not merely a prescription of etiquette but a preventive of role conflict. Since parents are more interested in indications of their children's future character, they apply different standards to their behavior than do age peers. Through the separation of various role-partners with different interests in the child, the latter can *take distance* from his former status in the expected normative way in *each* situation.

Following Merton, it can be said that this insulation from simultaneous observability by different role-partners helps the child to articulate his role. But, in addition to helping him articulate his role of child in relation to parents and peers, it helps him articulate his changing role as a growing person.

It is not sufficient to say that the child can make use of available mechanisms for reducing the burden of contradictory expectations in order to articulate his role. It must be added that he himself gradually learns to make such mechanisms operable,

as when he allocates time and space to certain activities or actively enlarges or restricts his role-set by seeking out associates or avoiding them.

In constructing a model of socialization in my paper on "Authority and Structural Ambivalence in the Middle-Class Family,"[66] I tried to show that the growing child's formation of identity can be facilitated by having to meet different expectations from the two parental figures. In this way he is given the opportunity to adopt different types of conformity to meet the demands of each. Alan F. Blum has called attention to the fact that what I posit as precondition for role articulation is a structural situation in which the individual can take what Goffman calls "role distance."[67] Following Blum's suggestion, we may now add that expectations for assuming distance, and contradictory expectations as well, are embedded in the social universe of the maturing individual.

GROWING UP AND COMPLEXITY OF ROLE-SET

The process of maturation takes place in an ever extending role-set and consists in the child's increasing obligation as well as ability to differentiate his behavior in relation to his various role-partners. This will enable him to deal with their various demands, even if they are contradictory, provided mechanisms are at work, or provided he can make active use of such mechanisms, for facilitating "role distance."

As the number of the child's role-partners increases,[68] he will have to learn the differences in expectations of teacher, playmates, cub mother, playground attendant, and parents, and the differences in expectations of father and mother. Just as he learns to play more complex games—such as soccer, where he will "be ready to take the attitude of everyone else involved in the game" and to relate the players with one another, where "he must know *what everyone else is going to do* in order to carry out his play," where he "organizes into a sort of unit the attitudes of the other players," and where "that organization controls his response"[69]—the child learns to interact with many role-partners, facing some, turning away from others. His expectations of *what everyone else is going to do* may be contradictory and call forth incompatible responses on his part. In spite, or perhaps because, of the difficulty that this entails, such ambivalence and role conflicts will also provide for him the opportunity to assimilate from his various associations ever more patterns of responses which he can put at the service of conflict resolution.

The very source of conflict also furnishes the means for its creative resolution. In Goffman's example, the twelve-year-old boy on the merry-go-round who wants to abandon his childish status can, in contrast to the younger child, behave like a play actor rather than a clown. Having found out what would be expected of him were he on a real horse, a symbol of older-age status, he can, in Goffman's words,

[66] *Op. cit.*

[67] In analyzing my model along with those of Whiting and Parsons, Alan F. Blum concludes: "We recognize a basic point of convergence in the fact that each of these explanations recognizes the importance of role-distance—of the need for the child to distance himself from his role as a child—in order for effective socialization to occur" ("The Study of Socialization Failure: A Review of Sociological Theories of Family Structure and Deviant Behavior" [1964 (mimeographed)]). Blum's formulation provided the first incentive for this paper.

[68] Georges Duhamel describes charmingly how a child's broadening of his role-set is ambivalently interpreted by the parent as a sign of growing up. Writing about his little boy, he says: "Quand il se promène au jardin, il adresse la parole à des enfants que nous n'avons jamais vus: 'Bonjour, Jacques! Bonjour, Nelly!' Ce sont des amitiés à lui, des amitiés dont nous sommes exclus. Et pourtant! Pourtant, je vous l'ai dit, il fleure encore le lait maternel" (*Les plaisirs et les jeux* [Paris: Mercure de France, 1931], p. 157).

[69] From G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 151–54; italics mine.

"exert creative acts of distancy, as when he jokingly treats his wooden horse as if it were a racing one."[70] This boy responds to a situation that he prepares to abandon by adopting a pattern that he hopes to use in another situation. His creativity consists in his ability to take distance through an act of anticipatory socialization.

A growing youngster will develop several identifications; he will adopt new ones as he takes distance from the old and learn to play several roles at once. When he reaches adulthood he will be able to mesh what Goffman calls "a simultaneous multiplicity of selves" into a coherent self-image. He will make use of the attitudes he has developed in his various role relationships for making choices in his behavior with his different role-partners. Thus, the mature individual, in contrast to the person who "does his job," has learned to live up to the demands of his status position with a repertoire of attitudes and inner dispositions which he can call upon freely to solve unexpected and ambiguous situations and in this way to maintain otherwise threatened role relationships.

The ability to use inner resources that were developed through successive resolutions of conflicts with the expectations of various role-partners is the sociological counterpart to what Freud has called sublimation. It is the ability of the individual with a "strong ego" to make use of the accumulated resources developed in manifold patterned role relationships of the past and present in the performance of his various roles. Role relationships, rather than being a source of constraint as some will have it, provide the opportunity for socially creative behavior. He who acknowledges his inner dispositions, crystallized over many years of role-learning, and puts them to the use of role performance is a truly creative individual.

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[70] Goffman, *op. cit.*, p. 108; italics mine.

Secularization, Incorporation, and Social Relations[1]

Phillip E. Hammond

ABSTRACT

Fifty-six small, private American colleges are used as substitutes for total societies in order that a global theory of social change and social integration can be investigated. Schools are classified by degree of secularization and quality, and a number of measures of their cohesion are then observed. High-quality secular colleges and low-quality sacred colleges are found to be similar in cohesion, whereas schools that are *either* sacred *or* high quality evidence less cohesion. This pattern is interpreted as the replacement by incorporation of what is lost through secularization.

The result may be called cohesion, or integration, or solidarity. The polar extremes may be called *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, or Sacred-Secular, or Folk-Urban, or Mechanical-Organic. And the process of shifting from one extreme to the other may be called secularization, or urbanization, or differentiation. But the underlying notion is much the same: societies, despite change, maintain their unity because the mechanism holding them together also changes. Secularization means change in social relations but not necessarily breakdown because secularization may also bring a different kind of cohesion. Urbanization alters the nature of social interaction but does not necessarily reduce social unity because urbanization may also enhance a different kind of integration.

No greater exponent of this view than Durkheim can be found. Virtually all of his intellectual life was bound up in the question of morality, the social cement holding people together. And he saw social change in the terms just outlined. In the case of mechanical solidarity, he wrote, "what we call society is a more or less organized totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all the members of the group." Organic solidarity, on the other hand, he pointed out, "is a system of different, special functions which definite relations unite."[2] In either case what is generated is "a moral power capable of containing individual egos, of maintaining a spirited sentiment of common solidarity in the consciousness of all . . . , of preventing the law of the strongest from being brutally applied."[3]

It is easy to see how "sacred," "secular," and "secularization" became key notions in the discussion by Durkheim and others. Investigating beliefs, sentiments, or moral norms quite naturally leads to the role of religion. This was the path, for example, to *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, because religion "originally . . . pervades everything; everything social is religious; the two words are synonymous. Then, little by little political, economic, scientific functions free themselves from the religious function, constitute themselves apart and take on a more and more acknowledged temporal character."[4]

Such a process, then, can be called secularization. Remove the religious sanctions of political, economic, and scientific activities, and the result *may* be anomie but not

[1] This paper is based on data from Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), a study of social science professors during the waning years of McCarthyism. Their generosity is gratefully acknowledged.

[2] Émile Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), p. 129.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

necessarily; instead there may "exist, or be formed, a group which can constitute the system of rules actually needed."[5] There may be, to use current terminology, functional alternatives to the religious community, and other sources of cohesion, therefore, than religious homogeneity.

For Durkheim, a major alternative source of cohesion is the occupational group "because of the moral influence it can have."[6] Such groups he calls "corporations" since they "surpass the individual," "subordinate particular interests," and "contain individual egos." Incorporation, as the process whereby corporations develop might then be called, is an antidote to secularization. Where the latter indicates a withering of common beliefs and sentiments and thus a decline in moral influence, the former indicates a growth of "secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life"[7]—and thus a restoration of moral influence. Occupational groups, said Durkheim, are peculiarly suited for this incorporation function; "that is their destiny."

But do sociologists believe the theory as much as they talk of it or include it in introductory texts? What can be accepted as evidence? As we are reminded periodically, the record shows the disappearance of almost no *societies*. It is smaller collectivities that get born, grow, decline, and wither away; and these are appropriately studied from different perspectives, not as microcosms of total societies.[8] If it were possible to collect data on many societies at various stages of secularization and incorporation, would we expect confirmation of our global theory of social cohesion?

In the absence of such data, we *can* look at "substitute societies." The substitutes we shall be examining are academic communities, and we intend to ask of them questions about cohesion and integration, secularization and incorporation.[9] With observations on a small scale, we will nevertheless ask questions on a large scale. The result, although hardly to be considered confirmation of the theory, nevertheless conforms to expectations derived from it.

Without exaggeration it can be said that secularization and incorporation describe two of the historical processes in American higher education. Founded originally as religious agencies for training clergymen and transmitting religious knowledge, private colleges have undergone steady change, and reflect now various stages in secularization. Though momentous events like westward expansion or the Great Awakening have given new life to founding religious colleges, the general process (for those that survived) has been to shift away from religious homogeneity, religious curriculum, religious qualification for enrolment or employment, and so forth. From being religious agencies, in other words, private colleges move in the direction of becoming secular agencies.[10]

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 5. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 10. [7] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[8] An exception is James A. Davis, *Great Books and Small Groups* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961), where numerically small groups are analyzed as "little societies," in terms of functional requisites, maintenance and decline, etc.

[9] An argument can be made that academic communities are reasonably good "substitute societies," at least relative to most subsocietal units. They share many of the attributes of "total institutions." For example, they frequently have facilities for sleeping, eating, and recreation as well as working. Their boundaries are generally fairly clear, perhaps even fenced, and integrity of these boundaries is maintained by school "colors," name, mascot, etc., as well as by peculiar "occupational" traits involving academic freedom, classroom "sanctity," and so forth. There is a system of stratification, with reasonably high permanence within the higher ranks. And very often these "societies" have their own police forces. Finally, it might be noted that relations between colleges and their environments, at least frequently, seem to resemble international negotiation more than intranational symbiosis.

[10] Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962), is a recent, good history of higher education which describes these changes. Public institutions, today dominant in terms of enrolment, do not, of course, reflect the secularization process in the same

They also move in the direction of incorporation. Instead of (or sometimes "as well as") serving as religious agencies, private colleges may come to serve as general academic or intellectual agencies. In addition to *transmitting* knowledge (the nature of which will reflect the stage of secularization), colleges variously assume the task of *producing* knowledge. In the process, certain occupational criteria, independent of local and traditional considerations, take on more importance. Evaluation for graduation, employment, and promotion, for example, is in terms of how well the knowledge-producing function is performed. Academic disciplines of faculty members assume greater importance, and the profession of teaching and research moves into its own orbit, with its own professional society, norms of competence, values of academic freedom, and so on. Specialties develop, not only within disciplines but also in administration and staff, and become separate career lines. Academies become incorporated into another moral sphere; they constitute "a system of different, special functions which definite relations unite."

These two processes—secularization and incorporation—occur independently, which is to say that, although one expects the latter to replace the former, it need not. Private colleges reflecting different stages of secularization can thus be found reflecting different stages of incorporation.

It is the contention of this essay that the moral influence or cement of which Durkheim spoke can be observed in the "little societies" of private colleges. At one extreme are the "sacred" groups with little evidence of incorporation; these are societies with mechanical solidarity, a cohesion stemming from "a more or less organized totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all." Doctrinal tests for entrance into them are not uncommon, and continued evidence of members' orthodoxy is frequently provided for. At the other extreme are the "secular" groups whose cohesion may be as great but, derived as it is from "a system of different, special functions," is an organic solidarity, resulting from incorporation.

In between are groups (societies) which are neither sacred nor incorporated. These are the secularized societies which *are* anomic, for they have only limited basis for solidarity, neither common beliefs nor interrelated functions. Suicide, Durkheim found, is commoner in such groups because no spirit of solidarity, no moral influence, is sufficient to contain individual egos. Today we would say, less poetically but more accurately, that norms do not exist with sufficient binding power.

Since suicide is fortunately rare within college faculties, what reasonable signs might there be of solidarity or moral influence resulting from either a "sacred" or a "corporate" condition? One set of signs, it can be argued, is the attitudes of members toward their societies—whether affirmative or negative, binding or loose, trustful or distrustful. We shall, at the end of this paper, utilize such attitudinal measures, but first the source of data must be identified, and the empirical measures of secularization and incorporation must be demonstrated.

Our data are based on some of the colleges sampled in 1955 and reported in *The Academic Mind*, a study of social science professors. The authors of that study have already classified non-public, non-Catholic colleges along a dimension of secularization. They distinguish between *private* and *Protestant* schools according to: (1) representation by a religious body on the governing board, (2) compulsory chapel, and (3) compulsory course in Bible or religion. Colleges for which none or one of these characteristics applies are called private; colleges for which two or three apply are called Protestant.[11] We further distinguish "sacred" and "secular" Protestant schools according to three additional criteria: (1)

way, though even in their case the term is not entirely inaccurate.

[11] Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

a ban on on-campus smoking, (2) a ban on on-campus dancing, and (3) compulsory Sunday church attendance.[12] Colleges having none or one of these characteristics are called *secular Protestant;* colleges having two or three are called *sacred Protestant.* Of the thirty-four institutions labeled Protestant in the parent study, eighteen are classed as secular and sixteen as sacred. The third group of institutions are twenty-two private schools, comparable in size to the thirty-four Protestant schools,[13] and considered even more secular. Fifty-six colleges are thus ranged along a continuum of secularization, reflecting one process of change frequently noted about collectivities.

Despite its crudity, a good deal of the theoretical meaning of secularization is captured by this measure. The highest proportion of theological degrees is possessed by presidents and faculty members of sacred Protestant schools, for example, and the lowest proportion is found in private schools. Correlatively, virtually all (99 per cent) of these social science faculty in sacred Protestant schools are themselves Protestant, while this proportion decreases with secularization (to 85 per cent in secular Protestant and nearer two-thirds in private schools). The fact of greater *religious* heterogeneity, furthermore, appears to indicate greater value heterogeneity *in general.* With secularization goes an increase in the percentage of teachers whose educational philosophy approves classroom discussion of "problem areas" and "value judgments" rather than transmitting facts and avoiding discussion.[14] The latter policy, it might be assumed, reflects less willingness to entertain competing ideas, or at least less willingness to have them entertained for students. Perhaps most telling of all, however, is seen in answers to the following question:

> On political matters, do you feel that you are more liberal or more conservative than most of the faculty here?

Respondents could answer "more liberal" or "more conservative," but many volunteered the answer "same" as most of the faculty. This question was then followed by identical questions which substituted for the last phrase: (1) "most of the trustees here at the college," (2) "most of the administration here," (3) "most of the alumni of this college," and (4) "most people in the community in which the college is located."[15] In all five cases (with 15–20 percentage point differences), the more "sacred" the school, the more likely are its professors to answer "same." In other words, at least in the eyes of faculty members, secularization of colleges brings with it political diversity.

It seems fairly clear that these fifty-six schools differently reflect the historical process of secularization. The more sacred among them continue to be strongholds of orthodoxy, of value similarity, of "normative integration." Presumably entrance to these "communities" remains contingent on certain traditions, and the result is, in Durkheim's words, "a more or less organized totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all."[16]

[12] Information on these criteria was taken from C. V. Good, *A Guide to Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1945). In the case of a few schools for which Good had no information, the college bulletins were used. If the first two criteria appear overly "pietistic" and thus not equally applicable to all Protestant groups, the fact is that, of thirteen denominations represented, only the Lutherans do not have strong historical ties with the evangelical, pietistic movement. Even some of their campuses, however, evidence these rules.

[13] Size of school was discovered in the parent study to be an important variable. Inasmuch as only two of the thirty-four Protestant schools have enrolments over 2,500 (but both under 5,000), we limit the private school sample to those of 2,500 and under.

[14] See the discussion of these questions in Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, pp. 134–40.

[15] See *ibid.*, p. 133.

[16] The comparison of college faculties with total societies breaks down at this point, we admit, since societies must socialize their members to a com-

But there is another process also at work —the process of incorporation. Finding themselves less and less as agents for transmitting religious orthodoxy, some colleges came to serve as agents for the production of knowledge. New criteria for entrance to such communities come into being. In large part independent of local and traditional considerations, these new criteria are "occupational" or "academic." A "system of different, special functions" develops, and, although normative control still abounds, it takes on a "more and more acknowledged temporal character." Thus, for example, qualifications are still applied to those who would enter as student or professor, but they are qualifications of expedience or interdependence. This dimension, we would assert, is one of incorporation and is reflected in Lazarsfeld and Thielens' measure of school "quality."

The quality index combines information about six aspects of each college: (1) total number of volumes in the college library, (2) ratio of library books to number of students, (3) ratio of annual budget (1951–52) to number of students, (4) proportion of holders of Ph.D. degrees on the faculty, (5) production of scholars (from graduating classes), and (6) tuition fees. On each attribute, schools were assigned scores of 1 (low) to 5 (high), and then the six scores were averaged. A score of 5.00 is thus the highest possible; 1.00 is the lowest.[17]

It will be demonstrated presently just how quality score reflects "incorporation," but first the point must be made that, though conceptually independent, the historical forces of secularization and quality are empirically related. The twenty-two schools called private by Lazarsfeld and Thielens have an average quality score of 3.87; the eighteen secular Protestant schools, an average score of 2.82; and the sixteen sacred Protestant schools, 2.12. There are, however, exceptions: low-quality private colleges and high-quality sacred colleges. Indeed, these exceptions become crucial as the effects of secularization and incorporation are observed, for it will become obvious that, just as secularization is associated with higher quality ratings, so also does secularization as well as quality reflect incorporation.

One way this effect can be demonstrated is seen in Table 1, where the proportion

TABLE 1

PROPORTION OF PRODUCTIVE* AND PERMISSIVE† PROFESSORS IN COLLEGES CLASSIFIED BY QUALITY AND SECULARIZATION

Secularization	Per Cent Productive in Schools of:		Per Cent Permissive in Schools of:	
	High Quality	Low Quality‡	High Quality	Low Quality
High (private colleges)	71 (217, 11)§	56 (109, 11)	60	39
Medium (secular Protestant)	59 (142, 12)	45 (44, 6)	39	36
Low (sacred Protestant)	51 (45, 4)	40 (60, 12)	24	17

* Index of Productivity defined in Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

† Index of Permissiveness defined in Lazarsfeld and Theilens, *op. cit.* p. 446.

‡ Assignment into quality groups follows the parent study. The private and Protestant schools were first distinguished, then each divided roughly into two equal groups having higher and lower relative quality. The Protestant schools were then classified as "secular" or "sacred."

§ Larger figure is number of social scientists on which percentage is based; smaller figure is number of schools at which those individuals were interviewed.

mon set of sentiments if that is their choice, whereas faculties can homogenize by recruitment.

[17] See *ibid.*, pp. 411–14.

of "productive" and the proportion of "permissive" professors are shown for the fifty-six colleges classified by quality (high or low) and secularization. Quite clearly, *both* increasing secularization and increasing quality are associated with higher rates of productivity and permissiveness on the part of faculty members. Social scientists at high-quality secular schools publish more and score higher in politico-academic liberalism or toleration. Their counterparts at low-quality sacred schools publish least and score lowest. This same pattern of results is also found if, instead of productivity or permissiveness, one substitutes: (1) membership in the American Association of University Professors, (2) Democratic vote in the 1952 election, or (3) reporting that the faculty has the most powerful voice on campus in matters of academic freedom.[18] Taken together, these findings indicate that with secularization and quality go greater adherence to the norms of the academic subculture, a greater orientation to the profession, or, to use the term above, a higher degree of "incorporation."

Secularization carries with it, therefore, a reduction in religious homogeneity, a decrease in the "organized totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all." But at the same time, secularization, especially if accompanied by increasing quality, may also mean greater incorporation, a greater system of functions "which definite relations unite." Mechanical solidarity may be lost, but organic solidarity may take its place.

But does it? Does there arise a "moral power capable of containing individual egos," a "common solidarity in the consciousness of all"? The question, one would suppose, is difficult to answer. After all, what can replace the certainty that comes with tradition, with orthodoxy, with uniformity of sentiment? What can substitute for the solidarity arising from the "mechanical" type of social organizations, the normative integration, the sacred society?

Allowing for the obvious changes that inevitably accompany a reduction in *Gemeinschaft,* we can nevertheless note a rather remarkable pattern in another set of findings. Table 2 supplies the evidence for just one manifestation. Two things stand out in Table 2. First, the highest

TABLE 2

PROPORTION OF FACULTY MEMBERS (IN COLLEGES CLASSIFIED BY QUALITY AND SECULARIZATION) WHO EXPECT WHOLEHEARTED ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT IN CASE OF ATTACK ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM*

SECULARIZATION	PER CENT EXPECTING WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT IN SCHOOLS OF:	
	High Quality	Low Quality
High	76	56
Medium	63	64
Low	51	82

* The question reads: "If someone accused you of leftist leanings, do you think the administration of the college would support you wholeheartedly, with reservations, or hardly at all?"

rates of "trust" are found both in schools that are most sacred and of lowest quality and schools that are least sacred and of highest quality. And second, the lowest rates of trust are found in schools which are *either* secular *or* high quality. It is as if what is "undone" by decreasing sacredness is "regained" by rising quality—as if incorporation substitutes, in the realm of social relations, for secularization. Colleges that are high quality but sacred (presumably conflicted over the basis of solidarity) or secular and low quality (presumably without basis for solidarity) evidence the lowest rates of "trust" between faculty and administration.

But this is simply one example of a *pattern* of findings. The pattern remains essentially the same for affirmative answers

[18] Other choices supplied: trustees, president, deans, department heads, students. See *ibid.*, p. 170, and the entire discussion of the "corporate" nature of the "superior" college, pp. 159–91.

to these questions regarding the solidarity felt by college communities:

1. Compared to what you know about other academic institutions, would you say that working conditions here (teaching load, salaries, and so on) are unusually good?
2. Would you say that relations among faculty members here are unusually good?
3. Would you say that relations between the faculty and the administration of this college are unusually good?
4. Are the people you see the most of socially mainly from the faculty?

In every instance, the highest rates of affirmative response are found in the low-quality sacred colleges *and* the high-quality secular schools. And, generally, the lowest rates are from their opposing numbers: the colleges which are *either* secular *or* high quality. It would seem entirely warranted to say, at least, that the solidarity, the cohesiveness, is greater in the former two types of school, and to say further that, very likely, this solidarity arises from quite different sources: religious homogeneity, a sacred, or folk, or mechanical type of organization in the first instance; a functional integration, a secular, or urban, or organic type of organization in the second. Moral influence is presented in both types of school but arises from two different bases.

It is, of course, dangerous to use such dichotomies to describe collectivities smaller than total society units for which they were derived. All the colleges in this sample, after all, are American colleges and firmly imbedded in the twentieth century. They are, therefore, in some strategic ways, at the mercy of social forces going on around, as well as within, them. The fact is, however, that social change in the enveloping society is significantly a function of social changes in constituent units. If these latter exhibit some of the attributes generally reserved for more global collectivities, does this not lend support to the presumed analytic utility of the attributes themselves? The present paper would argue that it does.

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TABLE 3

PROPORTION OF FACULTY MEMBERS (IN COLLEGES CLASSIFIED BY QUALITY AND SECULARIZATION) WHO EVIDENCE ATTITUDES OF SOLIDARITY ON FOUR QUESTIONS

SECULARIZATION	WORKING CONDITIONS UNUSUALLY GOOD		FACULTY RELATIONS UNUSUALLY GOOD		FACULTY-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONS UNUSUALLY GOOD		SOCIAL CONTACTS MAINLY WITH FACULTY	
	High Quality	Low Quality	High Quality	Low Quality	High Quality	Low Quality	High Quality	Low Quality
High	27	7	48	34	35	24	78	53
Medium	6	2	36	23	27	30	58	61
Low	11	25	33	53	29	58	60	67

Freedom, Visibility of Consequences, and Scientific Innovation[1]

Gerald Gordon and Sue Marquis

ABSTRACT

Wolfle, among others, has reasoned that the free academic environment is conducive to scientific innovation, while Ben-David and Gilfillan reason that the academically marginal settings provide greater impetus for innovation. Experts' evaluations of the innovativeness of 245 projects indicated that research conducted in academic social-science departments clearly was less innovative than similar research in marginal institutions. The question remains: How and in what manner do academically marginal settings stimulate innovation? It is hypothesized that the ease with which the consequences of research can be assessed in the marginal institutions accounts for the greater innovation found in the marginal setting. The hypothesis is also advanced that the effect of freedom is reduced when the consequences of research are not visible. These hypotheses were tested by an intra-organizational comparison of visibility of consequences and the extent of administrative influence on research activities. Three times more projects in ideal condition than non-ideal condition were evaluated as highly innovative.

In the literature on scientific organization there are a great many speculative statements stressing the relationship between freedom and scientific accomplishment. Wolfle, among others, postulates that the greater the freedom accorded the scientist, the more creative his research. Wolfle states, for example: "One of the most certain ways in which society can promote excellence in science and other areas of scholarship is by building strong universities and insisting that creative scholars be given time, facilities, and freedom of choice to carry out the studies that seem most likely to extend fundamental knowledge and understanding."[2] However, one finds little of an empirical nature which bears on the role freedom plays in enhancing creative scientific accomplishment. Rarer still are systematic attempts to relate structural variations in freedom to scientific accomplishment.[3]

To investigate the relationship between freedom and creative scientific accomplishment, we examined the authority patterns in four types of research settings: universities, medical schools, hospitals, and health agencies. Data were obtained by a mail questionnaire sent to the directors of 245 projects. The universe of inquiry consisted of all projects studying the social-psychological aspects of disease listed in the *Inventory of Social and Economic Research in Health* from 1954 to 1960.[4] Questionnaires for 223 (91 per cent) of the projects were returned. Of these projects, 64 were conducted in academic social science settings, 57 in health agencies, 38 in medical schools, and 20 in hospitals and clinics. Among the four settings comparisons were made of the proportion of project directors who had no administrative superior, the proportion who did or did not discuss the

[1] Revision of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, August, 1965. The research was partially financed by grant GM 11165, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Public Health Service.

[2] In Dael Wolfle (ed.), *Symposium on Basic Research* (Publication No. 56 [Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1959]), p. 279.

[3] For a detailed discussion of the literature on scientific accomplishment, see Anne P. Folger and Gerald Gordon, "Scientific Accomplishment and Social Organization: A Review of the Literature," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VI (December, 1962), 51–58.

[4] Health Information Foundation, *An Inventory of Social and Economic Research in Health* (Editions III–IX [New York: Health Information Foundation, 1954–60]).

specific areas of research with their administrative superior, and the extent of influence of the administrative superior over given areas of research. The following pattern of freedom emerged: the health institutions (health agencies and hospitals) were the least free with maximal executive authority, and the educational institutions (universities and medical schools) were the most free with minimal executive authority. Tables 1 and 2 are illustrative of the degree of freedom in these institutions.[5]

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF INFLUENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERIOR CONCERNING THE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS, HIRING OF PERSONNEL, AND FORMULATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Institution	*N*	Per Cent		
		Administrative Influence	No Administrative Influence	No Answer
Health agency	57	63	35	2
Hospital	20	50	45	5
Medical school	38	31	68	1
University	64	39	58	3

NOTE.—The difference between the educational institutions (medical school and university) and the health institutions (health agency and hospital) is significant at $p < .05$, z-test.

If Wolfle is correct and maximal freedom does lead to highly creative scientific accomplishment, then of these four institutions one would expect the university and medical school to be most innovative. Ben-David, however, referring to the work of Koch, Pasteur, Villemin, Devaine, Freud, and others, argues that academically marginal settings provide greater impetus for innovation than do purely academic settings.[6] Gilfillan, in *The Sociology of Invention,* also supports the position that marginal research settings lead to innovation.[7] If Ben-David and Gilfillan are correct, and contrary to the prediction derived from Wolfle's argument, one would expect that social research would be least innovative when conducted in academic social-science settings and most innovative when conducted in the more academically marginal medical school, hospital, and health-agency settings.

To resolve this contradiction, evaluations of the innovativeness of projects conducted in each of the above settings were compared. In order to obtain these evaluations, the director of each project was asked to designate the major report(s) resulting from his study. We then summarized the report(s) indicated. After we validated the use of ratings of summaries instead of ratings of the major reports themselves,[8] the summaries were placed in

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS IN WHICH THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERIOR INFLUENCED ALLOCATION OF FUNDS, HIRING OF PERSONNEL, AND FORMULATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Institution	Per Cent		
	Funds	Personnel	Research Design
Health agency	74	60	54
Hospital	50	45	55
Medical school	32	32.5	21
University	42	31	47

[5] For a fuller description of the methodology and data-gathering process see Gerald Gordon, Sue Marquis, and O. W. Anderson, "Freedom and Control in Four Types of Scientific Settings," *American Behavioral Scientist,* VI, No. 4 (December, 1962), 39–43.

[6] Joseph Ben-David, "Roles and Innovations in Medicine," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXV, No. 6 (May, 1960), 557–68.

[7] S. C. Gilfillan, *The Sociology of Invention* (Chicago: Follett Publishing Co., 1935), pp. 88–91.

[8] The extent of agreement between the ratings based on the summaries and the rating based on the major reports was twice that expected by chance ($p < 0.025$). For further information see Gerald Gordon, "The Problem of Assessing Scientific Accomplishment: A Potential Solution," *IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management,* Vol. Em-10, No. 4 (December, 1963), 192–96.

booklets of twenty-five randomly selected summaries for evaluation. The evaluators were persons chosen as leaders in medical sociology by the members of the Section on Medical Sociology of the American Sociological Association. The mean number rating each project was 4.5.

For each project the evaluators indicated their rating of each of four criteria on a ten-point scale. As a guideline in making the ratings of innovation, the evaluators were asked to indicate:

> How innovative you feel the research is—the degree to which the research adds to our knowledge of illness through the development of new theory or findings not explicit or anticipated in previous theories or findings and/or adds to the development of new methods of research. The reference points for this rating should be what you feel is the general level of innovation for studies dealing with the social-psychological aspects of illness.

According to their rating the projects were divided into fifths—quintile 1 indicating the lowest ratings of innovation and quintile 5 the highest ratings of innovation.[9]

A comparison of the percentage of the projects in the fifth or most innovative quintile clearly revealed that research conducted in academic social-science departments was judged less innovative than in the other three institutions (Table 3). Only 8 per cent of the projects conducted in the university were in the most innovative quintile compared to 18 per cent, 32 per cent, and 30 per cent, respectively, for the health agency, hospital, and medical school.

To determine if the nature and type of research carried on in the different types of institutions rather than the differences between the institutions per se accounted for the differences noted, the following factors were controlled: variables studied, researcher's discipline, disease interest, diffuseness or specificity of the research problem, theoretical or problem orientation, and purpose of the research. In all cases the pattern of innovation previously noted remained constant. Table 4 is illustrative of the consistency of the pattern.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS IN EACH INSTITUTION IN MOST INNOVATIVE (FIFTH) QUINTILE

Institution	No of Projects	Percentage in Fifth Quintile
Health agency	55	18
Hospital	19	32
Medical school	37	30
University	60	8

NOTE.—Difference between university and health agency, $p < 10$; between university and hospital, $p < .02$; between university and medical school, $p < .02$ (z-tests).

The findings support Ben-David and Gilfillan's belief that marginal research settings stimulate innovation. But the question remains: How and in what manner do marginal settings stimulate innovation? Ben-David provides insight into this question, stating: "Practice . . . is an invaluable guide in locating relevant problems—rather than finding illusory ones, which happened not infrequently in the history of academic thinking—and in adapting existing methods or devising new ones. The problems of practice are always real, and it usually possesses a tradition which is the result of a long collective process of trial and error and which may suggest the way toward new theory and new methods."[10]

[9] As the interpretation of the intervals on the rating scale was found to differ from evaluator to evaluator, the twenty-five ratings for each evaluator were converted to t-scores. The mean t-score for each project was determined. According to the ranking of the mean t-scores, the projects were divided into quintiles numbering 43, 43, 42, 43, 43. This excludes nine projects which had no findings at the time of the evaluation and which, during a follow-up two years later, were found to have publications then available. Feeling that the evaluations of the projects therefore were inaccurate, they were removed from all analyses using the dependent variables.

[10] Ben-David, *op. cit.*, p. 558.

Thus, following Ben-David's reasoning, research in the academic setting is less innovative in comparison to the hospital, medical school, and health agency because there is less direct contact with the population affected by the research, the patients, and with the practitioners, the doctors, to whom the research is most relevant. The more contact an individual or organization has with the population served, the easier it is to measure or assess the actual or probable consequences of research. Practice, we feel, is "an invaluable guide in locating relevant problems [and] suggests the way to new theory and methods" because it increases the visibility of consequences of research.[11]

The location of relevant problems, however, does not necessarily mean creative solutions will follow. Both Barber[12] and Kuhn[13] have documented the resistance to innovation within science. Their evidence indicates that in terms of the repercussions of both failure and success it is often more dangerous to innovate than to follow habitual or accepted research paths. Kuhn, in fact, argues that generally the reward pattern of normal science induces conformity rather than originality.[14] This perhaps explains our finding that medical sociologists in the relatively free environment of the university were less innovative than their colleagues in the other institutions. Given a research environment that allows freedom of choice, many scientists choose safe rather than dangerous but original research paths. If the resistances to innovation are not overcome, the effect of facilitating conditions such as freedom obviously is reduced. For some researchers, inner curiosity and other internal drives may overcome the resistances to innovation. But for many scientists innovation or non-innovation is *dependent* upon external constraints.

We believe that the visibility of research consequences, in addition to aiding in the location of relevant problems, is one of the more important factors in overcoming the resistance to innovation.[15] For instance, in an organizational setting where the own-

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS, BY RESEARCH PURPOSE, IN MOST INNOVATIVE (FIFTH) QUINTILE FOR EACH SETTING

	HEALTH AGENCY		HOSPITAL		MEDICAL SCHOOL		UNIVERSITY	
	*N**	%5Q†	*N*	%5Q	*N*	%5Q	*N*	%5Q
Delineation of problem	19	16	4	25	9	67	19	5
Causal relationship	9	11	3	33	15	33	16	12
Factors relating to problem solution	11	45	10	40	7	0	13	0
Problem solution	5	20	1	0	1	0	3	0
Evaluation	7	0	2	0	1	0	4	0
Methodology	2	50	0	0	2	0	3	33

* *N* is the number of projects with a given research purpose in each institution.

† "%5Q" refers to the percentage of these projects in the fifth or most innovative quintile.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Bernard Barber, "Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery," *Science*, CXXXIV, No. 3479 (September, 1961), 596–602.

[13] Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 150.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[15] The discussion of consequences and freedom is based on the theoretical perspective developed in Gerald Gordon and Selwyn Becker, "The Entrepreneurial Theory of Formal Organizations" (mimeographed working paper, University of Chicago, 1965).

er of an organization or his representative can accurately evaluate the findings of a project in terms of organizational goals, he can encourage the researcher who shows high probability of solving such problems. Also he can reward the researcher in relation to the extent to which the researcher aids in problem solution. As a consequence, the researcher is motivated to seek solutions to difficult but "relevant problems" in preference to less relevant but easier problems. In seeking a solution to the difficult problems the researcher at times must abandon traditional methods and thinking. This would appear to be as true for the academic as for the non-academic researcher. Kuhn, for instance, has observed that "the novel theory seems a direct response to crises."[16]

On the other hand, where it is difficult for an administrator to relate the results of research to the attainment of organizational goals, the difference between the competent and the better solution becomes blurred and it is more difficult for the administrator to reward according to the extent to which the researcher attains the organizational goals. As a consequence, the constraint toward seeking the best solution is reduced, and extra impetus to go beyond competent but traditional research methods is lacking.

Marginal institutions, such as the medical school, hospital, and health agency, allow for more visibility of consequences than the university because they are in closer contact with the population served by the research. Further, academic goals such as increasing the general fund of knowledge tend to be more nebulous than the goals of institutions primarily concerned with practice or profit. The more obscure the goal, the more difficult is the assessment of consequences. If, as we hypothesize, visibility of consequences is a major impetus to innovation, then the relationship between marginality and innovation noted by Ben-David, Gilfillan, and ourselves arise, in part at least, from the greater visibility of research consequences in the marginal settings. Conversely, it would be predicted that without such an impetus the effect of facilitating conditions such as research freedom will be reduced. To test both hypotheses we attempted to determine the effect of variations in visibility of consequences and freedom upon innovation for each of the four types of research organizations investigated. This analysis was based on the assumption that, no matter how readily consequences can be assessed, they are not visible until someone assesses them.

The projects were classified according to visibility of consequences and freedom on the basis of the responses of the project directors to the following questions:

Whom did you consider to be your administrative superior—the person to whom you were in any way responsible and who bore some responsibility for your research activity? (If no one, check here ——.)

Those who had an administrative superior were asked if they discussed the following points with him:

a) Research methodology employed in the study
b) Purpose of the study
c) Definition of the problem
d) Interpretation of the research findings

The project directors were also asked to indicate on a ten-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (completely) the extent to which their administrative superior influenced:

a) Allocation of the research funds
b) Hiring of personnel
c) Formulation of the research design

The projects were divided into three major groups:

1. Projects in which the project directors either stated they had no administrative superior or they did not discuss their research with their administrative superior (Low visibility of consequences + Freedom)
2. Projects in which the project directors had

[16] Kuhn, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

freedom to specify their research procedures and they discussed their research with their administrative superior (High visibility of consequences + Freedom)

3. Projects in which the project directors stated that they had an administrative superior with whom they had discussions and who consistently influenced procedures[17] (High visibility of consequences + Limited Freedom)

If our hypotheses regarding the effect of visibility of consequences is correct, then in the marginal institutions of the three types of authority patterns, type 2 would tend to maximize innovation while types 1 and 3 would minimize innovation. However, as previously discussed, in the university the organizational setting limits the visibility of research consequences, and therefore even if assessments are attempted, visibility of consequences tends to be low. Consequently, we would expect that variations in authority pattern would have much less impact upon innovation in the university than in the marginal institutions.

The consistency of the trends in the data in the direction of our hypotheses is striking. For example, as predicted, where consequences are difficult to assess, the amount of freedom accorded the scientist had little effect on innovation. As can be seen in Table 5, in the university where it was postulated that under all conditions consequences are relatively obscure, not only was there much less innovation than in the other three settings but the authority patterns appeared to have little effect on innovation. Looking at the authority patterns in the other settings where consequences are visible and freedom is accorded the scientist, the predicted pattern of innovation is seen. The one exception to the pattern (project directors with no administrative superiors in the hospital) occurs in a cell with only three cases. A difference of one project would change the relationship.

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS, BY AUTHORITY PATTERN IN EACH SETTING, IN MOST INNOVATIVE (FIFTH) QUINTILE

Institution	No Research Discussion		Research Discussion with Freedom		Research Discussion with Little Freedom	
	N*	%5Q	N	%5Q	N	%5Q
Health agency	6	0	31	19	15	13
Hospital	3	67	11	36	4	0
Medical school	14	7	20	45	3	33
University	23	9	21	10	12	8

* N is the number of projects with a given authority pattern in each institution

Where the three marginal institutions were grouped together as shown in Table 6, it was found that the percentage of innovation under the ideal authority pattern was two and a half times that under the non-ideal conditions (31 per cent under the ideal condition, 13 per cent with no administrative superior or no discussion, and 14 per cent with administrative influence). The difference between the ideal and non-ideal conditions is significant at $p < 0.02$. The ideal condition in the marginal institutions (High visibility + Freedom) has three times as many highly innovative studies than occurred under any condition in the university. This difference is significant at $p +0.02$. On the other hand, for those marginal institutions where visibility

[17] Ratings of 3 or above on all three ten-point scales.

of consequences was low, the difference between the marginal and academic institutions was less than 4 per cent. Nevertheless, even the non-ideal marginal situations tended to be slightly more innovative than the academic institutions—indicating that, in addition to visibility of consequences, other factors associated with the marginal settings may also be positively related to innovation.

In sum, it is not possible to make a blanket statement relating maximal freedom to innovation, but rather maximal freedom is conducive to innovation only when there is an impetus to innovate. It further appears that the institutional settings in which research is conducted—in particular the visibility of the consequences of the research in relation to the goals of the owners of the institution—has a significant effect on inducing innovation. Our findings also challenge the assumption that, except in unusual instances, academic environments stimulate creative scientific achievement.

The evidence presented by Ben-David, Gilfillan, and ourselves in regard to the effect of marginal settings on scientific accomplishment refers primarily to new and developing areas in the social and natural sciences rather than to well-developed scientific areas. On the other hand, recent evidence by Pelz and Andrews indicates that our hypothesis in regard to the relationship between visibility of research consequences, freedom and innovation is valid for established as well as emerging research disciplines.[18] It is possible, however, that in mature sciences the existence of highly developed theoretical frameworks serve both to identify meaningful research problems and to make the consequences of research highly visible. If this is true as a science developed, the effect of marginal settings upon innovation would decrease. But extending Kuhn and Barber's thesis, one would argue that the more entrenched a theoretical framework, the greater would be the resistance by academicians to re-

TABLE 6

PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS FOR COMBINED INSTITUTIONS AND AUTHORITY PATTERNS IN MOST INNOVATIVE (FIFTH) QUINTILE

Setting	Authority Pattern			
	Ideal*		Non-ideal	
	N	%5Q	*N*	%5Q
Marginal	62	31	45	13
Non-marginal	21	10	35	9

* Visibility + Freedom.

SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES (z-TESTS)

	p
1. University-Ideal versus Marginal-Ideal	<0.03
2. University-Non-ideal versus Marginal-Ideal	< .006
a) University-No Discussion versus Marginal-Ideal	< .02
b) University-Little Freedom versus Marginal-Ideal	< .05
3. Marginal-Non-ideal versus Marginal-Ideal	< .02
a) Marginal-No Discussion versus Marginal-Ideal	< .05
b) Marginal-Little Freedom versus Marginal-Ideal	<0.06

[18] Don Pelz and Frank Andrews in *Scientists and Organizations: Productive Climates for Research and Development* (chap. iii [to be published by John Wiley & Sons]) present additional evidence confirming our hypotheses in regard to the relationship between visibility of consequences and scientific accomplishment. They state, "Gordon and an associate, Selwyn W. Becker, suggest that innovation is more likely where 'consequences are visible' (represented in his data by a superior who keeps in touch), but where at the same time the researcher has freedom (is not dominated by the superior). In our data [physics labs, R & D labs, chemical labs, etc.], involvement of several decision-making sources should increase visibility of consequences; and the individual's influence guards against domination by one superior. Under this combination, we found performance to be highest."

search calling into question the theoretical framework.

Speculation along this line leads to further questions in regard to the differential effect of academic and marginal settings upon scientific accomplishment. For instance, is the university a supportive environment for the highly creative, internally driven researcher? Does the effect of marginal and university environments on innovation differ when research appears to have some immediate relevance to society and when the relevance of the research appears less immediate? Do sciences in different stages of development require different environments? These questions just begin to scratch the surface of the highly complex pattern of activities subsumed under the name "science."

CORNELL UNIVERSITY
AND
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RESEARCH NOTES

Marital Instability by Race, Sex, Education, and Occupation Using 1960 Census Data[1]

Until about twenty-five years ago, it seems to have been generally believed that divorce was more prevalent in the well-to-do groups. In 1938 Terman wrote: "it is well known that more divorces occur in the higher classes."[2] The lower-status groups, it was believed, tended either to separate informally or suffer together. As Goode indicates, this may well have been true at some previous period when the general standard of living and level of development was lower.[3] After 1940, as better data became available, sociological studies in the United States showed the inadequacy of this generalization.[4] These studies, based usually on small populations, consistently have demonstrated that the higher the socioeconomic status of a group, the lower their divorce and separation rates.

With the 1950 Census came the first opportunity to measure the relationship between status-related variables and certain aspects of marital stability, using the entire population. Glick, using 1950 Census data to calculate separation and divorce rates by race and education, found a curvilinear relationship of divorce to educational level for each race, with divorce rates highest in the middle levels of education. His data show a consistent inverse relationship between separation rates and educational level for each race.[5]

Hillman used 1950 Census data to calculate separation and divorce rates by sex for each race by status-related variables.[6] The breakdown of the data by sex showed the relationships between various status indexes to be quite complex. According to her method of calculation, the inverse relationship between marital instability (divorce and separation) and status held only for white males, with varying patterns occurring for non-white males and for females of both races. Figure 1 is prepared from her data, based on 1950 Census tabulations for race, sex, and educational level. Other tables in her original article present similar data for occupational and income groups by race and sex.

These conclusions fly in the face of con-

[1] The writer is indebted to the Bureau of the Census for providing for this analysis unpublished data from the 1960 Census of Population.

[2] Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938), p. 167.

[3] William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

[4] H. Ashley Weeks, "Differential Divorce Rates by Occupation," *Social Forces*, XXI (1943), 334–37; August B. Hollingshead, "Class Differences in Family Stability," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXII (1950), 39–46; William A. Kephart, "Occupational Level and Marital Disruption," *American Sociological Review*, XX (1955), 456–65; William J. Goode, *After Divorce* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956).

[5] Paul C. Glick, *American Families* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), p. 154, Table 102. Glick's rates are calculated as rate of divorce or separation among those "subject to" divorce or separation. "Subject to" divorce is defined as married plus one half of those divorced at the time of the census who divorced in the two years previous to the census. His rates are adjusted for age.

[6] Karen G. Hillman, "Marital Instability and Its Relation to Education, Income, and Occupation: An Analysis Based on Census Data," in Robert F. Winch, Robert McGinnis, and Herbert R. Barringer (eds.), *Selected Studies in Marriage and the Family* (rev. ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962), pp. 602–8.

clusions from small studies, and also contain patterns which are difficult to reconcile. For example, Hillman's tables show an inverse relationship between marital instability for white men, but a direct relationship for white women. In a population in which educational homogamy is the rule the result is improbable.[7] The problem is in the method of calculation of instability rates used by Glick and Hillman, necessitated by the limitations of their data. They




FIG. 1.—Percentage of those ever married who were divorced and separated at the 1950 Census. *Solid line*, white males; *long-dash line*, white females; *short-dash line*, non-white males; *dash-dot line*, non-white females. (Source: Hillman, *op. cit.*)

had available only figures from which to calculate the proportion of those ever married who were *at the time of the Census* either divorced or separated. It is possible that differences in the rate of remarriage and time lag in remarriage explain the differences in rates shown in their analyses, or at least the discrepancies between the Census data and previous studies. For example, if two groups have the same over-all percentage of couples who divorce each year, but one group has a remarriage rate of 90 per cent in five years and the second has a remarriage rate of 45 per cent in five years, then at any one time many more people in the second group will be in a divorced status. Likewise, if the remarriage rate for the first group is 50 per cent in two years, and in the second is 50 per cent in four years, then at any one time the second group will have many more persons in a divorced status, even though the ultimate divorce and even remarriage rates for the two groups are identical.[8]

The data presented below are calculated from unpublished tables from the 1960 Census, based on a 5 per cent sample of the U.S. population, and provided the author by the Bureau of the Census. For most of the categories calculated by Hillman for 1950, the 1960 data offer the same relationships. For some categories data are not available for one census or the other. The 1960 analysis contains no rates by income. The 1950 data provide no rates for females by occupational status of the woman. Differences in educational categories between 1950 and 1960 should also be noted.

In order to take into account the fact that most persons who divorce remarry,

[7] In 1960 the probability of a married college-graduate female being married to a no-college male was about 0.25, while the probability of a no-college male being married to a female college graduate was about 0.07 (calculated from *U.S. Census of Population, 1960: Families*. PC (2) 4A, Tables 25 and 26). This does not exclude the possibility that many short heterogamous marriages occur which then collapse to swell the ranks of the broken-marriage group. However, marriage license studies make this seem unlikely (see, e.g., Lee G. Burchinal and Loren E. Chancellor, "Survival Rates among Religiously Homogamous and Interreligious Marriages" [Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University, Research Bulletin No. 512, December, 1962], for some pertinent data).

[8] Exactly the same problems are inherent in Glick's analysis of marital disruption using the 1960 Census data (Paul C. Glick, "Marriage Instability: Variations by Size of Place and Region," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XLI [January, 1963], 43–55). Neither Glick nor Hillman had available the category "persons married more than once" to add to the numerators of their ratios, and hence they were unable to discuss the extent of marital instability at all but were required to limit themselves to marriages currently disrupted.

disruption rates were calculated in the present analysis by adding together the number divorced, the number separated, and the number married more than once, and dividing by the number ever married.[9] In the total population, of course, this calculation is contaminated by the number of widowed persons who have remarried, which might conceivably vary by socioeconomic status. Death rates also vary by race, marital status, and socioeconomic status, and serve as another contaminant, removing from enumeration more Negroes, low-status persons, and divorced persons than their proportion in the population. Therefore all calculations were also made on the age group 25–34. In this group most persons who will




FIG. 2.—Percentage of those ever married who were divorced, separated, or had been married more than once at the 1960 Census, by education (age 14 and over). Legend same as in Fig. 1. (Source: Unpublished data furnished by the Bureau of the Census.)

ever marry are married,[10] most have been married long enough to have a chance for disruption,[11] and few have had time to be widowed and remarried.[12] However, the data for the age group 25–34 so calculated show relationships identical to those calculated on all persons over 14 years old (see Figs. 2 and 3).

There are still weaknesses in the Census data from which the tables are calculated, as shown in the data. Men of each race, for example, show substantially lower disruption rates than women. Several factors could contribute to this picture: higher mortality for men with disrupted marriages than for similar women, underreporting of broken marriages by men (it is known that men who are separated or divorced are more likely to report themselves single than are separated or divorced women), report-




FIG. 3.—Percentage of those ever married who were divorced, separated, or had been married more than once at the 1960 Census, by education (ages 25–34). Legend same as in Fig. 1. (Source: Unpublished data furnished by the Bureau of the Census.)

[9] This calculation cannot catch the instability which takes the form of separation and reunion with the same spouse, since there is no category "ever separated."

[10] Of all females who eventually marry, about nine in ten do so before age 25, and of all males who eventually marry, about nine in ten do so before age 30 (calculated from Paul H. Jacobson, *American Marriage and Divorce* [New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1959], pp. 78, 80).

[11] For all couples who divorce, the median number of years of marriage before divorce in 1957 was 6.7 years (National Office of Vital Statistics, *Special Reports*, L, No. 18 [1959], lviii). But most of these were separated earlier. Kephart reported that in Philadelphia more than half of those divorcing were separated by the fifth year of marriage (William M. Kephart, "The Duration of Marriage," *American Sociological Review*, XIX [June, 1954], 287–95). The modal length of marriage at separation in Kephart's figures was less than one year, and Jacobson (*op. cit.*, p. 94) reported that post–World War II marriages which end in divorce had a modal length of less than two years.

[12] Of course using a young age group introduces other biases. Negroes, low-status persons, and females marry earlier and are therefore exposed to the risk of disruption more years by a given age than whites, high-status persons, and males, respectively.

ing of a previous marital state by unmarried women with children, and other factors. Studies of the effect of race of the interviewer on responses of Negro respondents have shown that white interviewers find higher proportions of separated women while Negro interviewers find higher proportions of single women. Whether inaccurate reporting of marital status varies by socioeconomic or educational status is not known, but the data available encourage

TABLE 1

PROPORTION OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES WHO WERE MARRIED BY CERTAIN AGES, BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, BY RACE, FOR HUSBAND-WIFE FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960

Age at Time at Marriage	Years of School Completed			
	Husband		Wife	
	Less than 8	16 or More	Less than 8	16 or More
White:				
Under 22.....	0.34	0.15	0.35	0.12
28 and over...	.25	.27	.25	.32
Non-white:				
Under 22.....	.39	.15	.39	.17
28 and over...	0.28	0.35	0.28	0.35

Source: Computed from *U.S. Census of Population, 1960: Families* (PC (2) 4A), Table 45, p. 358.

this hypothesis. Yet another factor is the fact that women marry at earlier ages than men, and therefore are exposed to the risk of marital disruption longer by a given age. Table 1 suggests that, if education is controlled, the sex difference in age at marriage is not so great And of course at every age mortality is higher for men than women.

There remains one serious problem which this data cannot resolve. The average age at first marriage is directly related to number of years of education. Therefore, at least in the group age 25–34, the most educated have been exposed to the risk of marital disruption for a shorter period of time. Table 1 shows that more than one-third of those with less than eight years of education are married before age 22, while only about one-sixth of those with 16 or more years of education are married before age 22. On the other hand, one-fourth of those with under eight years of education, but one-third of those with sixteen or more years of education, are married at or after age 28. These figures, however, do not vary much by race and sex, and therefore probably bias the race and sex differences in approximately the same way. (Unfortunately, those not in husband-wife family status in 1960 do not form part of the proportions shown in Table 1.) Other studies indicate that the rate of divorce in those who marry very early is greater than those who marry very late. If, of all marriages which are broken by divorce, half are broken by the fifth year of marriage, then by age 27, at least twice as great a proportion of those in the lowest educational category will have been exposed to the maximum risk of divorce as will those in the highest educational category.[13] If early marriage contributes to high disruption rates independently of education (and this is not certain), then these two factors of greater exposure to risk could account for most of the difference in the disruption rates by education shown in Figure 3. The fact that the pattern for all persons over 14 years of age (Fig. 2) is very similar to the pattern for those 25–34, which is in turn very similar to the pattern for those age 35–44 (not shown), weakens the likelihood that the greater exposure to risk explanation is the entire explanation, although it does not eliminate the possibility.

Hillman reviews other weaknesses of Census data on divorce, which also apply to the present data. The number of di-

[13] Furthermore, of all women who divorce, those who dropped out of high school tend to divorce after fewer years of marriage than those who graduated from college. This increases the exposure to risk of the least educated group, since the period of greatest risk occurs earlier in marriage and earlier in life (Glick, *American Families*, pp. 149–50).

vorced persons is underestimated in the Census, but it is not known how the underestimation of divorced persons varies by the characteristics of this analysis. Within the limitations inherent in the data, the following observations can be made.

EDUCATION AND MARITAL STABILITY

When looking at total disruption rates, it is obvious that there is a clear inverse relationship between disruption rate and educational status for both sexes and both races. The elevated rate for women with graduate training compared with the low rate for men with graduate training (most




FIG. 4.—Percentage of those ever married who were divorced but not remarried at the 1960 Census, by education (age 14 and over). Legend same as in Fig. 1. (Source: Unpublished data furnished by the Bureau of the Census.)

of whom are married to women without graduate training) is an interesting but minor exception (see Figs. 2 and 3). When we compare non-whites and whites of the same sex, non-white rates of disruption are from one and a half to more than two times the rates for whites of the same educational level. The higher the educational level, the more different are white and non-white rates of divorced status at the time of the 1960 Census (Fig. 4), but a comparison with Figure 3 suggests that this is largely due to differences in rates and lags in remarriage, since it does not hold when the "married more than once" group is added to the numerator. The ratio between white and non-white disruption rates in 1960 is fairly constant over different educational levels (Fig. 3). These observations do not give unqualified support to the frequent suggestion that increasing non-white status will obliterate racial differences in marital




FIG. 5.—Percentage of those ever married who were separated at the 1960 Census, by education (age 14 and over). Legend same as in Fig. 1. (Source: Unpublished data furnished by the Bureau of the Census.)

patterns, although they indicate that it should reduce these differences.

Being separated is still a characteristic reported primarily by the uneducated and the non-white (Fig. 5). Since these data only show those separated at one point in time, the pattern of Figure 5 cannot be taken to represent the relative frequency of the occurrence of separation in each category. In this sense it has the weakness inherent in the data Hillman and Glick worked with.

The percentage divorced may be viewed as a way of estimating differentials in the rate and time lag in remarriage among divorced groups. Comparison among the fig-

ures presented invites (but does not establish) the following interpretations as hypotheses for further exploration. Among whites without college, the men remarry more rapidly than the women, while among whites with college, the women remarry more rapidly than the men. Younger white females with graduate education remarry more rapidly than older white women with




FIG. 6.—Percentage of those ever married who were divorced, separated, or had been married more than once at the 1960 Census, by occupation (ages 25–34). (Source: Unpublished data furnished by the Bureau of the Census.)

similar education. The divorced per cent for these educated women age 25–34 is only 0.5 per cent, while among all white women with graduate education it is 6.3 per cent. There is virtually no difference for white men of this educational level between percentage divorced among the young and percentage divorced among all ages. Among non-whites, more-educated women remarry more slowly than less-educated women, while the relationship for men is curvilinear. There are, of course, other interpretations of these differences in rates. Many of the differences are no doubt due to differential accuracy of reporting in different groups, and to other limitations in the data discussed above.

OCCUPATION AND MARITAL STABILITY

Occupational status and its relationship to marital stability must be considered a different phenomenon for each sex (Fig. 6), since marital disruption may lead some women into certain occupational categories, while it is more difficult to conceive of men being led into certain occupations as a result of marital disruption. Generally speaking, there is lowest marital stability in the lowest-status occupation for men, and highest stability in the high-status occupations, with highest instability in men in personal service and domestic service. Occupational status has the same relationship to marital stability in non-white and white males, except that non-white rates are more than double the white rates. The relationship between occupational status and marital stability for men is direct and unequivocal.

Peculiar disruption rates are associated with each occupational category among women who are employed, and these rates cannot be said to be associated with the status level of the occupational group. Since occupational status of employed women cannot be said to be a primary socioeconomic status attribute of women, and since less than half of women are included, this finding does not vitiate the fundamental inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and marital disruption. The female rates by occupation are unexplained, and the pattern invites research into the functional relationship between marriage and various occupations for women.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Analysis of 1960 Census data shows the relationship between status and marital disruption to be inverse for both sexes and for both whites and non-whites, when status is measured by educational level. When measured by occupational status, the relationship of status to marital disruption is still inverse and clear for men. The far

greater instability of non-white marriages is shown not to be attributable solely to the general low educational and occupational status of this group, but a characteristic of non-white groups of all educational and occupational levels. By occupational status there is practically no overlap in rates between white and non-whites of any status level, and the overlap between the two groups on disruption rates by education is slight. Of course occupational and educational differences within the non-white group are related to marital instability in the same way as among whites.

The analysis presented here does not explain white–non-white differences but simply delineates them more clearly. Socioeconomic status differences not tapped by education and occupation may still explain much of the difference. For example, non-whites and whites matched on occupation or education are still grossly unequal in income, which may be related to divorce rates independently of occupational status. Perhaps the "caste" position of Negroes has a relationship to marital instability. Perhaps a historical-cultural explanation, tracing the Negro family pattern to roots in the slavery system, is made more tenable in the light of the above data.[14] Census data cannot lead to a definitive choice among the possible explanations.

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[14] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro in the United States* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957) and *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

The Hypothesis of Intersocietal Similarity in Occupational Prestige Hierarchies[1]

An influential hypothesis in stratification theory holds that industrial society produces a unique occupational prestige hierarchy. So it is thought that as the previously non-industrialized nations develop industry their occupational prestige structures become more and more like those of the industrialized nations.[2] Euro-American nations, especially the United States, are viewed as the most representative of this type. The data used to support this notion are the high correlations (+.90 or more, on the whole) among the average evaluations people of various societies make of certain occupational titles.[3]

But this evidence is weaker than it appears to be. Correlations such as those observed could arise when in fact there is only a slight similarity in the occupational prestige structures of any pair of societies. Moreover, no one seems to have produced evidence supporting the notion that *industrialization* produces the similarities that may exist. We shall present several factors that may influence the observed correlations among occupational prestige structures. Some of the factors should lead to overestimating the correlations and some to underestimating them. In the net, these suggest that the similarities may be less than has been supposed. Following this we shall present data suggesting that the complexity of the division of labor (urbanization) in general rather than industry in particular may be responsible for the reported similarities.

PROBLEMS OF RESEARCH TECHNIQUE

Ordinarily, data for calculating the intersocietal similarity in occupational prestige structures are based on samples of persons who rank samples of occupational titles. Each member of at least two samples of respondents, one sample from each society, is asked to rate a limited number of translatable occupational titles on a simple scale of social status (such as "prestige," "general standing," etc.). The possible scores for each occupation are usually 1 to 5. The societal evaluation of each occupation is, in effect, the mean of all the individual ratings assigned to it. Similarity in occupational prestige structure is calculated by correlating the means assigned to the occupations by members of one sample with the means assigned to the same occupations by members of the other sample. That is, the occupations rated are used

[1] The research on which this paper is based was supported by the Michigan State University Office of International Programs and the Michigan State University Agricultural Experiment Station, and was presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Montreal, August, 1964. The writers wish to thank Manuel Alers-Montalvo, Antonio Arce, and Iwao Ishino for their help at various stages of the research.

[2] Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXI (January, 1956), 329–39.

[3] Most of these data are presented or cited in Inkeles and Rossi (*ibid.*); Charles E. Ramsey and Robert J. Smith, "Japanese and American Perceptions of Occupations," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXV (March, 1960), 475–82; and Edward A. Tiryakian, "The Prestige Evaluation of Occupations in an Underdeveloped Country: The Philippines," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXIII (January, 1958), 390–99. Others may be found in Kaare Svalastoga, *Prestige, Class and Mobility* (Toronto: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1959), pp. 62–67 and 79–108, esp. the tables, pp. 91 and 108. Also see Robert W. Hodge, Donald J. Treiman, and Peter H. Rossi, "A Comparative Study of Occupational Prestige," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset, *Class, Status and Power* (2d ed.; New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 309–21.

as the final unit of analysis, rather than the persons who rated them. There are at least three sources of difficulty with this procedure as it is often used.

1. *Translatability of terms.*—The above procedure cannot possibly yield similarity of occupational prestige structures except for those occupational titles which can be expressed in the language or terminology of each of the societies under comparison. An occupational title is a word standing for an occupational role, a series of activities, all or most of which are ordinarily performed by any one role incumbent. All persons having the title are expected to perform most of the activities and presumably most usually do. Now, if activities carried out by members of one society are not carried out by members of another, or if comparable activities are combined in different ways in two societies, then the occupational titles standing for these activities cannot be translated except by means of complex, sometimes unintelligible, phrases. It stands to reason, then, that the greater the difference between the occupational roles of two societies, the lower the proportion of translatable occupational titles. There can be no prestige similarity among untranslatable occupational titles because those who rate the occupational titles will not know what they are rating. Hence, the prestige correlation between translatable sets of occupational titles will indicate, at best, the degree of prestige similarity in those sectors of the occupational structures of different societies which are most alike. There are at least two logically different (but probably empirically mixed) ways this could occur. First, the occupational structures of two societies may differ only in that one has a larger number of occupations than the other, but all those of the second are possessed by the first. The correlation coefficient might be very high, yet miss the fact that their occupational prestige structures differ sharply in complexity. Second, two societies may have some occupations in common, and have others which are relatively unique to each. Again, ignoring the unshared occupational titles and correlating the others would give the illusion of greatly similar occupational prestige hierarchies. In any case the research to date in this area almost surely tends to overestimate the degree of similarity because the most dissimilar occupations have been deliberately left out of the comparisons.

2. *Sampling persons.*—Obviously there are problems of sampling human populations that might interfere with accurate estimates of parameter values. Most of these are shared with practically all other sociological research. We shall restrict ourselves to one which is more or less characteristic of this particular issue. This is the possibility that large samples are needed in order to show accurately the degree of correlation that exists among occupational prestige hierarchies. Suppose, for example, that two samples (A and B) evaluate each of four occupational titles; and suppose, too, that the order of the means of each is identical in the universes from which the samples were drawn, namely, $\bar{X}_1 > \bar{X}_2 > \bar{X}_3 > \bar{X}_4$. This, of course, yields a rank correlation of $+1.00$ (although a Pearsonian correlation coefficient could be a little below $+1.00$). But if one sample (say, A) is small, the order of its means as we observe them may easily be quite different: $\bar{X}_{2A} > \bar{X}_{1A} > \bar{X}_{4A} > \bar{X}_{3A}$, for example. If the other sample (B) is very large, chances are the order of its observed means will be the same as the order of the true means in the universe: $\bar{X}_{1B} > \bar{X}_{2B} > \bar{X}_{3B} > \bar{X}_{4B}$. If we correlate the two sets of observed means, we will erroneously conclude that the correlation in the universe is lower than it really is. And if both samples are small, the possibilities for error are greater.

Thus, the net effect of this set of problems is probably to underestimate the true

correlation between occupational prestige structures.

3. *Sampling occupational titles.*—As if the above were not enough, there is yet a more serious statistical problem. To date, no intersocietal occupational prestige study known to the writers has used a large unbiased sample even of translatable occupational titles. This is needed because biased samples of occupations can yield overestimates of the amount of correlation, especially when the samples of occupations are small. Obviously, for example, if only two occupations at extreme ends of roughly similar occupational prestige hierarchies were being rated by persons from each of two societies, the means would doubtless turn out to have the same rank in each society and the observed rank correlation among occupations would be +1.00. This would occur if the true correlation among all occupations were as low as, say, +0.20 or less.

This is not an exaggerated example. Most of the studies on which the conclusions about intersocietal similarities in occupational prestige structures rest use twenty or fewer occupational titles in their comparisons, and none has ever used a genuinely random sample of titles, if indeed such a thing can be imagined. It is almost certain that most have oversampled the higher prestige end (as defined in the West) and to some extent the lower, and have undersampled the middle range. Because of this problem, most of the existing research has probably overestimated the amount of correlation between the occupational prestige hierarchies of different societies.

SOCIOLOGICAL SOURCES OF SIMILARITY

Inkeles and Rossi have tended to argue that the observed intersocietal correlations in prestige ranks of occupations can be explained largely as a function of the social structure introduced into any cultural system by industrialization.[4] This they call the "structuralist" position, viewed as a polar opposite to a "culturalist" position, which, they say, stresses the uniqueness of the occupational prestige hierarchy of each culture. Even if we assume that the observed high correlations are not simply illusions based on inadequate research techniques, it is still by no means certain that the introduction of industrial systems accounts for them. Indeed, in their detailed analysis of discrepancies in prestige positions, Inkeles and Rossi present evidence that industry per se is, at best, one of several factors responsible for the appearance of similarity in occupational prestige hierarchies. This analysis leads them to wonder whether similarities in "needs or values" and "the nation state" may account for them. Moreover, Thomas has shown that the same correlations exist between the occupational prestige structures of a non-industrial nation (Indonesia) and various industrial nations as exist among the latter.[5] He suspects that "common attitudes toward subdimensions of prestige," most of which are "not the exclusive property of either Western or Eastern civilization," may account for the similarities.

There are other reasons, too, for thinking that industrialization or the industrial system does not satisfactorily explain the valid portions of the correlations. Rather they are probably due to similarities in the evaluation of occupational roles which emerge in dense populations with complex divisions of labor; in short, they may be due to urbanization in general rather than industrialization in particular. The reasoning, by no means certain, is as follows.

1. Complex divisions of labor have existed in all known urban civilizations—the Nile River, Mesopotamia, China, Rome—as well as in many non-industrialized contemporary civilizations. These center on government, food distribution, personal adornment, health, building construction, the military, etc. When the lives, actions,

[4] Inkeles and Rossi, *op. cit.*

[5] R. Murray Thomas, "Reinspecting a Structural Position on Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (March, 1962), 561-65.

health, economic well-being, etc., of the population depend largely on the actions of the incumbents of a certain occupation, that occupation is usually highly evaluated, both today and in the distant past. Industrial systems, on the other hand, began in Europe within the last few hundred years and have been adopted extensively by only a few non-Western nations. The occupational titles in the research on which the case for the "industrialization" hypothesis rests are by no means always related to industry. For each of these studies[6] and for the 1947 NORC study,[7] we (with the help of several colleagues who are occupational sociologists and development economists) have tried to determine the proportion of the occupational titles (and their basic functions) which existed before industrialization took place in the West. Naturally, these counts are quite imprecise, but if our collective judgment is correct, at least one-third and perhaps many more of the occupational titles in each of the intersocietal comparisons cited here, including the 1947 NORC study itself, have no necessary connection with industry. Thus it seems certain that part of the evidence for the supposed influence of the industrial system on similarity of occupational prestige hierarchies is based on data which are not clearly related to the industrial occupational order. That is, occupational titles which apparently existed before the industrial revolution began are included in and contribute to the high correlations usually observed.

2. Most, if not all, published research on intersocietal correlations in the evaluation of occupations is based on samples of people most of whom are living in intimate contact with complex divisions of labor; indeed even the "rural" Japanese sample of Ramsey and Smith was taken from a city of 20,000 people.[8] It would be instructive to learn how people outside complex systems evaluate occupational titles. People who are not in frequent contact with many persons who occupy specialized work roles probably have little opportunity to perceive the relative deference, rewards, and punishments which are accorded persons in various specialized occupational roles, or to develop an awareness of the functional importance attributed to each by those deeply involved in such systems. Farming is one of the few sectors of the occupational structure which usually has a simple division of labor. However small, most farms are managed by means of a set of activities which are complex, varying sharply from chore to chore and season to season, yet are performed by one or a very few persons. (In complex divisions of labor these activities would be organized so that each individual concentrates on but a few things. This in fact tends to happen to farming itself when it becomes rationalized.) It is likely then that those living in closely knit farming communities would not learn to evaluate occupations as do those living in systems which have more differentiated occupational structures. Apparently, then, the variation among communities in the proportion of the population in farming would be a good index of the complexity of the division of labor visible to community members. Thus, if we assume that (*a*) the previously observed correlations are not purely illusory, and (*b*) translatable occupational titles stand for similarly evaluated sets of activities in different societies, then it stands to reason that the more complex the division of labor in which people participate, the more likely they will be to evaluate translatable occupational titles similarly. More specifically, the lower the proportion of sample members who are in farming, the higher the correlation among samples in the evaluation of translatable occupational titles.

We have tried to test the aspect of the

[6] See sources cited in n. 3.

[7] See Albert J. Reiss *et al.*, *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), esp. pp. 54–58.

[8] Ramsey and Smith, *op. cit.*

argument dealing with the complexity of the visible occupational structure in the following ways. First, using the general outlines of the usual procedures, we calculated prestige ranks for rough translations of eighty NORC occupational titles for five samples of Japanese school boys, one sample of Turrialba, Costa Rica, school boys, and a sample of Mason, Michigan, school boys. We then calculated the rank-order correlations of each set of evaluations with those provided by the NORC's adult United States sample of 1947. The latter is taken to be typical of occupational evaluations of people immersed in the most complex of known occupational structures. Thus the higher the rank-order correlation with U.S. adult samples, the more closely the group's evaluation of the occupations approaches that of people familiar with complex systems. Next we used the percentage of the sample who were from non-farm families as an index of the degree to which the sample members were involved in a complex division of labor. Finally we have plotted all seven samples according to their positions on these variables.[9]

Figure 1 shows this plot. The X-axis is the complexity of the division of labor immediately visible to the sample members, as indexed by the percentage of the sample whose families are non-farm. The Y-axis is the rank-order coefficient of the correlation ρ of the mean occupational prestige rankings made by each of the seven samples with the mean rankings made by the U.S. adult sample. Obviously, even when we allow for error due to sample variability, there are enormous differences in the average evaluations of these eighty occupations which are apparently related to complexity of the division of labor probably visible to sample members. The ρ with U.S. adult criterion group ranges from -0.04 for the sample with the simplest division of labor (Soro Aza in Japan; percentage non-farm $=25$), through $+0.84$ (Sendai Shi in Japan; percentage non-farm $=79$), to $+0.87$ (Turrialba, Costa Rica; percentage non-farm $= 75$).[10]

All the correlations that have been reported before are high, and they were probably all based on samples with complex divisions of labor. In the present data we see a clear and positive correlation of similarity to urban-industrial evaluations with complexity of the division of labor. These correlations range from some as large as those in previous literature down to about zero. Taken together with the reasoning presented above, this evidence suggests that something connected with the complexity of the occupational structure visible to participants in a social system, rather than industrialization as such, accounts for the valid parts of the intersocietal correlation in the prestige rankings of translatable occupational titles.

However, these data do not constitute a definitive test. Future research should

[9] These data are based on questionnaires filled out by junior high school and high school boys in school in 1959 and 1960. The names and sample sizes for each place are as follows: *Japan:* Sendai Shi (28), Noda Shi (28), Emi Machi (23), Futomi Mura (39), Soro Aza (24); *Costa Rica:* Turrialba (118); *Michigan:* Mason (61). Sendi Shi has a population of 250,000; Noda Shi has a population of 25,000. All other places are 6,500 or fewer. The school grade levels of the samples were slightly different: Sendai Shi, third-year high school; Noda Shi, second-year high school; all other Japanese samples, third-year middle school; Mason, Michigan, third-year high school; Turrialba, Costa Rica, first- through fourth-year high school.

[10] A check to see whether the rank-order (ρ) correlations are influenced substantially by the sample sizes shows that in the Japan samples there is little relation between the number of respondents in a sample and the ρ-values. However, the two largest ρ's are from the two largest samples (both non-Japan) as we would expect. Moreover, pooling all Japanese respondents results in a ρ with the U.S. sample of $+0.70$, while averaging the ρ's of the five Japan samples leaves a mean ρ of $+0.53$. This seems to show, as expected, that increasing the sample size decreases the variability of the mean scores, increasing the correlation with other large samples. We conclude that, although these samples are probably underestimating the degree of correlation in their respective universes, the differences in correlation among samples are due much more to the complexity of the division of labor than to error of estimation.

take the following into account. (1) New data should be based on much larger samples of people taken more systematically in several carefully selected societies, using better samples of occupational titles. Especially important would be samples drawn from non-Japanese communities with simple divisions of labor. This should tell us whether the inference concerning complexity is general or whether it applies only to Japan. (2) In any case, other evidence shows that there is a "Tokagawa," or pre-industrial, component in the evaluation of selected occupational titles by these same rural Japanese youth.[11] It is almost uncorrelated with the typical "urban-industrial" ordering. Thus it doubtless explains part of the correlation presented in the graph. Because we doubt that more than a few of the occupational titles presented to the boys can be viewed by them as modern examples of occupations in the Tokagawa system, we believe that the Tokagawa component cannot possibly explain the entire set of findings. But we need to learn just what its relative contribution is. (3) Also, more direct measures of both objective and

[11] David M. Lewis and Archibald O. Haller, "Rural-Urban Differences in Pre-industrial and Industrial Evaluations of Occupations by Japanese Adolescent Boys," *Rural Sociology*, XXIX (September, 1964), 324–29. The term "Tokagawa component" refers to a traditional ordering of occupations, stemming from the Tokagawa era. The Japanese rulers of the period decreed that there were four main classes. In order of prestige, these were warriors, farmers, artisans, and merchants.




FIG. 1

perceived complexity of the immediate occupational structure should be used. It is probably reasonable to assume, as we have here, that perceived complexity of the division of labor is a function of objective complexity, but this should be shown. Also, it should be possible to construct more direct indexes of complexity, thus providing better instruments for testing hypotheses of this sort. (4) It has been suggested that basic similarities in values may account for the fact that in complex systems people evaluate translatable occupational titles similarly. We need to learn whether in fact this is the case. And it is possible that, even in widely different occupational structures, the same set of values may be present, producing under such varying social conditions a different set of evaluations of translatable occupational titles.

DISCUSSION

We have seen that there are strong reasons for maintaining a certain degree of skepticism about recent inferences to the effect that the occupational prestige structures of different societies are similar and that this similarity is due to industrialization. The evidence regarding similarities is limited to translatable occupational titles. Moreover, the correlations reported are subject to error. Small and biased samples of translatable occupational titles tend to overestimate the correlation, and small samples of people tend to underestimate it. In any case industrialization may have relatively little to do with whatever intersocietal occupational prestige similarities may really exist. Many, if not most, of the comparable occupational titles used in determining the observed similarity do not depend on modern industry; at least one urban non-industrial sample has the same correlation noted among industrial societies,[12] and the correlation of the occupational prestige evaluations of various samples with those of an urban industrial society varies greatly with an index of the complexity of their division of labor.

But these conclusions should not lead us to abandon research in the area. On the contrary, they should stimulate more careful work aimed at developing and testing more general hypotheses to account for both similarities and differences in the evaluations of work roles. Perhaps the hypotheses offered by Thomas[13] could be a point of departure for explaining such similarities as exist among samples drawn from communities having complex divisions of labor. Among samples with simple divisions of labor it may well be that divergent occupational evaluations such as we have noted above may be due either to values not shared by those in complex systems, or to ignorance of the ways in which complex occupations tend to fulfil shared values. Finally, there are doubtless systematic similarities and differences in the evaluation of known occupations between communities with simple divisions of labor. Ultimately the sources of these differences should be traced down as well, and brought into a theory which accounts for them as well as the other sets of variations in occupational prestige hierarchies.

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[12] Thomas, *op. cit.*

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 565–67.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Female Status and Premarital Sexual Codes

May 26, 1966

To the Editor:

Ordinarily, differences in the strictness of premarital sex codes and observance of rigid standards of sexual morality are seen as normative phenomena—that is, deriving from the inculcation of such norms as part of childhood socialization. Yet in this, as in all such matters, I believe it useful to treat the norm somewhat as an epiphenomenon and to look for the source of variation in the structure of interactions themselves. Thus at the risk of naïveté in an area where I have little professional knowledge, I would like to suggest a possible source of such variation. More specifically, I would like to suggest that the rigidity of premarital sexual codes varies inversely with female dominance in the determination of family status. Where females are more dominant, that is, where the system is more matriarchal, the sex codes will be less rigid than where the female's ultimate status depends on the status of her husband.

This thesis is based upon the premise that only where the female is highly dependent upon the male for status and position in society will she have reason to maintain such a code. It says, in effect, that in such social settings the female's principal good-in-exchange by which she can locate herself favorably in society is her sexual activity and that, if this good is to remain valuable, it must be carefully guarded and conserved. In contrast, when her status and ultimate position do not depend greatly upon her husband, she need not be so cautious. Her sexual activity may now be a pleasure to be enjoyed more nearly for its own sake, without regard for its loss in value through promiscuity and loss of "reputation." Her sexual activity is not so much a commodity by which she establishes her ultimate social position, and she need no longer withhold it for exchange purposes. She becomes more like the male in this regard, having less reason to maintain her sexual activity as a scarce good in a market, more reason to consume it for its direct enjoyment.

If this thesis be true, it casts a very different light on the freer sexual codes observed by Negroes of lower and lower-middle class position than those of whites of similar position, for it locates the source of the difference in the greater dominance of the Negro female in the Negro family than of the white female in the white family. For historical and present occupational reasons, the Negro female has a much more dominant role in determining family position and status than does the white female of the same social class. According to the present thesis, this frees her from the use of sexual activity as a commodity and allows her more freely to accede to, or to initiate, sexual activity, with less regard for its consequence, than can her white counterpart.

The implication of this thesis is that, if true, the principal change in Negro or white sexual standards will come about as a consequence of changes in the relative importance of the female in determining family status. This is a very different source of change from that commonly proposed: increasing freedom in socialization patterns among parents of white children, leading to less rigid norms among whites, and increasing adoption of "middle-class standards" by Negroes, leading to more rigid norms among Negroes. The present thesis suggests that, whether or not either of these trends is occurring, they do not constitute the dominant source of changes in rigidity of premarital sex codes.

JAMES S. COLEMAN

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. By MANCUR OLSON, JR. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. 176. $4.50.

Read, sociologists! Mancur Olson's little book may prove subversive of the status quo of much *soi-distant* theory in sociology, anthropology, and the fresh behavioral science developments of political science. The subversiveness lies in what many may find an uncomfortable confrontation both analytically and evaluatively. Bluntly, we sociologists face some possibilities over Olson's brilliantly troublesome little book. If I am not incorrect in what I judge Olson to state there, if Olson is not incorrect in what I judge him to state about the literature on collective action in the social sciences generally, and if Olson's applications of theoretical tools largely identified with modern economic theory to this subject matter are not trivially untenable, then we are faced with certain clear-cut alternatives: (1) We regard his work as having definitively disposed of the views he holds untenable and cease to invoke the now-disposed-of positions, or (2) we give up our pretenses of interest in the science game, or (3) we do neither of the preceding but fall back on the position that one of the fundamental differences of kind between *Naturwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft* is that we of the latter persuasion never regard any position as disproved if we really care enough about it—for whatever reason. So much for a review in one sentence. For a précis of what the book does, I cannot improve on Olson's Introduction as quoted on the book's jacket:

> It is often taken for granted, at least where economic objectives are involved, that groups of individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those common interests. . . . [This view] presumably is based upon the assumption that the individuals in groups act out of self-interests. . . . But it is *not* in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested behavior. . . . Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.*

One can think of qualifications Olson has ignored. Charismatic leadership can do wonders for changing the membership parameters of "quite small groups" in this connection as can structures (for example, certain possibilities of rote learning and Pavlovian techniques) which might do for people what magnets can do for iron filings—but here the costs are high in obvious senses, and these measures affect only the exact location of the parameters, not the general theoretical demonstration that they can never be ignored.

His analysis has far-reaching implications for our very best intentioned positions on democracy, small groups, stratification, and many positions that will shortly be the rage among us on education, poverty programs, and other of our applied responsibilities. Beyond his substantive contribution—if that exists—Olson's troublesome little book requires that we put up or shut up about science.

MARION J. LEVY, JR.

Princeton University

Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory. By ALVIN W. GOULDNER. New York: Basic Books, 1966. Pp. ix+407. $8.50.

The century leading up to Plato is, from any sociological point of view, a natural. After all, it began with the reforms of that master applied sociologist, Cleisthenes, whose scrambling of Athenian roles, statuses, and reference groups in 507 B.C. (known conventionally and unilluminatingly in the ancient-history textbooks as the abolition of the ten old tribes and the founding of ten new tribes along with the hundred *demes*) provided the essential social contexts of the cultural efflorescence that is the fifth century B.C.—and of much else as well. For, as Alvin W. Gouldner shows us in this

extraordinarily good book, the forces which were eventually to subvert Athenian culture, leading to cultural morbidity, are closely interwoven with the processes of change which produced everything that Pericles eulogized in his celebrated oration. Along with (and indeed closely a part of) the astonishing achievements of the age were subterranean conflicts: between the traditional and rational, the communal and individual, guilt and emancipation, authority and choice. Eventually these conflicts were to prove too much for Athenian polity to bear, but they were transmuted for all posterity into the stuff of which Western social theory was born. As Gouldner writes: "One way that men for whom established tradition and its interpreters have lost authority may know the right and the real is by referring to the opinion of those around them."

Enter Plato! Gouldner is, of course, not the first to deal with the fundamental themes of Plato's social theory as responses to the problems of Athenian power, class, and status; but he is, so far as I know, the first systematic sociologist to do so, and he has done it well. Looking first at his method, we see that he has brought together two vital intellectual traditions: classical scholarship and sociological theory. We are given not only the works of the Greeks but the studies of such fine contemporary classical scholars as Eric Dodds, Arthur Adkins, M. I. Finley, and F. M. Cornford, all of whom, be it noted, have themselves acknowledged the interpretative stimulus they received from Weber, Durkheim, Marx, and Freud. Gouldner carries into Plato's age and his works the insights and perspectives of sociological theory. From any aesthetic or scholarly point of view, there is danger in such an enterprise. In hands less skilful and responsible than his the whole matter could have ended in banality, with Platonic genius cut down to the size of academic concept. What I admire most about this book is the restraint and the firm discrimination with which Gouldner has carried it off. It suffices to say that Plato, having entered, remains to dominate. Sociological concept is employed to illuminate, not subjugate. Gouldner gives considerable weight to the hypotheses of "shame culture" and "contest system" that have been advanced by Dodds, Adkins, Pearson, and other classicists in recent years. From the first hypothesis came the pervading Greek regard for "what people will say"; from the second, the intense value placed upon rivalry in all spheres, drama and politics as well as games and war. Gouldner's extension and highlighting of these is first rate. I should myself have given more attention to the effects of the attenuation of kinship norms than Gouldner does, working from the early, remarkable study by Gustave Glotz (who had studied under Durkheim) on the decline of the solidarity of the Greek family. (Gouldner uses Glotz's later study of the Greek city but not, so far as I can tell, the earlier work.) I could find no reference either to the still unsurpassed study by Gernet of the role of kinship themes in the language of Greek law and ethics. But it really does not matter. What is important is that Gouldner, exercising the clear right of scholar's choice, has ended up with a vivid and accurate portrayal of the problem that was to be endemic in the Greek mind by midpoint in the fifth century: the problem of the "maintenance and stability of cultural patterns."

It is in these terms that Gouldner approaches Plato. Two-thirds of the book is taken up with a penetrating analysis of Plato's social theory from the viewpoint of the challenges to Athenian polity that had been posed, not merely by a plague that had taken a quarter of the city's inhabitants in 430 and the paralyzing military defeat by Sparta in 404, but by processes of rationalization and secularization that had begun a century earlier and that had haunted the Greek mind, producing, so far as social processes ever can, the tragic and irrational elements that abound in Greek thought, Plato's included. I find Gouldner's portrait of Plato superior to that of Karl Popper two decades ago whose general correctness of conclusion was vitiated by a rather naïve animus and by an assignment of wrong reasons. Gouldner's analysis is better simply because, recognizing as he does that all major social theories have been efforts to diagnose and to prescribe for social instability, he takes the trouble to present the problems of Athens as Plato saw them and to deal with Plato's theories—ethereal and mundane, utopian and analytic—as responses to these problems. Hence his division of Plato's ideas into those of "diagnosis" and the "therapeutic." His two final chapters, "The Fatigue of Reason" and "Death and the Tragic Out-

look," are superb. In only one significant respect do I find Gouldner's treatment of Plato at fault; this is in respect to the idea of change and development. Gouldner takes the conventional view that "there is no real history in Plato's social theory, no real development, no evolution. . . ." Like many before him, Gouldner deduces this from the Platonic theory of unchanging ideas, alone "real." But no man, not even Plato, is a consistent whole in his thinking; always there are disconnected parts. Whatever his metaphysics, Plato was a Greek; he recognized cultural change, and it would be hard to find a neater picture of cultural development than we are given in the third book of *The Laws*.

ROBERT A. NISBET

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Organization and Innovation. By CHRIS ARGYRIS. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., and Dorsey Press, 1965. Pp. xii+274. $6.95.

Organization and Innovation is a report of Argyris' investigations of interpersonal competence (hereafter referred to as IC) in three research and development organizations and its relationship to the organizations' innovativeness, willingness to take risks, and problem-solving effectiveness, as these are perceived by the members. He argues that the members of these organizations, though they have high technical competence, have low IC. He sees their low IC as the result of internalized "pyramidal values," which emphasize the central importance of organization goals, rationality instead of emotionality, and the use of power and control. In these respects, holding pyramidal values and having low IC, the researchers are not very different from other organization people (managers, professors, and so forth) whom Argyris has studied, although he suggests that the solitary, thing-oriented nature of such physical science research may attract and nurture these characteristics more than other work.

He argues further that, because of the low IC of their members, research organizations tend to go through a process of progressively deteriorating interpersonal relations, innovativeness, and technical effectiveness, which is aggravated by top management's tendency to react to the situation by tightening controls.

This theory and diagnosis of organizational problems will be familiar to readers of Argyris' other works. Familiar too, will be his prescription for improving "organizational health," which is to increase the IC of organization members. Two chapters of the book are devoted to describing and evaluating a program of change that he undertook in one organization to do this. The method consisted essentially of having organization members discuss tape recordings of their regular business meetings. The evaluation, which includes before and after observations of interaction during meetings, as well as observations of the change sessions themselves, suggests that the program did have some effect in the desired direction.

The data from the three studies consist primarily of answers to questionnaires (to measure pyramidal values), responses to interviews (to measure perceived effectiveness and innovativeness), and scores derived from the observation of interaction (to measure interpersonal competence). Methodologically, the interaction observations are the most interesting. Argyris presents a new system of categories defining behaviors that he feels either further or reduce interpersonal competence—behaviors such as accepting or rejecting responsibility for one's actions and encouraging or discouraging the free expression of individual feelings and ideas. The system is imaginative, appears to be reasonably reliable, and is generally worth consideration by readers who are interested either in IC or in observational methods.

For the most part, the data are suggestive rather than compelling in their support of Argyris' ideas. In part, this is simply because his ideas go considerably beyond the data, as he fairly warns. For example, there is no data that really support the proposition, implied by his theory of organizational deterioration, that research organizations decline in technical effectiveness and innovativeness as they age

However, beyond the lack of data, there are at least two important criticisms that can be made. The first is that generally there are no comparison groups. For example, to test the hypothesis that pyramidal values encourage low IC, it is obviously necessary to compare the IC either of individuals who personally

vary in the degree to which they hold pyramidal values or of individuals who are members of organizations in which pyramidal values are differentially prevalent, depending upon how one interprets the hypothesis. But no such comparisons are made, although the data seem adequate to do so.

The second criticism is suggested by the following glimpses of Argyris at work in the field as observed and interviewer:

> The discussion continued for an hour and fifteen minutes. Finally, I decided that no one would discuss the important interpersonal issues unless I brought them up. I said, "If I understand the data, the people in the laboratory feel that there is rivalry between —— and ——; that it can become harmful, and that no one is able to do anything about it."
>
> A: Now you've really said it.
>
> B: Well yes, that's interesting. Speaking about budgets . . . ,
>
> and the discussion was again taken away from the interpersonal issues.
>
> I suggested that B had taken the discussion away from the interpersonal aspects. B replied, "I guess that I did" [p. 52].

> On the basis of the quantitative pattern, predictions were made that the board members would *not* tend to view their meetings as engendering innovation, risk taking, and full discussion of disagreements. After some initial resistance, the board members agreed with the predictions and presented many case illustrations [p. 124].

Reading these passages, it is hard not to feel that the consultant-therapist role should have been more strictly segregated from the research role. As it is, there is a strong suspicion that a major, unintended variable in these three studies was Argyris himself.

JOHN D. BREWER

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The Uses of Comparative Sociology. By STANISLAV ANDRESKI. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965. Pp. x+383. $6.50.

Theoretical sophistication, historical sensitivity, and scholarly independence are leading characteristics of this recent volume by the author of *Military Organization and Society.* The source under review is devided into three parts. Book I is focused on methodology. The following are suggestive of Andreski's penchant for significant *aperçus.* Somewhat abbreviated: The chief use of generalization is that we may know more without having to remember more for we need not remember what we can deduce. . . . Attempts to eliminate valuative words from sociology are fruitless; as soon as a neutral substitute for a colloquial word is put into circulation it acquires the same emotive charge. . . . A thesis which can be fully proven by existing data cannot be original; if it had not been current, workers in the field would not have gathered the relevant information. . . . Field workers who decry all second-hand information do not realize that if nothing useful can be said on the basis of knowledge obtained by reading then it is futile to write reports on field work. . . . "A sociologist obsessed with frameworks, jargon and techniques resembles a carpenter who becomes so worried about keeping his tools clean that he has no time to cut the wood." (Perhaps, but is it clear that sociologists are always able to identify "the wood," to say nothing of knowing how to cut it?)

Book II is directed to substantive general problems. Many of the observations reported herein are familiar to the reader; however, Andreski's simple and direct expression lends felicity. The following comments may be taken as representative: "When the posts of command are thrown open to competition, idlers and imbeciles have no chance but neither have the gentle nor those with too many scruples." . . . To win a competitive prize one must desire it very strongly, and therefore, nobody is likely to have power who does not crave it. . . . In a world state there would be no threats from the outside to countervail the normal tendency of rulers to segregate themselves from the ruled, and ill treat them. . . . Montesquieu's principle that despotism can be prevented only by a division of authority remains one of the greatest discoveries of sociology. . . . The use of mass media to foster the cult of violence, selfishness, and stupidity, instead of teaching civic virtues may well become the chief cause of the defeat of the West. This section offers some challenging ideas on the freedom, influence, and prestige of intellectuals and on the relationship of parasitism to poverty, technical stagnation, and capitalism.

Book III contains case studies on racial conflict with particular attention to South

Africa, Latin America, and the economic circumstances of antisemitism. In addition there are three essays on the antecedents and prospects of totalitarianism. Again Andreski's reasonableness turns on a not-so-common commonsense logic. To cite several instances: If Negroes were in fact incapable of learning difficult subjects there would be no point in laws and riots designed to keep them out of the universities. . . . One of the most stupid policies of South African government is to label as Communists anyone sympathetic to the Africans, thus instilling the idea that the Communists are their only friends. . . . The genealogy of ideas will throw light on historical processes when such ideas are difficult to conceive, as in science or technology, but "anything so primitive as ideological justifications for the dislike of strangers can occur spontaneously to any untutored mind." Defection of soldiers provides a fairly good index of loyalty; using this index, Stalin did not inspire as much loyalty as Czar Nicholas II.

The author's open-ended framework is consistent with the need to epitomize cultural similarities and differences. Inevitably, he is more successful in showing the fruitfulness of comparative analysis than in exhibiting its methodological limitations—a point he seems to recognize. On the other hand, some readers will find his criticism of functional theories quite insightful and even original. Since the level of analysis falls between the interests of text and trade audiences, the volume should appeal to both the specialized reader and the literate layman.

LLEWELLYN GROSS

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Group Process and Gang Delinquency. By JAMES F. SHORT, JR., and FRED L. STRODTBECK. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. xv+294. $7.50.

Family of Outcasts: A New Theory of Delinquency. By SEYMOUR RUBENFELD. New York: Free Press, 1965. Pp. xxiii+328. $5.95.

These books share a primary concern with the theories of delinquency identified with Cohen, Miller, Cloward, and Ohlin. They differ radically, however, in data, style, and contribution.

Short and Strodtbeck accumulated extensive interaction descriptions and mental measurements on hundreds of Chicago gang and non-gang youth. Rubenfeld's data are recollections from his clinical practice, primarily with training-school inmates, and extractions from the literature of all behavioral sciences. Methodologically, Short and Strodtbeck are hypercritical, creative, and sometimes highly technical; Rubenfeld evaluates research methods rarely, and then often poorly, though citing findings yielded by extremely diverse procedures. And while Short and Strodtbeck have an efficient prose (half their chapters previously were journal articles), Rubenfeld buries incisive analysis in much that is discursive, turgid, or cavalier. Yet both books make important contributions, not just in evaluating theories, but in revising and extending them.

The Chicago statistical research predominantly supports Cloward and Ohlin's "differential opportunity" theory (see p. 268), requires factor analysis to reveal a delinquency component somewhat like Cohen's "reaction formation," and finds some of Miller's "lower class focal concerns" mixed with much that is middle class. Their behavior observations distinctively show how immediate status concerns in the course of interaction grossly augment the adult role disability of gang youth. They then theorize that with a gang member's perception of alternative probabilities, his extreme risk-taking in interaction has a rational basis. This suggests primarily aleatory rather than short-run hedonism explanations for violence and for illegitimate parenthood.

Rubenfeld wisely advises readers to skip most of his tedious exegesis on writings of sociologists. He often overlooks the sociologist's focus on explaining subcultures, rather than explaining individual delinquency, but he frequently demolishes the shallower sociological criticisms of psychology. However, much of his counterargument asserts only that unconscious processes must be important because clinicians have had such long faith in them. Nevertheless, he persuasively argues that culturally and situationally determined features of the early socialization of many children account for much delinquent behavior, including variance in the internalization of a neighborhood's subcultures. The high point of his book is chapter ix, which can stand alone as a distinctive essay; in eight

"psychocultural propositions" on delinquency development, it provides a tight integration of personality and subcultural theories.

DANIEL GLASER

University of Illinois

Social Change in Modern India. By M. N. SRINIVAS. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. viii+194. $5.00.

This is a revised version of the Tagore Lectures for 1962–63 on the theme "Social Change in Modern India" delivered by M. N. Srinivas at the University of California at Berkeley in May, 1963.

No subject has been of greater importance in Indian sociology in our times than social change. Srinivas is aware of the hazards in handling such an all-India theme in a few lectures. Yet it is with a view to "see cultural and social processes in an all-India perspective" and to "locate some of the problems that need to be given priority in future research" that the present work was undertaken. Among the topics dealt with in this small volume are some which Srinivas has been concerned with for over two decades and a half. Sanskritization, westernization, caste mobility, secularization, and methodological issues in the study of one's own society are the topics Srinivas dwells upon in the five chapters in this book.

Using principally the concepts of Sanskritization, westernization, and "dominant caste," Srinivas analyzes trends in social change in modern India. He takes into account criticisms of his earlier writings, and clarifies and elaborates many a significant point. Thus, on Sanskritization, he notes that it has been a universal process of cultural change in Indian history, though it has been more active at some periods and in some parts of India. But he modifies his earlier "Brahminical model of Sanskritization" and speaks of three or four models of Sanskritization. So also in his discussion of the complex and diverse process of westernization, which includes an excellent analysis of the changing composition and roles of the elites, Srinivas prefers to distinguish between "primary," "secondary," and "tertiary" westernization.

A significant finding of Srinivas is that the caste system in pre-British or traditional Indian society has been wrongly regarded as a rigid, immutable, and clear hierarchy; actually, there were political and economic sources of mobility as well as indigenous egalitarian movements within the caste system.

His discussion of "secularization," which has accompanied westernization, clearly reveals the process of transformation of India from a predominantly communal to an associational society. Finally, he explains how the sociologist's membership in a particular segment of his soceity, his personal temperament and life experience, and so on, influence his choice of problems and his approach to their solution.

Though this small volume does not deal with all aspects of social change in modern India, it does amass an enormous amount of historical and contemporary material on some of the key aspects, and subjects them to a threadbare analysis. The analysis reveals the enormous complexity of the processes investigated and the intricacy of their interrelations. It holds out many projections for future research. It is a valuable contribution to contemporary Indian sociology and to the study of social change in developing countries.

SANTOSH KUMAR NANDY

University of Manitoba

Academic Women. By JESSIE BERNARD. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1964. Pp. xxv+331. $6.50.

There is little question that this is a benchmark book—not only for those interested in the specific subject matter but for those interested more generally in higher education, in women, and in a variety of other topics. Dr. Bernard has assembled and skilfully blended a vast amount of data from official statistics, published and unpublished research, personal documents, and case histories in an attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of women in higher education.

She provides data on trends in the sex composition of the academic labor force and on shifts in women's institutional distribution, attacking head-on the hypothesis that the decline in the proportion of women in academic life is the result of discrimination against them. The author finds that among people with five or more years of college education,

women make up about the same proportion of the total labor force as of the academic labor force. She concludes, therefore, that discrimination is not important—except at the "elite" universities. (In this sanguine conclusion the two academic men who contribute introductory essays do not fully concur.) Rather, there are relatively few academic women because of their higher attrition rate in post-high-school education, because of the probably increasing attractiveness of alternative careers, and, of course, because of the competition of marriage and motherhood.

The heart of the book is a comparison between academic men and those women who do survive. Not surprisingly, considering their attrition rate, academic women tend to be of higher social class background and higher test intelligence than academic men. These differences are minor, however, against the striking differences in institutional and subject-matter distributions between the sexes. As one would anticipate, women are overrepresented on staffs of low-prestige institutions, despite close sex similarities in sources of training. The author's interpretation of this and similar differences is not supported by substantial data, and will—it is to be hoped—irritate enough feminists (men and women) to provoke further research.

Specifically, having demonstrated rather convincingly that discrimination does not account for the *general* underrepresentation of women in academic life, Bernard proceeds to argue that discrimination does not account for their overrepresentation in low-prestige institutions and statuses. On the contrary, she argues, women like it that way. "Women tend to serve in institutions which emphasize different functions, and they themselves are attracted to different kinds of functions" (p. 92). Though the final—and crucial—phrase in this quotation is supported only by case history and personal documentation, Bernard argues further that many women have a true "vocation" for teaching, related to feminine personality traits associated with the normal sex role in the society. They work by choice in colleges rather than elite institutions. (With some justice, she excoriates the "academic" sociologists for their almost exclusive concern with elite institutions, suggesting that preoccupation with one kind of prestige does not characterize the entire academic profession.)

Her argument is similar with respect to what she calls "fringe-benefit" as opposed to professional academic women. The many "fringe-benefit" women have a marginal position in the academic system, predominantly teaching elementary courses. "They constitute an elastic labor pool, hired and furloughed as needed" (p. 100). Such women are probably primarily oriented to a non-professional reference group of other women, and enjoy both the activity and the prestige—in *their* reference group—of teaching even at the introductory level. *They* like it that way, too.

And the author's argument is similar with respect to women's orientations within the broad roles of teacher and scholar. Following Znaniecki and Franz Adler, she distinguishes between the teacher—a channel of transmission of knowledge—and the man of knowledge—an innovative, "charismatic mediator." Women tend to play the former role, specializing in more stable subject-matter areas, and in the least controversial aspects of those disciplines (like the social sciences) which are either unstable and/or controversial.

With reference to scholarship, an original "matched scientists" study (of 446 zoölogists) leads to the conclusion that "if enough variables are controlled, sex differences in productivity are reduced almost to insignificance. . . . Academic position is a far better 'predictor' of productivity than sex" (p. 154). However, her conclusions about the quality and impact of women's scholarly work are that it is probably less creative and less significant. This is both because "most women don't or can't want to be innovators" (p. 169), and because the (largely masculine) audience which must certify their contributions tends to think of them as less than full colleagues. "In most disciplines, the image of the profession did not include" even the most distinguished women scholars.

Bernard's attempts to generalize about the category "academic women" are less interesting when she turns to a consideration of the interpersonal relations of academic women with their male colleagues and with their spouses and children. The deficiencies of her very broad approach are most conspicuous here where contextual factors are probably of much more significance than categorical factors, as

Riesman anecdotally implies in his Introduction.

It is no easier for an academic woman to evaluate this book objectively than it would be for a Negro sociologist to review a book about Negro academics written by a Negro. (Indeed its assignment to an academic woman rather than, say, to a student of higher education, or even a student of women, seems like the kind of phenomenon that should find a place in this book.) Bernard's eclecticism in selection and presentation of data is matched by a conceptual eclecticism, in which academic women are analyzed sometimes in terms of "intrinsically" feminine personality characteristics, sometimes in terms of normal sex-role socialization, sometimes in terms of status or role anomalies. Sometimes they are analagized to Negroes as a similar social category; sometimes they are talked about as a special occupation—in which some have a "vocation" for teaching, or occupy a fringe-benefit status, and so on. The absence of a central analytic theme permits the author to touch upon a wide variety of issues connected with her subject matter: it is a smorgasbord, and a rich and engaging one, to which it is difficult to do justice in a brief review.

With all that is good, careful, and indeed important for those interested in the subject matter, there is much that is disturbing to me as a sociologist, woman, and academic. In general Bernard's logic implies that this is the way things are, and many women like it or have adjusted to it, and hence it is not bad. This explains neither how things got that way nor—except tangentially—the psychic and social costs of maintaining the status quo. (Does Dr. Bernard *really* believe in a secular "vocation for celibacy," for example?)

In leaning over backward to understand her non-elite sisters on their own terms, Jessie Bernard has made a significant contribution: only further research on academic women of *all* types, it seems to me, can answer some of the questions that this book raises and begs.

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Psychiatric Ideologies and Institutions. By ANSELM STRAUSS, LEONARD SCHATZMAN, RUE BUCHER, DANUTA EHRLICH, and MELVIN SABSHIN. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. xi+418. $8.50.

This is far too big a book to describe in the space of a short review—big because it contains a large number of words in its tightly printed four hundred pages and big because it covers a wide range of material.

In substance, the book deals with two different psychiatric settings in the Chicago area, the first a large state hospital housing about four thousand patients and the second a small, private teaching hospital with a strongly psychotherapeutic orientation and a wide reputation for excellence. The main focus of the book, as the title indicates, is the various professional ideologies which members of the hospital staff bring to the job of managing patients and getting along with one another. This problem is probed in three different approaches to the topic—a thoughtful questionnaire administered to 485 professionals in the mental health field; a fascinating sketch of ward routines in the state hospital; and a longer, more comprehensive report of professional and patient activities in the smaller of the two institutions. Given the length of the manuscript and the richness of its contents, it would be foolhardy to venture a summary of the book, but I would like to suggest in a brief way what kind of book it is.

The main contribution of this work, it seems to me, lies in its approach to the study of institutions. This is a book on social organization written by investigators who come primarily from a background in social psychology, and as such it offers a perspective on the concept of structure which is both imaginative and refreshing. The authors themselves are committed to the notion that human life is in a continual process of transformation and change, and their view of social structure reflects much the same qualities. The mental hospital is seen here as a scene of restless activity, an arena in which people are constantly negotiating with one another to establish a momentary division of labor which will sooner or later be replaced by another. What most sociologists would call the "structure" of the hospital, then, is scarcely more than a temporary arrangement built on provisional bargains and transient agreements. Freeze the moving scenery at any given moment in time, as one does with a photo-

graph, and we have an illusion of stability and order; but observe the moving scenery over a period of time, and we discover that today's pattern of stability soon gives way to tomorrow's, as the members of the group go through the exhausting business of forming and reforming the conditions of their work world. Now this does not necessarily mean that the mental hospital is less structured than other kinds of establishment. It means that one must look for evidence of structure in the ebbs and tides of the negotiation process itself and not assume that the coherence of the organization is somehow reflected in a stable set of administrative rules, institutional norms, or orders reaching down from the front office. In my own opinion, this is far and away the most compelling description of life in the mental hospital, and I say this having a high regard for several other works available in the literature.

An accomplishment of this sort has its risks. To begin with, the book will probably be described by some readers as a little wordy, and indeed it is; but the reasons for this are easy to see. The authors were required to develop a new imagery to give life to their new perspective, and this meant that they had to abandon much of the conventional vocabulary which lends such economy (and such flatness) to sociological prose. In the process of choosing a style to fit their approach, they employed a large number of words, and this means that the reader must make a considerable investment of time to see the book through to its conclusion. I mention this point primarily because many a reader will be tempted to skim the surface of the book for its findings, rather than taking the time to read it thoroughly; and while there is more than enough substance here to reward the browser for his efforts, he is very apt to miss a valuable experience. Like many well-written pieces of work, the sociological richness of this book is as much a product of its language as of its logic.

The book may also be criticized for its lack of a central organizing theme, but this apparent weakness, too, is in many ways a reflection of its principal strength. The authors clearly began their study by imposing on themselves a degree of conceptual open-mindedness which is rare in sociological research. They carefully avoided the temptation of evaluating the psychiatric setting by standards derived from psychiatry itself or of drawing a convenient set of hypotheses from among the various studies of formal organization, and, therefore, they avoided the error, so common in projects of this sort, of mistaking the structure of their argument for the structure of the institution they were exploring. But this stratagem also meant that they had no settled base line from which to mount their expedition into the hospital world. Readers of the book are, in a sense, invited to join the authors as they circle their subject, prowl around the edges of the institution, now and then reaching into the scene to record a particular event or study a particular process. The result of all this is a series of skilfully drawn scenes, rather than a narrative with a clear story line—but that, of course, is the character of the social situation they are describing, for one of the major findings of their research was that the various regions of the hospital did not fit together into a consistent map at all. It is in this sense that the reader must pay attention to the manner in which the story is told, for the texture of the hospital setting is reflected in the texture of the prose used to describe it and cannot be wholly deduced from the formal argument which threads its way through the manuscript.

In a word, the book offers us considerably more than a glimpse of the mental hospital, although it would deserve a wide readership on that score alone. The authors speak fondly of the "model" they have developed in the course of their work, but for once I think they have chosen the wrong word. Their approach to the hospital is more than a model: it is at once a style of thinking, a strategy of work, a new sociological genre from which we may all learn a great deal.

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Death and Identity. Edited by ROBERT FULTON. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. xi+415. $6.95.

This book should give us cause for some thought, much less for any excellence as such than for what it reflects about sociologists' sense of problem.

Robert Fulton, a sociologist, has put together a collection of readings, with one or two exceptions already published elsewhere, deal-

ing with various aspects of death. Unlike Herman Feifel's earlier collection, this one tends toward the elimination of the more mystical and philosophical ruminations which seem so easily aroused by thoughts of death. Fulton is interested in presenting recent research "into grief and bereavement, studies of attitudes toward death, and recorded responses to death and dying" which "have begun to appear in increasing plenitude in the social and medical science literature" (p. ix). The selections are ordered under four section headings: "Theoretical Discussions on Death"; "Attitudes and Responses Toward Death"; "Grief and Mourning"; "Ceremony, the Self and Society." There are brief introductions to each section.

The list of contributors, noted directly before the preface, allows a quick count: only three sociologists (Volkart, Geis, Fulton) and two anthropologists (Mandelbaum, Warner)—the remaining contributors are almost all psychiatrists or psychologists, with a scattering of physicians. Virtually all these writings, therefore, have been reprinted from journals of psychiatry or psychology. (A nineteen-page bibliography also reflects these sources.) Understandably, the flavor of the book is almost wholly psychiatric and psychological, with the psychiatrists leaning heavily for data on patients and the psychologists on college students, older people, and patients. But there are several studies of more general populations, including one on Hiroshima survivors by Lifton.

The contributions by the sociologists and anthropologists include Volkart's well-known paper on bereavement (co-authored with Michael, a psychiatrist); a kind of general orientation piece ("Death and Social Values") published in the *Indiana Journal of Social Research* by Fulton and Geis; a questionnaire-interview study of attitude toward death, funerals, and funeral directors by Fulton; Mandelbaum's useful survey of "Social Uses of Funeral Rites"; and an excerpt from Lloyd Warner's last "Yankee Series" book (*The Living and the Dead*), which deals mainly with the symbolism of cemeteries, funerals, funeral directors, and the physicians who ideally save but often must lose their patients.

I report these facts about the volume only secondarily to convey its contents. My primary purpose is to suggest what struck me, as a sociologist, about the collection. Aside from the postdeath phenomena of funerals, bereavement, and associated social actors (funeral directors, family members), there is an almost total absence of discussion of sociologically relevant persons or institutions. There is nothing much on hospitals or nursing homes; nothing on dying in war, by accidents, by murder, in riots, in disasters, by sickness; nothing on occupations that must deal with death or potential death (the military, police, firemen, even air pilots, stunt men, or tunnel construction workers). In fact, there is not really anything much on dying as behavior, much less as behavior in social context; the focus is all on attitudes toward dying or upon the end of the road—death itself. So it is understandable that only in a few places (like Warner's speculations about the physicians' behavior and feelings when treating dying patients and handling their families) does the reader get any sense of dying as a social process.

It comes home to me with some force that sociologists and anthropologists have a great deal to say about those matters, but the materials have never been organized in those terms. When we have done that, we shall be well on the way to a sociological theory of "death." Putting the issue that way also serves to remind us that sociologists' sense of problem does not usually include any direct focus on this central feature of social life. The ethnographers do better, but have stayed pretty much at the level of empirical description. But with our increasing geriatric problem, and dying in institutions now the prevalent mode, a collection of papers gathered ten years from now might give us all more sociology and better social theory about death and dying. The studies might also yield important general theory.

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Attributes of Innovations as Factors in Diffusion[1]

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ABSTRACT

Differences among innovations are important variables in explaining the diffusion process. Data on rate of adoption of thirty-three modern farm practices and farmers' perceptions of fifteen attributes of those practices are subjected to partial correlation analysis. For this sample of relatively prosperous farmers, innovations perceived as most rewarding and least risky are accepted most rapidly, as expected; high costs do not serve as a brake on adoption; direct contribution of the innovation to a major occupational interest enhances adoption, while complexity and the pervasiveness of consequences following from acceptance have no effect. Further studies with different types of respondents and different innovations should yield a scheme for classifying the item which is being adopted and thus permit better prediction of the diffusion process.

The continuing strong interest in research on the diffusion of innovations has resulted in an increasingly large body of research reports and also, fortunately, in periodic efforts to summarize and to systematize the many reported findings.[2] These summaries are useful for purposes of planning new studies and for integrating diffusion research with the general areas of social and cultural change.[3] The diffusion process itself has been variously conceptualized but basically includes: two types of actors, an advocate of change and a potential acceptor of change; the situations in which these actors operate; communication between the actors; and the subject of that communication, a new thing or idea. One of the points of weakness noted in several of the recent summaries of research is a failure to deal explicitly with variability in the latter element, the innovation itself, and it is to this

[1] Authorized for publication on December 17, 1965, as paper number 3087 in the journal series of the Pennsylvania Agricultural Experiment Station.

[2] Several of the more recent are Herbert F. Lionberger, *Adoption of New Ideas and Practices* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1960); Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: Free Press, 1962); and Elihu Katz, Martin L. Levin, and Herbert Hamilton, "Traditions of Research on the Diffusion of Innovation," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (April, 1963), 237–52.

[3] Diffusion of innovations has the status of a bastard child with respect to the parent interests in social and cultural change: too big to ignore but unlikely to be given full recognition. LaPiere, for example, regards this area of research as largely irrelevant to the study of social change (Richard T. LaPiere, *Social Change* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965]). Wilbert E. Moore is willing to recognize the existence of such a research interest but rejects most of the work as trivial (*Social Change* [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963], esp. pp. 85–88). Barnett, on the other hand, takes the position that innovation and diffusion are twin processes which together provide a key to considerably broader understanding of change (Homer G. Barnett, *Innovation* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1953]). It is our opinion that building on Barnett's approach will eventually provide a basis for integrating diffusion research into more general treatments of change.

point that the present study is addressed.[4]

Failure to take into account similarities and differences among innovations makes it problematical at best to generalize from the known determinants of adoption of a given innovation to a second or third innovation. That it is not now possible to put innovations on some common footing, and thus generalize across innovations, can perhaps best be illustrated by citing a well-known case, the diffusion of hybrid corn. Over twenty years ago, Ryan and Gross pointed out that the possibility of trying out the new seed on a small scale, prior to full acceptance, might be an important factor in explaining the rapid adoption of hybrid corn.[5] Today this proposition has essentially the same standing it had at the earlier time; it continues to be interesting and potentially useful but largely untested. The objective of this study is to specify a set of attributes of innovations, including the above-mentioned divisibility for trial, and to explore the extent to which these attributes have general utility in accounting for differences in rate of adoption for one type of innovation: modern farm practices.[6]

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The general idea that innovations could and should be classified on the basis of common characteristics is quite old. Tarde, for example, argued that "A nation which is becoming civilized and whose wants are multiplying consumes much more than it desires to produce. That amounts to saying . . . that the diffusion of sentiments anticipates that of talents."[7] Ogburn's familiar distinction between material and non-material innovations and the implications of this difference for the diffusion process should also be mentioned.[8] More recently a variety of other classifications have been suggested, some of which go beyond simple dichotomies to treat innovations as possessing a variety of attributes, but little systematic research has been undertaken to verify the utility of any of these classifications.[9]

The shortage of research in this area stems, at least in part, from the considerable complexity of the research task. The following description of our study design can serve both as background for the analysis which follows and as an outline of the design problems which must be solved if this theoretically important but, in practice, elusive research area is to be explored. Five major design problems are discussed: (1) controlling for the effects of personal, social, and situational factors known to have an impact on the diffusion process in order to permit an explicit focus on variability among innovations; (2) determining which aspects or attributes of innovations might be relevant; (3) maximizing variability in the focal area by including as many innovations as possible in the study design; (4) measuring the selected attributes of innovations; and (5) working out a method for considering the effects of each attribute in the context of other relevant attributes, since presumably no single attribute completely describes a given innovation.

The first problem, that of controlling on some variables in order to concentrate on

[4] See esp. Rogers, *op. cit.*, chap. v; and Katz *et al.*, *op. cit.*

[5] Bryce Ryan and Neal C. Gross, "The Diffusion of Hybrid Seed Corn in Two Iowa Communities," *Rural Sociology*, VIII (March, 1943), 15–24.

[6] The present study is a modification and expansion of an earlier study (see Joseph E. Kivlin, "Characteristics of Farm Practices Associated with Rate of Adoption" [unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1960]; and Frederick C. Fliegel and Joseph E. Kivlin, "Farm Practice Attributes and Adoption Rates," *Social Forces*, XL [May, 1962], 364–70). An account of changes in method and procedure is included in Fliegel and Kivlin, "Farmers' Perceptions of Farm Practice Attributes," *Rural Sociology* (in press).

[7] Gabriel Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, trans. Elsie Clews Parsons (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, Publisher, 1962), pp. 207-8.

[8] William F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York: Viking Press, 1922).

[9] Lionberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–5; Rogers, *op. cit.*, chap v; and Katz *et al.*, *op. cit.*

others, is common enough in research, though no less important for being common. Either purposive sampling or the selection of a sufficiently large sample to permit use of statistical controls is suited to the task. In the present case, a purposive sample of 229 farm operators was selected from a single Pennsylvania county to help insure that a given innovation would be applicable on each farm.[10] More important, however, the sample was drawn to minimize variation in personal and situational factors which have repeatedly been shown to affect adoption decisions. In effect, the sample consists of sole owner-operators of medium-sized, commercial dairy farms; all had been farming independently since at least 1952; and extremes of age and education were eliminated.[11]

A second design problem is related to the expressed desirability of a research focus on variability among innovations. Such variability can be maximized, in part, by taking into account as many as possible of the relevant facets of innovations. "But the trouble is that nobody is quite sure what dimensions of an item are relevant," as Katz, Levin, and Hamilton point out.[12]

These authors go on to cite such attributes of innovations as their cost, profitability, communicability, the degree of risk involved in acceptance, and several other attributes which have received some attention at various times and places.[13] The fact remains, however, that much detailed work remains to be done to determine which attributes are relevant under given circumstances.

For purposes of the present study, those attributes of innovations which have been suggested or shown to have some bearing on the diffusion process were listed in detail. Given the decision to focus on innovations having direct implications for agricultural production, it was imperative to include such attributes as costs, profitability, and risk, some of which might be irrelevant with regard to diffusion of innovations in consumer goods or public health practices, for example. A number of more general attributes were included, however, as shown in Table 1.[14] The intent was to arrive at a set of categories which could describe all of the major facets of agricultural innovations which might have some bearing on the diffusion process.

Third, having minimized variation in personal, social, and situational factors which affect the diffusion process, and having selected certain facets of the innovation for study, it is also desirable to maximize variability in this focal area by including as many innovations as possible in the research design. The rural sociologist has been in a strategic position in this respect in that American rural society has been quite literally revolutionized in recent decades by the introduction of many new

[10] Susquehanna, the county chosen, is part of a larger area which is relatively homogeneous with respect to soils and other physical and economic factors. In addition, almost all dairy farmers in the county ship their milk to the same market, thus minimizing the effect of differences in market regulations on practice adoption. Dairymen in those townships adjacent to New York State were not contacted in order to avoid the possible effect of differences in promotion of farm-practice adoption between the two states.

[11] Further details on sampling restrictions are as follows: Herd size had to be between sixteen and forty-nine dairy cows in the year prior to the study; milk had to be sold to the dominant market; respondents had to be between 25 and 59 years of age with at least 8 years but no more than 12 years of formal schooling, and had to be members of at least one business or social organization. Less than 250 farmers in the county were eligible for the study and, of these, 229 (93 per cent), were interviewed. The remainder could not be interviewed for a variety of reasons, including several refusals.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics of innovations (cf. Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 329) is not employed here. Extrinsic characteristics are presumably a function of the situation into which the innovation is introduced, involving questions of feasibility of adoption rather than basic acceptability of an innovation. The distinction is not used here because the situation into which innovations are introduced has been "held constant" by purposive sampling.

ideas. There has also been considerable support for research on the diffusion of these ideas, without specification that only one or a small number of innovations were to be emphasized. Rural sociologists have capitalized on this permissive situation by constructing defensible measures of general adoption behavior within a given substantive area, such as agriculture.[15] Even at this level of generality, however, the measures are crude.[16] Bridging the gap between agricultural innovations and, say, modern health practices has met with little success.[17] Thus there is a need for the type of study reported here, to develop "a 'content analytic' scheme for classifying the item which is diffusing."[18]

In the present study, the analysis has been restricted to only one type of innovation, modern farm practices, with an emphasis on maximizing variability within that type. A list of fifty-nine new farm practices was drawn up and adoption his-

TABLE 1

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF FIFTEEN ATTRIBUTES OF MODERN FARM PRACTICES, AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THIRTY-THREE PRACTICES BY MEDIAN ATTRIBUTE SCORES

Attribute	Rating Scale			
	1 (Low)	2	3	4 (High)
1. *Initial cost:* how much does it cost to buy or start using———.	7	13	12	1
2. *Continuing cost:* how much money does it cost to run or to keep using———	4	15	13	1
3. *Rate of cost recovery:* how long does it take to get time, labor, or money costs back on*———	1	15	15	2
4. *Payoff:* how well does———pay off (in money)	0	7	21	5
5. *Social approval:* are people likely to look up to a farmer because he uses———	3	14	14	2
6. *Saving of time:* how much time does———save in getting the immediate job done	7	14	8	4
7. *Saving of discomfort:* how much does———save hard, dirty, or sweaty work	12	11	4	6
8. *Regularity of reward:* does———show results every time	0	2	25	6
9. *Divisibility for trial:* how easy is it to try out———first, on a small scale	1	10	16	6
10. *Complexity:* how easy is it to understand and use———	1	12	14	6
11. *Clarity of results:* how clearly do results of———show up	0	2	13	18
12. *Compatibility:* how much different is———from older ways of doing the job*	5	16	12	0
13. *Association with dairying:* how much does———have to do directly with cows or handling milk	6	4	14	9
14. *Mechanical attraction:* how much interest would———have for the farmer who likes to work with machinery	8	6	10	9
15. *Pervasiveness:* how much does———lead to other changes or practices	7	21	5	0

* Field ratings were reversed to conform to the wording of the attribute title.

[15] James H. Copp, *Personal and Social Factors Associated with Rate of Adoption of Recommended Farm Practices among Cattlemen* (Technical Bulletin 83 [Manhattan: Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station, 1956]); and Fliegel, "A Multiple Correlation Analysis of Factors Associated with Adoption of Farm Practices," *Rural Sociology,* XXI (September-December, 1956), 284, 292.

[16] Everett M. Rogers and L. Edna Rogers, "A Methodological Analysis of Adoption Scales," *Rural Sociology,* XXVI (December, 1961), 325–36.

[17] See, for example, Eugene A. Wilkening, *Adoption of Improved Farm Practices as Related to Family Factors* (Research Bulletin 183 [Madison: Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, 1953]), pp. 22–27.

[18] Katz *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

tories were obtained from the sample of 229 dairy farm operators. For a variety of reasons, this list of innovations had to be reduced until only thirty-three innovations remained for the present analysis.[19] Some innovations had been accepted by so few respondents that reliable measures of rate of adoption would not be established. It became apparent that several innovations were in process of being superseded by still newer ideas, which meant that the older ones had to be dropped, and so on. The important point here, with regard to methodology, is that the unit of analysis is the innovation itself. Tests of hypotheses based on data from thirty-three cases must be treated with caution. On the other hand, the prospects for including substantially larger numbers of innovations in a meaningful research design are not bright until some progress is made toward establishing comparability among these innovations. For the present, the type of analysis undertaken here will have to be based on relatively small numbers of cases.

The fourth problem is that of measuring attributes of innovations. A particular and very basic aspect of this problem is to determine what type of criteria should be used in constructing the measures, objective or subjective. Menzel, for example, made a very insightful analysis of several attributes of innovations in the field of medicine, and relied on designations of innovations as more or less communicable, risky, or pervasive in their consequences, from the researcher's point of view.[20] Most of the other diffusion studies in which attributes of innovations have been considered have also minimized the subjective element.[21] Rogers, on the other hand, argues strongly that the degree to which a given innovation possesses a particular attribute should be measured from the point of view of the potential acceptor or rejector of that innovation.[22] A new seed variety, for example, may objectively yield more than an old variety. Unless this difference can be perceived by the user of this seed, however, the objective difference will not predispose the user to accept the new variety.

In the present study, it was decided to focus on the subjective approach, to try to obtain at least an estimate of farmers' perceptions, on grounds that farmers' perceptions would be likely to differ more from objective descriptions of innovations than would be the case for, say, a sample of medical practitioners.[23] Each of fifteen attributes was operationalized in terms of a four-point scale to reflect degree of possession of the attribute. The farm operators who had provided data on rate of adoption of new practices were then reinterviewed to rank these practices on each of the attribute scales.[24] Because of the

[19] The thirty-three practices cover the entire range of modern practices recommended for dairy farms in the area: soil management and fertilization practices; crop selection, production, and processing for feed; dairy cow breeding, feeding, and maintenance practices; farm machinery to facilitate the various tasks; and general farm management practices. Although the range seems wide, the thirty-three practices are in fact reasonably representative of homogeneous, universal, modern farm practices recommended in the study area.

[20] Herbert Menzel, "Innovation, Integration, and Marginality: A Survey of Physicians," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (October, 1960), 704–13.

[21] Rogers, *op. cit.*, chap. v. A recent study by Wilkening and others shows clearly that farmers perceive differences among practices on several attributes, but the effect of these differences on adoption behavior is not reported (see E. A. Wilkening, Joan Tulley, and Hartley Presser, "Communication and Acceptance of Recommended Farm Practices among Dairy Farmers of Northern Victoria," *Rural Sociology*, XXVII [June, 1962], 116–97).

[22] Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

[23] In another study, which is now in the design stage, attribute ratings will be obtained from potential acceptors of innovations, from local advocates of the innovations, and from scientists involved in developing the innovations, to assess differences in perceptions from the several points of view.

[24] Rate-of-adoption data were obtained in 1959, whereas the fifteen attribute ratings were obtained from the same respondents in 1964. The five-year time lapse was not planned for in the original study design but does have one advantage: Respondents

magnitude of this task from a respondent's point of view, rating thirty-three farm practices on each of fifteen attribute scales, a so-called split-sample interview procedure was worked out. A given respondent rated the list of practices on three to four of the attribute scales, the next respondent repeated the procedure on the succeeding three to four attribute scales, and so on. An average of twelve ratings for each practice on each of the fifteen attribute scales was obtained in this manner. The several separate ratings were then pooled to derive a median rating for each of the practices on every attribute.[25] The net result is, then, not a measure of individual perceptions of the attributes, but an estimate of the shared perceptions of a particular segment of the community, the sample having been selected to minimize socioeconomic differences.[26] Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of practices by attribute-scale category.

A fifth and final design problem consists of the following: If a given innovation is viewed as a thing or idea which has several facets and if these several facets are hypothesized to influence the acceptance of that innovation, then the tests of such hypotheses must take into account the *complex* of facets. This is again a relatively straightforward design question, though doing something about it presents certain problems. Perhaps the most obvious illustration would be a consideration of the cash outlay required to adopt an agricultural innovation. The positive or negative effects of such costs on the adoption of the innovation can hardly be assessed without also considering monetary returns, since agricultural innovations are usually intended to increase productivity. The same type of reasoning can be extended to other attributes —high costs and high returns may also involve high risks, and so on. This is not to argue that the potential acceptor or rejector of an innovation can precisely weigh and balance a variety of perceived attributes of that innovation in arriving at an adoption decision. The point is that if various attributes are perceived, the possibility of interrelationships among them must be taken into account.

Partial correlation was used in the present study to isolate the effect of any given attribute on rate of adoption while taking into account the effects of all the others. The techniques of partial correlation are well suited to the task and readily available via modern computers. Some assumptions regarding measurement which apply to both the simple and partial correlations used here are less easy to deal with. It can be noted in Table 1, for example, that the frequency distributions on several of the attributes scales are skewed. A more serious problem, however, goes back to the previously mentioned problem of a small number of cases. Misclassification of only one or a few cases can seriously affect the size of coefficients based on small samples. The ramifications of such error involved in the use of more complex statistical tech-

should not have felt obliged to rationalize their adoption behavior in providing the attribute ratings since the two sets of data were obtained separately. The most serious disadvantage is that it contributes to the general problem of time lapse between adoption decisions and specification of perceptions. Since we are not dealing here with individual perceptions in relation to past decisions, we do not, for present purposes, regard this as a serious problem.

[25] Comparison of arithmetic average ratings with median ratings showed essentially no difference. The median was preferred for its numerical simplicity.

[26] We use the terms "estimate" of "shared" perceptions because a given rating is based on an average of twelve individuals' responses, not the entire sample; therefore, the rating represents an estimate; and because a treatment of individual perceptions would have to link the individual adoption decision with the individual's perception of the practice, ideally by obtaining perception data at the time of decision-making. Our data involve a variable time lapse between decision-making and assessment of perceptions. We can argue that we have measured prevailing shared perceptions, and we relate these to aggregate behavior with respect to given innovations.

niques—in this case, fourteenth-order partial correlation—are hard to estimate, but should lead to caution in interpreting results.

RESULTS

Results of the analysis are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 summarizes the specific tests of research hypotheses concerning the relationships between median attribute ratings on the thirty-three farm practices and the rate at which those practices had been adopted in the study area.[27] In each case, the expected direction of the relationship is indicated, and the simple and fourteenth-order partial correlations which constitute the tests of hypotheses are reported. Special emphasis is placed on the partial correlations because of the

[27] The average percentage of adoption per year for the eight consecutive years of most rapid adoption of a given practice is the measure used for the dependent variable. This procedure was used to allow for the fact that some practices had been available in the study area for longer periods of time than others (only practices which had been available for at least eight years were considered) and also to minimize the effects of spurts in adoption in a particular year because of weather conditions or other seasonal factors. Selection of eight years as the appropriate time span was based on a considered judgment of the actual "growth" curves for the practices. Respondents, contacted in 1959, were asked to recall adoptions back to 1942. The time span over which change could take place is actually shorter, however, in that almost no new adoptions took place during the war years, 1942 through 1944, and the interviewing took place during 1959; therefore, the record is not complete for that year. In practical terms, then, the adoption histories cover fourteen full years, 1945 through 1958. Calculation of rate of adoption over the eight "steepest" years represented, for this particular sample, a simple and apparently accurate way of describing the degree of slope in the curves. Only one practice, the use of a stem crusher (a machine for preparing hay), was seriously "misclassified" by using this procedure. The first adoption of this practice occurred in 1950, only three other adoptions took place in the following six years, and then the curve rose steeply for three years. Calculation of rate over eight years deflated the effect of the rapid spurt, which may or may not reflect the "real" adoption rate for the practice.

TABLE 2

EXPECTED AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ATTRIBUTES OF FARM PRACTICES AND RATE OF ADOPTION

Attribute	Relationships with Rate of Adoption*		
	Expected Direction	Simple Correlation	Partial Correlation
1. Initial cost	−	+.10	+.43
2. Continuing cost	−	+.01	−.24
3. Rate of cost recovery	+	−.10	−.23
4. Payoff	+	+.23	+.36
5. Social approval	+	−.02	+.13
6. Saving of time	+	+.20	+.10
7. Saving of discomfort	+	+.25	+.11
8. Regularity of reward	+	+.14	+.30
9. Divisibility for trial	+	+.36	+.44
10. Complexity	−	−.19	−.00
11. Clarity of results	+	+.07	−.23
12. Compatibility	+	−.28	+.17
13. Association with dairying	+	+.07	+.31
14. Mechanical attraction	+	−.16	−.06
15. Pervasiveness	−	−.28	−.06

* With $N = 33$ and 31 d.f. for the zero-order figures, an r value of .30 is required for significance at the .05 level. With $N = 33$ and 17 d.f. for the fourteenth-order figures, an r value of .39 is required at the .05 level. The coefficients are Pearsonian, probabilities are one-tailed. In view of the small number of cases, purposive selection of sample, as well as measurement problems, the coefficients should be regarded as suggestive of what might be found if more rigorous statistical criteria were met.

likelihood that attributes of innovations are perceived as part of a complex. Intercorrelations among the various attribute scales are reported in Table 3.

In the description of the analysis which follows, an attempt is made to group the attributes into somewhat broader categories in order to facilitate the collation of these results with the results of other studies.[28] It will be noted that several attributes are discussed under two or more headings. The magnitude of economic return (payoff), for example, is of importance both in the sense of economic incentive and as an attribute facilitating communication about an innovation. This again illustrates the multifaceted nature of innovations and the need for careful definition of concepts in order to arrive at conclusions which have some general relevance. One other point regarding generalization must be stressed: The present data were deliberately obtained from a homogeneous sample of respondents; thus generalizations to other types of respondents are not warranted.[29]

COST ATTRIBUTES

The costs of adopting a new idea and putting it into operation have frequently been mentioned as obstacles to rapid adoption, usually with at least an implicit "other things being equal" assumption involved in the discussion.[30] Actual perceptions of costs, and especially the perceptions of costs in a context of returns and other attributes have not been analyzed, however. In this study, *initial cost* and *continuing costs* (or operating costs) were considered separately, with the expectation that high costs would deter rapid adoption of innovations.

Consideration was also given to a different type of cost attribute—social cost or "penalty," as Barnett expresses it—but the attribute was not included.[31] Since we are dealing here with innovations which have been designed for the farmer, at least in an aggregate sense, it was decided that the risk of being criticized by friends and neighbors for adopting these innovations would not be of major importance. Another factor entering into the decision to omit this attribute from the study was that those innovations accepted by only a few respondents had been dropped from the analysis. The primary reason for dropping these innovations was that rate of adoption could not be reliably calculated, but one of the effects of this action was to eliminate those adoption situations most likely to evoke critical comment and thus exact a social cost.[32] In a less structured diffusion situation, and especially with reference to cross-cultural diffusion, both social cost and its obverse, social reward, may well be important factors in diffusion of innovations and should be given higher priority.

As shown in Table 2, the initial cost involved in adopting an innovation is not a deterrent to rapid adoption for this sample. The simple correlation is low but positive, and the partial correlation is also positive and considerably higher. The hypothesis of high initial cost as a deterrent cannot be accepted. Respondents of the type dealt with here are apparently willing to adopt relatively expensive innovations, probably as part of a general emphasis on expansion of farm enterprises and substitution

[28] A factor analysis of intercorrelations among the attribute scales, currently in process, should help to reduce the many attributes to a few basic categories.

[29] Preliminary results from a contrasting sample of small-scale farmers show substantial differences.

[30] The term "relative advantage" can subsume both costs and returns (see Rogers, *op. cit.*, chap. v). This concept was not used in the present study on grounds that it can be interpreted to include a variety of attributes which we prefer to treat separately.

[31] Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 371–72.

[32] As a matter of fact, however, the obverse of this attribute, social approval, was included in the study in order at least to explore the relevance of this type of attribute. The results are discussed under the general heading of "returns," but, anticipating the discussion somewhat, the reservations expressed above seem to be warranted.

TABLE 3

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG FIFTEEN ATTRIBUTES OF FARM PRACTICES

Attribute	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Initial cost	.66	−.62	−.22	−.06	.33	.42	−.38	−.48	.32	.04	−.19	−.38	.49	.46
2. Continuing cost	...	−.51	.05	.11	.27	.22	−.29	−.33	.41	.25	−.14	−.07	.20	.40
3. Rate of cost recovery	...	.....	.08	.18	−.10	−.13	.56	.32	−.45	.17	.15	.35	−.08	−.30
4. Payoff	...	.....	.....	.27	.19	.20	.24	−.02	−.10	.50	−.56	.37	.10	−.01
5. Social approval	...	.....	.....	.....	.04	−.11	−.07	−.02	.09	.59	−.01	.36	.07	.13
6. Saving of time	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.74	.27	−.27	.05	.20	−.61	−.03	.28	.36
7. Saving of discomfort	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.20	−.30	.00	.09	−.56	−.16	.36	.29
8. Regularity of reward	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.15	−.33	.32	−.36	.24	.03	−.19
9. Divisibility for trial	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	−.33	−.01	.19	.07	−.58	−.76
10. Complexity	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.18	.04	−.03	.20	.49
11. Clarity of results	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	−.32	.40	.28	.08
12. Compatibility	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	−.24	−.28	−.26
13. Association with dairying	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	−.12	.03
14. Mechanical attraction	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.50
15. Pervasiveness	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

of capital for labor.[33] *It should be noted that the positive relationship between perceptions of high initial cost and rate of adoption is* **not** *a function of the fact that* respondents expect the greatest returns from these same practices. The effect of expected returns is taken into account in the partial correlation. Beyond this, however, respondents' perceptions of innovations involving high initial costs are negatively related to perceptions of "payoff," although the correlation is not large (Table 3).

The hypothesis that high continuing costs would act as a deterrent to rapid adoption receives at least partial support. The simple correlation between continuing cost and rate of adoption is almost zero, but the modest partial correlation is in the expected negative direction. One reason for the different effects of the two types of costs could be a preference for using current income to deal with operating costs, with credit playing a more prominent role in capital investment. No data are available to test this proposition, however.

RETURNS

Three attributes were included under this heading: *rate of cost recovery;* magnitude of return, or *payoff;* and a non-economic attribute, *social approval.* Taking up these attributes in the order presented, the hypothesized positive relationship between rapid recovery of costs and rate of adoption was not found. This is consistent with the finding on initial cost. The farm operators studied here are apparently quite willing to make investments and wait for those investments to bear fruit.

This is not to say that returns are not important, since payoff is positively associated with rate of adoption, especially when the other attributes are taken into account. The straightforward economic argument, that magnitude of financial reward is an important factor in achieving rapid acceptance of new ideas, receives considerable support from these findings.[34] Social approval, on the other hand, does not seem to be an important factor in explaining rate of adoption in this context. The partial correlation (shown in Table 2) is positive as expected, but quite low. As suggested previously, it may well be that social approval or disapproval would be of greater importance in explaining diffusion in some situations, especially where modern technology is still something of a rarity.

EFFICIENCY

The term "efficiency" is used here in a rather broad sense to include two attributes of farm practices. *Saving of time* has direct economic implications. *Saving of discomfort* is conceptually similar to time savings but involves a shift in perspective to non-economic factors. Table 3 shows that the two attributes are in fact rather closely related.

Farmers' perceptions that innovations would save working time were hypothesized to be positively associated with rate of adoption. Both the simple and partial correlations are positive in sign; thus the hypothesis receives some support. The partial correlation is quite low, however, suggesting that potential time savings are overshadowed by other attributes for the type of respondent studied here. Essentially the same conclusions can be stated for savings of discomfort. Relief from odious or difficult tasks seems to exert a modest positive influence on adoption decisions but is not important in the context of other attributes perceived by the decision-maker.

RISK AND UNCERTAINTY

The perception that an innovation will produce the desired results over repeated trials may be of somewhat greater importance in respondents' adoption decisions. *Regularity of reward* is positively associated

[33] This process is described for a comparable area in W. K. Waters and W. L. Barr, *This Business of Dairy Farming, 1942 and 1956* (Bulletin 638 [University Park: Pennsylvania Agricultural Experiment Station, 1958]).

[34] This point is stressed in Theodore W. Schultz, *Transforming Traditional Agriculture* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964).

with rate of adoption, as hypothesized, and in this case the inclusion of the other attributes in the partial correlation analysis raises the coefficient. This attribute also has some bearing on the concept of efficiency discussed above. Barnett refers to efficiency in the ultimate sense of "Will it work?"[85] Respondents' perceptions of an innovation as reliable, thus reducing uncertainty in adoption decisions, may be a factor of some importance in encouraging rapid diffusion.

Another attribute under this heading, *divisibility for trial*, refers directly to minimization of risk involved in adopting innovations. This attribute has frequently been mentioned as an important factor in the diffusion process.[86] The possibility of trying out an innovation on a small scale prior to full adoption has direct economic implications but is also of interest in the sense of minimizing possible unanticipated consequences, non-economic as well as economic. For the present sample, the relationship between divisibility for trial and rate of adoption is relatively large at the zero-order level and increases when other attributes are taken into account. It is concluded that this attribute is an important factor in encouraging rapid adoption in the study population.[87]

COMMUNICABILITY OF THE INNOVATION AND ITS EFFECTS

Four attributes are included under this heading: *complexity*, which refers directly to the problem of conveying an idea to the potential adopter; *clarity of results; regularity of reward;* and *payoff*, or the magnitude of the reward, all of which refer to the results of adopting an innovation and the problem of demonstrating that an innovation is in fact effective. While economists have stressed the economic aspects of some of these attributes, communication researchers and anthropologists have also shown considerable interest.[88] Erasmus, for example, makes a strong case for the importance of dramatic results, which can be perceived by the casual observer, as a major factor in adoption, especially in traditional societies.[89] This extends the idea of sheer economic reward and economic incentive to include perceivability of the reward, whatever the nature of that reward.

In general, the communicability of innovations seems to have a substantial bearing on the diffusion process, even for a relatively sophisticated sample such as the one utilized here. Regularity of reward and payoff have already been discussed under other headings, thus the detailed results will not be repeated here. Both attributes show substantial partial correlations with rate of adoption, however, and this is important from a communications point of view. The relationship between perceived complexity of innovations and rate of adoption is in the hypothesized, negative direction, but drops to nearly zero when the other attributes are taken into account. It seems likely that, for populations characterized by lower levels of education and less contact with urban society, the complexity of innovations would be a more important factor in adoption decisions.

The hypothesized positive relationship between clarity of results and rate of adoption was found in the simple correlation analysis, but the relationship is weak, and the partial coefficient is negative and somewhat larger. The data do not permit acceptance of the hypothesis concerning this attribute. As might be expected, perceptions of this attribute are positively related to the other "result" attributes: regularity of reward and payoff (Table 3). Since we

[85] *Op. cit.*, pp. 359–60.

[86] Ryan and Gross, *op. cit.* The more recent references are given in Rogers, *op. cit.*, chap. v.

[87] The opposite substantive conclusion was drawn from the forerunner of this study (see Fliegel and Kivlin, "Farm Practice Attributes and Adoption Rates," *op. cit.*). The difference in results stems from modification of the operational definition of the variable (see Fliegel and Kivlin, "Farmers' Perceptions of Farm Practice Attributes," *op. cit.*).

[88] See esp. Katz *et al.*, *op. cit.*

[89] Charles J. Erasmus, *Man Takes Control* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961), esp. pp. 17–56.

are dealing here with innovations involving economic productivity, it may well be that demonstrated economic feasibility and certainty of results take into account the relevant aspects of this type of attribute. For other types of innovations, clarity of results, as here defined, might warrant a higher priority.

CONGRUENCE

In addition to the several categories of attributes already listed, there is another broad category, here labeled "congruence," which has probably been most heavily emphasized by anthropologists.[40] The general idea involved is that an innovation is perceived in the context of other things and ideas, both old and new, and that the perceived ties between the innovation and elements of the context can affect adoption decisions. Our attempts to operationalize this general idea resulted in four attribute scales: *compatibility*, *association with dairying* (the major enterprise), *mechanical attraction*, and *pervasiveness* (of consequences). We recognize that the commonality of these four attributes and the extent to which they explicate the broader category, congruence, may not be apparent at first glance, and we have attempted to deal with these matters in discussing each attribute in turn.

Compatibility has reference to the degree of similarity, or congruity, between an innovation and an existing thing or idea which has traditionally served that purpose which the innovation is intended to serve. Some innovations become substitutes for existing elements, while others may represent net additions to an existing stock. It seems likely, however, that in most cases an innovation will be rather directly compared with an existing idea which it may eventually supplement, complement, or replace. The degree of similarity between an innovation and its traditional counterpart is at issue here, and it is hypothesized that compatibility and rate of adoption will be positively associated. This hypothesis receives no support at the level of simple correlation, for the coefficient is negative. When the other attributes are taken into account, the relationship is in the expected positive direction, but the partial coefficient is not large. It is concluded that compatibility between old and new is not an important factor in explaining rate of adoption for this sample.

The larger issue, whether compatibility has any general relevance for diffusion of innovations, cannot be settled on the basis of these data alone, of course. References to this concept have frequently appeared in the diffusion literature.[41] There is an element of face validity in the hypothesis that a radical departure from tradition will be less readily accepted than an idea which represents a variation, perhaps, on a well-known theme.[42] The partial correlation from these data does show this type of relationship, but the negative simple correlation raises some disturbing doubts about the concept as used here. If it can be argued that similarity between old and new encourages acceptance of the new, it can also be argued that the new must to some extent differ from the old or there will be no perceived advantage in acceptance of the new. Barnett makes this point in referring to both compatibility, as a necessary condition for assessing an innovation in the context of existing ideas, and incompatibility, the latter representing a possible sufficient cause for acceptance of the new, most clearly in those cases where the old has come to have negative value.[43] One inference which might be made from present data is that compatibility cannot be assessed as an attribute of innovations unless the value system of the potential acceptor can be explicitly taken into account.[44] Our

[40] Katz *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 249–51.

[41] Rogers, *op. cit.*, chap. v.

[42] Wilkening distinguishes between improvements and innovations (*op. cit.*, pp. 11–12); see also his "Sources of Information for Improved Farm Practices," *Rural Sociology*, XV (March, 1950), 19–30.

[43] Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

[44] On this point, see E. A. Wilkening and Donald E. Johnson, *Goals in Farm Decision-Making as Related to Practice Adoption* (Research Bulletin

intent in drawing a purposive sample was precisely to avoid this kind of problem, that is, we tried to "hold constant" the context into which innovations are introduced. Compatibility, however, involves a quite specific comparison between a new idea and a particular element in the existing situation. Our sampling procedure may well have been too crude to control for variability at this concrete level. Thus the logic of our hypothesis regarding compatability and the hypotheses of others who have taken a similar position may be in error.

Two other attributes included under the heading of congruence are less controversial. The degree to which an innovation contributes directly to the farmers' main enterprise, dairying, points to a tie between the new idea and a portion of the context into which the innovation is introduced, which can be assumed to have positive value. A similar argument can be made for mechanical attraction; in view of the strong emphasis on things mechanical in American culture, it seems likely that an innovation which contributes directly to that emphasis will be accepted more readily than one which does not. The data show that association with dairying is a relatively important factor in explaining rapid adoption of innovations for this sample. When other attributes are taken into account, the correlation is positive and relatively large. This is not true for mechanical attraction. Neither the simple nor the partial coefficients are positive, and the relationship at the partial level falls to near zero. It is concluded that mechanical attraction is not an important factor in adoption decisions for this sample.

Still another aspect of the ties between an innovation and elements of the context in which it is to be applied is the possibility of ramifications resulting from acceptance of a given idea. The focus here is on a possible web of relationships, in a sequential sense, between a new idea and a variety of elements in the existing context. Following others who have referred to this attribute, we have hypothesized that the greater the pervasiveness of consequences of adoption, the less rapid will be the acceptance of an innovation.[45] The zero-order coefficient lends considerable support to this hypothesis, since it is negative and of at least modest size, but the partial correlation analysis changes the picture. When other attributes are taken into account, the relationship between pervasiveness of consequences and rate of adoption remains negative but drops to near zero. It is concluded that pervasiveness is not an important deterrent to rapid adoption for this sample.[46] It is apparently overshadowed by other attributes, again pointing to the importance of considering the many facets of an innovation jointly in attempting to account for variability in rate of adoption.

225 [Madison: Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, 1961]).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study is based on the premise that the attributes of an innovation itself are a basic factor in explaining differences in the rates at which various innovations are adopted. Our objective was to work toward a parsimonious statement of those attributes which, for a given type of decision-maker and decision-making situation, stand out as important in explaining rate of adoption of agricultural innovations. It should be clear from the preceding sentence that broad generalizations about the role of "the thing itself" in the diffusion process cannot be derived from these data. Carefully designed studies using different types of respondents and different types of innovations are necessary to achieve this end. We take it for granted that the broader objective is important, especially in the context of induced change in developing societies.

[45] See esp. Menzel, *op. cit.*

[46] It is necessary to point out that pervasiveness of consequences could have a positive effect on rate of adoption where, for example, reorganization of a farm enterprise is being actively sought. The assumption is that this is not the case for the present sample.

Results of the tests of research hypotheses have already been described and will not be repeated here. Three more general conclusions seem to be warranted, however. First, since we are dealing here with innovations having direct economic significance for the acceptor, it is not surprising that innovations perceived as most rewarding and involving least risk and uncertainty should be accepted most rapidly. We had also expected, however, that high costs and a slow rate of recovering cost would serve to deter acceptance of innovations, and this was not confirmed.

The most likely conclusion for this relatively prosperous and commercially oriented sample is that increased capitalization and general business expansion are being actively pursued and that this involves more than perceptions of costs versus returns. Whether this can be explained in terms of pressure to grow in order to survive in a competitive struggle is not known. Our data show only that high initial cost and slow cost recovery are *positively* associated with rate of adoption and that these relationships persist when other attributes are taken into account. It seems likely that high costs would deter rapid adoption in situations characterized by modest financial resources, for example, peasant farmers in developing countries. This is a question which should be pursued.

Second, regarding the general question of communicability of new ideas and their effects, it seems trite to conclude that such attributes as cause a new idea to stand out from others have a positive effect on rate of adoption. The more appropriate question is which attributes cause an innovation to stand out under what circumstances? It seems likely that economic attributes play this role for the present sample. And it seems logical and perhaps even likely, that non-economic attributes, such as "clarity of results," would play a more important role in situations involving less emphasis on commercial considerations or less sophistication in commercial matters. The [illegible] argument, regarding non-economic attributes, would seem to have merit in the area of rewards and penalities involved in adoption of innovations in less commercially oriented settings.[47]

And third, we are least satisfied at this point with our understanding of attributes involving the "fit" between a new idea and the setting into which it is introduced. This is an important area for research, especially with respect to cross-cultural diffusion. Present data show that a respondent's main occupational interest—in this case, dairying—has something like a "halo effect" in contributing to rapid adoption of innovations most closely allied to that interest. The questions raised about compatibility in our analysis illustrate the problems which need to be solved if the role of this type of attribute is to be fully assessed. More explicit consideration of respondents' valuations of familiar things and ideas seems to be indicated.

Despite this fundamental concern about the conceptualization of congruence between innovations and other elements of a culture, results of this study are seen as encouraging. One way of summarizing the data is to indicate that, in a multiple correlation between all fifteen attributes and rate of adoption, 51 per cent of the variance in rate is accounted for. Some refinement of concepts is indicated, and the same type of analysis should certainly be extended to other contexts. Communication about new ideas could be substantially improved if the communicator had some knowledge of the potential adopters' perceptions of those ideas. This can always be achieved after the fact, which is not very helpful. Predictive knowledge in this area will depend on working out a set of categories which can be used to put innovations in general on a common footing.

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[47] See Frederick C. Fliegel, "Differences in Prestige Standards and Orientation to Change in a Traditional Agricultural Setting," *Rural Sociology*, XXX (September, 1965), 278–90.

A Psychological Model of Individual Participation in Formal Voluntary Organizations: Application to Some Chilean Data[1]

David Horton Smith

ABSTRACT

A psychological model for the explanation of individual formal voluntary organization (FVO) participation is proposed and tested on two purposive samples of members and matched eligible nonmembers of several FVO's in Chile. The model includes three sets of variables of increasing specificity —personality traits, attitudes relevant to FVO's in general, and attitudes toward the specific FVO. The results strongly support the value of the sequential specificity model, accounting for over 50 per cent of the variance in participation in both samples. In addition, the results indicate that general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes are the more important discriminators of FVO members from non-members, while personality traits are more important discriminators of high- from low-participating members. This fact is attributed to a two-stage selection process.

Granted that we know many or most of the social background characteristics related to formal voluntary organization (hereinafter abbreviated "FVO") participation, we must dig more deeply into two underlying problems. First, we must inquire what are the intervening psychological or attitudinal variables that may help to explain these gross sociological findings. And second, we must explain why there are so many potentially eligible and potentially active members who do *not* in fact join or participate actively in FVO's, even though their social background characteristics suggest that they "should."

Most sociological research in the past has confined itself to using social background characteristics in trying to predict individual participation. Thus there are numerous studies relating participation in FVO's to environmental, physical, and social characteristics of individuals, such as their residential area, age, sex, education, occupational prestige level, and so forth.[2] This is progress but would be an inadequate and unsatisfactory stopping point.

Pursuing both of the above-mentioned problems, the present paper will attempt to set forth and tentatively confirm a model of the intervening psychological variables that proximately cause FVO participation. The research design employs samples of individuals who have been matched as closely as was feasible on various social background characteristics, with the result that all of these sampled individuals could and "should" be FVO members or high participators, although about half of them in fact are not. Finally, it is held (but not demonstrated here) that most of the observed distal relationships between FVO participation and environmental, physical, and social variables may be explained in terms of

[1] The present paper is a condensed version of parts of my Ph.D. dissertation, "Psychological Factors Affecting Formal Voluntary Organization Participation in Chile" (unpublished, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1964). The author wishes to express special thanks to Alex Inkeles for constructive criticism and advice during all phases of the research here reported. The research was partially supported by a grant from the Warren Fund of Harvard University and partly supported also by funds from the Project on the Socio-cultural Aspects of Development, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and from the National Science Foundation.

[2] See my dissertation, chap. iv; and Murray Hausknecht, *The Joiners* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962).

the variables included in the psychological model presented.[3]

The level of system reference we are concerned with is the individual person, not a social system of any sort.[4] The questions we are trying to answer are: "Why does an individual join an FVO?" and "Why does an individual participate actively in an FVO, once a member?" For a start, let us tentatively assume that the answers to both questions will be similar, viewing active participation in any given FVO as a series of specific decisions to participate, similar in kind to the original decision to join the FVO. The psychological model proposed to account for FVO participation involves sets of variables at three levels of specificity—personality traits, general FVO-relevant attitudes, and specific FVO-relevant attitudes.

PERSONALITY TRAITS

By personality traits we refer to those dispositional characteristics that an individual manifests in his behavior in a wide variety of different types of situations. First of all, since FVO participation generally involves principal interaction with people rather than with objects or concepts, we may expect greater FVO participation from an individual who does not have strong personal cynicism, hostility toward people or psychic and interpersonal adjustment problems, but rather who has positive, trusting, confident, and favorable general dispositions toward others, a low need for autonomy, isolation, and independence, and who has a willingness to meet new people.[5]

Second, insofar as the FVO involved has instrumental goals of some sort,[6] we may expect more participation from an individual who tends to perceive the possibility of and to derive satisfactions from the achievement of such goals. Thus, the potential high participator should be characterized by such traits as general optimism, general satisfaction (presumably related to optimism), felt sense of competence or mastery, achievement orientation, self-confidence, perseverence, tendency to plan (presumably reflecting expected mastery over future events), and similar traits. Further, we may hypothesize that higher participation will occur for individuals characterized by more sensitivity to moral appeals (owing to the basically normative compliance structure of FVO's)[7] and by more perceived free time.

GENERAL FVO-RELEVANT ATTITUDES

The second level of specificity of variables in the model comprises attitudes and dispositions toward how to spend one's leisure time, toward formal organizations in general, and toward FVO's as a type of formal organization. Specifically, we expect to find greater FVO participation for individuals who have a "service orientation" to their leisure time (as opposed to

[3] For further work on this point, see my "Intervening Psychological Variables in the Sociological Explanation of Individual FVO Participation" (unpublished paper, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1966).

[4] For a model concerning the prevalence of FVO's in a social system, especially national societies, see my "A Model of Formal Voluntary Organization Prevalence" (unpublished paper, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1966).

[5] Insofar as the FVO goals involve more interaction with objects and concepts than with people, one would expect this variable of positive, trusting attitudes toward people to be less important. However, every organization requires some degree of trust among its members irrespective of its primary goal, so that trust never should vanish from the model as a relevant variable.

[6] Although many organizations are primarily expressive or non-instrumental in basic goals, it is still almost always the case that instrumental goals are salient to FVO members as members. At a bare minimum, FVO members must be concerned with the instrumental goal of keeping the organization together and facilitating its operation to satisfy whatever individual or social needs it may be tailored to fit.

[7] The distinction between normative, coercive, and remunerative compliance structures was drawn by Amitai Etzioni in his *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1961), chaps. i–iii.

a more hedonistic approach); who feel some sort of general moral or social obligation to participate in FVO's (that is, an obligation to participate, not in any specific FVO, but just to participate in *some* FVO or community organization); who prefer formally organized groups rather than small, casual, informal groups; who perceive FVO's as effective *types* of groups, able to achieve goals of personal importance to themselves; who perceive support from their significant others for participation in FVO's in general; and who are active in other types of social activity, such as visiting, church attendance, voting, and so forth (all of these being indirect measures of a generally positive attitude toward engaging in social activity).

SPECIFIC FVO-RELEVANT ATTITUDES

This third level of specificity includes attitudes that pertain to a particular named FVO of interest, rather than to FVO's in general. Most of the *general* FVO-relevant attitudes have complementary *specific* FVO-relevant attitudes that should even more strongly predict participation. Thus, we may expect more FVO participation from an individual who feels a strong moral obligation to participate in a *particular* FVO; who perceives the particular FVO to be effective and sees himself as potentially effective within the organization; who perceives the time and effort demands of the FVO to be within "reasonable" bounds; and who perceives strong, positive support for participation in the particular FVO from significant others both within and outside the organization.

In addition, we must consider all of the specific attitudes of attraction or potential satisfaction an individual may have toward an FVO. Naturally, we may expect more FVO participation the greater the extent to which an individual considers its program worthwhile, its meetings and activities interesting, and so on. In terms of self-concept theory, this means that participation will be greater for an individual who perceives the FVO, its members, goals, and activities, to be congruent with his own values, tastes, preferences, interests, and beliefs.

Finally, over and above any specific feelings of attraction to or congruence of self with a particular FVO, there is the all-important variable of "ego-involvement" with or commitment to the FVO. Psychological commitment to the FVO refers to the degree of emotional importance attached by an individual to the existence and welfare of the organization. It refers to the degree to which an individual identifies with the FVO and feels himself psychologically a part of the FVO, the FVO a part of himself. Providing an individual is eligible for membership, we may expect more FVO participation to be associated with greater commitment to an FVO.[8]

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The research here reported was conducted in or near Santiago, Chile, in the latter months of 1963. Chile presently has an extensive and active network of FVO's of all types, and most of these types have been represented by at least one FVO since the beginning of the present century. Although one may argue that special features of Chilean customs and national character affect FVO participation there, the present model emphasizes instead the more universal and non-culturally specific, psychological determinants of participation. The psychological processes involved flow from the structure of personality and behavior as well as the demands made upon personality by the social structure of FVO's.

In order to test the model, two different types of samples were collected. The first sample comprised 171 *active members* and *matched eligible non-members* of five different types of Chilean FVO's—a center for mothers, a religious auxiliary, a neighborhood development organization, the

[8] See my "Psychological Factors . . . ," *op cit.*, chap. v, for prior studies supporting the model here presented.

Red Cross, and volunteer firemen. The second sample, described in more detail later, comprised 122 *high* and *low participating members* of five different types of FVO's—a sports club, a different neighborhood development organization, a stevedores' union, and again the Red Cross and volunteer firemen.

For both the first and second samples, the same basic interview schedule or questionnaire was used. It consisted of some 100 items,[9] largely with fixed-response alternatives. Data were thus gathered on background characteristics, self-reported FVO participation, and the various elements of the model. In order to avoid the effects of acquiescence response set, nearly all of the items had contentful alternatives, rather than being simply agree-disagree or yes-no type questions. In addition, some of the items were corrected for social desirability response set for the individuals most susceptible to this influence.[10]

The questionnaire was translated into Spanish and worked over by various bilingual Chileans and the author. Some forty questionnaires were self-administered by members of the Red Cross, volunteer firemen, and the religious auxiliary, which were among the higher socioeconomic status, and hence higher educational level, FVO's. The rest of the 200-odd cases were collected through interviews made by native Chilean interviewers at the homes of the subjects, the names and addresses of members having been supplied by the organizations. The refusal rate for member interviews was about 15 per cent, and 20 per cent for non-members.

THE RESULTS FOR THE FIRST SAMPLE: ACTIVE MEMBERS AND MATCHED ELIGIBLE NON-MEMBERS

The first sample was composed of active members of several FVO's together with matched eligible non-members. The subjects of this sample were selected in two separate stages to insure a careful matching on selected background variables. First of all, active participants were selected from five organizations on the basis of designations by leaders of the organizations. Then for each set of subjects from a given FVO, an attempt was made to obtain a set of equivalent subjects who, while formally eligible to participate in the given FVO, actually participated in no FVO at all. Interviewers were sent out to the same neighborhoods of origin of the previously selected FVO members and instructed to obtain individuals of the same age, sex, marital status, educational level, employment status, and occupational prestige level.

In this manner, some 171 usable cases were collected for the first sample—eighty-one members and ninety matched eligible non-members spread more or less equally among five FVO's (a neighborhood development association, a center for mothers, the Red Cross, volunteer firemen, and a religious auxiliary of the Catholic church). Although the matching was rather expensive and wasteful in the sense that about fifty interviews had to be discarded unanalyzed because no matches were available, the matching procedure was by and large a success. None of the differences between active participants and eligible non-members come anywhere near being significant on the variables used in matching (sex, marital status, employment status, occupational level, age, education, residential area).

Thus, by eliminating some of the major known sociological variables affecting participation, the psychological model of participation is put to a much sharper and more stringent test than would be the case if these other variables were included. The reasoning, as indicated earlier, is as follows: We know that various social background variables strongly affect FVO participation. The present model holds that much or most of the impact of such back-

[9] An English translation of the actual Spanish questionnaire can be found in *ibid.*, Appendix A.

[10] See my "Correcting for Social Desirability Response Set in Opinion-Attitude Survey Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, in press.

ground variables upon participation is mediated by certain specified psychological variables. Therefore, if the model is correct, not only should these psychological variables be more powerful in a study where social background variables are permitted to vary freely, but also these psychological variables should remain strong and substantial predictors *even when* social background variables, known powerful influences upon participation, are controlled by matched sampling as in the present research.

One other aspect of the sampling deserves a bit of comment. In the second sample, described later, we might have simply taken a random sample of members from all levels of participation rather than insisting on having polar cases insofar as possible; and here in the first sample we might merely have compared members of a given organization with non-members of that particular organization. Instead, clearly distinguishable criterion groups on which to test the model initially were chosen. The matched non-members in the first sample were in general not only non-members of the given FVO but were also not members of any other FVO. In selecting the sample in this manner the proposed model will be shown in the best light possible, a practice quite justifiable in debuts. In dealing with a random sample of the population or with the total membership of an organization, lower levels of prediction may be expected than will be found in the present study, though such an outcome is not necessary.

The main analysis was carried out with twenty-four multiple-item scales (usually with only two or three items per scale) and several single-item variables.[11] *Within* each of the scales constructed, the average correlation between items has an average of .35, a highly satisfactory degree of interrelationship. The lowest intrascale item intercorrelation average was .14. Essentially the same set of scales was used in analyzing both the first and second samples. Two exceptions were the item regarding number of FVO's belonged to and the scale of rewards and satisfactions received from actually participating in the FVO. These were eliminated from consideration in the first sample because they would obviously and trivially discriminate members and non-members; all of the remaining scales could presumably characterize non-members as much as members. Using the dependent variable of FVO membership versus non-membership thus, Table 1 presents the results of χ^2 calculations for the first sample, dichotomizing each of the independent variables as near the middle of its frequency distribution as possible.

Contrary to prediction, only a few of the personality variables discriminate significantly between members and non-members. The most powerful personality discriminator by far is the autonomy variable: Members of FVO's are much more likely to be low on the need for autonomy than are non-members. Of the other personality variables, only trust, moralism, and efficacy in public affairs were significantly related to membership in the predicted direction. And contrary to prediction, social confidence was significantly related to membership in the negative direction—less social confidence among members than matched non-members. None of the remaining personality variables reached a significant level of discrimination.

Of the eight general FVO-relevant attitudes, six are very strongly related in the expected positive direction with membership: general obligation to participate in FVO's, perceived instrumental value of FVO's in general, preference for formal rather than casual groups, service orientation to leisure time, frequent participation in informal relations and church attendance (the latter two variables being attempts to measure indirectly the respondent's attitudes toward participation in social activity in general). Perceived parents' participation in FVO's and self-reported voting were not related to membership.

[11] See the Appendix (below) for a review of the content of the various scales.

Eight of the nine specific FVO-relevant attitudes are very significantly and positively related to membership, as expected: commitment to the specific FVO, attractiveness of the specific FVO in terms of goals, perceived personal fit with the FVO, amount of favorable support for participation in the FVO given by significant others, friendliness with people in the FVO, felt obligation to participate in the specific FVO, perceived efficacy of the FVO in achieving its goals, and the perception of having been influenced or recommended to join the specific FVO. Parents' approval of the specific FVO had no significant relationship to membership, contrary to prediction.

In sum, it was mainly the general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes that discriminated members from matched eligible non-members in this first sample, although autonomy, moralism, trust, efficacy in public affairs, and social confidence from the set of personality variables were sig-

TABLE 1

χ^2 RESULTS FOR THE FIRST SAMPLE: DISCRIMINATION OF ACTIVE MEMBERS FROM MATCHED ELIGIBLE NON-MEMBERS

Independent Variable	Percentage of Active Members High on Variable ($N=81$)	Percentage of Matched Nonmembers High on Variable ($N=90$)	χ^2	p
General personality traits:				
Trust	54	38	4.06	.05*
Willingness to meet new people	65	60	.33	N.S.
Lack of personal cynicism	51	44	.43	N.S.
Social confidence (negatively related)	36	52	4.01	.05
Lack of need for autonomy	78	31	35.44	.001
Achievement orientation	49	52	.05	N.S.
Efficacy in public affairs	59	38	7.05	.01
Non-fatalism	53	56	.03	N.S.
Planning	54	49	.31	N.S.
Optimism	64	63	.00	N.S.
Satisfaction	52	44	.66	N.S.
Self-confidence	57	60	.07	N.S.
Moralism	83	51	17.61	.001
Psychic adjustment	48	43	.23	N.S.
Free time	54	49	.31	N.S.
General FVO-relevant attitudes:				
General obligation to participate in FVO's	70	21	39.92	.001
General FVO instrumental value	73	33	25.10	.001
Formal group preference	84	42	29.76	.001
Service orientation to leisure time	59	24	19.96	.001
Parents' participation in FVO's in general	48	52	.14	N.S.
Informal relations	60	29	16.03	.001
Church attendance	74	34	25.32	.001
Number of times voted	48	39	1.14	N.S.
Specific FVO-relevant attitudes:				
Commitment to specific FVO	90	20	81.41	.001
Efficacy of specific FVO to achieve goals	88	26	63.93	.001
Obligation to participate in specific FVO	93	36	56.81	.001
Attractiveness of specific FVO	75	19	52.45	.001
Outside significant-other support for FVO	85	37	39.70	.001
Personal fit with specific FVO	62	20	29.27	.001
Friendly with people in specific FVO	75	36	25.58	.001
Influenced or recommended to join specific FVO	67	46	6.86	.01
Parents' approval of specific FVO	33	28	.39	N.S.

* Significance levels are indicated as .05, .01, .001, or N.S. (not significant at the .05 level), where relevant. All calculations were made for a fourfold table with one degree of freedom.

nificant discriminators. From these results, one might conclude that personality factors, though important, are not *as important* as general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes in discriminating members from non-members.

STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS: FIRST SAMPLE

So far we have considered only the relationships between single independent variables and our dependent-membership variable. As we have seen, the relevance of variables from all three levels of specificity —personality traits, general FVO-relevant attitudes, and specific FVO-relevant attitudes—is tentatively confirmed. The next question is how well do all three sets of variables perform *together* in the prediction of membership? In order to provide an answer to this question, a multiple-regression technique was utilized, attempting to construct an equation that would give the best possible predictive weights to the independent variables included for the particular sample at hand. The specific technique used was a stepwise, multiple-correlation computation, which differs from a standard multiple-regression analysis by adding variables into the final regression equation in such a way that only the "best" predictors from a larger pool of predictors are included. There are various methods of selecting the "best" predictors from a pool, but the present technique adds variables into the regression equation in the order of their partial correlational strength in accounting for portions of the over-all variance in the dependent variable.[12] The resulting regression equation sets something of an *upper* bound to the amount of variance we can account for in the first sample using the variables of our model.[13]

Rather than simply putting all of the predictor variables of the model into a pool, calculating the regression equation, and letting it go at that, separate regression equations were computed for various combinations of the three main sets of variables. First of all, Table 2 indicates the multiple-correlation coefficients resulting from correlating each of the three sets of independent variables separately with the dependent-membership variable. When this is done, we find that the specific and general FVO-relevant attitudes account for 59 per cent and 42 per cent of the variance,

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF MULTIVARIATE PREDICTION RESULTS: FIRST SAMPLE, DISCRIMINATION OF ACTIVE MEMBERS FROM MATCHED NON-MEMBERS

Predictor Variables	Resulting Multiple Correlation with FVO Membership* (and Variance Accounted for)
Personality traits	.54 (28%)
General FVO-relevant attitudes	.65 (42%)
Specific FVO-relevant attitudes	.77 (59%)
Social background variables	N. S.
Personality traits combined with general FVO-relevant attitudes	.686 (47%)
Personality traits combined with general *and* specific FVO-relevant attitudes	.84 (71%)
Personality traits, general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes, and social background variables	.84 (71%)

* The reported correlation coefficients are for regression equations discussed more fully in my "Psychological Factors," *op. cit.*, chap. viii. New variables were added into the regression equation in each case until the increase in the sums of squares explained had an *F*-ratio of below 2.75, representing the .10 significance level.

[12] The computer program that makes this calculation was written by Dr. Kenneth J. Jones of Harvard University as a part of his set of chain-link IBM 7094 programs called the Multivariate Statistical Analyzer. His help is gratefully acknowledged (see his *The Multivariate Statistical Analyzer* [Cambridge, Mass.: Privately published (available from the Harvard Cooperative Society), 1964]).

[13] For a discussion of how the lower bound of the predictive power of our psychological model may be set, see my "Psychological Factors . . . ," *op. cit.*, chap. x; or "A Pattern Score Technique for Testing Multivariate Theoretical Predictions" (unpublished paper, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1966).

respectively, while personality traits account for only 28 per cent of the variance in membership, thus confirming our impressions from the χ^2 results: The general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes, when considered as sets, are substantially more powerful than the personality variables in accounting for membership. Moreover, these results indicate that the differences between FVO members and matched eligible non-members are not simply matters of specific FVO-relevant attitudes. Specific FVO-relevant attitudes are certainly the most important discriminators as a set, but *both* general FVO-relevant attitudes (which do not in any way single out the FVO for which members and matched non-members are being differentiated) and personality measures also are of substantial importance.

Second, let us take the set of personality variables to be the most general one and inquire what happens when we add into the predictor pool a second and more situationally specific set of variables—the general FVO-relevant attitudes. The resulting multiple-correlation coefficient from this computation, as Table 2 indicates, is .69, up from .54 for personality variables alone (raising the variance accounted for from 28 to 47 per cent). Thus, adding in this more specific set of predictors substantially increases the amount of variance explained.

Third, let us add into the predictor pool the most situationally specific set of variables of the model—the specific FVO-relevant attitudes. When the full set of psychological predictors is thus used, a stepwise multiple-correlation coefficient of .84 is yielded, and the variance accounted for rises from 47 to 71 per cent (see Table 2). This figure would doubtless drop somewhat if the regression weights derived on the present sample were used to predict participation in a similar but independent sample. However, we have left aside the matter of correcting the multiple correlation for the effect of "coarse grouping" of the dependent variable. If such a correction were applied, the presently reported multiple-correlation results would be still higher.

These results make it clear that each of the three sets of variables of increasing specificity makes a substantial and independent contribution to the explanation of FVO membership when combined in the present manner. Further, addition into the predictor pool of the social background variables of sex, marital status, age, education, and social class self-placement produces no increase in the variance accounted for. This is of course what we would expect from our matching operation.

THE RESULTS FOR THE SECOND SAMPLE: DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN ACTIVE AND INACTIVE FVO MEMBERS

In order to assure a criterion variable solidly independent of the questionnaire-derived personality and attitude variables of the model, the high and low participators (active and inactive members) of the second sample were chosen on the basis of participation ratings by FVO leaders or, in one case (the Red Cross), on the basis of participation statistics kept by the organization.[14] Again to increase the focus on psychological variables and eliminate the gross impact of social background characteristics, the high and low participators were matched insofar as possible on sex, age, marital status, occupational level, and education within organizations. As a result, there is only one significant difference at or below the .05 level between the highs and lows as over-all groups for these five variables: the high participators had significantly more education than the low participators ($p < .01$; $\chi^2 = 7.0$; 1d.f.). Using the dependent variable of rated degree of participation, then, let us look at

[14] On the relationship between rated and self-reported FVO participation here, see my "Communication: Comparison of Self-reported Participation in Formal Voluntary Organizations with Ratings of Participation Given by Organization Leaders," *Rural Sociology*, September, 1966.

the results of the second sample data in terms of simple independent—dependent-variable relationships.[15]

Table 3 presents the results of χ^2 calculations between rated degree of participation and each of the independent variables, in each case dichotomizing the latter as

[15] The previously selected active participators of the Red Cross and volunteer firemen, from the first sample, were included in the second sample, together with active and inactive participators from three new or hitherto unsampled FVO's. Since the two groups of high participators that were used in both the first and second samples were compared with a different and independent group each time (low participating members in the second sample; non-member matched eligibles in the first sample), it was considered statistically legitimate to allow this overlapping of the two samples to a small degree. In all, 27 subjects are involved out of 122 in the first sample and 171 in the second sample.

TABLE 3

χ^2 RESULTS FOR THE SECOND SAMPLE: DISCRIMINATION OF ACTIVE FROM INACTIVE FVO MEMBERS*

Independent Variable	Percentage of Actives High on Variable ($N=69$)	Percentage of Inactives High on Variable ($N=53$)	χ^2	p
General personality traits:				
Trust	70	49	4.46	.05
Willingness to meet new people	57	28	8.57	.01
Lack of personal cynicism	65	40	6.91	.01
Social confidence	57	51	0.18	N.S.
Lack of need for autonomy	70	59	0.99	N.S.
Achievement orientation	54	19	13 86	.001
Efficacy in public affairs	58	21	15.57	.001
Non-fatalism	58	38	4.13	.05
Planning	67	36	10.23	.01
Optimism	58	30	8 23	.01
Satisfaction	61	49	1.25	N.S.
Self-confidence	57	38	3.52	N.S.
Moralism	67	36	10.23	.01
Psychic adjustment	54	42	1.31	N.S.
Free time	75	81	0.29	N.S.
General FVO-relevant attitudes:				
General obligation to participate in FVO's	72	36	14.90	.001
General FVO instrumental value	70	28	18.82	.001
Formal group preference	90	55	17.72	.001
Service orientation to leisure time	68	43	6.51	.05
Parents' participation in FVO's in general	72	70	0.01	N.S.
Informal relations	46	45	0.00	N.S.
Church attendance	39	38	0.00	N.S.
Voting frequency	65	47	3.29	N.S.
Number of FVO's belonged to	54	36	3.13	N.S.
Specific FVO-relevant attitudes:				
Rewards for participation in specific FVO	80	38	20.56	.001
Social support within the specific FVO	81	43	17.11	.001
Commitment to specific FVO	71	32	16.77	.001
Attractiveness of specific FVO	74	38	14.67	.001
Obligation to participate in specific FVO	64	34	9.50	.01
Personal fit with FVO	71	43	8.35	.01
Efficacy of specific FVO	75	49	7.89	.01
Outside significant-other support for FVO	58	34	6.00	.01
Parents' approval of specific FVO	49	28	4.65	.05

* The .05 level of significance for a χ^2 statistic with one degree of freedom, as in the present calculations, is 3.84; relationships reaching this level of significance but no higher are indicated by ".05," while relationships failing to reach this level are indicated as not significant (N.S.). The .01 level is reached with a χ^2 of 6.64 here, and the .001 level is 10.83, which are also indicated where appropriate.

near the middle of its frequency distribution as possible. As predicted, trust, willingness to meet new people, and lack of cynicism are positively and significantly related to participation, although neither social confidence nor autonomy is significantly related. Similarly, achievement, efficacy, planning, and optimism are positively and significantly related to participation, while satisfaction and self-confidence show insignificant trends in the expected direction. Finally, moralism (sensitivity to moral considerations) shows a strong positive relationship with participation, psychic adjustment an insignificant trend in the proper direction, and perceived free time shows no relation. In sum, nine of fifteen personality variables show significant relationships with participation as hypothesized. Three of the four strongest relationships here deal with the efficacy theme—felt efficacy in public affairs, achievement orientation, and planning. The fourth is a scale dealing with sensitivity to moral appeals.

Of the variables measuring general FVO-relevant attitudes, degree of participation is very strongly associated with a general felt obligation to participate in FVO's, with a perception of the instrumental value (effectiveness) of FVO's, and with a preference for formal rather than informal groups, as well as being significantly related to a service orientation toward leisure time. Neither the intended measure of significant others' attitudes toward FVO's in general (parents' participation in FVO's) nor the measures of social activity in general (informal social relations activity, church attendance, times voted, number of other FVO's belonged to in addition to the FVO of interest) were significantly associated with participation in the given FVO. Thus, four of nine general FVO-relevant attitude measures were significantly related with participation as predicted.

All of the specific FVO-relevant attitude measures used were positively and significantly related to degree of participation. The four strongest of these predictors were perceived rewards for participation in the specific FVO, social support from within the FVO, commitment to the specific FVO, and attractiveness of the FVO's goals and activities. In addition, participation was associated with felt obligation to participate in the FVO, perceived personal fit with the FVO, support from significant others for participation in the FVO, perents' approval of the FVO, and perceived efficacy of the FVO.

On the basis of the χ^2 results, one might be inclined to conclude as in the first sample that the most important set of variables was the third one, specific FVO-relevant attitudes, followed by general FVO-relevant attitudes and personality traits. But this ignores the degree of covariation that may be found within each of the three sets. A principal-components factor analysis of the total set of scale variables and single-item scales reveals that both the specific and general FVO-relevant attitude clusters are essentially single factors (in fact, the two overlap to a high degree), while the set of personality measures involves several factors. Keeping this in mind, let us turn to our multivariate analysis procedure.

STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS: SECOND SAMPLE

Using the stepwise multiple-regression procedure again, we may compute the predictive power of each of the principal sets of variables when used alone predicting the dependent variable, degree of participation (see Table 4). When this is done, the personality traits as a set appear to be the most powerful, accounting for some 44 per cent of the variance alone, while general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes alone account for only 24 and 35 per cent of the variance, respectively. The great predictive strength of the personality traits as a set is a surprise after viewing the χ^2 results; but, as hinted above, the reconciliation of the two types of results is to be found in the fact of greater independence

among the various personality-trait measures than among the measures of general or specific FVO-relevant attitudes.

These results have two important implications. First, it is clear that our model is again broadly confirmed by these results in the sense that each of the three major theoretical sets of variables in the psychological model is quite significantly and substantially related to the degree of participation in FVO's. Second, contrary to our initial hypothesis of the essential similarity of discriminating active from inactive members and of discriminating members from non-members, it now becomes clear that there are substantial differences in the weights to be given to the three sets of predictors in our model according to which discrimination is being made. *For the discrimination of members from non-members, the specific and general FVO-relevant attitudes should be given most weight, while for the discrimination of active from inactive FVO members, the personality variables should be given most weight.* We shall say more of this a bit later.

Following again our sequential specificity approach, we find that adding the *general* FVO-relevant attitudes into the predictor pool with personality traits results in a small increase in the multiple-correlation coefficient (from .66 to .69) and in the variance accounted for (from 44 to 48 per cent). Similarly, when *specific* FVO-relevant attitudes are further added into the predictor pool, completing the psychological model, the stepwise multiple-correlation coefficient with degree of participation in the given FVO rises again from .69 to .75, and the variance accounted for rises from 48 to 56 per cent (see Table 4). As for the first sample, therefore, increased explanatory-predictive power is derived from the sequential addition of increasingly specific sets of variables into the prediction equation for our dependent participation variable. In the second sample the increments are smaller, however, owing to the fact that FVO members have already been selected out of the larger eligible population on the basis of general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes, thus attenuating the range and variance of these variables among the FVO members in our second sample.

Finally, the question again arises as to whether the social background variables of sex, marital status, education, age, and social class self-placement will add anything to the explanation already provided by the three sets of variables of the model. Unlike the first sample, where matching was nearly perfect, matching in the second sample was less than perfect, so that the social background factors when taken as a set alone had a multiple correlation of .35 with degree of participation. Hence it is *not* a trivial fact that adding into the predictor pool (already containing the variables of the psychological model) the social background variables of sex, marital status, age, education, and social class self-placement produces no increase in the var-

TABLE 4

SUMMARY OF MULTIVARIATE PREDICTION RESULTS: SECOND SAMPLE, DISCRIMINATING ACTIVE FROM INACTIVE MEMBERS

Predictor Variables	Resulting Multiple Correlation with FVO Participation* (and Variance Accounted for)
Personality traits	.66 (44%)
General FVO-relevant attitudes	.49 (24%)
Specific FVO-relevant attitudes	.59 (35%)
Social background variables	.35 (12%)
Personality traits combined with general FVO-relevant attitudes	.69 (48%)
Personality traits combined with general *and* specific FVO-relevant attitudes	.75 (56%)
Personality traits, general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes, and social background variables	.75 (56%)

* See the note to Table 2.

iance accounted for. This result suggests that these social background variables have no independent contribution to make in predicting participation beyond the contribution of the variables of the psychological model. Whatever contribution to prediction was made by these background variables when standing alone ($R = .35$) probably came from the mediating influence of certain psychological variables associated both with participation and the background variables themselves.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

A. THE SEQUENTIAL SPECIFICITY APPROACH

One of the most important general conclusions to be drawn from the present research is that the approach to explanation of individual behavior by combining variables of increasing situational specificity is a powerful and useful technique. The general idea behind this approach is perhaps most clearly stated by Gordon Allport in an article published in 1950.[16] In that article he points out that there are a multitude of theories purporting to explain the dependent variable of prejudice but that they need not be mutually contradictory. The way to make a certain amount of sense out of most of them is by arranging them on a scale of increasing specificity or increasing focus on the variable being explained.

Allport's list of levels includes the historical, the sociocultural, the situational, the level of personality dynamics and structure, the phenomenological, and the stimulus-object levels. In the present research we have been primarily concerned with the latter four levels.[17] We have consciously attempted to explain the *present* FVO participation of individuals in terms of their *present* psychological states, traits, and attitudes. The results of our research indicate that the proposed psychological model of FVO participation does indeed explain a very substantial part of the variance in such participation for two samples of individuals in Chile. Given now a psychological model that substantially explains present participation in FVO's, we may go on to ask in future research about the prior steps in the (essentially endless) causal sequence that explain in turn present personality traits and general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes.

Past studies of the power of psychological variables in predicting FVO participation have generally accounted for smaller proportions of the variance than in the present research. Perhaps the best multivariate prediction study using psychological variables is one by Copp and Clark,[18] where 42 per cent of the variance in 4-H Club membership (members re-enrolling after a given year versus members dropping out) is accounted for by using a combination of social and attitudinal variables. Various other studies have failed to provide an over-all multiple correlation for their prediction of FVO participation but have shown varying levels of prediction—from 5 to 35 per cent of the variance—using single predictors or sets of predictors combined into a scale.[19] The

[16] G. W. Allport, "Prejudice: A Problem in Psychological and Social Causation," *Journal of Social Issues*, Suppl. Ser., No. 4 (1950).

[17] The historical and sociocultural levels of explanation are quite as relevant to FVO's as to prejudice, though space considerations forbid their discussion here. But see my "Psychological Factors . . . ," *op. cit.*, chap. xi.

[18] James H. Copp and Robert C. Clark, *Factors Associated with Re-enrollment in 4-H Clubs* (Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin No. 195), Madison, Wis., 1956.

[19] George M. Beal, "Additional Hypotheses in Participation Research," *Rural Sociology*, XXI (1956), 249–56; Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Personality and Participation: The Case of the Vanishing Variables," *Journal of Social Issues*, XVI, No. 4 (1960), 54–63; H. G. Gough, "Predicting Social Participation," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XXXV (1952), 227–33; John Harp, "A General Theory of Social Participation," *Rural Sociology*, XXIV (1959), 280–84; Richard F. Larson and William R. Catton, "When Does Agreement with Organizational Values Predict Behavior?" *American Catholic Sociological Review*, XXII (1961), 151–60.

greater levels of variance accounted for in the present research may be attributed to several factors, such as the greater range of variables included in our sequential model, the mode of multivariate analysis used, and the nature of the sampling and dependent variables employed.

To give just one example, at the level of discriminating members from non-members most studies in the past have used a composite measure of FVO membership which consisted of the sheer number of FVO's to which an individual belongs. If the number of FVO's is used as the dependent variable in the present data (combining both the first and second samples), the resulting stepwise multiple correlation is .65 (accounting for 42 per cent of the variance) when personality traits, general FVO-relevant attitudes, and social background variables are combined in the predictor pool. This is substantially less than the amount of prediction that results when we predict membership versus non-membership for a *particular* FVO (71 per cent of the variance). The reason is obvious—the addition of specific FVO-relevant attitudes to the predictor pool provides an extremely powerful increment. Thus we suggest that the "sequential specificity" approach deserves a great deal more attention and use in the social sciences than it is currently granted.[20]

B. A PROPOSED TWO-STAGE MODEL OF FVO SELECTION

The present research began by asking why people join FVO's and, once members, why they participate to the extent they do. The main answer to these two questions was our proposed model. Making the simplest assumption under the circumstances, we hypothesized that the variables and their weights would be the same in both cases, arguing that the decision to join or not join a particular FVO is quite similar to the series of decisions to participate or not participate in the various meetings and other activities of that FVO. The results of the research indicate that we were only partially correct: All three sets of variables of the psychological model are indeed significant and substantial predictors of participation for both types of discrimination. *However, the personality traits are the strongest set for discriminating active and inactive members, while the general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes are strongest for discriminating members from non-members.*

In retrospect, this set of findings does not seem at all strange; in fact, there is another body of evidence that makes it quite plausible. We are referring to the research on friendship choice and mate selection[21] which has indicated that people tend to become friends and/or marry to the extent that they share proximity, similar social background characteristics, common interests or values, and similar personality traits. On the basis of the present research we might extend this generalization to FVO participation, hypothesizing that *people will tend to participate in FVO's to the extent that* (a) *they have proximity to or intercommunicate with FVO's,* (b) *they have similar social background characteristics to the FVO members,* (c) *they have common interests or values with the FVO members, and* (d) *they have personality traits similar to those of the FVO members.* Our psychological model goes somewhat further than the above generalization with regard to the last two categories involved. Not only will people tend to participate more in FVO's where their attitudes and personality traits are *similar* to those of members of the specific FVO, but also joiners and high FVO participators will tend to possess

[20] See my "The Sequential Specificity Approach to Explanation in the Social Sciences" (unpublished paper, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1966).

[21] See A. Paul Hare, *Handbook of Small Group Research* (New York: Free Press, 1963), chap. v; Wayne Kernodle, "Some Implications of the Homogamy-Complementary Needs Theories of Mate Selection for Sociological Research," *Social Forces,* XXXVIII (1959), 145–52.

certain attitudes and personality traits characteristic of the "high participator syndrome" in general.

The second and implied aspect of the generalization about friendship and mate selection is that *these four sets of variables act as filters chronologically in the order presented*. Hence, the same thing may be said about our extended hypothesis for FVO participation: First, proximity and lines of communication together with social background characteristics filter out from the general population the "effective eligibles" for the FVO or FVO's; then, general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes, values, and interests come into play and filter out members from non-members within the set of effective eligibles. Finally, with the increasing interaction of members within the FVO, personality variables come into play and filter out from the other members the highly active participators—those who really feel at home and who personally fit with the organization's programs and people.[22]

Thus, joining an FVO, especially a large and instrumental one, may be a very simple and non-committing act on the part of an individual, involving little engagement between the individual's deep-seated personality traits and the social structure of the FVO. Once past the filters of proximity communications and the social characteristics of the FVO, an individual will be guided primarily by his images and perceptions of FVO's in general and the specific FVO in particular. The decision to join or not join some FVO will be determined by these perceptions together with the personal interests, attitudes, and values that are the basis for most of the routine and short-term decisions we make in everyday life. Where the decision to join or not join an FVO takes on special significance for an individual (for example, where the FVO is a dangerous, notorious, or persecuted one; where it is an intense social movement, etc.), we may expect personality traits on a deeper level to play a larger role in this decision.

Once formally a member, however, active participation obviously demands a great deal more commitment of time, energy, and resources than does inactive participation or nominal membership. To pay a small entrance fee and attend perhaps one or two meetings is all that may be required for joining, but an active member must contribute much more. Since FVO's are by definition non-coercive and non-remunerative (at least in a direct sense), people who are willing to become high participators in an FVO must be receiving some sort of psychic rewards that make it all worth their while. The two principal psychic rewards, we suggest, are the rewards of good fellowship and the rewards of personal participation in the achievement of some valued goal—hence the importance of the personality variables of trust-sociability and efficacy-achievement in differentiating high from low FVO participators.

If the above thesis is correct, we may expect future research to show that the relative importance of personality traits in predicting participation increases as the amount of actual behavior or social activity involved increases. Thus, we might expect that personality traits will be more important for predicting joining versus not joining where an FVO involves a great deal of pre-entrance activity and interaction with FVO members than where an FVO involves only a minimum of such contact. Similarly, the greater the absolute amount of participation involved in being an active member of a particular FVO, the greater may we expect the importance of personality traits to be in discriminating high from low participators for that FVO. Where there is in fact little

[22] For an example of the application of this mode of analysis to one of the specific organizations in the present sample, see my "The Explanation of Formal Voluntary Organization Participation: The Case of Volunteer Firemen in Chile" (unpublished paper, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1966).

absolute difference in the amount of participation of high and low participators and where average participation is low (for example, in an FVO that operates mainly by mail and individual action—a minor pressure group), we may expect general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes to override personality factors in predicting participation.

Another important problem that future research must settle is the problem of temporal sequence. The present study has led us to draw some tentative conclusions about the causal selective effects of certain psychological variables through time, although the basis for drawing these conclusions has been a single study at one point in time. The basic questions to be answered here in the future are to what extent can the observed differences in psychological variables between FVO members and matched non-members be attributed to selection or recruitment processes and to what extent can they be attributed to socialization processes occurring after members have formally joined or become candidates for joining a given FVO? In order to separate these two effects, one would have to compare matched non-members with members who have just joined the given FVO or are just about to join, and the latter group would have to be compared with members who have been in the FVO for, say, one year or more, or five years or more, keeping track of the characteristics of people dropping out of the FVO at various stages. Either in this manner, or preferably by using a longitudinal design, testing members who have just joined the FVO and then retesting them at various intervals later on, the relative effects of recruitment versus member socialization could be assessed.

Although the present data do not lend themselves well to the above type of analysis, an attempt was made to assess the impact of longer range FVO socialization and selection effects among members by comparing, for all FVO's in both samples, individuals who had been members for less than three years with individuals who had been members for three years or more. This particular cutoff was near the middle of the distribution for the number of years that members had been in their respective FVO. When these two groups were compared on the various psychological independent variables of the previous analysis, dichotomizing these variables at or near their medians, there was evidence of significant (at the .05 level) "date of entry" effects for the following variables: number of times voted was higher for more time in the FVO, as were optimism, planning, and informal relationships. The tendency for more voting with longer time as an FVO member was by far the strongest relationship (significant at the .0001 level), and the trend held up when controls for age were introduced. This finding is consonant with Maccoby's results[28] for an FVO in the United States.

In sum, there is evidence that some socialization or selection effects may be occurring within our FVO's, but the number of such effects is small when a three-year cutoff point is used and the variables involved are not the more crucial or powerful ones from our prior analysis. It is quite likely, however, that stronger effects might be found, especially in the specific FVO-relevant attitudes, when a shorter time period of membership is used, as suggested earlier. The trend both for the results reaching statistical significance and for those not quite reaching it was for increased time in the FVO to be associated with an increased participation tendency (in terms of scores on the various psychological variables of our model). This may either mean that FVO participation tends to beget more participation by increasing socialization into the role of FVO member once a threshold level is reached, or it may simply mean that

[28] Herbert Maccoby, "The Differential Political Activity of Participants in a Voluntary Association," *American Sociological Review,* XXIII (1958), 524–32.

persons with lower psychological participation tendency and less fit with the role of FVO member (in general or in the specific FVO) tend to drop out of the organization after short periods of time, thus "purifying" the long-term member group as compared with the recently joined member group.

Probably both of the above interpretations are true to a degree, but only future research can settle the matter and give the relative weights of each effect. The present data, being simply a small pilot study, do not permit drawing any firm conclusions on these points. In fact, only the *longitudinal* type of study suggested above could permit us to resolve the recruitment versus socialization issue conclusively. For the present, therefore, we must be content with having discovered that there *are* important differences in the weights of variables differentiating FVO members from non-members as opposed to differentiating active from passive members. *How* and *why* these differences have arisen are separate and as yet unanswered questions.

A final word or two about the problem of generalization from the present samples would not be out of place here. The Chilean samples, which strongly supported the value of a revised version of the proposed model, were purposive ones and hence not representative of any particular statistical universe. They were gathered to test hypotheses rather than to assess the parameters of any particular population of FVO members or non-members. The FVO's included in the samples were, however, diversified in their major purposes, and they also differed broadly in the sex, age, marital status, socioeconomic status, and education of their members.[24] Thus it cannot be easily argued that the confirmatory results obtained on these samples were solely or even largely the product of the special nature of one or another type of FVO included. Furthermore, the results obtained in Chile for the model as a whole are in accord with prior results in the United States for various individual elements of the model.[25] Thus, it cannot be argued that the present results are simply the product of peculiarities of Chilean culture or Chilean FVO's. In sum, then, although the present results are not generalizable in a strict statistical sense, there is good presumptive evidence that the proposed model will have explanatory relevance in other cultures and for other FVO's.

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[24] The *sports club* was composed mainly of males 17–35 years old, both single and married, employed and still going to school, with most individuals representing the working-class and lower middle-class levels on education and occupational level. The *neighborhood associations* were also largely male, but almost completely made up of married men currently employed in a lower-class or working-class job and having very low education; most of these men were in the 25–55 year age range. The *stevedore's union* was similar to the sports club in being all male, with both single and married men, but the educational level was basically low and all were obviously employed rather than any attending school; the age range was fairly broad and the occupational level low. The *center for mothers* was composed of married mothers of very low educational levels, and most of them did not have paid occupations outside the home; their ages covered the gamut from about 20–65, and their husbands had basically lower-class or working-class occupations, if any. The *Red Cross* members were mostly female and either single or separated, rather than married; they tended to have medium to high education, no paid occupation (or a white-collar occupation, if any), and covered a fairly wide age range. The *volunteer firemen* were mainly 18–30-year-old single males with a high level of education; about half were still attending school and the other half were employed in white-collar or professional jobs. Finally, the *Christian Family Movement* was composed of both males and females (married couples, mainly) of high educational and occupational status, covering the age range from about 25 to 55.

[25] See my "Psychological Factors . . . ," *op. cit.*, chap. v. See also chap. x, where it is shown that the proposed psychological model has predictive relevance for each of the FVO's involved when taken alone, so that the sample overlap of twenty-seven cases from the Red Cross and volunteer firemen, mentioned in n. 15 above, cannot be invoked to explain away the present results.

APPENDIX

The scales used were composed of the following items, dichotomizing the response distributions as near the median as possible and giving equal weight to each item in a particular scale. Only a reduced form of each item is presented here, however.

Trust: (*a*) Merchants give honest weight and fair merchandise; (*b*) trusting others is important; (*c*) relatives will not take advantage if they know private affairs; (*d*) should trust a stranger; (*e*) should not pardon an irresponsible child.

Willingness to meet new people: (*a*) Like to meet new people; (*b*) would like to know likable foreigner better.

Lack of personal cynicism: (*a*) People not just honest through fear; (*b*) people make friends because they enjoy them, not simply because they are useful.

Social confidence: (*a*) Never have to fight timidity; (*b*) starting conversation with strangers is easy; (*c*) can make friends more rapidly than others.

Lack of need for autonomy: (*a*) One should accept dependence on others; (*b*) group participation gives growth opportunities rather than taking away one's liberty.

Achievement orientation: (*a*) Always tend to persevere in goal-striving to overcome obstacles; (*b*) always tend to go all out in trying to achieve some goal.

Efficacy in public affairs: (*a*) Politicians pay attention to people like you; (*b*) own political influence is more than others; (*c*) have gotten interested in public issue often; (*d*) could do something about an unjust law; (*e*) own influence in changes of today is not negligible; (*f*) power of a candidate to change the situation once elected is great.

Planning: (*a*) The man who plans ahead has fewer problems; (*b*) prefer to plan most things in advance.

Optimism: (*a*)Seldom feel that nothing turns out well; (*b*) expect that country will have a good future; (*c*) expect own future will be good.

Satisfaction: (*a*) Satisfied with major activity in life; (*b*) satisfied with own life as compared to others'; (*c*) life has given mainly happiness.

Self-confidence: (*a*) Expect success in everything; (*b*) have much confidence in self; (*c*) feel self much more able than others.

Moralism: (*a*) Always consider the morality of your acts; (*b*) man needs an absolute morality.

Psychic adjustment: (*a*) Not bothered by nervousness; (*b*) have not often lacked spirit to do things in past years.

General FVO instrumental value: (*a*) Could achieve some of own goals better through organizations; (*b*) people with common interests should unite in groups to achieve them; (*c*) best to realize oneself participating in groups.

Formal group preference: (*a*) If formed a group, would prefer fixed rules rather than a casual group; (*b*) prefer to participate in formal rather than informal groups.

Service orientation to leisure time: (*a*) Main reason for being in an FVO is to serve others; (*b*) main goal in life should be service to others; (*c*) first choice for spending leisure time is to serve others or be in some FVO.

Informal relations: (*a*) Have many close friends; (*b*) know many neighbors; (*c*) know many people outside neighborhood; (*d*) visit relatives often.

Rewards for participation in specific FVO (NOTE: This scale was used only for discriminating active and inactive members, not for discriminating members from non-members): (*a*) Organization meetings and activities are extremely interesting; (*b*) obtain much satisfaction from the organization; (*c*) receive much respect and prestige from participating in the organization.

Social support within the specific FVO (NOTE: This scale was also used only for differentiating *among* organization members): (*a*) Very friendly with people in the organization; (*b*) feel very much united with people best known in the organization.

Commitment to specific FVO: (*a*) Failure of organization would be very important to you; (*b*) organization plays a very important part in your life; (*c*) feel it is almost a personal honor when good happens to the organization.

Attractiveness of specific FVO: (*a*) Organization is a social movement, not just another organization; (*b*) like the program of the or-

ganization very much; (*c*) think participation in the organization makes one a better person.

Personal fit with specific organization: (*a*) Have much similarity of interests with other members of FVO; (*b*)have many qualities of an active member of the FVO.

Efficacy of the specific FVO: (*a*) Organization has achieved most goals in past; (*b*) organization will achieve most goals in future.

Outside significant-other support for FVO: (*a*) Acquaintances have much respect for the FVO; (*b*) best friends have very favorable attitude toward the organization.

Also used in the analysis were the following single items:

Non-Fatalism: Life position depends on effort, not fate.

Free Time: Have much free time aside from sleep, work, and family necessities.

General obligation to participate in FVO's: Feel much obligation to participate in organizations such as unions, sports clubs, Red Cross, etc.

Parents' participation in FVO's in general: Much participation of parents in organizations such as (same list as above).

Church attendance, voting frequency, and number of FVO's belonged to are self-explanatory.

Obligation to participate in specific FVO item was similar to general obligation item, but with name of actual organization substituted.

Parents' approval of specific FVO: Present attitude of parents toward specific FVO.

A Note on Bureaucracy and Its "Correlates"

Richard H. Hall and Charles R. Tittle

ABSTRACT

Twenty-five organizations are ranked according to their degree of bureaucratization. The ranking is accomplished by the combination of scores on six dimensions of bureaucracy into a single Guttman scale of bureaucratization. This over-all degree of bureaucratization is then found to have a moderately strong association with an organizational concern with objects as opposed to ideas. Less association is found between degree of bureaucratization and the size of the organization, the number of departments or divisions in the organization, the nature of the official organizational goals, or the extent to which the organization is "people oriented."

Previous research has suggested that bureaucracy can be fruitfully approached by separating it into component parts or dimensions.[1] This dimensional approach can be particularly useful in research when organizational structure is treated as an independent variable and factors such as conflict between professionals and nonprofessionals or interdepartmental relations are handled as dependent variables. In such cases a dimensional breakdown permits more insightful analysis than would be possible if bureaucratization were considered a unitary phenomenon. This contention is borne out by the fact that the separate components vary somewhat independently for a sample of diverse organizations.[2]

In some instances, however, there are advantages in approaching bureaucracy as a total phenomenon.[3] Research contingencies calling for this type of analysis would include situations in which the object is specification of organizational conditions that are associated with, or that permit, various degrees of bureaucratization. Or one might be interested in comparing societies with the object of isolating the conditions that permit organizations with various degrees of bureaucratization to emerge. One way of handling such problems is to examine configurations of the individual bureaucratic components to determine similarities and differences between organizations of varying types or to determine the characteristic organizational configurations for societies of diverse composition. For example, common configurations might be found for manufacturing firms of similar size or for governmental agencies engaged in regulative activities. Similarly, one might find that societies with similar levels of technological development

[1] Examples of this approach are Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "'Bureaucracy' and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organization Theory: An Empirical Study," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December, 1959), 491–95; "'Bureaucratic' Elements in Organizations: Some Research Findings," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (August, 1958), 415–18; Richard H. Hall, "The Concept of Bureaucracy: An Empirical Assessment," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIX (July, 1963), 32–40; and *idem*, "Intra-organizational Structural Variations: Application of the Bureaucratic Model," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VII (December, 1962), 295–308.

[2] Hall, "The Concept of Bureaucracy: An Empirical Assessment."

[3] Weber and his followers depict bureaucracy as a syndrome of particular kinds of organizational arrangements, and they intimate that such a construct is extremely meaningful when so treated. See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons and ed. Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), pp. 329–36; Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Harry Cohen, *The Demonics of Bureaucracy* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1965).

were characterized by organizations with particular kinds of configurations.

An efficient method for treating bureaucracy as a configurative unity suggests itself. It may be the case that various bureaucratic components are actually parts of a cumulative phenomenon such that one could predict the total dimensional pattern of an organization from a knowledge of the extent to which it possessed any specific subdimension. If this is true, it might be possible to combine scores for various bureaucratic elements to form a cumulative scale of bureaucracy. The advantages to such a procedure are obvious: not only could bureaucracy be empirically studied as a totality, but the relative strength of each subdimension as a differentiating element could be specified. This paper reports the results of an attempt to rank twenty-five organizations of varied types using Guttman scaling procedures as a means for combining bureaucratic elements into an over-all bureaucracy scale.

PROCEDURES

The twenty-five organizations considered in this study were quite diverse, as Table 1 indicates. Scores for each organization on six dimensional scales developed by Hall were utilized. These components included hierarchy of authority, division of labor,

TABLE 1

BUREAUCRATIZATION SCALE FOR TWENTY-FIVE ORGANIZATIONS

Organization	Imper-sonality		Hier-archy		Division of Labor		Speci-ficity		Complex-ity of Rules		Techni-cal Com-petency	
	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−
State liquor department	X		X		X		X		X			X
State tax department	X		X		X		X		X		X	
Military-equipment maintenance center	X		X		X		X		X		X	
Trucking company	X		X		X		X		X			X
Hotel	X		X			X	X		X		X	
State welfare department	X		X			X	X		X			X
County health department	X		X			X	X		X		X	
Factory		X	X		X		X		X		X	
Government regulative agency		X	X		X			X	X		X	
Academic department	X			X	X		X		X			X
Bank		X		X		X	X		X		X	
Factory		X	X			X		X	X		X	
Sales firm		X		X		X		X	X		X	
Board of education		X		X		X		X	X		X	
Men's store		X		X		X		X	X			X
Law firm		X		X		X		X	X			X
Equipment marketing department		X		X	X			X		X	X	
Insurance company		X		X		X		X		X	X	
Stock brokerage		X		X		X		X		X	X	
State regulative agency	X			X		X		X		X	X	
Advertising agency		X		X	X			X		X		X
Television station		X	X			X		X		X		X
Petroleum marketing department	X			X		X		X		X		X
State church headquarters		X		X		X		X		X		X
Insurance company		X		X		X		X		X		X
Errors	3	0	2	0	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	6

complexity of rules, specificity of procedures, impersonality of operation, and technical competency as the criterions for hiring and promotion. Each component was measured by means of Likert internal-consistency scales which contained a series of statements related to each dimension. The scales were designed for administration to organizational employees, each of whom was to indicate how accurately each statement described his own organization. Each scale was demonstrated to be reliable, and all were judged valid.[4] The scales were completed by a random sample of personnel in the larger organizations and by the total population of the small organizations. Mean scores for each organization were computed. The scores for these dimensional scales were arranged into statistical frequency distributions for five categories of grouped date. Each category was then treated as a single score for purposes of scalogram analysis using the Cornell technique. Categories were combined into dichotomies, and cases were shifted to minimize error in the usual Guttman scaling manner.[5]

The resulting quasi-scale was characterized by a coefficient of reproducibility of .887 and a minimal marginal reproducibility of .553. All the error in this case does not appear to be random. The data do not justify a conclusion that the six dimensions form a cumulative scale in the Guttman sense. They seem to indicate that technical competency does not fit with the other components. Thus it can easily be seen (Table 1) that, if technical competency is eliminated from consideration, the remaining five subdimensions are found to produce an acceptable scale characterized by a coefficient of reproducibility of .912, with an improvement of .360 over the minimal marginal reproducibility. All error in the five-item scale appears to be random.

The twenty-five organizations are ranked as shown in Table 1. The five subdimensions in descending order of their differentiating strength are: (1) impersonality of operation, (2) hierarchy of authority, (3) division of labor, (4) specificity of procedures, and (5) complexity of rules. Thus, if an organization scores high on the impersonality component, it is also likely to score high on all the other subdimensions and would be ranked among the most highly bureaucratized. In like manner it is found that those organizations that score low on the complexity-of-rules dimension are likely to score low on all the other dimensions. This derived scale of bureaucratization permits a more total approach to organizational structure without minimizing the importance of the separate dimensions. Moreover, its use makes possible the comparison of organizations with respect to degrees of bureaucratization.

CORRELATES OF BUREAUCRACY

Employing the derived Guttman scale in five-category ordinal form,[6] relationships between bureaucratization and variables commonly assumed to be associated with bureaucracy can be examined. One of the most often postulated correlates is that of size. Some social scientists have asserted that an increase in size is indicative of an increase in bureaucratization. Indeed, such a relationship has been considered causative and even referred to as a "law."[7] In order to test this hypothesized

[4] A more detailed description of these scales is found in: Hall, "The Concept of Bureaucracy: An Empirical Assessment."

[5] Louis Guttman, "The Cornell Technique for Scale and Intensity Analysis," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, VIII (1947), 247–80.

[6] Cases between the first and fourth cutting points were combined into a single category, and the seventh category was retained to produce five approximately equal categories.

[7] C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administration* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), pp. 7–8. See Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 225–27, and Joseph Bensman and Bernard Rosenberg, *Mass, Class and Bureaucracy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 268–75.

association for the data considered here, organizations were classified in five categories with respect to size.[8] The data indicate some association between the two, although it is not especially strong (.252).[9] In general, large size is shown to be indicative of a high degree of bureaucratization, as defined here, but exceptions are numerous enough to suggest that size alone is inadequate as a predictor of bureaucracy. Certainly the relationship is too weak to justify an assumption of causality or universality.

TABLE 2

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN BUREAUCRATIZATION AND VARIOUS CORRELATES

Correlate	Association*	Level of Significance†
Organizational size	.252	.06
Organizational divisions	.176	.14
Ease of assessing goal attainment	.084	.31
Ideas-objects dimension	.372	.01
People orientation	−.248	.06

* Kendall's Tau C.

† One-tailed.

A second set of variables thought to be associated with bureaucracy consists of basic structural factors such as the number of divisions or departments of an organization.[10] It is commonly assumed that the greater the number of organizational divisions, the more highly bureaucratized the organization will be. For examining this relationship, the organizations considered here were separated into five categories on the basis of the number of official divisions.[11] As can be seen from Table 2, the number of divisions is not strongly associated with the scale of bureaucratization (.176). This implies that these simple structural components, while useful for certain kinds of organizational analysis, cannot be used as indicators of the extent of bureaucratization.

A third attribute often considered as a possible correlate of bureaucacy is the degree to which goal attainment by the organization can be assessed.[12] It could be anticipated that an organization whose goal attainment is relatively easy to evaluate might be more subject to routinization and bureaucratization. In order to test this hypothesis it was necessary to obtain a ranking of the organizations on a goal-specificity dimension. Goal statements for each organization were submitted to a panel of twenty-five social scientists to be used as a guide for rating each organization on a seven-point scale with respect to the ease or difficulty of assessing goal attainment.[13]

[8] All categorizations in this paper were made following the rule of marginal equalization. In the case of size, the categories were: 0–24, 25–99, 199–299, 300–499, and 500 or more.

[9] Tests of significance for Kendall's Tau are reported in Table 2 for the consideration of the reader, although the nature of the sample requires caution in their interpretation.

[10] Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organizations* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961), pp. 12–15 and 41–46; and Bensman and Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

[11] The categories are: 1–2, 3, 4–5, 6–7, and 8 or more.

[12] Although not dealing with goal specificity directly, Weber notes that precision and speed (direct goal accomplishment) are enhanced by a bureaucratic structure (Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1946], p. 215). Clark also notes that vague goals do not lead to definitive (bureaucratic) courses of action (Burton Clark, "Organizational Adaptation and Precarious Values," *American Sociological Review*, XXI [June, 1956], 327–36.

[13] We agree with Perrow that official goal statements are inadequate for a full understanding of organizational behavior. Nevertheless, these statements represent general guidelines for the organizations and do seem sufficient for the operational use to which they are here put. See Charles Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (December, 1961), 854–66. See also Herbert A. Simon, "On the Concept of Organizational Goal," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IX (June, 1964), 1–22.

The mean ranking for each organization was used as a basis for placing the organizations into ranked categories, following the rule of marginal equalization. The magnitude of the derived association (.084) indicates little relationship between the bureauracy scale and the goal-assessment dimension.

The implication of this finding is twofold. First, rankings based on such goal statements are not predictive of organizational bureaucratization. Second, Perrow's suggestion that these official goals may be something other than definitive for the organization is evidently confirmed.[14] "Operative goals," or specific activities of the organization, may be better indicators of the degree of bureaucratization. Perhaps the degree of bureaucratization is primarily dependent upon organizational activity, although the structure may at times serve as an activities modifier.

Concern with operative goals might necessitate examination of the extent to which organizations primarily manipulate ideas rather than objects in their day-to-day activity.[15] It would be anticipated that the greater the extent to which an organization manipulates objects, the more highly bureaucratized it would be. But dealing operationally with such a variable is even more difficult than dealing with official goals. As a pragmatic approach, a second panel of fifty social scientists was asked to rate each of the twenty-five organizations on a five-point continuum polarized as "ideas" and "objects."[16] The judges were asked to focus on the primary activity of the organization in deciding upon the placement of each organization. The impracticality of handling an ideas-objects dimension empirically, particularly of treating it as a continuum, is illustrated by the difficulties encountered in this procedure. Judges found the task extremely frustrating, and as a result the derived valuations showed little consistency. Nevertheless, the mean scores were utilized for separating the organizations into ranked categories. Surprisingly, the association between this variable and the bureaucratization scale is at least moderately impressive (.372). The observed association suggests that an ideas-objects distinction may be quite meaningful, although more fruitful application demands further conceptual clarification.

A similar operational difficulty arose in attempting to classify organizations in terms of the degree to which they "work on" people as a purposive activity.[17] The panel of fifty experts was instructed to rate each of the twenty-five organizations on a five-point continuum representing the degree to which the organizational product is measurable in human terms. Again the task proved frustrating for the raters, particularly since many of them felt that every organization must concern itself with people in its normal operations regardless of the type of organizational product. Consequently, they were unable to focus meaningfully on the predominant activity. Despite these problems, the mean rating scores were employed to differentiate the organizations. University departments, welfare agencies, and other such organizations were thus placed in high-"people-orientation" categories, while manufacturing firms and a governmental tax agency were classified in less-people-oriented categories. The peo-

[14] Perrow, *op. cit.*

[15] For an examination of this problem, see Eugene Litwak, "Models of Organization Which Permit Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (September, 1961), 177–84.

[16] It is not clear whether such a "dimension" should appropriately be thought of as a continuum. It may well be that there are two continuums that overlap to some extent. If this is the case one might be more justified in characterizing organizations in terms of the extent of such overlap.

[17] Parsons notes that structural differences will occur when the "materials" worked upon are people whose social relationships and motivations must be considered (Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Society* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960], p. 70). Litwak also makes the same suggestion (*op. cit.*, p. 181).

ple–non-people factor, thus derived, was found to be associated to some extent with the bureaucratization scale (— .218). The more-people-oriented organizations tend to be less highly bureaucratized.

Given the fact that some of the variables considered here are found to be at least moderately associated with the bureaucratization scale, ideally one would proceed to an examination of their individual and combined contributions to variations in bureaucratization. The ordinal nature of the data and the small number of cases,[18] however, prohibit such a multivariate analysis. The findings do suggest that fruitful investigation of organizations will necessitate further concern with the elusive factor of operative goals and organizational activities as well as with more traditional elements such as size.

[18] Attempts have been made to develop multiple coefficients for use with ordinal indexes, but the results have been disappointing. See James A. Davis, "A Net Partial and a Multiple Coefficient for Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma" (unpublished paper, University of Chicago, November, 1964).

CONCLUSION

It has been argued that organizations may be analyzed by treating bureaucracy either as a configurative whole or as a collection of separate dimensions. The nature of the research problem should dictate the choice of approach. Further, it has been shown that a particular configurative treatment using five subdimensions yields a cumulative Guttman-type scale for twenty-five organizations. An attempt to relate the resulting scale to factors commonly hypothesized to be indicators of the degree of bureaucratization produced mixed results. These findings suggest that bureaucracy is too complex to be explained in terms of such simple factors as number of divisions or type of goals. A more useful approach would seem to call for additional analysis of variables relating to operative goals as they emerge in ongoing activities. However, the difficulties encountered here in attempts to empirically investigate some of these elements accentuate a serious need for their conceptual clarification.

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Occupational Assimilation and the Competitive Process: A Reanalysis

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ABSTRACT

A recent article reports negative correlations for several major occupations between income of white males and percentage Negro. The results are interpreted as tentative confirmation of the hypothesis that Negro workers pose a competitive threat to the earnings of white workers. Reanalysis of the original cross-sectional regressions, taking account of additional confounding variables, reduces the effect of percentage Negro on income of white workers to insignificance for all major occupations except professional workers. Among professionals, discriminatory barriers to entry and a pattern of segregated clientele are proposed as better explanations than "competition." Reanalysis of the original longitudinal regression, again adding confounding variables, reduces to insignificance the effect of change in percentage Negro on change in income. An alternative mode of analysis designed to capture more precisely any effect of competition in local labor markets similarly reveals no association. A cross-sectional analysis using percentage Negro in an occupation as the dependent variable leads to an emphasis on processes of segregation rather than of competition. A review of the economic theory underlying the notion of competition indicates weaknesses in the original formulation and demonstrates that the original mode of analysis is inadequate for choosing among alternative interpretations of the results.

Hostility of workers toward an influx of new laborers of a different regional, ethnic, or racial background is a familiar occurrence. The plea of indigenous workers is likely to be expressed in economic terms: the newcomers constitute "cheap labor" and hence pose a threat to current wage levels. Within several highly industrialized nations of western Europe, similar arguments are made opposing importation of foreign manpower from southern and eastern Europe.[2] In the United States, local variations on this theme occur regarding the *bracero* program in the Southwest and the employment of Cuban refugees in the Miami area. But the principal example of workers' hostility toward "cheap labor" appears in white reactions to Negro demands for equal participation in the labor market.

To the extent that economists have given direct attention to these issues, their emphasis has been on analyses of "long-run" and "over-all" benefits to be gained from lowering discriminatory barriers and on exposing fallacies in the arguments put forth by groups erecting barriers. Economists have tended to analyze effects rather than causes of discrimination; they seem to agree implicitly that non-economic considerations are at the root of prejudice and discrimination, and they generally leave these issues in the hands of sociologists and psychologists. Sociologists have also tended to debunk economic rationalizations, instead stressing non-economic sources of prejudice. A recent article by two sociologists, however, emphasizes economic benefits derived from discrimination against minority groups. Census data are brought to bear on the issue, with the conclusion that "white earnings and wages are adversely affected by competition with minority groups" (Negroes and females). Thus white hostility toward the participation of minorities in the labor force has "some objective basis" and is "not rooted in attitudes of ra-

[1] We are indebted to W. Lee Hansen for commenting on an earlier version and to Leslie G. Ibach for assisting with the statistical computations.

[2] "4 Million Workers Migrate in Europe," *New York Times*, December 23, 1965, p. 1.

cial superiority or other feelings of prejudice."[3]

These conclusions have important ideological as well as sociological implications. Although the authors' generalizations are cautiously expressed, the racist construction that may be placed on their findings is particularly serious in the current era of conflict over union racial policies and fair employment practices. Further analysis of their data removes the empirical support for the "competition" hypothesis and leads to reconsideration of the theoretical underpinnings of the argument.

CROSS-SECTIONAL APPROACHES

1. *The original argument.*—According to the "competition" hypothesis formulated by the Hodges, the presence of Negroes in an occupation indicates a form of competition that adversely affects the earnings of whites in that occupation, and this effect should be revealed in a negative correlation between the percentage Negro and the earnings of whites. This is the fundamental empirical test undertaken in the original analysis, but certain controls proved necessary. The simple negative correlation ($r = -.67$) that obtains over 418 detailed occupations between white male income in 1949 and percentage Negro in 1950 provides "no way of choosing between the suggestion that white male workers were receiving lower wages because of competition with Negroes . . . and the obvious inference that Negroes . . . are concentrated in low-status occupations."[4]

One index of the status of an occupation is the educational level of its incumbents. Controlling for white male educational attainment, the partial correlation (over the 418 occupations) between white male income and percentage Negro is still negative, but lower in magnitude ($r = -.43$). Again, the result is consistent with the "competition" hypothesis but is equally consistent with the "segregation" hypothesis that Negroes "gain entry to jobs in which the return upon an educational investment is less than that expected from the total income-education relationship over all occupations."[5]

In an attempt to get at competition unconfounded with segregation, separate regressions were calculated across detailed occupations within each of seven major occupation levels. If detailed occupations within a major level constitute a relatively homogeneous set of skill levels, a negative correlation between percentage Negro and white male income, controlling for education, might be interpreted as evidence for competition. The segregation argument would not apply—Negroes could not be concentrated in "undesirable" jobs because all jobs within a major level (and with similar educational requirements) are regarded as equally undesirable. "By looking at relationships *within* major occupation levels, the effect of the inferior occupational attainment of Negroes . . . is largely eliminated."[6]

This approach yielded some evidence for competition. In three of the seven regres-

[3] Robert W. Hodge and Patricia Hodge, "Occupational Assimilation as a Competitive Process," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXI (November, 1965), 263. The bulk of the Hodges' analysis and interpretation is concerned with Negroes rather than females or other "minorities," and our analysis refers only to Negroes.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 251. The square root of the percentage Negro was used to reduce skewness.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 252. In fact, there is large variation in skill level within the major occupation groups, and this variation is only partially captured in the measure of formal education used as a control variable. Within the major groups, Negroes are likely to be in those detailed occupations that require less training and skill, and for this reason their earnings as well as earnings of the white incumbents of those occupations will be low. A negative correlation between percentage Negro and earnings of whites may emerge simply because a positive correlation exists between the skill level of an occupation and the earnings of its incumbents, both white and Negro. The percentage Negro, in this case, would be standing as a proxy for the level of skill and training, rather than for "competition" in the sense that the Hodges use the term.

sion equations, the regression coefficient for percentage Negro was negative and significantly different from zero.[7] After some discussion of alternative interpretations, competition was accepted as the explanation of the results for professional workers and service workers, but rejected for craftsmen.[8] We believe this approach poses a premature antinomy between "competition" and "segregation" to the neglect of other relevant considerations. Set in a broader perspective, the problem may be rephrased: "What are the reasons for variation in the income of white males within major occupations?" This question suggests consideration of additional occupational characteristics in the absence of which it is difficult to interpret any association of income with percentage Negro and in the presence of which any effect of race is likely to be trivial. Let us expand the scope of the analysis.

2. *Further analysis.*—Our analysis of manual occupations modifies the original in two respects, by altering the dependent variable and by adding independent variables to the regressions. (*a*) In this part of the original analysis, the Hodges used the same cutting point to define the income variable for all seven major occupations, namely the percentage of white males with incomes of $3,500 or more in 1949. For several occupations, this cutting point is at an extreme end of the income distribution, thus giving undue emphasis to idiosyncratic features of the tail of the distribution rather than representing a more stable average. The average percentage with incomes of $3,500 or more among detailed occupations ranges from 58.8 for professionals to 8.7 for laborers. Among laborers the correlation across detailed occupations between an income measure using a cutting point of $3,500 and one using $2,000 is only .49. Consequently, we utilize a figure as close as possible to the median for the major occupation.[9]

(*b*) In the original analysis, educational attainment was controlled because it is correlated positively with earnings and negatively with percentage Negro. Other variables that confound the association between income and race may also be controlled. Jobs that are seasonal in character or that do not provide steady employment tend to yield low annual incomes and to have relatively high percentages of Negroes. One new variable introduced into the analysis is the percentage of white males in the experienced civilian labor force who worked fifty to fifty-two weeks in 1949. Further, occupations that are concentrated in the South, a low-wage region, are likely to yield low average incomes. Because of the high percentage of Negroes in the southern la-

[7] Each regression utilizes income as the dependent variable and education, square root of percentage Negro, and square root of percentage female as independent variables. Inclusion of females in the regressions affects the coefficients for Negroes. Thus, the discussion should not completely overlook the female measure; we are inclined to regard it more as an index of selected aspects of the character of an occupation or of intra-occupational differentiation than as an index of minority competition. See Sumner Slichter, "Notes on the Structure of Wages," *Review of Economic Statistics*, XXXII (February, 1950), 80–91.

[8] For craftsmen, the Hodges argue that strong unionization provides immunity from competition: "Discrimination may be a more powerful explanatory factor at this occupational level than at others. If Negroes are selectively admitted to unions representing those craft occupations that are low-paying and, therefore, less attractive to whites, the observed relationship would be expected" (Hodge and Hodge, *op. cit.*, p. 256).

[9] See Table 1 for the specific cutting points. To minimize differences from the original analysis, we retained the $3,500 break for craftsmen rather than shifting to $3,000, a figure closer to the median for this group. A minor source of noncomparability with the original analysis arises because we included and the Hodges excluded persons reporting no income in 1949 when calculating the income measure. Persons who did not work in 1949 are included in the denominator of the percentage working full time in 1949. For operatives, service workers, and laborers, the simple correlations between square root of percentage Negro and the income measure using a cutting point of $3,500 are: —.17, —.66, and —.07, respectively. With the lower cutting points on income, the corresponding correlations are —.13, —.58, and —.25.

bor force, such occupations are also likely to have higher-than-average percentages of Negroes. A second new independent variable is the percentage of the total male experienced civilian labor force residing in the South.[10]

Regression equations incorporating our modifications for the manual occupations are summarized in Table 1. Only for craftsmen does the percentage Negro have a significant effect on the income of white male workers. Education has a significant association with income only among operatives, and then, curiously, its effect is negative, that is, the higher the educational attainment the lower the income (net of other variables).[11] For each of the four manual occupations, at least one of the new varia-

[10] Seasonality and region were mentioned by the Hodges in their discussion of craft occupations, *op. cit.*, p. 256, but our analysis indicates their relevance for other manual occupations as well. Total rather than white labor force is used in the measure of southern concentration because the data are not available by color. The source of data is U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1950*, Vol. IV: *Special Reports*, Part I, chap. B, "Occupational Characteristics" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956).

[11] A speculative interpretation of the negative effect of education on income for operatives is that "seniority" is a confounding variable. Seniority probably has a positive correlation with the earnings of operatives and a positive correlation with age, and age in turn has a negative correlation with educational attainment.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS OVER DETAILED OCCUPATIONS RELATING INCOME OF WHITE MALES TO SELECTED VARIABLES: MANUAL OCCUPATIONS, UNITED STATES, 1950

Independent Variable[a]	Major Occupation Group			
	Craftsmen	Operatives	Service	Laborers
No. of occupations	72	113	28	63
Cutting point on income	$ 3,500	$ 2,500	$2,000	$ 2,000
	Regression Coefficients in Raw-Score Form			
Regression constant	39.060	39.000	−7.315	22.320
Percentage:				
High school graduates, WM	− .036	− .279*	.221	− .255
Working full year, WM	− .344*	.588*	1.110*	.898*
In South, TM	− .444*	− .236*	− .416	− .393*
Negro (sq. rt.), TM	− 5.398*	− 2.234	−1.355	.778
	Regression Coefficients in Standard Measure			
Percentage:				
High school graduates, WM	− .026	− .226*	.102	− .083
Working full year, WM	.317*	.502*	.767*	.626*
In South, TM	− .259*	− .233*	− .147	− .435*
Negro (sq. rt.), TM	− .296*	− .166	− .122	.061
R^2	.40	.34	.86	.54
R^2 (Hodges[b])	.23	.05	.62	.23

[a] WM = white males, TM = total males.

[b] Based on a cutting point of $3,500 or more for white male income, and using three independent variables: percentage high school graduates, square root of percentage Negro, and square root of percentage female; from Hodge and Hodge, *op. cit.*, Table 2.

* $P < .05$.

bles has a significant regression coefficient in the anticipated direction.

The census category "craftsmen" also includes "foremen, and kindred workers." Negroes are systematically excluded from supervisory positions, which tend to be high paying. A dummy variable was added to the analysis, scored 1 for foremen and 0 for all other craft occupations. By contrast, barriers to Negro entry may be circumvented by self-employment in selected crafts, particularly several with minimal capital and licensing requirements (e.g., shoemakers and plasterers). The square root of the percentage self-employed among employed white males was also added to the analysis. With these two additional variables in the regression equation for craftsmen, the explanatory power of percentage Negro is reduced to insignificance; the explained variance is increased to 64 per cent; and the self-employment, foremen, and South variables carry significant regression coefficients.

Of the three white-collar groups, only for professional occupations did the regressions calculated by the Hodges reveal a significant negative association between race and income (net of education and percentage female). Consideration of the detailed professional occupations suggests that it is premature to attribute this relationship to "competition." Nearly two-thirds of male Negro professional workers are in occupations serving the Negro community: teachers, college faculty, clergymen, physicians and surgeons, dentists, lawyers and judges, and funeral directors. For these occupations, both product and labor markets are highly segregated, and the notion of competition is largely irrelevant. An additional 16 per cent are in relatively low-paying professional occupations whose primary qualification is *special ability* rather than *formal education*—actors, artists and art teachers, athletes, authors, dancers and dancing teachers, entertainers, musicians and music teachers, photographers, sports instructors and officials, and therapists and healers. Undoubtedly, a significant share of these men is restricted to entertainment and services for the Negro community.[12]

It strains credulity to assert that such professional occupations as teachers, social workers, librarians, and male nurses are relatively low paying for white men because of an overrepresentation of Negroes in them. It is much more plausible that the relatively low income of these professions occurs independently of the presence of Negroes and that segregation—restriction of Negroes from entry into high-paying professions—rather than competition accounts for the observed relationship between race and income.

Summarizing the cross-sectional material, for two of three major occupations that initially provided evidence for competition (craftsmen and service workers), reanalysis of the data shows the percentage Negro to be an insignificant correlate of white male income when seasonality, region, and self-employment are taken into account. For the third occupation, professional workers, we argue that the relationship between race and income is more plausibly attributed to patterns of segregation than of "competition."

LONGITUDINAL APPROACHES

The notion of competition has a definite processual connotation: as Negroes become increasingly prevalent in an occupation, the income of white workers in that occupation will be adversely affected. Hence a longitudinal analysis seems more suited to the problem.

1. *The original argument.*—For their principal longitudinal analysis the Hodges

[12] Admittedly, this argument about professional workers is ad hoc, and we have been unsuccessful in quantifying it. Expansion of the regression equation to include additional variables added little to the explained variance, and the race variable remained significant. Our assumption about segregated clientele is supported for male Negro clergymen, teachers, and college faculty by the disproportionate numbers residing in the South: 71, 86, and 88 per cent, respectively.

used the major occupation group "operatives and kindred workers" and correlated the percentage-point change in percentage Negro with a measure of change in white male income. They find zero-order correlations between the two variables of — .06 for the 1940–50 decade and — .40 for the 1950–60 decade. The negative evidence for the earlier decade is dismissed (with some justification) because of the "peculiar characteristics of the war years," while the significant correlation for the later period is adduced as support for the competition hypothesis.

2. *A reanalysis.*—As with the cross-sectional approach, we have taken basically the same set of data and pursued the analysis a little further. We limit our analysis to the 1950–60 decade and use detailed occupations rather than the highly abridged list of occupations which remained for the original analysis after necessary combinations to achieve comparability over two decades.[13] This modification and other procedural improvements lowered the simple correlation between changes in income and changes in racial composition to —.26, compared to the —.40 reported in the original analysis.[14] Again, we may carry the analysis further by consideration of changes in other variables related both to income and to race.

Table 2, which presents the results of a multiple-regression analysis across eighty-four operative occupations, takes change in income of white males as the dependent variable and changes in racial composition, educational attainment, full-time employment, and southern location as independent variables. A final independent variable, the rate of growth of each detailed occupation, is introduced in an attempt to measure the rate of change in demand.

As was true in the cross-sectional reanalysis, the race variable is reduced to insignificance when other variables are taken into account. The most powerful predictor of change in income is change in the extent of full-time employment. The income measure is based on income in the year preceding the Census, so that any unusual events affecting an occupation in that particular year (such as a strike) will be reflected in the statistics. Our results also show a significant adverse effect upon in-

[13] To develop a list of comparable detailed operative occupations from the 1950 and 1960 Censuses, we began with a table in the 1960 Census showing the distribution by detailed occupation of the male experienced civilian labor force in 1960 and 1950. Comparing the revised 1950 figures (i.e., those made comparable by the Bureau of the Census with 1960 definitions) with the figures originally published for 1950, we excluded from the analysis those occupations for which the difference was more than 10 per cent. This resulted in a loss of twenty-five occupations. The exclusion of two residual categories left eighty-four detailed operative occupations for analysis. The appropriate data are in U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Detailed Characteristics, United States Summary,* Final Report PC(1)-1D (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 201; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1950,* Vol. II: *Characteristics of the Population,* Part I, United States Summary (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), Table 124.

[14] There are several discontinuities between the two analyses that might be responsible for the difference in the strength of this relationship. (*a*) The original analysis utilized the intermediate occupation classification, while the present analysis is based on the detailed classification. (*b*) The two analyses differ in the manner in which the problem of changes in definitions of occupations was resolved. (*c*) Our income measure utilizes Census data for white males; the Hodges found it necessary to rely on a color-standardized income measure in order to achieve comparability with 1940 data in which income was not available separately for whites. (*d*) Finally, the dependent variable in the original analysis was the residuals from a regression of (color-standardized) white male income in 1959 on 1949. We used the percentage-point difference between the 1959 income measure (the percentage of white males with incomes of $4,000 or more) and the 1949 measure (the percentage of white males with incomes of $2,500 or more). The shift in dependent variable from residuals to percentage-point changes has very little effect on the results. Using our income data for white males (rather than the Hodges' color-standardized income data), the residuals are highly correlated with the percentage-point changes ($r = .98$). We use the percentage-point change measure because it is more readily understood.

come performance of an increased concentration in the South. We need only recall the example of the textile industry, which employs many operatives, to appreciate this relationship. Finally, growing occupations tend to show greater improvement in income (net of the other variables) than do declining occupations. The three added variables contribute substantially to our ability to explain variance in changes in the income of white males in the eighty-four operative occupations: $R = .73$, compared to the simple correlation between change in income and change in percentage Negro, $r = -.26$ (or to the corresponding figure from the Hodges' analysis, $r = -.40$).

In all of the analyses reported thus far, occupations have been used as units of analysis. We indicated earlier our belief that detailed occupations within any major group are not homogeneous but differ in many factors affecting income, such as level of skill required, growth, regional location, unionization, seasonality, government employment, etc. (see footnote 6). Ideally, we want to choose units that are as similar to each other as possible, differing only in the specific variables under consideration. For these reasons, we undertook an analysis of several particular occupations across Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) in the belief that, for example, bus drivers in Seattle are more like bus drivers in New York than bus drivers as a group are like "fruit packers" or "blasters and powdermen." Furthermore, metropolitan areas tend to correspond to actual labor markets in which the effects of competition would be highlighted.

In the operative group as a whole, the original cross-sectional analysis revealed no significant association between race and income. To maximize the possibility of finding such an association in an analysis across metropolitan areas, we chose seven detailed operative occupations that had a high percentage Negro and in which white males had lower incomes than expected on the basis of their educational attainment. The data pertain to northern SMSA's of 250,000 and over in 1950 and 1960.[15]

Some occupations are relatively ubiquitous and appear in virtually all areas (such as "truck drivers and deliverymen"), while others with strong industrial ties appear in few areas (such as operatives in the "motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment" manufacturing industry). Thus, the number of SMSA's on which the correlations are based varies for different occupations from twenty to fifty. Income of detailed occupations is not available separately for

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS RELATING CHANGE IN INCOME OF WHITE MALE OPERATIVE WORKERS TO SELECTED VARIABLES: UNITED STATES, 1950–60

Variables	Regression Coefficients: In Raw-Score Form	Regression Coefficients: In Standard Measure
Regression constant	3.541	....
Change in:		
1. Percentage Negro	−.255	−.093
2. No. of workers	.047*	.190*
3. Educational attainment	.148	.091
4. Weeks worked	.627*	.549*
5. Southern location	−.575*	−.386*
R^2	.536	
No. of occupations	84	

Note.—Definition of variables is as follows: (1) percentage-point change in percentage Negro, 1950–60; (2) percentage change in male experienced civilian labor force, 1950–60; (3) percentage-point change in percentage high school graduates, 1950–60; (4) percentage-point change in percentage working fifty to fifty-two weeks, 1949–59; (5) percentage-point change in percentage in South. The dependent variable is the percentage-point change between percentage with incomes of $2,500 or more in 1949 and percentage with incomes of $4,000 or more in 1959. Variables (1) and (5) refer to total male experienced civilian labor force; all others refer to white male experienced civilian labor force.

* $P < .05$.

[15] Three SMSA's with major boundary changes during the decade were excluded from the analysis (Syracuse, Youngstown, and San Bernardino).

whites for individual metropolitan areas, so we were forced to use the percentage change in total male median income as our dependent variable and to introduce as a control variable the percentage Negro in the occupation in 1950.

Table 3 presents, for each of the seven occupations, the zero-order correlation over SMSA's between the percentage change in median income for all males and the percentage-point change in percentage Negro, as well as the partial correlation adjusted for percentage Negro in 1950. A significant correlation appears for only one of the seven occupations, "painters, except construction and maintenance." Examination of the scattergram reveals this correlation is due solely to one area—Flint, Michigan—in which a large increase in percentage Negro was acompanied by a lower-than-average change in income. In Flint, there was a decrease between 1949 and 1959 in the percentage of men in this occupation who worked full time (63 to 26 per cent), presumably because of the 1959 steel strike. Omitting Flint, the correlation is —.15 and the partial correlations is —.02. On the basis of this supplementary analysis we still find no evidence for the "competition" hypothesis.

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR NORTHERN METROPOLITAN AREAS OF 250,000 AND OVER RELATING CHANGE IN INCOME TO CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE NEGRO: SELECTED OCCUPATIONS, 1950–60

Occupation	No. of Areas	Correlations[a]	
		r_{yx_1}	$r_{yx_1 \cdot x_2}$
Attendants, auto service, and parking	34	.21	.04
Bus drivers	28	.06	−.14
Laundry and dry-cleaning operatives	23	−.04	−.00
Painters, except construction and maintenance[b]	20	−.54*	−.51*
Taxicab drivers and chauffeurs	24	−.04	−.04
Truck drivers and deliverymen	50	−.04	−.04
Welders and flame-cutters	39	−.07	−.19

[a] y = percentage change in median income of males, 1949–59, x_1 = percentage-point change in percentage Negro, 1950–60, and x_2 = percentage Negro, 1950.

[b] When Flint, Michigan, is omitted, the correlations are not significant; see text.

* $P < .05$.

SEGREGATION WITHIN MAJOR OCCUPATIONS

The empirical evidence presented thus far has offered little support for either "competition" or "segregation" as formulated in the original analysis. But an analysis with income as the dependent variable is not an appropriate test of the notion that Negroes are segregated into selected occupational niches. We may, therefore, turn the analysis around and ask how well we can predict the percentage Negro in detailed occupations within each major group.

We may distinguish two types of occupational segregation. One is the segregation of Negroes into less-skilled, low-paying, and generally "undesirable" jobs. This may arise from lower productivity of Negro workers, or it may be that incumbents of some of the more desirable jobs exercise monopoly power over occupational entry sufficient to exclude Negroes. Another type of segregation is more adventitious—a disproportionate number of Negroes may be found in occupations with many work places in the South or in northern cities.

For each of the seven major occupations, Table 4 presents the results of a cross-sectional multiple-regression analysis taking the square root of percentage Negro as the

dependent variable. Within major occupations, a small number of occupational traits suffice to explain from one-third to nearly two-thirds of the variance in percentage Negro across detailed occupations.

A strong tendency for Negroes to be concentrated in low-paying, less-educated, highly seasonal jobs appears only within the "craftsmen" category. This group was singled out in the original analysis as one in which the exercise of monopoly power by strong unions was so obvious as to rule out any meaningful operation of "competition." Among professionals, income is the only significant predictor of percentage Negro. Like craftsmen, many professional occupations are strongly organized with rigidly controlled barriers to entry, and it is plausible to assume the exercise of considerable monopoly power. Service occupations present a special case; in addition to the adventitious variable of southern location, the important predictor of percentage Negro is a dummy variable for protective

TABLE 4

SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS OVER DETAILED OCCUPATIONS RELATING PERCENTAGE NEGRO TO SELECTED VARIABLES: MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUPS, UNITED STATES, 1950

Independent Variable[a]	Professional	Managers	Clerical, Sales	Craftsmen	Operatives	Service[b]	Laborers
No. of occupations	54	58	30	72	113	28	63
	Regression Coefficients in Raw-Score Form						
Regression constant	1.53	3.10	3.41	4.71	3.23	− .12	1.10
Percentage:							
High school graduates, WM	.01	− .02*	− .03*	− .02*	− .06*	...	− .03
High income,[c] WM	− .03*	− .01	− .01	− .01*	− .01	...	.00
Working full year, WM	...	...	...	− .03*	− .00	.02	− .02
In South, TM	...	− .02*	...	− .01	.01	.13*	.06*
Urban, TM	...	...	...	...	.02*	...	.05*
Government-employed (sq. rt.), WM	...	...	.15*	...	.12*	...	...
Female, T	.08	.11*	...	...	...	...	...
Protective service,[d] WM	...	...	...	...	...	−3.44*	...
	Regression Coefficients in Standard Measure						
Percentage:							
High school graduates, WM	.18	− .44*	− .58*	− .25*	− .62*	...	− .14
High income,[c] WM	− .66*	− .25	− .24	− .23*	− .19	...	.04
Working full year, WM	...	...	...	− .42*	− .01	.17	− .20
In South, TM	...	− .22*	...	− .07	.07	.50*	.83*
Urban, TM	...	...	...	...	.25*	...	.63*
Government-employed (sq. rt.), WM	...	...	.38*	...	.19*	...	...
Female, T	.24	.27*	...	...	...	...	...
Protective service,[d] WM	...	...	...	...	...	− .71*	...
R^2	.54	.47	.54	.53	.32	.63	.59

[a] WM = white males, TM = total males, and T = total, both sexes.

[b] Because of the small number of service occupations, the education and income variables are omitted here. Their regression coefficients were not significant.

[c] High income is defined as $3,500 or more, with the following exceptions: operatives, $2,500 or more; service workers and laborers, $2,000 or more.

[d] A dummy variable, scored 1 for protective service occupations and 0 for all other service occupations.

* $P < .05$.

service occupations. This can also be viewed as an index of monopoly power, for local governments control the majority of protective service positions and Negroes are nearly completely excluded.

It is the professional, craftsmen, and service groups within which the Hodges initially claimed to find empirical support for the "competition" hypothesis, yet it is precisely these three groups that have training and licensing prerequisites to occupational entry. It is in these three occupations, therefore, that the exercise of monopoly power is most readily accomplished.[16] Among the other major occupations, productivity traits and adventitious variables largely account for variation in percentage Negro.

This analysis of segregation within occupations is sketchy, but it suffices to illustrate the variety and complexity of the processes. However, the problem requires greater attention to historical and idiosyncratic factors than can be given in this type of systematic analysis of census data.

DISCUSSION

Our empirical results do not confirm the assertion of a causal association between the percentage Negro in an occupation and the income of white workers. However, weaknesses in the underlying data and in the techniques of analysis limit the reliance that can be placed on these results. In addition, neither we nor the Hodges took account of variables not readily available from census data, such as quality of education, extent of unionization, industry affiliation, industrial concentration, and size of plant. Hence our empirical reanalysis cannot stand alone but must be supplemented with an interpretive discussion.

According to the Hodges' conceptualization, an association between percentage Negro and white male income, if not explained away by controlling for confounding variables, must result from one of the following processes: (1) "Segregation": barriers to entry in certain privileged, high-paying occupations which restrict to low-paying occupations both Negroes and those white males similarly excluded from the ranks of the protected. (2) "Competition": wage-cutting competition affecting all incumbents of an occupation, resulting from the presence of a relatively large number of Negroes in an occupation and their "willingness to work for less."

Deciding between these two poses a problem, for both interpretations predict identical associations between percentage Negro (or changes therein) and white male income (or changes therein); the data under examination are intrinsically incapable of discriminating between them. This dilemma is illustrated in our discussion of the cross-sectional result for professional workers—what is viewed in the original analysis as evidence for competition is seen by us as evidence for segregation. In fact, the word "segregation" could be substituted for the word "competition" at many points in the original analysis without violating the data.[17] Hence, we must attempt an alterna-

[16] Although clear cases of the exercise of monopoly power exist, as in the case of many craft unions or professional associations, a recent study suggests that monopoly power results mainly in the protected workers being of higher quality (productivity) than "outside" workers, and the higher wages of "insiders" are little if any greater than expected on the basis of their higher quality. See Leonard W. Weiss, "Concentration and Labor Earnings," *American Economic Review*, LVI (March, 1966), 96–117. Our regression analysis includes too few measures of worker productivity to permit us to distinguish whether the concentration of Negroes in undesirable jobs results only from the lesser average skills of Negro workers or whether there is also some segregation attributable to monopoly power.

[17] The Hodges inadvertently acknowledge this in two instances. First, they suggest that the apparent absence of "competition" among laborers and operatives is a consequence of the low zero-order association between the percentage Negro and white male income (*op. cit.*, p. 257). But a correlation between race and income is an equally plausible measure of segregation; their statement is equivalent to saying that, because there is no segregation of Negroes into low-paying occupa-

tive elaboration of relevant economic theory to that presented by the Hodges.

This brief review of economic theory will be addressed to three propositions: (1) For cross-sectional data, there is no reason to predict a negative association between the percentage of Negroes in an occupation and the earnings of white males, nor, as we have shown, do the empirical results support such an association. (2) For data showing changes over time, there are formulations of the problem such that a negative association would be predicted between change in Negro membership in an occupation and change in earnings of white males. The formulation presented by the Hodges, however, is incorrect at a critical stage of their argument. (3) Finally, under correct formulations, conclusions about the role of economic factors in the "etiology of prejudice" appear to us seriously misguided. Let us take up each proposition in turn.

1. The competitive theory of the determination of wages is that market forces, unfettered by monopoly, tend toward equal pay for equal work. At any given moment the expectation is that, on the average, workers are paid what they are worth, subject to deviations due to transitional situations. If competition prevails, the productivity of white males determines their earnings, and the percentage of Negroes in an occupation is irrelevant (but see footnote 6).

To test whether the facts are consistent with this theory, ideally, we should use as a dependent variable the earnings of *individual* white males in various occupations. Among the independent variables should be skill or productivity traits (such as education) and "compensating factors" (such as rural residence with its lower cost of living). With an adequate set of control (independent) variables included, the percentage Negro in the worker's occupation should have no effect on his earnings. Weiss has reported empirical results for a regression analysis that nearly fits this model, except that the percentage Negro in the worker's industry rather than his occupation was used. Separate regressions were calculated for male workers in each of three major occupations and eight detailed occupations, and in none is the partial regression coefficient for the percentage Negro statistically significant. Because the present analysis uses occupations as units and hence could never effectively control for the inherent confounding of occupation and skill levels, we view Weiss' results using individuals as units of analysis as particularly noteworthy.[18]

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tions, there can be no "competition."

Second, consider the Hodges' description of segregation: "The only obvious alternative to admitting that competition with Negroes and females may depress white male wages is to assert that, within every major occupational level, processes of segregation allow females and Negroes to find employment largely in those occupations where income is rather less than expected on the basis of the income-education relationship within the major occupation group" (*op. cit.*, p. 259). But this is exactly the analysis they have performed and presented in their Table 2. They assert that it is the presence of minorities that produces this result, while we can equally justifiably argue that discrimination allows minorities only in low-paying occupations. The issue, then, is simply one of semantics, and the data presented by the Hodges do not permit a choice between these two interpretations.

[18] Weiss, *op. cit.*, used the 1/1,000 sample from the 1960 Census. His units of observation were individual workers in the labor force in 1960. His primary concern was the relation between earnings, industrial concentration, and unionism, with control variables representing personal and productivity traits of the individual earner. The control variable for aggregate racial composition of the industry actually was not percentage of Negroes but its near-complement, percentage "white with other than Spanish surname." The major occupations used by Weiss for his separate regressions were craftsmen, operatives, and laborers; the detailed occupations were draftsmen; mechanical engineers; managers, officials, and proprietors, not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.); machinists; truck and tractor drivers; operatives and kindred workers, n.e.c.; janitors and sextons; and laborers, n.e.c. Other occupations were deemed too concentrated in specific industries for this type of analysis to be meaningful. Weiss' empirical results support our contention, but a contrary finding—of a significant negative effect of percentage Negro in an industry

2. With respect to changes occurring over time, it is correct that particular segments of the labor force may rationally oppose a worsening of their competitive position stemming from an increased supply of labor to their occupation (assuming no change in demand). Moreover, any group of workers stands to improve its employment and earnings position by restraining competitors, and, to the extent it succeeds, it reaps the rewards of monopoly. *Ceteris paribus*, wages will decline if the supply of Negro workers seeking work in that occupation increases, but exactly the same wage-depressing effect will occur if the increased labor supply consists of white workers. "Outside" white and "outside" Negro workers both pose a competitive threat to the monopoly privileges of a protected group.

The Hodges appear to be arguing that Negroes pose a special threat to the wages of white workers because they are "willing to work for less."[19] Two comments may be made about this argument. (*a*) First, economic wage theory does not indicate that wages are set at levels just sufficient to entice individual workers to enter the occupation or that the person willing to work for least will be hired. Rather, wages are set at that level which brings into balance the marginal demand for and marginal supply of workers with particular skills. It is safe to say that most workers would be "willing" to work at their current jobs for somewhat less than their current pay, and it is equally true that most would be "willing" to work for higher wages than they currently receive. The fact that a new Negro worker typically would accept less than a new white worker is irrelevant to the process of wage determination; competition by employers would set the wage for either at just below what the going wage was prior to the new entry. (*b*) The germ of truth in the Hodges' argument is that there are circumstances under which Negroes would pose a special competitive threat. A case can be made that, contrary to the competitive theory of the determination of wages, Negroes are paid less than they are worth in the labor market.[20] If so, the question may be raised, why are Negroes underpaid (or underemployed)? The answer given by economists is that prevailing attitudes in society are responsible for the unfavorable position of Negroes. Becker has indicated modifications necessary in the competitive theory to take account of such exogenous factors as "tastes for discrimination."[21] To the extent they exist, such "tastes" certainly have economic consequences, but clearly their origin is in societal racial discrimination rather than rational economic behavior.

3. The Hodges "suggest that the etiol-

—would not necessarily have to be taken as support for the "competition" hypothesis. A high percentage of Negroes could be viewed as indicating the absence of monopoly power in the industry, and this absence would adversely affect the earnings of white incumbents. Weiss' data included measures of industrial monopoly power on both the producers' side (concentration) and the workers' side (unionism); there was no significant effect of either type of monopoly power on earnings except through selection of workers with greater productivity.

[19] The low-wage character of the Negro labor supply is emphasized repeatedly in the Hodges' opening paragraph (*op. cit.*, pp. 249–50).

[20] Whether Negro workers are paid "what they are worth" remains a controversial question. The best empirical analysis of this issue is based on the 1/1,000 sample from the 1960 Census. A significant earnings differential in favor of whites held up despite a large number of controls over productivity traits. The author's belief, however, was that additional productivity traits (such as quality of education) not captured by census data probably account for much of the remaining differential. See Giora Hanoch, "Personal Earnings and Investment in Schooling" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1965). Weiss, *op. cit.*, included in his analysis a dummy variable specifying whether the individual was Negro. This variable had a significant negative regression coefficient. This finding on the individual level is consistent with Hanoch's results and must be clearly distinguished from Weiss' finding of no effect for the racial composition of the worker's industry.

[21] Gary S. Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

ogy of prejudice may lie partially in the transformation of what were, at one time, motives of an economic kind."[22] On an individual level, there may be some truth in this; an unprejudiced person may believe that Negroes (more than whites) threaten his job and hence may support racial discrimination. Yet we have just argued that if there is any validity to his belief it must derive from prior patterns of racial discrimination, which themselves derive from non-economic considerations.[23]

A final issue is whether the identifiability of Negroes suffices to explain their rejection from a monopolized occupation. To be fully effective, barriers to occupational entry must be maintained against the entire gamut of outsiders, but is it not partially effective, and hence economically rational, to raise barriers against selected categories of outsiders? The answer is yes, it may be partially effective and economically rational, but no, it is not economically more rational to select Negroes than to select any other group. There are thousands of potential bases for exclusion—a common one is the lack of kinship with incumbents—and each is equally rational on economic grounds alone. If it is easier or more natural to maintain barriers against Negroes than against persons with red hair or blue eyes, that in itself is a product of stereotypical thinking that must be attributed to the pervasiveness and long history of racism in our society. The roots of prejudice and segregation lie elsewhere than in simple monopolizing behavior in the marketplace.

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[22] Hodge and Hodge, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

[23] Sociologists will recognize the analogy to a self-fulfilling prophecy, and, indeed, union discrimination against Negroes formed one of Merton's original examples. "Thus our fair-minded white citizen strongly supports a policy of excluding Negroes from his labor union. His views are, of course, based not upon prejudice, but upon the cold hard facts. . . . Our unionist fails to see, of course, that he and his kind have produced the very 'facts' which he observes" (Robert K. Merton, "The Self-fulfilling Prophecy," *Social Theory and Social Structure* [rev. ed., Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957], p. 424).

COMMENT

In the text of Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain, we are asked to believe *in general* that the composition of the labor force has *no* effect upon relative wages of the groups comprising it. *Specifically,* the claim is clearly stated: "If [perfect] competition prevails, the productivity of white males determines their earnings, and the percentage of Negroes in an occupation is irrelevant." This assertion is not, however, a corrigible empirical statement; rather, it is a logical derivation from the "competitive theory of the determination of wages." That the claim is purely logical is evident enough: for if one finds a market in which the claim does not hold, then one *always* concludes that the market is imperfect, *never* entertaining the prospect that the claim is wrong. But, happily, most labor markets are not perfectly competitive, and all sorts of wizards and hobgoblins creep into the pristine world of economic theory.

One of these creatures is the prospect that wages of particular groups are determined not only by their productivity, but by the composition of the labor market in which they are employed. There is nothing novel about this hypothesis: Economists have entertained it for some time. For example, discussing plausible (though in this case unproven) effects of immigration from southern and eastern Europe on real wages in manufacturing, Albert Rees notes, "A great influx of unskilled labor could both drive down money wages and bid up the prices of those commodities consumed primarily by the lowest income groups. The real wages of all workers, including the immigrants, would tend to fall."[1] In our article, we attempted to demonstrate that, even if one could establish a relationship between the wages of particular groups and the composition of the occupations in which they are employed, the interpretation of the finding is, at best, ambiguous. About the strongest claim we made was that one cannot rule out the prospect that competition among white males, Negroes, and females may have deleterious effects upon the wages of the former. If this is, in fact, true, then one must also entertain the possibility that discrimination will persist even after feelings of racial superiority have waned. Other sociologists have suggested much the same on the basis of other types of evidence: ". . . this study lend[s] credence to the view that discrimination and its supporting prejudice persist mainly because majority people gain from them. One should not go so far as to attribute the perpetuation of discrimination entirely to its functions to the majority, nor should the many known and possible dysfunctions of discrimination to the majority be overlooked. However, one should also avoid viewing discrimination as merely a self-perpetuating carry-over from a past era which will certainly and rapidly disappear once the Myrdalian 'vicious circle' is broken. The tradition of discrimination against Negroes apparently receives continuous reinforcement from the present self-interests of the majority."[2]

To entertain any of these prospects, one needs, of course, to establish an empirical relationship between the composition of the labor force and the advantages which accrue to its component parts. Taeuber, Taueber, and Cain claim that there is no net relationship between the incomes of white males in various occupations and the percentage Negro in them. There are, however, several indications that all of the

[1] Albert Rees, *Real Wages in Manufacturing: 1890–1914* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 14–15. New estimates of the movements of real wages in manufacturing, prepared by Rees, suggest that immigration had only a small, if any, effect on wages during the period covered by his series.

[2] Norval D. Glenn, "Occupational Benefits to Whites from the Subordination of Negroes," *American Sociological Review,* XXVIII (June, 1963), 447–48.

evidence on this point is not yet in and that, consequently, one cannot definitively reject the possibilities raised in our article. We have already made clear in our paper that, even if one cannot roundly reject these possibilities, one is not required by the evidence to accept them.

The probability of obtaining eleven or more heads in thirteen tosses of a fair coin is given by

$$\sum_{i=11}^{13} \frac{13!}{i!(13-i)!} (\tfrac{1}{2})^{13} = \tfrac{23}{2048},$$

or approximately .0112. In their discussion, Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain present the net association between the percentage Negro in an occupation and a measure of the income of the incumbents of that occupation in thirteen different universes of occupations and/or labor markets. In eleven of these universes, the net association between the Negro and income variables is negative, an unlikely event indeed *if* there were *no* association between the two variables and *if* the tests are independent of each other. The point, of course, is underscored when one realizes that the tests in fact exhaust the universes in which they are performed. Although we would not care to advance this observation as substantial evidence against the arguments posed by Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain, it does make clear that their conclusions flow from a rigorous dependence upon tests of significance when those tests are not strictly applicable: The data exhaust the universe and there are no sampling errors. Were it not for errors of observations (which under the usual assumptions of random and uncorrelated measurement error would enhance the reported associations),[3] the results reported by Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain would be parameters, rather than estimates of the parameters, of the universes from which they are taken. Because the over-all picture reveals an inverse, though small,[4] association between the income of occupational groups and the proportion Negro of their incumbents, we were led to a closer inspection of the details presented by Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain.

If one views the cross-sectional analysis performed in our original paper as an exercise in the analysis of covariance in which the results for specific major occupation groups represent the within-group regression lines, then one is not at liberty to change one's definition of income as one moves from one group to another. Consequently, it seemed fruitful to augment the analysis of Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain by adopting the measure of income utilized in our original work. For the twenty-eight service and private household occupations studied in the cross-sectional analysis for 1950, we defined the following variables: I_1 = percentage of *white* male experienced civilian labor force (ECLF) with incomes of \$3,500 or more; W = percentage of *white* male ECLF working 50–52 weeks in 1949; E = percentage of *white* male ECLF completing four years of high school or more; P = a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 for protective service oc-

[3] Ordinarily, one estimates universe or population parameters by analysis of observations made upon only a sample of the objects comprising the universe. This is the source of sampling error. In the present case, the occupations studied exhaust for all practical purposes the universes from which they are drawn, to wit, detailed occupations identified in the classification of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Even if one's sample may be thought to exhaust the universe, one still incurs errors in observation or measurement. In the present case, the observations upon the objects of analysis—occupations—are based upon the characteristics of a sample of persons comprising the occupation. Thus, sampling error is present in the analysis, but this sampling error can be thought of as making a contribution to the errors of observation or measurement associated with the data on a universe of occupations which has been exhaustively sampled. Observations on the occupations are also subject to the more usual sorts of measurement error: misreporting, transcription mistakes, and the like.

[4] In our original article, we noted that the effects we discussed are not necessarily "large in an economic sense, especially at the individual level" (see Robert W. Hodge and Patricia Hodge, "Occupational Assimilation as a Competitive Process," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXI [November, 1965], 263).

cupations and the value 0 otherwise; $S =$ percentage of *total* male ECLF residing in the South; U, percentage of the *total* male ECLF residing in urban places of 2,500 or more; $N =$ square-root percentage Negro of *total* male ECLF; and $F =$ square-root percentage female of *total* ECLF. From the regression of I_1 on W, E, P, S, U, N, and F, we find that the standardized regression coefficient associated with Negro concentration,

$$b^*_{I_1 N.WEPUSF} ,$$

is —.5409. This coefficient is more than twice its standard error, though the relevance of statistical tests on samples of objects that exhaust the universe from which they are drawn is not clear. The result is obtained after controlling for *more* variables than Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain choose to include. Doubtless our critics will retreat to the claim that our measure of income gives "undue emphasis to idiosyncratic features of the tail of the distribution rather than representing a more stable average." However, if we set $I_2 =$ percentage of *white* male ECLF with incomes of $2,000 (the measure used by Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain), then the correlation between I_1 (our measure) and I_2 is .82. Their measure does differ from ours: It sets the cutting point so low that the measure of income is made virtually synonymous with weeks worked during the year. No one expects Negro concentration to influence directly weeks worked by whites.

The preceding paragraph suggests that our results for service occupations are not so easily dismissed. Whether the same conclusion would hold at other major occupation levels and/or for our analysis of females, we cannot say. We have restricted our new analysis to service occupations, since that is the *only* instance in which the cross-sectional findings of Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain are inconsistent with the substantive considerations advanced in our original article. Though we were at pains to caution in our original article that cross-sectional patterns cannot provide an authoritative resolution to the problem of causal direction, we do not find in the cross-sectional analysis of Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain any reason for rejecting conclusively the possibilities raised in our article.

Other vistas opened by Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain have no apparent relevance to the considerations advanced in our article. The processes we discuss are concerned with the way workers within a particular labor market are channeled into different occupational pursuits and are affected by the labor force characteristics of the incumbents of that occupation. The analysis of such processes requires comparison of different occupations in the same labor market. Certainly one deficiency in our article is our inability to perform the analysis within meaningful regional and local labor markets. This deficiency is the result of shortcomings in published tabulations and cannot be remedied by comparison of the same occupation in different labor markets. The reader may, of course, evaluate the intercity comparisons effected by Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain in a different way. In that case, it is important to recognize that any possible effect of Negro concentration is doubtless obscured by community-wide trends in economic well-being and patterns of intercity migration. For example, one can surmise that wage trends in particular occupations reflect in large measure trends in whole labor markets. Also, labor markets in which wages are rising more rapidly than in the country as a whole may well be experiencing labor shortages and be attractive to migrants, especially Negro and white migrants from the South. Such a pattern, if it exists, suggests that the intercity comparisons effected by Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain are, even if relevant to our discussion, hopelessly confounded by economic and population trends affecting *all* occupations in the communities that serve as units for their analysis. We cannot, of course, be certain what patterns would emerge if the intercity comparisons effected by Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain were con-

trolled for relevant economic and population changes affecting whole communities.

We are in full agreement with Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain that the aggregate level analyses reported in our paper are not the most appropriate way of investigating the matters at hand. Consequently, we were delighted to learn of the individual level analyses executed by Weiss, even though his major concern is with matters other than those of central importance to our article. Even so, when introducing his control variables, Weiss formulates the hypothesis advanced in our article: "Some argue that the over-all labor force characteristics affect industry wage rates paid. For example, earnings of a male worker would be lower in an industry with a large proportion of female workers than in one where most workers were male. . . . The five labor force characteristics for which this sort of argument seems most plausible are the percentages of the labor force that are (*a*) male, (*b*) skilled, (*c*) white, (*d*) in the South, and (*e*) of non-urban residence."[5] Though the hypothesis is nearly identical to ours, Weiss differs in his interpretation of the postulated effects, being careful to note the microeconomic decisions of individual firms which must accompany them. Unfortunately, Weiss's findings do not prove relevant to the matters at hand. The variable Weiss always uses is, for example, the industry-wide percentage of males or the industry-wide percentage of whites other than Spanish surname. These variables are used to describe the labor force characteristics of industries *regardless* of the occupational level enjoyed by the respondents under study. We do not see why the earnings of "draftsmen," "machinists," and "janitors," for example, should be affected by the industry-wide fractions of males and whites other than Spanish surname in the ECLF. The relevant labor force characteristics, if one follows the arguments in our original paper, are occupation- as well as industry-specific. For example, when studying the earnings of white draftsmen, one would want to use the industry-specific fractions of all draftsmen, that are Negro or female, or, at least, the industry-specific fractions of some restricted set of professional and technical workers that are Negro or female. Weiss, of course, is not subject to criticism on these grounds, and his study should prove of great value to sociologists and economists alike. But Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain are stretching a point when they cite his findings as evidence against our own. Incidentally, one cannot make the inferences drawn by Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain from Weiss's *published* results, since he does not include the details necessary to evaluate the variables of interest. For what it is worth, we observe that Weiss's only published equation which allows one to evaluate the effects of labor force characteristics on individual earnings reveals that the income of male operatives in unregulated industries is inversely and significantly related to the industry-wide percentage female.

In our article, we prefaced our discussion by noting that "we want to make it perfectly clear that the cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses we have discussed do not *prove* that the competition between majority and minority groups depresses the relative wages of the former." Neither we nor Taeuber, Taeuber, and Cain know what really goes on in labor markets. If their provocative analysis prevents the premature acceptance of possibilities discussed but not established in our article, then we applaud their efforts. If, on the contrary, their analysis prematurely closes discussion of alternative interpretations, neither scientific nor policy ends have been served.

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[5] Leonard W. Weiss, "Concentration and Labor Earnings," *American Economic Review*, LXI (March, 1966), 99.

A Demographic and Ecological Analysis of the Distribution of Physicians in Metropolitan America, 1960[1]

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ABSTRACT

This study examines five demographic and ecological variables that influence the distribution of physicians within the metropolitan areas of the United States: population size, population composition (age, race, education), and "medical environment." The use of multiple correlation analysis permits an assessment of the relative importance of each of these variables. The findings clearly indicate that the five variables significantly influence the distribution of physicians' services and that there are marked differences between their influence on physicians in general practice and on specialists.

One of the areas that interest demographers and ecologists concerns the manner in which various human activities are ordered by the population that supports them and the environment in which they exist. Few would quarrel with the assertion of one contemporary student of this problem that organizations differ because "each territorially delimited aggregate confronts a special set of environmental circumstances and differs from other such aggregates in size and composition."[2] This observation represents the general problem for this research effort. Selecting institutionalized medical services as the object of analysis, a study will be made of the differences in the distribution of physicians serving the various metropolitan areas of the United States as influenced by the three factors mentioned—population size, population composition, and environmental conditions.

Concern for the relationship between such factors and social structure is not a recent phenomenon. Its clearest exposition is found in the discussions of "social morphology" and "human ecology," both of which regard social structure as a dependent variable and seek the explanation for the form which it takes in what Durkheim called the "social substratum"—population, environment, and technology.[3] Despite interest in this problem, however, little empirical research has been undertaken to examine social structure as the variable to be explained. Most sociologists have preferred to consider structure as an independent

[1] This article is the revised version of a paper presented at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America, New York, April 29–30, 1966. It was developed from my doctoral dissertation, which was supported by a predoctoral fellowship from the National Institute of Mental Health and a basic-research grant from Brown University (see Parker G. Marden, "An Examination of Certain Morphological Factors Associated with the Distribution of Physicians in Metropolitan America, 1960" [unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1966]). I would like to thank Professors Basil G. Zimmer, Robert P. von der Lippe, Kurt B. Mayer, and James M. Sakoda of Brown University for their critical evaluations of my work and useful insights into the problem, and Mr. William E. Feinberg and Mr. Peter A. Morrison for their invaluable programing assistance as well as constructive suggestions on the research problem itself. Responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation, however, rests with me.

[2] Otis Dudley Duncan, "Human Ecology and Population Studies," in Philip M. Hauser and Otis Dudley Duncan (eds.), *The Study of Population* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 683.

[3] Émile Durkheim, "Morphologie sociale," *L'année sociologique*, II (1897–98), 520–21; Otis Dudley Duncan and Leo F. Schnore, "Cultural, Behavioral, and Ecological Perspectives in the Study of Social Organization," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV (September, 1959), 132–49; Duncan, *op. cit.*, pp. 681–84; and Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology* (New York: Ronald Press, 1950), pp. 66–74.

variable by which to improve their understanding of individual behavior.[4] Even ecologists themselves have seldom submitted the relationship between structure and morphological factors to empirical investigation.

One exception to this indictment of ecological research is Hawley's examination of the relationship between urban service institutions and certain demographic variables.[5] If these institutions are considered as "agencies established for the service of the needs of the general population,"[6] then the number and variety of these institutions should directly depend upon the demographic and environmental factors noted above. Hawley's findings confirmed this observation, as they showed that the size of population directly affects the size and type of institutions serving it,[7] although the variations within groups of cities of similar size were greater than those between size groupings.[8] Many of these differences, however, could be attributed to variables of population composition.[9]

At the conclusion of his analysis, Hawley invited other investigators to explore this problem by extending the research to include other types of institutions and additional population variables. In the twenty-five years that have elapsed since the invitation was offered, few have responded. More recently, describing his own study as "preliminary," Hawley again called for studies of this type which use more revealing statistical techniques than the simple descriptive measures that he had employed.[10] The present study is an attempt to answer Hawley's requests.

STUDY INFORMATION

Of the many institutions that could be selected for study, the medical services provided by physicians can be profitably analyzed because of their responsiveness to population trends. The dramatic increase in the size of population, changes in age composition, the redistribution of population through migration, and changes in the economic and social characteristics of the American people all significantly influence the amount and type of medical care which the populace can expect from its physicians.[11] But most statements showing an awareness of these demographic implications for medicine are only intelligent reflections on the needs for medical care and the changes in the availability of physicians. While these observations are firmly rooted in statistics concerning changing demographic patterns and the utilization of health services by various segments of the population, there have been few empirical investigations of the relationship between the number of physicians serving an area and social morphological factors.

This lack of investigation is quite surprising when the completeness of the available data on the medical profession is considered. Sufficient information is available on physicians from the Health Manpower Branch of the United States Public Health Service to make detailed examinations by county for mid-year 1959—the closest possible tabulation to the decennial Census of

[4] Cf. Leo F. Schnore, "Social Morphology and Human Ecology," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (May, 1958), 633.

[5] Amos H. Hawley, "An Ecological Study of Urban Service Institutions," *American Sociological Review*, VI (October, 1941), 629–39.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 631. As Hawley notes, the term "institution" is used advisedly in this context since it deals only with the observable aspects of institutions.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 633.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 633.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 638.

[10] Amos H. Hawley, "Population Composition," in Philip M. Hauser and Otis Dudley Duncan (eds.), *The Study of Population* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 379.

[11] Cf. Dudley Kirk, "Anticipating the Health Needs of Americans: Some Demographic Projections," *Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CCCXXXVII (September, 1961), 126–36; and Herman M. Somers and Anne R. Somers, *Doctors, Patients, and Health Insurance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Foundation, 1961), pp. 140–49.

April, 1960.[12] These data are taken from the registers maintained by the two professional societies of physicians, the American Medical Association and the American Osteopathic Association, and they are based upon licenses issued by the various states and *not* on membership in the professional societies. The procedures used in collecting the information and comparisons with other sources indicate that the data can be used with confidence in their completeness and accuracy.[13]

From these data it is possible to identify the physicians who directly serve the population of any given county—those engaged in a full-time, non-federal, private practice.[14] In addition, this group of physicians can be subdivided by whether they are engaged in general practice[15] or the full-time practice of a specialty. These three categories of physicians will represent the dependent variables in this analysis, and the explanation of variations in their distribution will be sought in the characteristics of the population they serve.

The fact that the data are available on the county basis permits the use in the analysis of metropolitan areas and their operationalization as Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's). The study of medical services has been handicapped in the past by difficulties in determining areas in which the population being served and the physicians serving that population are circumscribed by the same set of boundaries. Focus upon metropolitan areas, those functional entities in which "the daily economic and social activity of the local population are carried on through a common system of local institutions,"[16] poses no such problems.[17] Therefore, the 204 SMSA's identified for the purpose of the 1960 Census will be used in this study.[18] In addition, the 165 cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000, together with the county(ies) in which they are located, will be designated as "small metropolitan areas" and included in the study as well.[19]

[12] William H. Stewart and Maryland Y. Pennell, *Health Manpower Source Book, Section 10: Physicians' Age, Type of Practice, and Location* (Public Health Service Publication No. 263, Sec. 10 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960]).

[13] Report of U.S. National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, *United States Statistics on Medical Economics* (Public Health Service Publication No. 1125 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964]), p. 7; and R. A. Prindle and M. Y. Pennell, *Health Manpower Source Book, Section 10, Industry and Occupation Data from 1960 Census, by States* (U.S. Public Health Service Publication No. 263, Sec. 17 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963]), p. 96. For a fuller evaluation of the data, see Marden, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–7.

[14] Eliminating physicians who are in full-time hospital service may bias the study slightly as these doctors may provide an important source of medical care to low-income populations through hospital clinics. The great majority of such services, outside certain hospitals in the larger urban centers, are principally the responsibility of private practitioners in the community. Similarly, eliminating those federal physicians who do *directly* serve patients may introduce a bias, but the number of such physicians in any single metropoltan area is quite small, with the possible exception of Washington.

[15] Physicians who engage in the part-time practice of a specialty have been categorized with general practitioners in accordance with the procedures of the Public Health Service (Stewart and Pennell, *op. cit.*, p. 6).

[16] R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933), p. 84.

[17] Some cities, such as Pittsburgh, Boston, or Rochester (Minnesota), do act as regional medical centers, serving the specialized needs of populations of large areas, groups of states, or even the entire nation. But the majority of such services are tied to hospital services rather than to physicians in private practice, and effects on this study should be minimal.

[18] The Census actually involved 212 SMSA's, but those found in New England, constructed on the basis of town boundaries, were redefined along county lines for the sake of comparability.

[19] It is possible to assess the wisdom of the decision to use metropolitan areas. A study of the twenty-nine westernmost counties in Pennsylvania conducted in 1954 computed the percentages of residents of a county receiving their medical care in that county and elsewhere. By using these data, it is possible to look at the six metropolitan areas

With these procedural considerations as background, it is possible to test the following hypothesis, which is suggested by the general interests of human ecology and the specific empirical investigations of Hawley: *Differences in the distribution of institutionalized medical services provided by physicians in the metropolitan areas of the United States in 1960 are associated with the differences in the population that supports them and in the environment in which they practice.* Attention will be directed first to the effects of population size upon physician distribution.

POPULATION SIZE

As suggested, a population's size is an important factor in determining the institutional structure that serves it. Not only does the absolute size of a population set the outer limits to the possible activities that can be carried on, but it affects the degree to which an activity can be specialized as well. For example, the number of patients a physician can serve is finite, and, as the population exceeds this number, other doctors are needed and the total number of physicians will increase in response to this demand. The implied linearity of this relationship between physician distribution is modified by the concept of medical "threshold levels" or the minimum population needed to support a particular type of medical practice. The practice of a specialty requires a larger supporting population than does general practice, and increases in the degree of specialization (e.g., internists versus urologists) must be paralleled by still greater increments in the size of the aggregate that supports them. Thus, as the various threshold levels are reached, the number of physicians serving an area will be determined by the general increase in demand due to increased population size plus the fact that the population is now sufficiently large to support certain specialties.

Analysis, however, reveals that this curvilinear pattern in which increments in population size are paralleled by disproportionate increases in physician services is not present. Comparisons of the correlation ratio and the correlation coefficient clearly indicate that a linear relationship is the best description of the association between population size and each of the three physician variables.[20] This suggests that the passing of a "threshold level" for a given specialty and the demand for a physician with that appropriate training are absorbed into the more general increase in numbers of physicians serving the larger population. Additional research involving individual specialties is needed to evaluate this interpretation.

Thus there is a linear relationship between increases in population size and the number of physicians available to the aggregate. The correlation coefficients obtained in examining this relationship are quite startling. As Table 1 indicates, there is a very strong positive correlation for each of the three variables when all cases are considered. Indeed, a correlation coefficient of .97 between population size and specialist distribution (the *lowest* of the three results) challenges the credulity of

(four SMSA's and two small metropolitan areas) identified in the present study which are located in this region. Of the ten counties that make up these six metropolitan areas, none had more than 7 per cent of their populations using physicians practicing outside of the metropolitan area of which they are a part. Similarly, only two of the eleven counties that are contiguous to a metropolitan area had more than 12 per cent of their population receiving medical care within a metropolitan area. These findings indicate that the decision to use metropolitan areas as the territorial units in this study is an appropriate one, and their boundaries include both the population being served and the physicians serving it. See Antonio Ciocco and Isidore Altman, "Medical Service Areas as Indicated by the Intercounty Movements of Physicians," *United States Public Health Service Monograph 19* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), Appendix Table 1.

[20] E.g., the results of the test for curvilinearity ($eta^2 - r^2$) for the general practitioner group was only .004, and this was the highest value for any of the three categories.

any social scientist. As pleasing as these high correlations may be, it must be recognized that they can be spurious due to the presence of a few extreme cases in the range of cases examined. One answer to this problem is to divide the range of metropolitan areas into six size categories as indicated in Table 1, together with the number of cases in each category. With the exception of the "1,000,000+" grouping, these size categories are relatively homogeneous, and the correlation coefficients that are computed will be meaningful. Results obtained for the "1,000,000+" size category, however, will still need to be interpreted with care, since the twenty-four metropolitan areas included within it have populations ranging from one to ten million.

In examining the relationship between population size and the three physician variables in Table 1 for each of the six size categories identified, some definite patterns emerge. Beginning with the total group of physicians, the most sweeping observation that can be made concerning this relationship is that there is a positive association between population size of a metropolitan area and physician distribution. With increments in population size, the number of physicians serving that population also increases. In each of the six size categories considered, the correlation coefficients were statistically significant at least at the .01 level.

The coefficients of determination (r^2) for each size category indicate that population size explains between 26 and 96 per cent of the variation in the distribution of all physicians, although the differences in the range of the various size categories make it improper to conclude that population size accounts for a lesser amount of the variation in small areas than the larger ones as the data seem to indicate.[21] Nonetheless, the data establish that population size is an important factor to be considered in examining the distribution of physicians in private practice. Even if each of the six size categories is considered separately and not compared with the others, population size is significantly and positively associated with the distribution of private practitioners.

The same general pattern is found when the *total physician group is divided into*

TABLE 1

EXAMINATION OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN POPULATION SIZE AND PHYSICIANS IN PRIVATE PRACTICE, BY TYPE OF PRACTICE, FOR SIX SIZE CATEGORIES, METROPOLITAN UNITED STATES, 1960

Size Category	No. of Cases	Total Group of Physicians in Private Practice	Private Practitioners by Type of Practice		
			General	Specialized	Difference
All cases	369	.98***	.99***	.97***	None
1,000,000+	24	.98***	.99***	.96***	$P<.01$
500,000–999,999	33	.85***	.80***	.74***	$P<.01$
250,000–499,999	47	.81***	.62***	.64***	None
100,000–249,999	123	.81***	.73***	.67***	$P<.01$
50,000– 99,999	111	.60***	.58***	.41***	None
Under 50,000	31	.51**	.51**	.29	$P<05$

** Significant at the .01 level.
*** Significant at the .001 level.

[21] The decrease in the strength of a relationship may be an artifact of the size groupings selected for study, which include a range of five hundred thousand for the second category and only fifty thousand for the fifth grouping. Correlations at the lower end are therefore bound to be lower because of the reduced range.

its two components: general practitioners and specialists. As Table 1 indicates, the distributions of both groups are positively associated with population size in each of the six size categories that are considered. Only in the case of specialists in the "under 50,000" size grouping is the association not found to be statistically significant.

While comparisons between size categories remain inappropriate, comparisons within the size groupings do not present the same difficulties. Consequently, the differences between the distributions of general practitioners and specialists in response to population size are noteworthy. In four of the six size categories considered, there is a statistically significant difference between population size and the number of physicians in general practice and population size and the number of specialists. In each of the instances where the differences were significant, the coefficients of determination were lower for specialists than for general practitioners. This indicates that variables other than population size play a more important role in determining the distribution of specialists than physicians in general practice. This observation, combined with the fact that large proportions of the distribution of all three physician categories remain unexplained, leads directly to a consideration of additional demographic and ecological factors.

POPULATION COMPOSITION AND "MEDICAL ENVIRONMENT"

The knowledge that population size is an important factor in the distribution of physicians permits a slightly different approach to the examination of the impact of other morphological variables. A model of perfect linear relationship between population size and physician services can be postulated, permitting elements of population composition and environment to be conceptualized as factors that modify such a relationship. Accordingly, rather than considering the number of physicians in a metropolitan area as the dependent variable, the amount of deviation from the "line of best fit" in the correlation between population size and physician distribution will be substituted in its place.[22]

Examination of the compositional variables is based upon the premise that institutional structure is shaped by the different types and volume of service required or sought by various groups within a population. The first of these variables, *age composition*, is illustrative. Data from the National Health Survey indicate that visits to physicians are most frequent in the oldest (sixty-five and older) and youngest (under five) segments of the population.[23] These statistics closely follow morbidity trends with younger persons having a high incidence of acute-illness episodes and the aged having a high rate of chronic disease. It may be logically postulated that, if the greatest need for medical care occurs in these segments of the population, then areas in which they predominate should have proportionately greater numbers of physicians serving them than areas in which the intermediate age groups are more numerous. The age variable, therefore, will be operationalized as the percentage of the total population under five years old and sixty-five and older.

A second compositional variable, *education*, should also have considerable impact upon medical institutions, since data from the National Health Survey indicate that there is a direct relationship between socioeconomic status and utilization of physician services.[24] Thus, the following hypoth-

[22] This procedure has the effect of eliminating the influence of population size from this part of the analysis. The amount of variation that is explained by morphological factors other than population size is *in addition* to that which is explained by that variable.

[23] U.S. National Health Survey, *Volume of Physician Visits, United States, July, 1957–June, 1959* (Public Health Service Publication No. 584-B19 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960]), p. 15.

[24] U.S. Center for Health Statistics, *Medical Care, Health Status, and Income, United States* (Public Health Service Publication No. 1000, Ser. 10, No. 9 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964]).

esis will be tested: the number of physicians serving an area is directly related to the educational level of its population (median school years completed). Education will be used as the socioeconomic measure in this analysis, as income, with which it is highly correlated, may not lead to the use of medical services unless accompanied by an understanding of the need for such services. Data on the purchase of health insurance, for example, show that, within various categories of family income, increases in educational attainment are paralleled by increased percentages of persons with such insurance.[25] Purchase of health insurance requires a combination of financial resources with an understanding of the need for insurance and a willingness to act accordingly. A similar situation exists with respect to medical services provided by physicians, and education may be viewed as the more powerful of the socioeconomic variables.

The relationship between physician distribution and a third factor of population composition, *race*, is influenced by two factors. In the first place, the non-whites have substantially fewer physician visits per person per year than whites.[26] Additionally, the underrepresentation of Negroes in the medical profession may influence this relationship. In 1956, for example, there were 218,000 physicians in the United States or about one for every 770 persons in the total population. Of this number, approximately 4,000 were Negroes or about one for every 4,560 non-whites.[27] While white physicians provide medical services to non-whites, the insufficient number of Negro physicians to meet the potential requirements of non-whites, combined with the relative lack of demand for physician services in this segment of the population, suggests that an inverse relationship exists between the number of physicians serving an area and the percentage of the population of that area which is non-white.

In addition to these three compositional variables, one environmental factor will be considered. To the ecologist, "environment" includes all external elements to which a population and its institutions are responsive.[28] In the present case, such a conception of environment is especially relevant. Medicine is no longer a highly individualized profession but one that is very dependent upon a complex of supportive services, institutional facilities, and other health personnel. Due to this need for an elaborate medical technology in the conduct of his practice—a technology that is best provided in hospital facilities—physicians are located in areas where such facilities are found. The following hypothesis will be tested: the number of physicians serving an area is directly related to that area's hospital facilities (operationalized by the number of available beds in short-term, non-federal hospital).[29]

Through the use of multiple correlation analysis and the derivative beta weights, it is possible to examine the relationship between these four morphological factors and the three physician variables as reconstructed to control for the effects of population size. The multiple correlation coefficients, presented for each population size category in Table 2, reveal that the variables of age, race, education, and medical environment (hospital beds) combine to

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[26] U.S. National Health Survey, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[27] Franklin C. McLean, "Introduction," in Dietrich C. Reitzes, *Negroes and Medicine* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. xxvii.

[28] Hawley, *Human Ecology*, pp. 12–13.

[29] The number of hospital beds reflects many other aspects of the medical environment. Presence of complex medico-technological equipment and the personnel to operate them is closely connected with the size of the hospital, and number of hospital beds is a measure of such size. Short-term, non-federal hospitals are those that are most closely associated with the physician group selected for study—non-federal physicians in private practice. Hospital data are taken from the annual tabulations made by the American Hospital Association ("Guide Issue," *Hospitals*, Part II, Vol. XXXVI [August 1, 1962]).

account for substantial amounts of the variation between metropolitan areas with respect to physician distribution. Only in four instances, three in the "1,000,000+" category, are any of the multiple correlation coefficients found not to be statistically significant. Again, the unique character of the largest size grouping influences the results. Since less than 8 per cent of the variation in physician distribution was left unexplained by population size, probably due to the great range in this variable, a lack of statistical significance at this point is not surprising.

Interestingly, with the exception of the "under 50,000" size grouping, the four variables account for more of the variation between metropolitan areas in the case of general practitioners than in the case of specialists. This suggests that, among the factors that have *not* been considered in this study, there are one or more that have particular impact upon specialist distribution. Certain inferences about these unidentified factors can be developed after inquiry is made concerning the relative importance of each variable by examining their beta weights which are supplied in Table 3.

As these data indicate, the most important variables for the distribution of general practitioners are found to be age and race, while education and medical environment are relatively more important in the case of specialists. The pattern for the combined physician group is a blending of these results. Indeed, the findings presented in Table 3 for the "total physician" category are difficult to interpret, and if this grouping had not been divided into its two components, general practitioners and specialists, existing patterns would have been obscured and the sensitivity of the analysis would have been blunted.

Perhaps the most revealing variable in this analysis is the medical environment or available hospital facilities (beds). In the case of general practitioners, there is only one instance, the "under 50,000" grouping, in which hospital beds have any real importance for the distribution of these physicians. The sign attached to the beta weight (—.37), however, indicates that there are more general practitioners in those metropolitan areas where there are fewer hospital facilities. A quite different pattern is found for specialists. For these doctors, such facilities are very important in nearly every size category. Interestingly, it is the same "under 50,000" grouping in which this variable is particularly important as indicated by a beta weight of .70

TABLE 2

EXAMINATION OF THE MULTIPLE CORRELATION BETWEEN PHYSICIAN VARIABLES AND COMPOSITIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS, METROPOLITAN UNITED STATES, 1960

SIZE CATEGORY	PHYSICIAN CATEGORIES		
	Total	General	Specialists
1,000,000+	.29	.41	.26
500,000–999,999	.55*	.70***	.46
250,000–499,999	.45*	.60***	.52**
100,000–249,999	.59***	.64***	.51***
50,000–99,999	.60***	.57***	.48***
Under 50,000	.66***	.58*	.72***

* Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the .01 level.
*** Significant at the .001 level.

that is substantially higher than the value for the next factor. Comparison of the beta weights for specialists and general practitioners for this population size category suggests that in the smaller metropolitan areas availability of hospital facilities is a most powerful influence upon the distribution of specialists, while general practitioners provide medical service in areas where facilities are less numerous—a pattern that has implications for policy decisions by health administrators in the face of evidence that the number of general practitioners is declining in the United States.[30]

The discovery of the great influence that medical environment has for specialists, re-

[30] Stewart and Pennell, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

flecting the elaborate medical technology that can only be found in hospitals, provides insight into the unidentified variables mentioned above. The importance of hospital facilities for specialist distribution, combined with the lower multiple correlation coefficients found for specialists than for general practitioners, indicates that the unexplained variation in the multiple correlation analysis for specialists could rest with environmental factors other than hospital beds. The presence of a medical school, availability of approved residencies, and similar factors may influence the distribution of specialists. Further research in this area would be valuable.

A second variable, education, can be coupled with medical environment as a major factor in the distribution of specialists, while it has comparatively little importance for the distribution of general practitioners. Since educational attainment, as hypothesized, is a powerful socioeconomic variable as well as a reflection of the knowledge of the need for medical services coupled with a willingness to act accordingly, it appears that specialists are attracted to metropolitan areas in which financial rewards are available and in which the population may generally be "appreciative" of their particular skills. A problem for future analysis is the identification of the exact importance of each explanation.[31]

TABLE 3

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF COMPOSITIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN MULTIPLE CORRELATION ANALYSIS (WITH BETA WEIGHTS), PHYSICIAN DISTRIBUTION, METROPOLITAN UNITED STATES, 1960

Rank	1,000,000+	500,000–999,999	250,000–499,999	100,000–249,999	50,000–99,999	Under 50,000
	Total Physicians					
1	Race −.21	Educ .40	Beds .25	Age .32	Age .39	Beds .35
2	Age −.20	Beds .36	Age .20	Beds .32	Educ .25	Race −.34
3	Educ .14	Race −.32	Educ .20	Educ .25	Beds .23	Age .28
4	Beds .12	Age −.18	Race −.16	Race −.13	Race −.09	Educ − 04
	General Practitioners					
1	Race −.41	Race −.66	Race −.40	Race −.40	Age .49	Age .54
2	Age −.22	Educ .24	Age .26	Age .36	Race −.15	Beds −.37
3	Educ .12	Age −.07	Educ −.21	Beds .13	Educ .07	Race −.35
4	Beds .06	Beds .07	Beds .06	Educ −.09	Beds −.02	Educ −.10
	Specialists					
1	Age −.18	Beds .38	Educ .42	Educ .37	Beds .32	Beds .70
2	Beds .14	Educ .34	Beds .23	Beds .29	Educ .27	Race −.18
3	Educ .14	Age −.17	Race .19	Race .15	Age .13	Age −.04
4	Race −.11	Race −.01	Age −.02	Age .12	Race −.01	Educ .02

31 An exploratory effort was made in this direction by using both income and education in the multivariate analysis (operationalizing possible financial return and knowledge of medical need, respectively), but the close correlation of the two factors introduced the problem of suppressant variables into the computation of the beta weights and clouded the results. The decision was made, therefore, to focus upon education as the more powerful of the two socioeconomic measures.

When the associations between physician distribution and the remaining two variables are examined, patterns are found that are markedly different from those observed in the consideration of medical environment and education. While specialists are responsive to these factors, they have little meaning for physicians in general practice. Almost without exception, Table 3 shows race and age to be the two most important variables in accounting for the distribution of the latter medical group. In both instances, the relationships are in the direction of the hypotheses, as the distribution of general practitioners is directly associated with the "high medical risk" age group and inversely associated with proportion of non-whites in the population of a metropolitan area.

The comparison between the specialists and general practitioners can best be understood by noting that the relative importance of each variable and its expression as a beta weight in Table 3 takes the importance of each of the other factors into account. Thus, when specialists are found to be particularly influenced by the presence of hospital facilities and an "appreciative" population, the remaining variables, bisocial characteristics of the population they serve, become comparatively unimportant. On the other hand, neither medical environment nor education has much impact upon the distribution of gen-

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF VARIATION IN DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS ACCOUNTED FOR BY MORPHOLOGICAL VARIABLES, METROPOLITAN UNITED STATES, 1960

Size Category and Physician Group	Population Size: Variation Explained (R^2)	Population Size: Variation Unexplained	Other Variables: Per Cent of Remaining Variation (R^2)	Total Variation Explained*
1,000,000+:				
Total	96	4	8	96
General	98	2	16	98
Specialists	92	8	7	93
500,000–999,999:				
Total	72	28	30	80
General	64	36	49	82
Specialists	55	45	21	64
250,000–499,999:				
Total	66	34	20	73
General	38	62	36	60
Specialists	41	59	27	57
100,000–249,999:				
Total	66	34	35	78
General	53	47	41	72
Specialists	45	55	26	59
50,000–99,999:				
Total	36	64	36	59
General	34	66	32	55
Specialists	17	83	23	36
Under 50,000:				
Total	26	74	44	59
General	26	74	34	51
Specialists	8	92	52	56

* Total variation explained = unexplained part by population size × percentage explained by other variables + variation explained by population size.

eral practitioners, and, as a consequence, the racial and age compositions of the population they serve become strongly influential. Again, it should be noted that the "total physician" category, which is composed of both types of practitioners, reflects the combined influence of both patterns, and the merits of this division should be readily obvious. In various combinations, then, these factors modify the perfect linear relationships that may have been assumed to exist between increases in the size of population and increments in the numbers of physicians serving these aggregates.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the addition of four morphological variables to the study of the relationship between population size and the distribution of physicians is of considerable value. Although comparisons cannot be made between the size categories because of differences in their range, Table 4 indicates that all variables studied combine to explain substantial amounts of the variation in the distribution of the three categories of physicians under consideration. Beyond this, however, analysis of the beta weights for the three variables of population composition and the one involving medical environment permit judgments on the importance of each factor in accounting for the variation in physician distribution left unexplained by population size as reported above. While certain questions remain unanswered and several problems have been identified for future analysis, the results clearly confirm the general hypothesis that has guided this analysis.

The proper note on which to conclude this report is to repeat the invitation issued by Hawley twenty-five years ago when he called for more analyses of the relationship between what French social morphologists would call the "social substratum" and various forms of social structure. While this study, paralleling Hawley's analysis of urban service institutions, indicates that variables of population and environment have importance in the distribution of the medical services provided by physicians, additional research is needed before the human ecologist can claim full understanding of the problem that is basic to his field of study—"the forms that social organization assumes in response to various demographic, technological, and environmental pressures."[32]

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[32] Duncan and Schnore, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter*

June 27, 1966

To the Editor:

Mr. Keyfitz' supercilious non-review of Charles Abrams' *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (*AJS*, Vol. LXXI, No. 6) is an insult not only to a fine book but also to the readers of your journal. Mr. Keyfitz spends most of his time belaboring Mr. Abrams for not having written a different book—i.e., one about birth control, or increased food production, or industrialization. He argues that since these are the overriding problems in the underdeveloped world, Mr. Abrams has no business being concerned about housing, which—just as during the nineteenth-century industrial revolution in Europe—should be allowed to take its natural, often desperate, course. Surely this kind of argument went out with neo-Malthusianism! To maintain that bad housing is a natural, and therefore acceptable, concomitant of the early stages of economic development is also to maintain that cholera epidemics, TB, and squatter fires are acceptable—even desirable—methods for reducing overpopulation.

Mr. Keyfitz is, in any case, on thin ice when he says that "one way to find out about the process of development is to study the countries that have achieved it." Many students of urbanization (including several in the recent volume edited by Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore, to which Mr. Keyfitz was a contributor) believe that inputs are so different today from what they were in nineteenth-century Europe or even early twentieth-century Russia and Japan that urbanization in the underdeveloped world may take a very different course. The "revolution of rising expectation," invidious comparisons of the "have" with the "have-not" nations, political unrest—all these factors argue for giving housing a much higher priority than may have been the case elsewhere in the past.

Mr. Keyfitz considers it fortunate that housing experts like Mr. Abrams are so little listened to, but he neglects to mention that Mr. Abrams did not force his presence on unwilling customers. On the contrary, Mr. Abrams was requested by the nations that he visited to study and, if possible, solve their housing problems. Nor was his advice unrealistic. Mr. Abrams is one of the few housing experts who has had the nerve to say in print that "urban renewal" is beyond the means of most underdeveloped countries and that substandard housing or "improved slums" is better than nothing at all. And his advice to Turkey—that they needed not a housing program but a technical college—and the success of the college that was subsequently established is something Mr. Keyfitz prefers not to mention in his review.

I myself have just completed some research on the resettlement of squatters in Hong Kong, where government-built housing and flatted factories have been a spur to economic growth not only by providing jobs and decent living quarters for many desperately poor refugees but also by clearing valuable urban land of squatter huts so that it could be redeveloped industrially. Mr. Abrams' discussion of squatting and its political implications in places like Manila is wholly new in the literature of urbanization.

Last, it seems to me that Mr. Abrams'

wealth of first-hand experience as a housing consultant has made him acutely aware of the economic and political aspects of housing. Far from being unrealistic, his book is one of the most practical, well-balanced books to have appeared on this subject; and as such it should be read by more sociologists like Mr. Keyfitz who prefer to schematize the problems of development rather than study them.

SHEILA K. JOHNSON

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Reply

To the Editor:

My trouble is not superciliousness but rather taking Mr. Abrams too seriously. I originally wrote a detailed review commenting point by point on the book, which I will be glad to send on request to readers of this journal, but I submitted only a précis because of space limitations in the *American Journal of Sociology*. I had been concerned lest the published précis be too brief to carry my point, but the strong words which it elicited in this reply show that I communicated adequately at least on the main issue.

For the record, I am not in favor of bad housing *or* of cholera epidemics. The underdeveloped countries face immense difficulties. How they can attain comfort and dignity is the supreme problem of the twentieth century. Our tragedy is the inadequacy of Western efforts to help—an inadequacy both in the quantity of aid and in its direction. Elsewhere I make the point that our efforts often amount to a kind of charity which increases the dependence of the poor. We do not try to encourage productivity by buying their raw materials and textiles, but make them gifts (e.g., of food) instead. This is analogous to the charity that we long ago superseded in relation to the domestic poor of the United States. The international gap in welfare is increasing. A half-dozen small countries are making progress, but aside from these I see little reason for satisfaction with the results of twenty years of foreign aid. We should do much more, and we should do it better.

Development is difficult and uncertain enough that someone must ask whether houses should come first, or food, family limitation, and factories. In the nineteenth century the market set the priorities for development; housing was near the bottom. The Soviets planned their priorities; they set housing equally low. The Japanese had a mixed system; they also neglected housing.

We know that attitudes among the underdeveloped peoples are different from what they were in the nineteenth century —or in the twentieth century in the U.S.S.R. and Japan when these were undeveloped. Today results are wanted more quickly than they were by the English, the Russians, or the Japanese of a few years back. Many people do not want to take the time to ensure their source of food before they live in decent houses. Americans naturally sympathize with this impatience. But the impatience which demands directly the ends and refuses to attend to the means does not really hasten the attainment of the ends. The problem is how impatience can be turned into housing *and* food *and* clothing, not for a few hundred squatters but for millions, and this needs the hardest thought we can give.

Miss Johnson's methodological prescriptions do not seem likely to lead to answers. She tells us not to schematize (last paragraph), but neither, on the other hand, is one to study the way in which the presently rich countries escaped from their poverty (second paragraph). Must we confine our observation to Hong Kong (fourth paragraph), a colony whose exceptional char-

acter is indicated by the fall in its birth rate from 36 to 29 per thousand between 1960 and 1964? India is in many ways more typical of Asia and Africa. The welfare of large sectors of the masses of India is no greater than it was twenty years ago, despite much effort and enthusiasm, and the morale within India today, as well as the disposition of the U.S. Congress, promises no better for the next twenty years. While the absolute number of poor and homeless in a country is increasing by millions each year, it seems childish to focus on the building of five hundred houses. The only justification for doing so would be that the building of these five hundred houses set an example, developed housebuilding skills, or was otherwise likely to extend to millions. But this again was not seriously taken up in Mr. Abrams' book.

If the consultant proposes loans or donations for houses, he (or someone) must face the question of whether the city is already overpopulated in relation to its ability to sustain itself; and whether the houses will draw more people. He must ascertain what housing will do to the birth rate—remember that Sweden facilitated housing in the 1930's for the specific purpose of raising the birth rate. These points do not occur to Mr. Abrams. He feels sufficiently protected by his good will, as he concentrates on the short-run objective of helping a few poor people get shelter from the rain and disregards the increasing millions who are still in the rain and are hungry as well. Such scarce public funds as he persuaded officials to put into housing were withdrawn from something else, and the value for development of the thing forgone is relevant. The only defense against having to ask such questions is that the busy consultant in fact gets few houses built, and Mr. Abrams is honest enough to report that he did not have much effect.

Social science must include not only good will but the analysis of consequences. My review had at least the merit of inciting Miss Johnson to considerably more concern with consequences than appears in the book she is supporting.

NATHAN KEYFITZ

University of Chicago

BOOK REVIEWS

Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs. By MARION J. LEVY, JR. 2 vols. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xx+374; xi+377–855. $22.50.

In *Modernization and the Structure of Societies,* Marion Levy has extended and amplified the frame of reference he set forth in *The Structure of Society* (1952). While the work owes an important debt to the intellectual stimulation of Talcott Parsons, the author's strong concern with what he calls "concrete structures" produces a different sociological genre.

Levy writes so as to produce strong reactions, but this does not obscure his real contribution. Because of his ambitious effort to synthesize a tremendous amount of available scholarship, the study is certain to last for a long time as a standard reference in the field of comparative sociology.

The subtitle, *A Setting for International Affairs,* is likely to catch the reader's eye, especially since Levy reports that "this book had its beginning in a course designed for graduate students resolved on professional careers in public and international affairs." The book is linked to international relations to the extent that Levy believes that the key to international relations rests in modernization and societal stability. He does not deal with the institutions of international relations, for this is a treatise in social structure in the grand Marion Levy manner. Nor does he see himself as a "policy scientist," since he remains unconcerned with the details of the institutional problems of applying social science to international affairs. In effect, he belongs to the "old fashioned" enlightenment school whose members believe that university professors should engage in the pursuit of knowledge and write scholarly books, rather than operate as self-appointed consultants to the great powers.

What is modernization for Marion Levy? "I use a definition of modernization that focuses on the sources of power and the nature of the tools used by members of a given society" (p. 10). But he is quick to add that he is not proposing a simple technological or economic determinism. In fact, there is little of any kind of determinism, since his approach focuses on the categories of analysis, rather than on "principles" of change. Upon closer examination it appears that modernization is, in effect, the capacity of a society to maintain continuous change (and, I assume, economic growth). He is pointed in including revolution in his definition. "One of the special features of relatively modernized societies is a peculiar set of structures of revolutionary change" (p. 19). But revolution for him means radical change and not necessarily "the violence of the means by which it is achieved." Thus Levy fits in with those who are content with a "structural" view of the notion of modernization. For my tastes, this is too general or too primitive, since it does not make a distinction between Westernization and modernization. In other words, some cultural and normative dimensions are required to handle the alternative paths toward modernization.

The "theoretical formulations" are elaborations of Parsons' and Levy's own earlier work. I would describe them as "categorical" theory construction because of the emphasis on formulating comprehensive schemes of classification rather than on system properties and delimited hypotheses ("systemic") theory construction. Social structure is analyzed in terms of role differentiation, and the central problematic issues are the forms of allocation and integration required for stability and change.

Levy boldly proclaims his interest in theory and his lack of concern for empirical reality. At one point he states that "in scientific work, it is more important to be fruitful for further work than to be right" (p. 6). But such bravado can be dismissed, for it hardly guides or influences him. Some of his best material is his critical evaluation of other theorists, especially his brilliant critique of Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft theorists. But it is not the elaborateness of his abstract formulations that constitutes his effective contribution. In fact, I am unhappy that he emphasizes one set

of categories to analyze uniformities among societies and another to handle differences. He has a powerful ability to discern central substantive sociological issues in complex institutions and total societies that makes reading his work rewarding.

Levy avoids the current concern with simplistic notions of social evolution which have become popular as a basis for comparative analysis. Instead, he is concerned with identifying the crucial "foci" of social change, which turn out to be family organization and government. Considering that the analysis started with a technological definition of modernization, it indicates that at least there are many steps in the development of his approach.

Macrosociology, or the comparative analysis of social structure, has suddenly reemerged in sociology as a core concern. Many of the approaches are concerned with single-variable explanations, such as population growth, class stratification, or the like; others reason by analogy: nation-states engage in transactions similar to small groups. Levy's contribution, despite its elaborate formalism, stands out as a conspicuously more sophisticated and realistic enterprise.

MORRIS JANOWITZ

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The Emergence of the American University. By LAURENCE R. VEYSEY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, pp. xiv+505. $10.00.

In the first part of this study, the author considers the principal academic philosophies of the period between 1865 and 1910; the second part deals with the crystallization of the structure of the American university between 1890 and 1910. Using the philosophy of the old-time college, which had sought a combination of religion and mental discipline as a starting point, the philosophies of the educational reform are described in their turn: the idea of utility and social efficiency as the goals of higher education, the ideal of research for the sake of increasing pure knowledge, and, finally, the ideal of liberal culture.

The new philosophies of academic reform all started as sharp formulations of doctrine and ended up as sets of generalities which could be conveniently bent to the varied needs of gaining public support for the university, of boosting the morale of the academic profession, or of arousing the imagination of students.

The picture obtained is clear, rich, and enlivened with much detail about the main personalities involved. It is one of the best and fullest documentations of the process of the transformation of "utopias" into "ideologies" (as Karl Mannheim used these terms), losing their logical coherence as they change their function from that of soliciting the complete devotion of a few pioneers to that of balancing the contradictory interests of large groups, and of insuring the stability of existing organizations. The material for the sociological interpretation is abundantly supplied, even though the author prefers to emphasize the evolution of the immanent potentialities and contradictions of ideas.

The second part of the book is explicitly sociological. It is an "informal structural-functional analysis" of the emerging American university. A description of the constituent parts of the university—faculty, students, and administration—shows the inherent conflicts of interests among them. It is further shown how these conflicting interests were accomodated within the expanding structure, through making it sufficiently worthwhile for each group to belong to the university. Thus a "working combination of concrete interests" emerged without evincing a genuine value integration. Accommodation is, of course, no permanent resolution of conflict, and there is an excellent chapter on the periodic tensions and explosions concerning academic freedom, and the chronic, but rarely acute, alienation of the eccentric and the idealist from the American university.

This book is a rare blend of historical scholarship, good writing, and skilful use of sociological concepts. No sociologist could have produced a better analysis of the working of the major American universities at the beginning of this century. There are, nevertheless, a few points of criticism. On pages 300–301, Veysey presents data on the social background of "93 eminent professors and presidents, mainly at the leading institutions" and concludes that "American professors were far less uniform in terms of their backgrounds than, for instance, German or English professors." He quotes no sources to support these

data, and those I know (i.e., von Ferber's about Germany) do not support it.

Another statement that I find unsupported, in fact contradicted, by Veysey's own data is that "the effects of initiative competition upon the pattern of the emerging American university permanently undid all sorts of more creative hopes." The only "evidence" on which this statement is based is that after the 1890's the universities became "more standardised, less original, less fluid." Obviously, the originality of an institution is greatest when it first appears, but this has nothing to do with competition.

This last point raises a more general disagreement between Veysey's interpretation of his story and my way of seeing it. The idea that the American university had arrived at "a stopping place, in every sense, except that of quantitative aggrandizement—by the year 1910" (p. 338) reappears now and again. Apart from the fallacy which has been pointed out above, this conclusion is the result of a sampling bias. The material relates: (*a*) mainly to the larger universities; and (*b*) these universities are described in terms of the relationships among presidents, faculty in general, and students in general. The combination of these two criteria of selection also implies a bias of representing the situation principally from the point of view of the humanists and the social scientists. Had the sample also included institutes of technology and colleges which have not become large universities, on the one hand, *and had it investigated the intermediate structure of the universities*—departments, institutes, profesfessional schools, and interdisciplinary committees—on the other, then a different picture would have been obtained: 1910 would not have become a stopping place (in the reform of the professional schools, for instance, it can be regarded as an important starting point); and the newly stabilized macrostructure of the university would then have appeared as a mere shell in which the vital processes of differentiation had just begun.

Finally, it would have been discovered that there was much continuity between the consistent thinking of the first reformers and the policies of different departments and schools within the university, quite unlike the discontinuity between the thought of early reformers and late presidents. One might also have glimpsed a view of Michelson or Morgan doing their path-breaking experiments alongside such noisier figures as Ross and Veblen.

These are important points, but they have little effect on the value of the book. The picture which is presented there is a true one as seen from a given perspective. There are enough qualifications and references dispersed in the book to make the careful reader aware of this specific perspective. However, by making the sociological description and analysis a little more formal, the relationship between the part presented in the book and the rest omitted from it would have been even clearer. Nevertheless, this is an important book, one of the very best examples of sociologically meaningful institutional history.

JOSEPH BEN-DAVID

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Reports on Happiness: A Pilot Study of Behavior Related to Mental Health. By NORMAN M. BRADBURN and DAVID CAPLOVITZ. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xvi+195. $5.00.

This concise report contains the findings of a pilot study which has considerable potential significance. Bradburn and Caplovitz have set themselves a formidable task. They are seeking to construct reliable measures of psychological well-being, to determine how these change over time, and to identify the specific impact upon such states of events and conditions in the social environment. The over-all objective of the ambitious enterprise is to contribute to an understanding of "mental health, as well as to the study of the causes of mental illness."

The pilot study, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center with a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health, employed standard survey research methods. Interviews were conducted in four small communities in Illinois, with a population of less than 10,000. A total of 450 households were reached, yielding about 400 personal interviews with men aged 25–49 and 1,600 self-administered questionnaires completed by adult men and women in all age brackets.

There were two unusual features to the research design. The communities were selected because they differed in degree of economic

prosperity. This set the basis for examining whether gross differences in social conditions would be correlated with differences in psychological well-being. The other important variation from usual surveys was that a portion of the respondents were interviewed a second time during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, eight months after the original interview. It was thus possible to explore the effects of a major national crisis upon the variables being investigated.

The analysis revolves around four categories of questions: What are the dimensions of happiness? How are they correlated with demographic and socioeconomic variables? How do they change over time? What is the impact on them of national crisis?

In regard to the first two questions, the study set out to replicate some of the material reported in *Americans View Their Mental Health,* and confirmed many of the basic findings of the earlier study. Thus, it was found once more, for example, that happiness and worry are not incompatible with each other but often are associated as a reflection of involvement and affectivity; that people of low socioeconomic status and older people are both less happy and less involved. Some of the specific findings regarding the interrelationship of education, income, and age in regard to happiness differ from earlier findings. However, the samples were different, so that further research will be needed before such discrepancies can be interpreted.

Combining a number of measures, the authors suggest that "happiness" is a product of the balance between two different dimensions which seem to be relatively independent of each other—one made up of "positive" feelings and the other of "negative" feelings. The authors make no final claim for their interpretations, but the ideas are interesting and merit the further testing that they are scheduled to receive.

The major original contribution of the study is to be found in its longitudinal dimension and especially in the linkage with national crisis. The results are hardly definitive but open up a variety of problems for the further research which is promised. On the important question of the reliability of measures of "happiness" over time, results are mixed. Sixty-three per cent of the sample gave the same response to the general self-evaluative question (i.e., whether they considered themselves "very happy," "pretty happy," or "not too happy"), and the shifts, for practically all respondents, were limited to one step in the three-point scale. The authors argue plausibly that this points to a degree of reliability in the measure, but it is not possible at this time to determine to what extent changes in response reflect real changes in psychological states or the factor of unreliability in the measures.

Most of the items included in the schedule referred to behavior and feelings of the respondent in the previous week. The data from the two interviews are insufficient to provide a basis for determining what degree of variation is to be expected from week to week. It will take a great deal of additional detailed research to determine how much variation is compatible with normal well-being and what concentration of unhappiness may be related to mental illness. At this point, it must remain an open question whether any of the measures employed here are indicators of potential mental illness. Because of all these questions flowing from the pilot study, it is regrettable that the authors did not indicate just what the program of future research is to be. It is not clear whether a panel will be used and interviewed many times during the year, nor is there an evaluation of the assets and hazards of alternative research approaches.

Findings in regard to the impact of economic conditions on "happiness" were largely negative. There were some interesting variations by socioeconomic status, age, and other factors that may have a bearing on concepts such as relative deprivation, but conclusions of that order must await the promised further detailed analysis of the communities.

Great interest will center on the findings concerning reaction to the Cuban missile crisis. That people worried about the crisis is clearly indicated. It does not follow, however, that these worries were related to any of the several dimensions of happiness included in this study. Most of the findings on that score were negative, and there are even some measures which indicate that there was a greater sense of psychological well-being during the crisis than at the time of the earlier interview.

No reviewer could raise more questions about the inconclusiveness of the study or the uncertainty of the measures than those anticipated by the authors. They are modest in

their claims and careful in their interpretations. In their own words, they "have made a beginning." They are to be commended for undertaking a large and important task, and their future research will be awaited eagerly by all disciplines concerned with the relationship between the social environment and psychological states. It would seem that the major problem which they face is how to achieve, within the framework of a survey research methodology, the refinements in the measures that are necessary to answer the many issues posed in this pilot study.

Arnold Gurin

Brandeis University

Coming of Age in America: Growth and Acquiescence By Edgar Z. Friedenberg. New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. xvi+300. $5.95.

Those who know Edgar Z. Friedenberg only as the witty polemicist whose essay reviews blaze upon the pages of literary periodicals will find that lively character conjoined in this book with an alter ego—the diligent and ingenious researcher. For the book is the product of a research year during which he interviewed—personally and at length and with tape recorder—several hundred students, selected randomly from nine widely scattered schools. To provide his subjects with a common basis for an intensive discussion of the issues and conflicts that emerge within high-school life, he and a colleague composed a series of six narrative episodes about an imaginary high school and its students and staff. Together with the document relating the episode, he gave to the student respondents a set of nine cards, each bearing a critical comment on the events, and asked them to sort the cards in accordance with their own judgments.

Representative of the character of these episodes is the "Clarke-Barto" incident, in which a teacher, entering the men's washroom, encounters a student engaged in the forbidden act of smoking The student, Johnny Barto, is described as a junior and of a somewhat notorious character. Responding to this episode, the students rated most highly the card which turned the offender over to the school psychologist, while they rated lowest the card in which the teacher would have performed his own business and ignored Barto's indulgence. This pattern of response troubles Friedenberg, as it should any thoughtful and moral reader. Clearly, his respondents do not believe that a youth of sixteen or so has any right to decide for himself whether he should smoke, even if he carries out this action in that last refuge of pseudo-privacy, the public toilet. Nor will they accord the offender the dignity of being a criminal who has knowingly chosen to do wrong. Rather, they are disposed to regard this conduct as a proper topic for faculty discussion leading to referral to the school psychologist, who is then to establish a counseling program "to get at Johnny's 'anti-social' behavior and straighten him out."

In the analysis of this and the five other episodes that constituted the focus of his interviews, Friedenberg writes not merely as a researcher who has become thoroughly familiar with the nature of student attitudes but as a sociologist who is keenly aware of the dynamics of school systems. He emphasizes what others have found convenient to overlook, that schools are authoritarian and bureaucratic and that they are expected by society both to be assimilationist and to provide ladders of social mobility. If they are repressive toward students of imagination, verve, and curiosity, this is in the nature of the institution, as now constituted. But Friedenberg refuses to stop his analysis at the level of functionalist description. As we have come to expect from him, his argument is original, infused with passion and understanding, and thoroughly readable.

My one criticism of the book is that it lacks an index, bibliography, and list of tables. Considering how much profit can be made when a book is used as a text, publishers choose to economize in some strange ways.

Murray Wax

University of Kansas

Life and Death of a Mental Hospital. By Ezra Stotland and Arthur Kobler. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965. Pp. 257. $6.95.

A social event comes to the attention of social scientists in several different ways. Its degree of significance for research can also

vary. Yet, the two are often closely related. *Life and Death of a Mental Hospital* and its companion volume, *The End of Hope: A Social Clinical Study of Suicide,* resulted from an investigation of a rash of suicides and the impending closing of the hospital (the Crest Foundation) in which they occurred. While the latter volume examines the social-psychiatric factors which precipitated the suicide epidemic, the book being reviewed here examines the institutional experience of the hospital throughout its ten years of existence.

Although there are several themes implicit in this book, the central point of interest revolves around two prerequisites of viable organizational performance: survival and effectiveness. The authors observe that mental hospitals—as organizational types—have experienced particular difficulty in establishing a balance between survival and effectiveness. The problem stems from the lack of an adequate technology or set of means suitable to the achievement of the treatment goals of the organization. As a substitute for operational goals, mental hospitals develop ideologies that provide staff members with a cognitive basis for the strategies which are used to fulfil the productive task.

Organizational viability is necessarily precarious under these conditions, since operational procedures available do not provide the necessary support for the ideology. However, viability can be sustained if other supports are available. In the early history of Crest, for example, the ideology of the hospital called for the optimization of the conditions of treatment, or what the authors conceptually view as a "hopeful" ideology. This ideology emerged from the belief systems of the two Menninger-trained psychiatrists who founded the hospital, and it was sustained and supported by the groups involved in the hospital's operation. At this point in the history of the organization, Crest functioned as a "normative" organization (à la Etzioni) in which the members were highly committed to the ideology, a commitment which of itself tended to confirm the effectiveness of the elite institution.

As Crest began to encounter operational difficulties in all areas of performance, the needs of survival began to acquire greater predominance. Under these circumstances, a basic set of changes occurred within the hospital. Norms of efficiency and economy of effort assumed priority over the optimization of treatment. The criteria of staff-patient relationships shifted from an emphasis on flexibility and problem-solving to an emphasis on control and routinization. The co-ordination of organizational activity changed from one in which staff members and related groups (e.g., the board of trustees) contributed to the productive task in terms of a unified ideology to one in which the various groups contributed to the hospital in terms of their area of specialization or social position.

Although the movement in this direction was rational in the sense that the steps were necessary to meet the survival needs of the organization, it exacerbated latent contradictions in the ideology and power struggles among the various groups. At this point in the history of Crest, the hospital functioned as a "remunerative" organization, where the membership participated in terms of their own personal gain, material or otherwise. The final breaking point occurred with the suicide epidemic; the various groups withdrew their support, and the hospital terminated its operations.

From this experience, the authors generate a number of propositions about viability in mental hospitals and organizations having similar characteristics. It is most unfortunate that they should suggest that the key to viability is a "hopeful" ideology. The empirical materials of the study forcefully demonstrate that "organizations do not exist by ideology alone," whether hopeful or not.

Additionally, the authors suggest that the "sources of hopefulness" must be maintained. The reference is undoubtedly to the structural characteristics of these organizations, that is, leadership, distribution of power, support by lay and professional groups in the lay community, etc. There can be no doubt that ideological commitments of these groups can affect the strategy used in organizational performance. But strategy cannot replace technology or even compensate for the absence of an adequate technology—the original contention of the authors. As Perrow has brilliantly argued, such attempts are doomed to failure—the kind of structural support called for cannot be sustained by the available technology. This, of course, does not mean that organizations will cease their operations as was the case at Crest. It does mean, however, that the priorities of action are more likely to reflect the survival

needs of the organization. At Crest this was reflected in the conversion from the normative to the remunerative structures.

The basic criticism of this book, therefore, can be directed at the author's attempt to promote "hope" as a technological requisite and in its use as an explanatory concept. It obscures what otherwise is an insightful analysis of the events at Crest and the depiction of the central dilemma of organizations of this type.

ANTHONY COSTONIS
University of Wisconsin

Trapped: Families and Schizophrenia. By LLOYD H. ROGLER and AUGUST B. HOLLINGSHEAD. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. xii+436. $8.95.

As the authors state in their preface, "this book examines the intimate, detailed life histories of a series of families who live in the slums and public housing projects of San Juan, Puerto Rico. . . . The purposes of the study were threefold: to identify the distinctive experiences of persons who are nonschizophrenic in comparison with those who are afflicted with schizophrenia; to determine the circumstances associated with the onset of the mental illness; and to assess the impact of mental illness on family life." The study group was composed of twenty families, each with a schizophrenic husband, wife, or both; the "control group" comprised twenty families with spouses who were not psychotic or who had neurotic traits.

The data were compiled chiefly from the present generation of families of procreation. Retrospective data from the spouses, their parents, and siblings provided information that could be "reconstructed" to describe family life in the two groups for three generations. Data on the children in these forty families also were compiled.

The authors went to remarkable lengths in selecting their samples of families (albeit small), giving psychiatric diagnoses of all the spouses, staffing their interviewing teams, and preparing the field work. Eight specific schedules were prepared for the family interviews: a screening schedule, mental status examination, health opinion survey, life history, description of family life, conceptions of mental health, spiritualism in everyday life, and problematic areas. The items were both fixed-choice and open-ended, the latter providing further probing where indicated. All of the families were of the lowest social class.

The bulk of the book presents a detailed and intimate description of family life for children and adults in the two groups studied. The volume is divided into six parts: Part 1, "The Problem and the Method"; Part 2, "The Childhood Years"; Part 3, "Becoming an Adult"; Part 4, "Becoming a Schizophrenic"; Part 5, "The Impact of Schizophrenia on the Family"; Part 6, "The Future." The writing is straightforward, clear, and lucid, giving a vivid and empathic description of family life in the San Juan slums, with a mixture of statistical data and qualitative, ideal-type descriptions of the families.

The authors conclude that "experiences in childhood and adolescence of schizophrenic persons do not differ noticeably from those of persons who are not afflicted with this illness. At an identifiable period in the life of the schizophrenic person, however, a set of interwoven, mutually reinforcing problems produces an onrush of symptoms which overwhelm the victim and prevent him from fulfilling the obligations associated with his accustomed social roles. The impact of schizophrenia on the family depends on the sex of the person afflicted."

The authors close their book with a challenge to others "to test, enlarge, or modify the ideas generated by this study." Indeed, the denial of the significance of childhood and adolescence in the etiologic process of schizophrenia strikes at the core of psychodynamic psychiatric theory, and the reaction by psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and other psychotherapists with a Freudian bent should be interesting.

It should be pointed out that the authors actually test no specific sociologic theory of schizophrenia other than to explore the potential significance of family life and social roles that may or may not be related to the presence of schizophrenic family members. Their work still leaves a number of important questions unanswered: Were those who became schizophrenic more susceptible to mental breakdown when caught in the web of role conflicts described by the authors than those who coped with such problems? To what extent

are their findings relevant and applicable to cultures and social classes other than Puerto Rico and the lower classes? Why is schizophrenia the result rather than some other type of mental illness when the "person unsuccessfully struggles to disengage himself from his manifold conflicts, a break with reality occurs, and he decompensates into schizophrenia," as the authors state?

Nevertheless, the authors achieve remarkably well the stated purposes of their study and confine their conclusions generally to the range of validity of their data. Their contribution is primarily within the realm of precipitating factors of mental illness as provoked by stressful family life in a particular culture. An ideal next step would be to integrate equally derived data on predisposing factors that would further social-psychiatric knowledge of the crucial impact of interlocking sociogenic with psycho- and biogenic factors in the etiology of schizophrenia.

E. Gartly Jaco

University of Minnesota

The Transition from Childhood to Adolescence: Cross-Cultural Studies of Initiation Ceremonies, Legal Systems and Incest Taboos. By Yehudi A. Cohen. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1964. Pp. 254. $5.75.

This is an informed and thoughtful book in the interdisciplinary behavioral science mode, but it has methodological flaws marked by a chapter devoted to their defense. We will return to these flaws.

This volume can be viewed as a serious contribution to the occasionally rousing current debate and massing of correlational evidence regarding initiation ceremonies and related practices, their psychosocial functions, causes, and contents.

Cohen leaves for other places any direct confrontation of the work of Frank Young, John Whiting, and others involved in the current debate. He is out to make his own contribution, in his own way. Nor will this reviewer make any attempt to integrate these matters, except to say that Cohen appears to be more biological and psychological than Young and more sociological than Whiting in his emphases. Besides, Cohen has stepped back from the firing line into the stance of the individual scholar who, has returned to the voluminous ethographic sources more in search of hypotheses than of proof. Let us look at his argument.

Cohen leans heavily upon a recognition of two stages which are vital in the transition from childhood to adolescence rather than the usual one. Both are anchored, he argues, in pan-cultural facts of biology and physiology. The first stage occurs at 8–10 years, the second at puberty. The second, though it is more dramatic, is used less often by the cultures in his sample. Cohen argues, somewhat convincingly, that the first stage or phase is probably more potent in its effects and that more is achieved by manipulating the child in this phase. At 8–10, the child is more teachable because the physiological cues tied to basic changes are less clear than in the second stage, and the things done to children in the first stage are more structurally vital and lasting and can solve some huge personal and social problems.

The practices of interest to Cohen at this first stage are the presence (or absence) of extrusion of the child from the nuclear family, the imposition of brother-sister avoidance, or both of these. The former, or both, of these practices are found in societies where socialization is "aimed at sociological interdependence": where training is importantly in the hands of members of the child's broader descent group and where (less reliably) there exists a unilinear descent group. These practices serve (goes the argument) to fix an individual's social anchorage and to establish that kind of sense of social and emotional identity which fits the social structure. So, if a child lives where he must come to terms with the kinds of "boundary-maintaining structures" implied by unilineality, then his horizons must be broadened by recourse to socializing agents who come from those structures and with whom he can identify.

But this is not all that is achieved in this first stage: This is also the time par excellence for finishing the inculcation of the incest taboos, and family exclusion and brother-sister avoidance will help in this. These practices (and particularly exclusion, of course) will provide *general* buffering against the over-close nuclear family ties, and they are, therefore, found in those contexts where place

must be made in the psychosocial space of the child for broader identifications.

On the other side lie the many cultures where child training is aimed at "sociological independence," and where it is expected that the child will retain his anchor within the nuclear family alone. Here the extra socializing agents (and there must be some in *all* societies) must not come from any other lasting boundary-maintaining group to which the child might become anchored or identified due to lasting contact and need satisfactions. So these extra agents will not tend to be from the descent group even where such a group is present. Cohen speculates about how these groups handle the incest taboo inculcations, but the argument is weakest at this point.

These two focuses of socialization—toward sociological interdependence and toward independence—are also reflected in the basic cultural values as indexed by the legal code. Where children are brought up by parents and by the descent group and where they are extruded from the home or have brother-sister avoidance, we find the legal concept of *joint liability* ("you are responsible for my actions and I am responsible for yours") in thirty-six out of thirty-seven cases. Where the independence focus is present, we find the concept of *several liability only* in thirty-six out of thirty-seven cases.

Finally, a word about the dramatic and often bloody initiation ceremonies of the second stage of puberty which are studied by everybody else. These merely serve to weaken further (but never dissolve) the child's ties to his nuclear family by showing how impotent its members are compared to the broader kin group which initiates him and whose children share his trauma. Not all the interdependent-focused societies "use" this additional practice. The point is that the interdependence focus is a *necessary* condition but not a sufficient one for initiation ceremonies to be present (only one exception in twenty-nine cases to this statement). Ten of the twenty-nine interdependent societies do not have initiation ceremonies.

This is the bones of the argument. Cohen is prepared to accept looseness in the fine texture of the matter and in the details of the posited processes in search of the larger fit. He suggests, interestingly but not at all fully, that the language of "boundary-maintenance system theory" may prove generally more useful than that of role theory. The book's argument is rather weakly buttressed by nine tables (eight of them 2×2 inches) plus some reference to systematic cross-cultural work by Murdock, Schneider, and others.

The basic flaw is methodological: Cohen is his own selector of material, coder, and interpreter. He says he lacked funds to hire an independent categorizer of materials, and on this point I can suggest that at Cornell we have found that a graduate student seminar can often turn up quite reliable work, even using original sources rather than the Human Relations Area File. Cohen does spend many pages in this book presenting his own summary of the bases of his judgments, with references. But he has certainly not overanalyzed his data: the ratio of new facts to discussion is very small, and it will remain for those interested to move his thinking from the exploratory stage to the publicly documented one.

But surely the time has come for some well-planned field experiments on just what these practices due to the various participants. There is no doubt that the extant ethnographic reports have not been plumbed to their depths as yet, but a matched group "before-during-after" design would provide a refreshing new type of data which might weed out some of the current controversy and give us more confidence in what we know about these very important matters.

WILLIAM W. LAMBERT

Cornell University

Mothers of Six Cultures: Antecedents of Child Rearing. By LEIGH MINTURN and WILLIAM W. LAMBERT. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. xi+351. $7.25.

This book is an elaboration and extension of the investigations reported in *Six Cultures: Studies of Childbearing,* edited by Beatrice Whiting. In each culture, from sixteen to twenty-four mothers were interviewed, with equal proportions of mothers of boys and girls and of younger children (three–six years) and older children (seven–ten years). The Minturn and Lambert volume focuses on quantitative analysis of data. Rating scales were developed for analysis of interview material gathered by field workers in a New England town, Juxtlahuaca in Mexico, Taira in Okinawa, Khalapur in India, and the Gusii

in Kenya. Two judges coded the interview material, a factor analysis was performed, differences between societies on various factors were investigated, tentative hypotheses were formulated, and these hypotheses were then tested with data from the Human Relations Area Files. Twenty-six scales related to child-rearing practices were used in the factor alalysis. These scales pertained to the handling of aggression, dependency, obedience, responsibility, achievement, sociability, discipline, and other aspects of behavior.

The correlations among the interview scales reflect the extent of unreliability of the judges' ratings. Of the 338 correlation coefficients used in the factor analysis of the twenty-six scales (in addition to age and sex of the children), only thirteen were greater than ± .30. In spite of this unreliability, several of the factors appear to make sense. The authors compared societies on six factors extracted in the analysis. These factors include maternal warmth, maternal instability, mothers' responsibility for child care, responsibility-training, mother-directed aggression, and peer-directed aggression. On the basis of these comparisons, Minturn and Lambert formulated hypotheses concerning influences on child-rearing. Some of their hypotheses are:

A curvilinear relationship exists between privacy and maternal warmth, with mothers who have intermediate privacy being the most warm and mothers in crowded quarters being the lowest of the two extremes [p. 283].

Mothers become emotionally unstable when they are forced to spend long periods of time without help in caring for their children [p. 284].

Mothers who make a heavy contribution to the subsistence of the family are less permissive than are mothers who make less of a contribution [p. 287].

Punishment for defiance of maternal authority tends to be increased as the number of persons who live in the house increases [p. 287].

Where families live in close proximity to kin, rifts in family ties cannot be risked through conflict between children and therefore children tend to be punished more severely for fighting and quarreling than do children of isolated nuclear family households [pp. 288–89].

The shortcomings in an investigation such as that reported in this volume are easy to identify—inferences to cultures on the basis of small and unsystematically selected samples, correlations computed on data which probably do not meet the required assumptions, unreliability of ratings, use of data in the HRAF which were inadequate to the task of testing the particular hypotheses. Yet, the methodological deficiencies are less important than what this investigation has accomplished. The authors have tried to study an area of social behavior in a much more systematic manner than had been attempted previously. They have developed procedures for the systematic collection and analysis of data pertaining to child-rearing on a cross-cultural basis. Hence, to concentrate on deficiencies in this review would be unjust.

The development and initial testing of the hypotheses constitute the substantive contribution of this volume. Its second contribution lies in detailing many of the problems involved in cross-cultural analysis and in describing some of the techniques developed by the authors to overcome these difficulties. Although the results of the analysis are not definitive, the authors have shown much resourcefulness in handling ethnographic information. This book deserves to be read both for its substantive contribution and methodological implications.

Bernard Farber
University of Illinois, Urbana

The Human Shape of Work: Studies in the Sociology of Occupations. Edited by Peter L. Berger. New York: MacMillan Co., 1964. Pp. vii+241. $5.95.

The objective of this volume, according to the dustjacket, is to explore "the meaning of work in modern society." Five contributors each provide an essay, and the editor offers an "incisive summary."

The essays are of varying quality. The first two, Gold's analysis of janitors and Chinoy's description of assembly line workers, draw their materials from what are now durable classics. Although they offer no new materials, the presentation is fresh and forceful. Evans' analysis of the engineering technician is less successful. His essay gives the impression of a wrestling match between a newly emerging occupation and some stale sociological theory, with the theory emerging as the winner. One rarely manages a clear-cut glimpse of the nature of the technician. By contrast, the depiction of the advertising man by Lewis is a jewel-like masterpiece; it provides an ironic

delineation of the absurdities inherent in the efforts of the advertiser to create meanings for his clients and victims. Members of other professions, in reading this section, will find it a faithful and uncomfortable mirror. The final essay, by Underwood, on the business executive, is disappointing. Presumably his subject matter is "higher" than that of the other essayists. Unfortunately the attempt to comprehend the executive by using a schema of "moral" concepts results in a bland mixture of trite comment. The realities of executive life never come clearly into focus.

The summary by the editor could more aptly be used as an introduction inasmuch as it rarely concerns itself with the materials of the preceding five essays. It is more properly a sixth essay aimed at sorting out various ideologies of work. In his statement Berger seems perpetually tempted to see the whole work world as a glorious experiment in "con-manship" and "one-upmanship." His more sober efforts are reflected in his attempt to "suggest a three-fold division of work in terms of its human significance. First, there is work that still provides an occasion for primary self-identification and self-commitment of the individual—for his 'fulfilment' if one prefers. Thirdly, there is work that is apprehended as a direct threat to self-identification, an indignity, an oppression. And secondly, between these two poles, is work that is neither fulfilment nor oppression, a sort of gray neutral region in which one neither rejoices nor suffers, but with which one puts up with more or less grace for the sake of other things that are supposed to be more important—these other things being typically connected with one's private life" (p. 219). He contends that the first and third categories have shrunk in favor of the second.

The volume is notably readable. With rare exceptions, it is free from technical jargon. It lacks an index.

Oswald Hall

University of Toronto

The Sociology of Film Art. By George A. Huaco. With a Foreword by Leo Lowenthal. New York: Basic Books, 1965. Pp. vii+229. $5.50.

The pretentious title of this interesting, lucid, provocative book belies the actual contributions made by the author in the volume. For, although the book will enlarge the sociological analysis of art and literature and will undoubtedly encourage additional analyses of film art in particular, it is not comprehensive enough to be considered an exhaustive, definitive, and finite presentation of *the* sociology of film art. Also, one should not be led to expect, from the title, an analysis of the Hollywood mass-culture films. The author is singularly interested in historic film art styles, identified as homogeneous, unified waves of film art, and accepted by film historians as representative of the specific style.

Huaco chooses three groups of films for analysis: the German Expressionist school (1920–31); Soviet Expressive Realism (1925–30); and Italian Neorealism (1945–55). In each of three separate sections, the author performs an admirable content analysis of the films comprising these three groups. Although his analysis is somewhat laborious in places, he very effectively shows the relationship between the film themes and the larger social-cultural order. This is effected by using a sociohistorical approach and ample historical data, and by examining the common social characteristics (nativity, level of education, occupation of father, previous occupation) of the film directors for each stylistic group.

The author's greatest contribution, however, is in establishing the necessity of four factors for the appearance and continuance of each of these three art styles. In Weberian manner, he demonstrates that the emergence and existence of each art style is dependent upon a cadre of trained film technicians, directors, cameramen, and actors; a basic film plant including studios, laboratories, and equipment; a mode of organiation of the film industry tolerant of the ideology of the productions; and a climate of favorable political norms toward both the ideology and the style of the films. In the absence of any one of these factors, the author has shown that the art style has declined. This has been done by liberally using historical data to support his contention, although Huaco does not actually demonstrate that the combination of these four factors is sufficient to produce a unified film wave.

Martin R. Morris

Brooklyn College of the City University of New York

The Profession of English Letters. By J. W. SAUNDERS. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964. Pp. 266. $5.75.

If sociologists were professionally interested in the arts, and the evidence indicates that they are not, then the appearance of J. W. Saunders' book would be an important event. Saunders is an informed literary historian who has learned, mainly from Carr-Saunders and Wilson, some simple yet sound sociological ideas. With a refreshing lack of apology, he analyzes the profession of English letters as others have analyzed the professions of law and medicine.

A profession has certain attributes, for example, a socially valued skill, standards of correct performance, and the power to impose these standards upon clients, which can be developed and maintained only when certain social conditions are present. Saunders' task is to define what these social conditions are and how they facilitate, impede, limit, or completely inhibit the development of professionalism.

One example can, perhaps, suggest how Saunders goes about his work. The social organization of the literary world in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries encouraged, for the first time, the emergence of professional standards. Authors were concentrated at court, which meant that they had a great deal of intimate contact. They were nearly equal in power and prestige, which meant that they could freely judge one another's work on its literary merits. Saunders says, "no poet was likely to get a frank and helpful opinion from a man who was markedly his social inferior, and mere idle flattery (from those above) sharpened no wits" (p. 44). And too, literary performance was sufficiently prized so that only those with literary ability were admitted to court circles. Later these conditions were to disappear and then to reappear with definite consequences each time for professional standards.

Saunders' great virtue is that he is systematic. He recognizes and concedes exceptions, but he does not share the humanistic bias about the uniqueness of the arts and so can find patterns where patterns do exist.

If there is virtue in what he does do, there is also virtue in what he does not do. He is not a frustrated literary critic and, therefore, does not distract us with literary judgments. Further, he does not get involved in the complex problems of the relationship between content and social structure. This has been the area that has most fascinated people in the sociology of art, and it is an area that is most difficult. Saunders deals, rather, with men of letters as one would deal with any other group of professionals, and ends by saying some new and very interesting things.

LARRY MITCHELL
Columbia University

The Mountain Gorilla. By GEORGE B. SCHALLER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Pp. xviii+432. $10.00.

This report of a twenty-month investigation of the African mountain gorilla is superb. Using the venerable method of patient observation and meticulous recording—466 hours of direct observation of ten gorilla groups—Schaller blends technical rigor and lively clear prose into an outstanding field monograph. It is in the tradition of the best in Darwinian natural history.

The substantive value of this study for sociologists with an ethological bent is great. The myth of gorilla ferocity is demolished; the infamous "gorilla charge" turns out to be largely a bluff. Rather, we find these creatures to be lovable, shy, peaceful—kind of dull, though. For Schaller, the small number of direct social interactions was the most striking aspect of group behavior. He reports no overt expression of family unity—nor sexual "jealousy." Moreover, sexuality was not especially important in structuring social relations and was handled with as little drama as eating or defecating. Co-operation and antagonism were not highly developed social processes among adults—the most aggressive act recorded was a mild shove. When different gorilla bands confronted one another, a kind of ritualized attack display seemed to occur, but no troublesome behavior was noted. Schaller also provides us with fascinating information on group dynamics, leadership, communication, play, dominance, territoriality, ecology, and population density. The literature on primates was frequently employed to locate particular observations within a reasonably broad comparative framework; analogies between gorilla and human behavior were put forward with great restraint and care.

Most readers should enjoy at least some of the wide range of materials reported in this

monograph; however, Schaller's work is likely to be of greatest value to sociologists who have methodological commitments to naturalistic observation. Most of his observations were performed in full view of the animals—he habituated them to his presence by slowly advancing and then selecting and remaining in an observation post which allowed the gorillas to inspect him clearly. In successfully habituating the gorillas, he overcame what was considered to be an impossible task—a systematic field study of these supposedly difficult primates.

Schaller reports fully what he observes; excerpts from his notes are frequently provided to illustrate and document most of his assertions. The value of these field-note fragments is enhanced by the fact that they seem to have been written with an eventual readership in mind. They are clear, precise, lively, and often a delight to read. He has a way of attaining a high degree of descriptive fidelity without being boring.

In the process of unfolding his take, he provides the reader with an assessment of the quality of the data used to support a particular point. He shares with his readers information on the sampling of observations; also the degree to which he believed that his presence influenced the behavior of the animals. Occurrence frequencies are used when possible to support a statement. In effect, he grades the quality of evidence used to support any patterning submitted for consideration. The reader is offered a rough "confidence level" and the raw data upon which this assessment is based. Photographs, drawings, diagrams, and a detailed appendix are available, and the text is tightly integrated with these evidenciary sources.

To those sociologists who still enjoy meddling into other people's affairs, this study is welcome because it serves as a model for future field investigators to move toward. Some of the lessons to be learned from Schaller's work can be used to invigorate the tradition of field work—a methodological tradition which has failed to innovate and develop in anyway comparable to the advances made in survey and experimental work. If used for a field-methods course, this book might even induce a student or two to attempt to have as much fun as Schaller seems to have had.

LARRY ROSENBERG

University of Chicago

Mental Health of the Industrial Worker: A Detroit Study. By ARTHUR KORNHAUSER. With the collaboration of OTTO M. REID. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. xi+354. $7.95.

Shift Work: The Social, Psychological, and Physical Consequences. By PAUL E. MOTT, FLOYD C. MANN, QUIN MCLOUGHLIN, and DONALD P. WARWICK. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965. Pp. vi+351. $8.50.

The two volumes are addressed to the same basic question: How is the mental health of American workers affected by the technical demands of a highly rationalized production system? Both studies in general respond in the negative. Both are reasonably sound in research design and execution. Neither pretends to be the last word on the subject.

Arthur Kornhauser's study analyzes the results of depth-interview questionnaires among 655 male workers in thirteen automotive manufacturing plants and in several other non-manufacturing companies in the Detroit area. His conclusion: a large number of industrial workers, especially those in "lower" occupational categories, reveal general symptoms of poor psychological health. These symptoms are reflected in expressed feelings of anxiety, hostility, and low self-esteem. Sense of accomplishment, personal growth, and feelings of identification are important attributes of a "healthy" job. Personal and social characteristics explain differences in the mental health of *individuals*, but when comparisons are made between *occupational groups*, Kornhauser could not attribute poor mental health to factors such as education or prejob conditions. The intrinsic nature of the work itself is an important independent variable. Workers in the more routine, repetitive jobs express the highest degree of deprivation and frustration. Size of the organizational unit and the quality of managerial practices are also important. Workers do find some compensations extrinsic to work itself which allow them to face their work life with a passive, homewhat fatalistic, acceptance at best.

Kornhauser does not let his emeritus status interfere with his work as a first-rate analyst who can, among other accomplishments, martial the data to challenge the popular but different motivation theories of Maslow and Herzbag. More than this, he is brilliantly

articulate about the need to find new ways of making life meaningful for hundreds of thousands who spend the greater part of their waking hours tied to a socially alienating machine system. He puts it squarely up to union and management to take a long hard look at what work is doing to the mental health of the worker.

The second study, *Shift Work*, seeks to determine whether people perceive their shift-work experience as facilitating or interfering with their ability to maintain their major social roles in the home and community. More than one thousand questionnaires were analyzed and, remarkably enough, each questionnaire contained no less than three hundred questions.

Predictions were made about the effects of three independent variables: (*a*) shift hours and hours associated with other role behavior, (*b*) difficulty felt in role behavior, and (*c*) physiological aspects of the work experience. The researchers demonstrated quite clearly that workers not on a regular day shift felt they were unable to execute a variety of desired social responsibilities as father, companion to wife, or joiner in organized community activities. They confirm the hunch that self-esteem, anxiety, and conflict pressure are adversely affected when the worker feels that the temporal rhythm of the shift he is on conflicts with the rhythms of other role behaviors. This in turn causes physical fatigue, lack of sleep, and other physiological difficulties.

Although the book is long in diagnosis and short in prognosis, the authors do seriously question more premium pay as a solution to the shift-work problem.

ROBERT H. GUEST

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Rural Life and Urbanized Society. By LEE TAYLOR and ARTHUR R. JONES, JR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv+493. $7.50.

The central theme of this book is that the entire society of the United States can be characterized as an urbanized type of social organization. This situation had its origin in the shift from ruralized social organization to a differentiated rural-urban type of organization, an evolution which occurred in Europe in earlier periods. This argument is supported by brief comparisons of contemporary rural society in the United States with medieval rural social organization and with early social organization in this country.

The authors demonstrate the increasing interdependence of rural and urban segments of contemporary society by examining the social interaction of the various rural populations, the social structure of food and fiber production, and the social institutions of rural America. Rural sociologists have long ignored the organizational aspects of commercial farming, agribusiness, and vertical integration; and the descriptive analysis developed here is a substantial contribution to the literature.

Despite the many worthy innovations in this book, its shortcomings are also numerous. For example, students in introductory rural sociology are capable of internalizing far more than the limited number of sociological concepts which are used in the analysis. Also, the fact that one must rely upon overgeneralized historical accounts of the social organization and ideology of both medieval European and early American societies does not excuse the inadequate theoretical development of "ruralized social organization." Nor does the fact that "urbanized social organization is still in the process of becoming established" (in the empirical sense) render impossible an adequate development of the concept as an ideal type.

Notably absent from the text are explanations of either the necessary or sufficient conditions by which rural-urban differentiation and urban social organization occur. And by refusing to consider the two main concepts as polar extremes of a multidimensional continuum, the authors are faced with the dilemma of an all-or-none proposition. Thus, "Colonial America appeared to be characterized by ruralized social organization during the seventeenth century more because of its physical wilderness (environment) than ideology." If the ideology of seventeenth century America cannot be considered "ruralized" in comparison to present-day ideology, then it becomes even more difficult for the authors to explain the ideology of contemporary Springdale, which has a mass, urban environment: "But these [Springdale's] expressions are abstract sentiments which idealize some particular location. They do not express the actual social organization or way of life." The fact that every rural community

in America idealizes its particular location with the same rural ideology cannot be explained away simply because the ideology is not realistic. Ideology can and does influence human behavior and organization, as the authors imply later when noting that rural schools are still numerous despite changes and proposed changes (which largely emanate from urban sources). Ideology still prevents even the most commercial farmers from developing those forms of organization which could give them the same degree of economic power that their urban counterparts have attained.

It is clear that the authors have overstated the case of an urbanized social organization in which "the life of both rural and urban people is on the same pattern of social organization." There are ample sociological reasons why sparsely settled areas will vary significantly in social organization from densely settled areas, as theorists from Ibn Khaldun to Hans Zetterberg have explained. If this is not the case, then it is difficult to explain how Taylor and Jones were able to identify for discussion purposes the various rural social institutions which exist in an urbanized society.

In balance this book is challenging and stimulating. It contains a wealth of material which is not available in other rural sociology texts. Its treatment of urbanized social organization can be justified for no other reason than that it may be needed to change the provincial attitudes of most rural students and of some rural sociologists.

DONALD E. JOHNSON
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Lawyers and Matrimonial Cases: A Study of Informal Pressures in Private Professional Practice. By HUBERT J. O'GORMAN. New York: Free Press, 1965. Pp. xviii+206. $5.95.

Divorce, New York style, before the recent changes in the law, provides the setting for O'Gorman's book. Viewing the practice of matrimonial law in a social context, the author takes the opportunity to "test" some sociological concepts while presenting a description of lawyers who accept matrimonial work.

Divorce laws in New York State were especially strict, adultery providing the only ground. The alternatives for the lawyer and his clients were slim and dismal: They could opt to get involved in messy litigation which might have long-term consequences for the parties and their children; they could stage the adulterous scene, which is illegal and unethical but not uncommon; they could obtain an out-of-state divorce, which meant tampering with out-of-state residential requirements or heavy investments of time and money; they could attempt to circumvent the divorce laws by applying for an annulment, which was easier to obtain than a New York divorce, but which might require some meddling with the truth; or, finally, they could settle for a legal separation.

The eighty-two New York City lawyers in O'Gorman's sample (collected for his Ph.D. dissertation) practice matrimonial law with varying degrees of intensity. Only eighteen specialize. The members of the sample are not a homogeneous group. They respond differentially to their clients and to the divorce laws which place lawyers in the unenviable position of being caught between the conflicting demands of the clients and the norms of their profession. How they handle their clients' matters depends not only on the degree to which they specialize in matrimonial work but also on their role orientations. These lawyers are separated into the problem-oriented, the people-oriented, and the money-oriented. And they are further divided into the counselors, that is, those who help the client make up his mind, and the advocates, that is, those who insist that the client make up his own mind.

What is most important about this book is that we finally have some concrete information about the client-lawyer relationship. For example, some information is reported about lawyers' incapacity (the degree of incapacity depending upon the type of lawyer) to deal with client emotionalism; their dislike for and often trained inability to deal with the female client; and the pressures in their practice which work for and against the norms supporting efforts toward reconciliation. Lack of information concerning professional-client relationships has plagued the occupational sociologist for some time, probably because of the confidential nature of these relationships.

Lawyers and Matrimonial Cases is a useful book, and except for the summary chapter,

is, as Robert Merton writes in the Foreword, "a . . . lively, lucid" one. It further illustrates the diversity among lawyers so that when this study is coupled with the works on the solo lawyer, the business lawyer, the criminal lawyer, the young lawyer, the Detroit lawyer, and so on, we not only come away with an awareness of how ignorant we were about lawyers, but more positively, have a more realistic picture about what lawyers do and what their importance is for the functioning of our society.

ERWIN O. SMIGEL

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Constituency Politics: A Study of Newcastle-under-Lyme. By FRANK BEALEY, J. BLONDEL, and W. P. MCCANN. London: Faber & Faber, 1965. Pp. 440. 63*s.*

This is an intensive study of political behavior in the borough and rural district which comprise the parliamentary constituency of Newcastle-under-Lyme. Working under the sponsorship of the Institute of Electoral Research, the authors have conducted an intensive study of the recent history of party politics in the constituency in relation to its economic and social characteristics, its political party history, and its voting behavior in local and national elections. An important source of data was an interview survey of randomly selected samples of one hundred respondents in each of the twenty-one wards of the constituency. Various socioeconomic indicators, including a social-class designation system adapted from census categories, were employed in the analysis.

The authors present an interesting, though relatively simple, analysis of economic, social, and political leadership, finding only a slight association between social and political leadership and "no connection between economic and political leadership." This paucity of association is contrasted with the situation of thirty or forty years ago, they indicate, pointing out the similarity of this finding with Dahl's in New Haven. Nevertheless, they conclude that "character and style of leadership" have a great influence on the flavor of constituency politics. They also find that political power is associated more closely with decision-makers in formal government positions than with the leadership of the constituency associations.

Generally, the conclusions of this study are rather bland and their theoretical importance is extremely modest, largely because the authors have confined themselves to an exhaustive study of the interrelation among a number of important, common-sense variables without attempting either to relate their material to a theoretically meaningfully framework or to use the data to refine conceptualizations and to test or suggest hypotheses. Thus, it is a gold mine for those interested in intensive description and matter-of-fact analysis, but prospectors for generalizable propositions or for creative theoretical insights had better stake their claims elsewhere.

ROLAND L. WARREN

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The Analysis of Organizations. By JOSEPH A. LITTERER. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. x+471.

The author of a textbook is faced with two contradictory demands on his work. On the one hand, his book should be comprehensive; it should deal with the most significant aspects of its subject matter. Thus, we might expect a text on formal organization to review major theories of bureaucratic structure as well as relevant research. But at the same time, a textbook must be thorough in its discussion of material presented, and so it is of necessity selective. The skill with which the author discriminates between the important and the peripheral determines the quality of his book.

As a text, *The Analysis of Organizations* is hampered by too much of the peripheral and too little of the important. Though the book draws its material from a large number of sources, the theories of March and Simon appear to be the most influential, almost to the exclusion of others. There is some discussion of the same psychological concepts on which March and Simon dwell (evoked set, programs of behavior, motivation to participate), and the book tends to focus on the behavior of individuals within organizations rather than on organizational structure as a whole. Weber's

theory is mentioned only in passing; Barnard is not cited at all.

The lack of theoretical depth in *The Analysis of Organizations* is in a sense balanced by (and perhaps is a result of) the diversity of subjects with which the book deals. Litterer begins with a discussion of motivation and perception and ends with a section on organizational change. In between, the reader is exposed to social stratification, small group research, communications, and managerial structure, among other things. Some of these topics are considered in a manner that is, if anything, too detailed. The chapter on communications, for instance, goes into problems of error, coding, and feedback, as well as the more familiar experiments with communications networks by Bavelas and Leavitt. The relevance of all this material to organizational structure and effectiveness is sometimes not made explicit but is instead brushed aside with statements such as, "Many factors already discussed in organizations influence one or more aspects of communications systems. These, in turn, are affected by the types of conditions facing an organization."

In sum, *The Analysis of Organizations* presents the manifold aspects of bureaucratic structures, but it does not wield them into a coherent whole. Thus it is not satisfactory as a sociological approach to organizations.

Marshall W. Meyer

University of Chicago

Social Class in American Protestantism. By N. J. Demerath III. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965. Pp. xxvi+228. (Paper.)

This study is an effort to answer the question: How does an American Protestant's socioeconomic status affect his religion? It is based on analysis of questionnaires collected from members of selected congregations in "strategically chosen urban areas" by the National Council of Churches of Christ in 1957. Demerath concentrated his analysis on the Lutheran segment but utilized data from four other denominations (Congregationalist, Presbyterian, Baptist, and Disciples of Christ) as checks on his major findings.

The focus of the study is the widely held belief that high-status Protestants are more religiously involved than are low-status Protestants. Demerath substitutes for church attendance a multidimensional conception of religiosity including churchlike and sectlike forms of commitment. Placing respondents on a scale of social status based on education, income, and occupation, he finds that churchlike commitment is more frequent among high-status parishioners than among low-status ones. Sectlike commitment, on the other hand, is just the reverse. The finding holds for all five denominations. A careful analysis of status discrepancy fails to support its relation to sectlike religiosity. The important contribution of the work is thus its reconceptualization of religious involvement and the assertion that different social groups may have different forms of involvement.

Despite the competent handling of secondary data and the excellent analysis of past literature, we are left with an empty feeling and with little knowledge of religiosity. The indicators of forms of commitment are not validated, and we do not know if they express the underlying orientations which the author posits. Church attendance membership in other organizations, and participation in parish activities are used to denote churchlike commitment. Close friends in the same congregation, church membership seen as an aid in several life areas, and disapproval of ministerial participation in community affairs are the signs of sectlike religiosity. Demerath views churchlike members as finding support for secular values in church and sectlike ones as finding an alternative to secular values in church. It is most problematic that these indicators point to such underlying orientations; that cannot be assumed.

The use of the church-sect distinction as equivalent to accommodation and conflict with non-religious institutions leads the author to an error the reverse of that he criticizes; he tends to see high-status churchlike religiosity solely as a prop to other values. Its "religiosity" is implicitly denied. The church-sect distinction used in this way also ignores the many instances of church involvement in social issues in American history, as in Sunday laws, the Social Gospel, and Prohibition—all efforts to Christianize a secular society. He ignores the frequent role of sects as adjuncts to secular values, as in the economic propensities of eighteenth-century Quakers and the support

given by North Carolina Pentecostalists to the labor movement. Such empirical realities demonstrate that these types hide important complexities.

The data are further defective in removing most of the presumed sectarians. Southern churches were not in the sample; the conservative synods of the Lutherans are absent; no sects are included; rural churches are exempt, and apparently Negroes do not constitute part of the sample. Most of the continuum lies outside the sample. While this is a careful and competent piece of work, the use of secondary analysis of survey research here is not adequate to the problem posed. Even a little field work in church and sect might have helped us to know what these forms of religiosity indicate about religious experience. It is no use studying a problem happening in the middle of the block by standing under the corner lamp post. The light may be better under the lamp post, but it does not shine on very much.

JOSEPH GUSFIELD

University of Illinois

The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada. By JOHN PORTER. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965. Pp. xxi+626. $15.00.

Everything about this book—except perhaps the price—is praiseworthy, from conception through execution to production. Subtitled "An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada," it finds its place in, and complements, a series: "Studies in the Structure of Power: Decision-Making in Canada."

The title is a clever turn on the Canadian contention that Canada's culture—whatever that is—is a mosaic in the sense of a set of juxtaposed, well-defined, presumably colorful pieces, presumably on the same horizontal plane. The same contention would be made in reference to society, the constitutent tiles being presumably ethnic, religious, or linguistic blocs. But it takes more than a clever turn to demonstrate that these "cultures" and "societies" do not lie on a pretty and pleasing plane, mapping a two-dimensional Canadian society, and self-evidently preferable to a "melting-pot," but that they lie, rather, and are meant to lie in an order of less and more, domination and subordination, power and impotence.

The carefully promoted flat image of Canadian society is not the only image that Porter destroys by counterposing it to well-documented reality. Another carefully nurtured myth has to do with an alleged resemblance to American society (or the image of American society?): substantially egalitarian, at a high plane of living, with a very widespread middle majority having access to a very rich standard package of goods, material and—more material!—immaterial. By the skilled analysis of income statistics, the author painstakingly sets forth the well-nigh incredible concentration of wealth in Canada and the even greater concentration of economic power in a handful of institutions, directored and profited from (in income, power, deference, and safety) by the merest coterie of mighty men.

These—the economic "elite"—are, of course, not the only power-holders; and their power is bounded and occasionally nibbled at by the elites of other structures. (There should be some objection, perhaps, to the use of the word "elite" to describe merely those who have the most of what there is to get and who want more, since in popular parlance, at least, it carries the ring of praise. It is strange, if we sociologists really mean the word neutrally, that we do not talk of the elite perverts, meaning the most perverted, or the elite of burglars, meaning the most burglarious.) But while power for any single elite is thus partially contained, as Porter points out, the elites interact so as to preserve, promote, and protect the interests of each of the others. Links of common schooling (common to them, that is, not public), kith and kin, like origin (from the "Anglo" charter group who, next after the Indians, got there the "fustest with the mostest"), club and church membership, all integrate into a tight weave—what might be called a general elite. In Porter's view, such an organization to "co-ordinate" the (underlying) structures is, at least for modern, industrial societies, the only alternative to co-ordination by ideology and party, as in, for example, the Soviet Union. (I am not sure that the social organization of Denmark, say, or Sweden fits either pattern.)

But even if "structure" has to be taken for granted, if the slope of the pyramid is unalterably steep, there is the question of the openness of the society, the recruitment of the "elites," so that at least life chances or tickets

on the pots, fabulous or miserable, be randomized with reference to birth and rationalized with reference to talent. In this respect, as in the others, Canada fares far worse than its "image"; what we have largely is a near-caste system in which ethnicity and religion profoundly affect access to the various troughs, and indeed, even to education, which functions, if anything does, as the solvent of hereditary privilege.

The least that can be asked under such circumstances is probably that the hereditary rulers in protecting their own interests necessarily protect the common or national interest. But this is—evidently from the Appendix material on the ownership of the largest firms—not the Canadian outcome. For most purposes one might almost place on the economy a sign "Canada-operated; U.S.-owned." If the elite were scattered, divided, and important, the result might be written off, as it is in the Canadian press, to "U.S. economic imperialism." But what has been sold (or sold out) has been sold by that same elite—who claimed always as the moral source of their legitimation, their patriotism, their desire to hold on the North American continent a second national interest incorporating a better way. What is it? Where is it? What have these men done with their undoubted dominion? These are the questions that Porter's excellent book inferentially raises. To be so (implicitly) probative and so politically and morally relevant is a rare virtue to appear in a socioeconomic political monograph.

John R. Seeley

Brandeis University

Delinquency and Drift. By David Matza. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. x+199. $4.50.

Current theory with respect to the delinquency of lower-class boys, exemplified by the work of Albert Cohen and of Cloward and Ohlin, seems to have produced a peculiar confusion as to what its proper problem of explication is. The stated purpose of the theories advanced by these writers is to eyplain not the concrete behavior of street boys but the sources and characteristics of the delinquent subculture. Cohen's work is particularly apt in this respect; and although they quarrel with Cohen with respect to the source of the problem to which the subculture is a response, Cloward and Ohlin are in essential agreement with him as to the social psychological process through which it emerges and is sustained. However, having offered an account of the origin of the delinquent subculture, they then incautiously attempt to infer the expectable characteristic types of delinquent behavior from the norms of the subculture. Ignored in this procedure is the now established view that normative prescription is not and cannot be mechanically followed in actual behavior. In their attempts to make subcultural theory predictive of the major forms, types, and styles of lower-class delinquency, they have at best succeeded in suggesting the empirical character of only the "carriers" of the subculture. In their attempts to delineate the followers, or the transient members of the subculture, they are forced to resort to *ad hoc* theorizing.

A second source of confusion in current delinquency theory is what may be called the "placement" of the delinquent subculture. The norms of a culture are properly regarded as a property of the group in which the culture exists. But the concept of the "subculture" raises novel problems. By definition, a subculture is a variant of the parent culture, its norms being only marginally differentiated from those of the latter. Consequently, however different the specific norms of a subculture may be from those of the parent culture, they take the latter as their point of reference. The openly oppositional subculture may be regarded as the extreme case of marginal differentiation, its norms being defined as the negative, or mirror image, of selected norms of the parent culture.

It is within the framework of these problems and issues that *Delinquency and Drift* makes an original and illuminating contribution, although the author's expository zeal places these issues at the periphery of his concern. To begin with, Matza forthrightly rejects the concept of the delinquent subculture in favor of a concept of subcultural delinquency. By this concept he seeks to denote the specific attitudes and modes of thought through which street boys in the context of peer-group association invoke the more widely diffused norms that countenance, justify, and excuse evasion of law in their efforts to cope with the problem of masculine adequacy. He regards the norms supportive of delinquency as

an unacknowledged attribute of the general culture but suggests that their control of behavior varies as a function of their situationally keyed utility. Thus, in his treatment of the problem of the "placement" of subcultural norms, Matza presents the essential feature of his perspective on delinquency—that the delinquent is bound to the parent culture by ties of shared norms over the range of the observance as well as the violation of law. On this basis he insists on the importance of seeing delinquency as infraction rather than as action. On this basis, too, he attends closely to the ways street boys distort and exploit established legal principles in extenuation of guilt and that place certain injurious acts within the domain of "private" wrongs, as well as extra-legal principles that justify the violation of unjust laws.

Since he rejects as invalid the concept of the delinquent subculture, Matza escapes the need to infer the principal types or styles of delinquency from the motivations engaged in subcultural innovation. Having freed the delinquent from the constraints of a delinquent subculture, he also necessarily denies that, except for a small number of pathological persons, the typical or "mundane" delinquent, as Matza calls him, is under compulsion to commit his delinquencies. Matza's reconstruction of the sequence of developments that produce the typical street boy's somewhat random pattern of intermittent delinquent escapades may be briefly summarized. Given a loosening of the "moral bind," the potential delinquent neutralizes the claim of law to legitimacy by distorting legal principles of extenuation, thus putting himself in a condition of drift with respect to crime. In a condition of drift the person is confronted with a novel situation of choice: he may choose between the alternatives of engaging or not engaging in delinquency, alternatives that in effect do not exist for those whose ties to the moral rules are unrelaxed. Choices actually made them become largely contingent on the response to demands of the adolescent peer group for demonstrations of valid claims to membership, demands which are somewhat accentuated in the lower class. Such claims are best advanced by exhibitions of masculine adulthood. The latter, in turn, are most convincingly mounted through the delinquent escapade which, as an attack on adult authority that usually invites countermeasures, constitutes an act of control over the social environment, the hallmark of masculine competence.

In according an important place to the factor of choice, this account parallels the theory of crime underlying the legal viewpoint, a theory that is almost reflexively discredited in modern social science circles. The similarity is more than likely to put off readers who might otherwise be inclined to acknowledge the cogency of Matza's views, which have little in common with a punitive spirit. It is this reviewer's opinion, however, that in spite of Matza's somewhat intemperate (if entertaining) attack on such current apostles of positivism as psychiatrists and social workers, he succeeds in making a wholly valid point. It is after all inaccurate and misleading to represent the person, whether given to delinquency or not, as acting blindly and automatically in response to forces that impinge on him. However constrained by the imperatives of his situation, the person, whether given to delinquency or not, action of which he is aware. The course he follows also constitutes an act of choice, decision, or will. Insofar as the functionaries of our social courts deny the operation of this kind of qualified voluntarism, they invite the delinquent to view himself as object. As subject he is then bound to exploit whatever in this perspective is advantageous to him as a delinquent.

Indeed, some of the most rewarding passages in *Delinquency and Drift* are to be found in Matza's incisive and ironic extrapolations of the implicit rhetoric of positivism. However, his failure to separate the rhetorical aspects of positivism from its substantive logic has led him to attribute to the latter some of the excesses of the former. Thus, he indorses the dubious and justly neglected distinction between "hard" and "soft" determinism, a distinction similar to that between a mild and a severe case of pregnancy. Nonetheless, his basic point is well taken: when positivists as functionaries of the control institutions fail to treat the violator as a member and, therefore, an agent of the moral order, they succeed only in fostering his exclusion from that order. At the same time, Matza's polemical assault on the view of the delinquent as the protagonist of those whom life has treated unjustly, and his proper insistence that he is also and simultaneously an antagonist, is mildly suggestive of a current conservative perspective that re-

gards the procedural aspects of the criminal law as having too tender a regard for the rights of the accused.

Whatever his view of this matter may be, Matza demonstrates intellectual honesty and courage as well as a rare order of originality in laying bare the linkages among delinquency theory, the characteristics of the legal norms, and the character of practice in our control institutions. By the same token, his own theory gains enormously in power and scope by its attention to the structure and dynamics of the legal norms which form the defining context of delinquent activity. After *Delinquency and Drift*, it will hardly be possible for delinquency theory to treat its problems outside the context of the sociology of law.

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Values and Organizations: A Study of Fraternities and Sororities. By WILLIAM A. SCOTT. With the collaboration of RUTH SCOTT. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965. Pp. v+290. $5.00.

Values and Organizations obscures rather than illuminates important conceptual and theoretical questions as well as its own empirical data. It inflates its true research problem, especially in the first chapters, and misleads the reader into expectations that are not fulfilled. Its interpretative argument is blinded by a naïve functionalism which yields (if at all) only with utmost regret and circumspection to the author's own empirical findings. Its analysis is essentially a series of unimaginative zero-order correlations, and its style bestows unbecoming pomp on self-evident understatements, for example, "To remain dispassionately objective, even when assessing one's own values, is a feat of which few mortals are capable"; and "'cause and effect' is essentially a human formulation."

William A. Scott's book purports to examine the relationships of twelve questionnaire-assessed attitudes to five organizational processes and four sociometric ratings among fraternity and sorority members at the University of Colorado. The attitudes were evaluations of the following personal traits: intellectualism, kindness, social skills, loyalty, academic achievement, physical development, status, honesty, religiousness, self-control, creativity, and independence. The organizational processes were: recruitment, status differentiation, maintenance of member allegiance, attrition, and socialization. The sociometric dimensions in which every member of a fraternity or sorority rated every other member were: studiousness, contribution to house activities, social skills, and friendship.

The basic samples consisted of a random cross-section of the university student body ($N = 218$) which provided criterion measures on the twelve attitudes, and samples of members of six campus fraternities and four sororities which were compared with the cross-section. Two observations were made on the latter samples: in November, 1957 ($N = 760$), and again in November, 1958 ($N = 702$).

Not until the very last chapter does the author state the seventeen propositions his study is purported to test, and for this reason as well as others to be discussed, it is extremely difficult to say what this study is really about. The author's final and presumably summary statement, however, indicates at least what he thinks his effort has been: "For the present, we may conclude that, given a selected definition of functionally relevant processes . . . the chief function of campus social organizations would appear to be the maintenance of friendly, interpersonal relationships, for this is the kind of value that enters most prominently into these processes" (p. 243). It thus appears that the author had naïvely hoped, by showing positive associations between friendship-related member attitudes and organizational processes in a single type of organization, to establish that the chief function of this type of organization is friendship. The true requirements of such an objective are obviously far more complex than Scott seems to have realized, and so it appears that the research was out-of-hand from the moment its problem was formulated.

One of two central pivots of the study is, of course, its definition of values. Scott offers the following: "A person may be said to entertain a value to the extent that he conceives a particular state of affairs as an ultimate end, an absolute good under all circumstances, and a universal 'ought' toward which all people should strive" (p. 15). There are many things objectionable about this definition (including

the opportunity it gives extremists to claim that they are the only ones who have values), but a few analytic blind alleys into which it leads may be pointed out briefly. The restriction that a value must be considered an absolute good under all circumstances confounds two quite different ways of assessing values. In the first, the comparison is with other values, and in the second, the comparison is with the circumstances in which the value is found. To insist that a value must be absolute vis-à-vis other values nullifies the value-hierarchy idea and makes more difficult the solution to value-choice and value-conflict problems. It should be clear that if all values must be absolutely good, whenever a person entertains more than one value, irreconcilable value conflict necessarily follows. Scott recognizes this difficulty, by implication, and wishes to substitute degree of relevance for degree of cathexis of a value, but this seems to be merely sleight-of-hand and does not solve the analytical difficulties posed by any concept involving "absolutes."

The effect of the "under all circumstances" stipulation is to insist that only extremist dogma can be a value. As a result, we run head-on into the remarkable statement that "for an American capitalist, for example, individual freedom is an absolute good, and revolutionary violence is an absolute bad" (p. 67). Scott does not seem ever to have read a newspaper, let alone any American history.

The author further insists that a value be held as a "universal 'ought' toward which all people should strive." Clearly, this denies the possibility of a social division of values corresponding to the division of labor. Therefore, it eliminates the possibility that those who strive to publish books could believe others should strive to read them.

One research consequence of the author's absolutistic definition of "value" is reflected in the question asked of students: "What is it about any person that makes him especially good?" There were no probes regarding the type of situation or kind of person which the respondent had in mind, but such circumstantial features are almost certain to have determined the reply. For example, it is very good to men for a given woman to be physically attractive; but it is often an evil to other women that she should be so.

Scott, however, is not even true to his own definition and exhibits peculiar ideas about the sorts of things values can pertain to: "It has been said that morality cannot be found among thieves and prostitutes. This is far from the case, if the present conception of morality be accepted. But the place where one is less likely to find morality is among politicians, whose central concern is with maintaining power through gratification of relevant interests, rather than with judging the legitimacy of those interests" (p. 70). Among other things, it is a relative mystery to this reviewer why the maintenance of power does not qualify as a value by Scott's definition, especially if "a value is . . . identified, not by its content (i.e., the state of affairs which is regarded as ideal), but by the attitude of the person toward it" (p. 214). Similarly, it remains obscure why Scott describes as "non-evaluative" reasons for acting precisely the forms in which such abstractions as friendship, pleasure, and self-preservation appear to the actor in his life situation.

Turning to the author's discussion of organization theory, it becomes important to note that Scott is a psychologist and that his emphasis on an organization's function for its individual members manifests a psychologistic, as opposed to sociologistic, bias in the analysis of social structures. Had the author chosen to emphasize the functioning of organizations in their external environment, his entire analysis would have been radically different.

One far-reaching consequence of Scott's assumption of friendship as the chief function of fraternities and sororities is revealed in a chain of reasoning whereby the extent of a member's friendships is arrived at as the relevant measure of his status, but only in this particular kind of organization. "In some other type of organization with a different central function, the appropriate measure of status may be quite different. For instance, in a business enterprise oriented toward the production of goods or services for some external social system, a more useful measure might be obtained from sociometric ratings of the degree of relevant expertise possessed by each member" (p. 119). Scott then argues that "status differentiation [sustains] the social system, since it orients the membership toward collective goals by rewarding those who contribute most to them" (p. 149). By

such degrees, the author seduces himself into an overwhelming circularity: (1) the principal dimension of members' status can be logically deduced from the organization's principal function; (2) the organization's principal function can be logically deduced from its principal dimension of member status. As a result, we find Scott resting his case largely on the finding that the correlations between friendship rating received and (*a*) rated ability to get along with other people was .93; (*b*) rated contribution to house activities was .63; (*c*) rated studiousness was .25. "So it may be inferred that manifestations of social skills are more important in determining status than are manifestations of group loyalty, and that both are more important than an orientation toward academic achievement. This ordering of correlates accords reasonably well with our assumptions concerning the relative importance of these three traits to the functioning of Greek organizations" (pp. 231–32).

This reviewer is hard-pressed to imagine any organization in which rated social achievement would not be highly correlated with rated social ability, regardless of the organization's "function." It is equally difficult to imagine that friendship rating would not correlate least with rating on an activity intrinsically involving least social interaction, and moderately with rating on activities involving moderate degrees of social interaction. In short, it is only Scott's conclusions, not at all his findings, which are amazing.

When we come to examine what the author calls "values" throughout five chapters of data analysis, we are forced to conclude that these attitudes emphatically do not meet the criteria he himself established for values in the first two chapters. It is unfortunate (to say the least) that we are never told exactly what proportion of respondents did view a given trait as a value according to the author's definition. But it is evident that some very large proportion did not. It seems, therefore, that it is *not* justified to refer to these attitudes as values, under the definition given.

A technical criticism of the way in which the data are handled is in order: Throughout the analysis, Scott unhesitatingly applies to exclusively ordinal data statistics and statistical tests of significance which are appropriate only to interval and ratio scale data (e.g., arithmetic mean, geometric mean, variance, standard score, product-moment correlation, *F*-test, etc.). This practice not only tends to misrepresent the level of the researcher's field measurement, but produces an unknown direction and degree of distortion in each table and in every conclusion presented. More important than technical matters, however, is the fact that with the exception of the sociometric analysis (which I found interesting and instructive, despite the scale incongruity of data and statistic), Scott's is an unimaginative analysis. I was able to find only one table in which an attitude was an intervening variable, none where sociometric status intervened, and only a few of higher than zero order.

With all this, however, unexpected empirical findings (i.e., strong value-selection effects, but no value-socialization effects, among new Greek-letter members) do entice the author to put forward one interesting idea: "New members are selected so as to reaffirm certain group relevant values which the old members no longer espouse so strongly" (p. 220). Although this is stated as though it were a finding, it is actually a hypothesis based upon findings; the clear implication is that an organization's members believe that some values are appropriate to certain members, while other values are appropriate to others. Of course, this casts unacknowledged question on Scott's insistence on the "universal" nature of values, but more important than that, the idea suggests that a systematic phenomenology of old members' perceptions of their social organization and of the kinds of attitudes and behaviors they think, at different stages of their own careers, are appropriate to new members should prove useful in the search for determinants of organizational change and stability.

WALTER L. WALLACE
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American Learned Societies. By JOSEPH C. KIGER. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963. Pp. 291. $6.00.

This is an important book for those interested in the history and sociology of science. It describes the major architecture of America's higher learning from the point of view

of its associations and societies—a useful corrective to the all too frequent telling of the story in terms of great men and great universities.

Kiger's brief sketches of the origins, structure, organization, and vital statistics of sixty "learned" societies are peculiarly evocative. Consider, for example, the following genealogy for its bearing on the processes by which various disciplines break up and recombine into new specialties:

> The American Historical Association was an offshoot of the American Social Science Association and came into being under its auspices at [its] 1884 Annual Meeting . . . at Saratoga, New York [p. 37].
>
> The American Social Science Association and the American Historical Association were involved in the creation of the American Economic Association. At the second meeting of the American Historical Association again in Saratoga, New York, held with the American Social Science Association, a group of young historians and allied specialists proceeded to organize the American Economic Association [p. 39].
>
> [The American Political Science Association] was the outgrowth of a 1902 movement for a national society to deal with comparative legislation. In 1903 at New Orleans, where members of the American Historical Association and the American Economic Association had gathered for a joint meeting, developing sentiment for a new organization with a much wider range of interest in political science resulted in the formation of the American Political Science Association [p. 48].
>
> The American Sociological Society was formed at the December, 1905, joint meetings of the American Historical, Economic and Political Science Associations which were being held in Baltimore, Maryland [p. 51].

There are only a few tantalizing footnotes describing the American Social Science Association (1865–1912), which spun off more than a half dozen reform, scholarly, and professional associations. This very success "was its own undoing. It has emasculated itself to such an extent that in 1912 it went out of existence" (p. 235). Surely this episode deserves more intensive study.

The book is a rich if somewhat loosely organized mine of such intriguing facts. Following the terse but fully packed descriptions of the sixty societies, there is an equally crisp chapter on the supra-associational councils and institutes (e.g., American Council of Learned Societies or the American Association for the Advancement of Science). This is followed by chapters discussing the relationship of the learned societies to philanthropic foundations (chap. iv) and to government, industry, and universities (chap. v). The international relations of the societies are covered in chapter vi, and chapter vii provides a thoughtful discussion of the problems and prospects for organized knowledge production.

Though descriptive rather than analytical in intent, the book invites such questions as: why do some fields splinter off into separate associations and others proceed to consolidate into larger federation-type associations? What is the relation between the associational structure of a field and its communication patterns —why should psychology have developed over forty professional journals while political science (with slightly less than half the membership) developed only one or two?

Inevitably, there are quarrels with the definition of a "learned" society. These boundary disputes, however, identify important theoretical issues. One involves the complexities of scholarly versus professional organization; the structural embodiment of pure versus applied work. Kiger quite reasonably excludes professional societies from his definition. He would indeed be overwhelmed by the myriad number of legal, medical, educational, engineering, and other professional societies. Yet why is the American Institute of Nutrition, to pick but one borderline case, included? Though founded by the more academic life sciences and allied with them, the Institute is only one of at least fifteen other national associations dealing with nutrition.

A second basic issue is the institutional setting of the "learned" activity. The university is the home base for most of the fields. This means that recruitment and instruction of new members is more the function of the school than of the learned society. But what about the American Numismatic Society (founded in 1958; about 1,000 members) which Kiger includes? Is there any college or university that offers courses to further the Society's aim of "the collection and preservation of coins and medals, with an investigation into their history and other subjects connected therewith" (p. 28)? It is again puzzling why the American Numismatic Association (founded in 1891; 25,000 members) was not selected and even more peculiar that

none of the more than twenty national philatelic associations was included. The problem turns on another connotation of the word "professional," here in opposition to the amateur.

All in all, the raw descriptions, tabular material and appendixes, twenty-nine pages of reference notes, and a sixteen-page bibliography make this an invaluable reference compendium for those working in organizational analysis, American history, the history of science, or the sociology of knowledge.

PHILIP H. ENNIS

University of Chicago

The Dynamics of a Changing Technology: A Case Study in Textile Manufacturing. By PETER J. FENSHAM and DOUGLAS HOOPER. With a Foreword by O. L. ZANGWILL. New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Pp. xvi+248. $7.00.

This case study examines social readjustments in an English weaving mill when automatic looms and continuous product flow were introduced. The authors also studied a mill which had successfully assimilated such a change. Their discussions of the two mills are mainly separate, with little systematic comparison, and the chief interest is in the mill that was modernizing during their two years of field work. The theoretical focuses are on ways in which values and beliefs condition the adaptation of social organization to technical change, and on problems of communication and co-ordination arising from growing organizational complexity.

The new technology enlarged the role sets of individuals and increased the interdependence of departments, demanding close co-ordination where there had been considerable autonomy. Some of the autonomy died hard. The new looms required less manual skill than the old, diminishing the traditional basis of weavers' satisfaction. Instead, more mental activity was needed to keep track of more machines and discover malfunctions. Some weavers adjusted slowly to these changes, not because of emotional opposition to them but because management underestimated their significance and provided no instruction or incentives to induce new orientations.

The authors' main theoretical contribution is their re-examination of two concepts. They show that what looks like "resistance to change" may be simply failure to understand what behavior the new situation demands. They resolve contradictory previous findings on the relation of "work group cohesion" to morale and productivity by distinguishing the "peer group" of those with similar status and we-feeling from the "work group" of those who are functionally interdependent. Their findings suggest that work-group cohesion helps productivity, whereas peer-group cohesion may not, though it helps morale.

Apart from these valuable insights, the analysis illuminates the particular case more than it aims at cumulative generalizations. Most of the general propositions are platitudinous and not new to sociologists. The descriptive data are, however, unusually rich, sometimes to the point where readers may feel deluged with facts. The analysis is penetrating, though not always as systematically placed in the context of organizational literature as it might have been.

RICHARD L. SIMPSON

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. By AUSTIN RANNEY. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965. Pp. xiv+298. $6.50.

Although there has been much theorizing about recruitment to political roles, studies of the process of selecting candidates for national office are rare. The potential for such studies, however, is much greater in the United States than in Great Britain, where politicians are frequently reluctant to talk about internal party behavior.

Given the inherent drawbacks of such a situation, Austin Ranney has written a well-organized study of the kinds of people that the major parties in Britain (Conservative, Labour, and Liberal) have nominated for Parliament since 1951 and some of the forces that shape the selection process. In addition to secondary anecdotal material and some interviews with party "knowledgeables," Ranney has had to rely on an analysis of such characteristics of the nominees as age, occupation, education, and ties to the constituency.

A major portion of the book is devoted to a sophisticated effort relating candidate characteristics to the "winnability" of constituencies (based on voting behavior from 1951 to 1964) and to interconstituency movements.

A more interesting problem arises, however, from Ranney's thesis that the British system deviates considerably from the classic model of "responsible" party government because constituency parties tend to dominate the selection process, despite formal powers which would allow the national party organizations to intervene regularly in the selection of candidates for Parliament. Labour has acted more vigorously than the Conservatives in the matter of intervention, partly because right-wing leadership in that party has been challenged regularly for control by left-wing militants; normally the pressures of time, organizational size, and localistic traditions hamper central involvement.

Ranney, however, has tended to blur the differences between local selection and responsibility. Thus, one encounters a sentence like the following: "Despite the absence of a local residence rule and the presumed centralization of British politics, almost a third of the Conservatives' candidatures by non-incumbents and over a quarter of Labour's have gone to persons with personal connection in the constituencies for which they were adopted" (p. 277). While it is difficult to know what a proper distribution *should* look like, it does not seem from Ranney's figures that the parties are overwhelmed by "locals." Indeed, Ranney finds that among Conservatives the safest seats are likely to go to persons without local ties, although numerical differences are small.

Furthermore, the significance of local selection for the political system is not meaningfully discussed by the author. Perhaps the English system has achieved a functional balance in the matter: the national party organization does not press its own candidates upon the local party, although it may offer lists of suitable persons for possible local adoption; the chore of sifting the many names, particularly in a "winnable" constituency, and battling over personalities is left to the local organizations. Once the candidate has been chosen and elected, however, he is expected to be loyal to the national party leadership. (Few candidates have personal strength of their own; independents seldom have a chance to win in the British system.) In the case of the Conservatives, there is a fierce loyalty by constituency parties to the party leader; this picture is clouded in the Labour party because of ideological wings, but in both parties instances of defection by local units are rare.

For the most part, however, Ranney has left to others, like Leon Epstein, the study of the impact of the selection process upon the formulation of party policy, although this is precisely the area where the question of responsibility and constituency support might arise.

The weaknesses of this book point up some limitations of behavioral research in politics. To know, for example, that "a majority of candidates make their first races under the age of forty, and were less likely to get winnable seats than candidates over forty with previous experience," is at best a starting point. Given the nature of the British system, however, it is difficult to blame Ranney for not having taken us further.

Donald B. Rosenthal

State University of New York, Buffalo

Arab Border-Villages in Israel: A Study of Continuity and Change in Social Organization. By Abner Cohen. New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Pp. xiv+194. $6.00.

The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 profoundly changed the political organization of the Arab villages within the state. In this monograph, a social anthropologist examines some of the changes in the villages of the Triangle, the strategically important area near the border of Jordan. He uses what Max Gluckman calls the extended-case method, "the detailed study of chains of events involving the same individuals and groups in different social situations and at successive points in time within the same village community."

The changes Abner Cohen focuses on have to do with the *hamula* (a named, partly endogamous, patrilineal descent group). In the early nineteenth century it had been the chief unit within the village for economic and political purposes, but during the British Mandate

it had disintegrated as cleavages developed along the lines of economic class and as local loyalties were submerged in Arab nationalism. Ten years after the end of the Mandate period, however, the *hamula* was again a politically effective group. It had flourished in an egalitarian society and declined in a stratified one; now it was revived in a new egalitarian society, as a result of material prosperity, increasing absorption into the Israeli economy, and isolation of Triangle villages from old neighboring villages and from Arab national organizations.

In the village Cohen chooses for study, four incidents which occurred in the 1950's dramatized the changes in political organization: a dispute over the organization of the local Labor Exchange Office, an accidental death which was interpreted as a homicide, a marriage preceded by complicated maneuvers and bitter disputes, and the establishment of a village council. The author shows how each involved a jockeying for position among *hamulas* and a weakening of the *hamula* which had dominated the village during the Mandate period. He then discusses more generally the nature of the revivified *hamula*, its contribution to the unity of the Arab village under border conditions, and the role it played in the general election in Israel in 1959.

Cohen has not fleshed his subjects fully, or indulged in vivid phrases, as they themselves do when, for example, they describe the time immediately after an act of violence as "a period of the boiling of blood." Perhaps the sensitivity of the situation he examines makes him cautious. But his exposition is admirably clear, cool, and convincing.

JEAN BURNET

University of Toronto

Small Social Groups in England: A Real Life Study. By MARGARET PHILIPS. With a sociologist's footnote by BRYAN WILSON. London: Methuen & Co., 1965. Pp. 318. 25*s.*

The purpose of this book is to provide laymen with a picture of how groups function and vary in structure in real-life British settings as opposed to sterile research laboratories. The research was begun in 1940 and seems to have been carried on intermittently over a twenty-year period. An open questionnaire was circulated asking respondents (usually friends and colleague psychologists) to describe the following aspects of group life: place of meeting, personnel, history, organization, activities, conventions and codes, and relation of individual members to each other and to the larger society. About 215 descriptive records were obtained on different kinds of groups: student, religious, nursing, teaching, professional, village, neighborhood, recreational, leisure, etc.

The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses upon internal structure of groups, and Part 2 describes how the larger social context affects and is affected by small social groups. The former deals primarily with group emergence and development, stressing factors which contribute to cohesion and disruption such as "common needs of members [are] strong, stable personalities predominate, common needs produce common purposes and common action . . . successful common action produces group narcissism" (p. 60).

A chapter on the physical setting of groups concludes with four rather obvious hypotheses acknowledging material factors, for example, "the layout of the available space, by facilitating some types of activity and discouraging others, affect the quality of the group life developed," but "nevertheless, a sufficient urge to a particular form of group life may mould material conditions to its own purposes" (p. 69).

Attempting to use the Parsons-Bales instrumental and expressive aspects of group life (with Freudian father- and mother-figures as leaders), Phillips draws parallels between the family and the group. The role of leadership is depicted as contributing to planning and co-ordination, task skills, group codes and values, and group maintenance.

Part 2 of this book concerns environment, organization, and groups; essentially, this involves descriptions of large groups (villages, Christian communities, schools, hospitals, etc.). A few of the principles stated earlier in the book are utilized for descriptive purposes. There are frequent references to Freudian groups in which a central figure plays a major role in these collectivities. The main point seems to be that more attention should be paid to the emotional needs of the participants of large groups. The concluding chapter by Bryan Wilson succinctly presents the argument

for studying small groups in their natural settings, and comments on the neglect of this topic in England.

It is most regrettable for this reviewer to conclude, after carefully examining Phillips' book, that research conducted over a twenty-year period produced such a low yield. Even though the author is very modest in her claims regarding the book's potential contribution to science, the blatant fact remains that random observations unsystematically linked are not very helpful to either scientist or layman.

Many of the concepts used are vague and unoperational in their original formulation; Phillips' reworking of them contributes little to their clarification. For example, concerning the mother- and father-figures as leaders, how helpful are the following? "It is clear here that the writer [respondent], though officially a father, is by temperament and as regards the functions she performs, equally a 'mother.' . . . The maternal possessiveness of which we get a glimpse here recurs . . . where a mother-figure . . . is in competition with a female father-figure, possibly also a mother by temperament, for the children's allegiance" (p. 103). I am all for sexual continua, but this conception of bisexuality as leadership leaves me cold (frigid).

Phillips' book displays an abysmal neglect (a word I prefer to ignorance) of the small-group literature. Even granting her questionable belief that little work has been done in England outside of laboratories, there still remains the American data and theory to which one can relate observations and findings. (In England, has work not been done by the Tavistock Institute, Mogey, Collison, and Burns in the small-group area?) It is interesting that the only American studies noted in her book are based primarily on laboratory work. The names of researchers at the Harvard Business School, Survey Research Center, and such individuals as Shils, Blau, Katz, and Lazarsfeld, etc., are conspicuously absent.

In Wilson's chapter he says this book is "a fund of information about the texture of human relations" even if it "does not admit the rigour of the laboratory precision." One does not need the polar extreme of laboratory rigor as an alternative to richness in detail in natural settings. There are many examples in the literature of books which have combined systematic presentation with in-depth feeling for the actors. In short, this book will have little value for American audiences. I have trouble believing that the state of the craft in England warrants this low level of output.

PHILIP M. MARCUS

University of Michigan

Professional Employees: A Study of Scientists and Engineers. By KENNETH PRANDY. London: Faber & Faber, 1965. Pp. 197. *32s. 6d.* net.

This is a modest, well-planned monograph with the twin intentions of contributing to the theory of stratification and to the sociology of science. Prandy has clearly achieved success in his latter intention by providing us with interesting and important findings on how scientists handle the fact of employment in research organizations as regards controlling their work conditions and careers. For American sociologists, his data will be useful for comparative analysis with our own data on organizational work problems and careers of scientists.

Briefly, his general findings are the following: Many scientists and engineers are employed in positions in which they either share directly in the exercise of authority or in which their work gives them the feeling of being close to management. They therefore accept the employers' "status" ideology (social stratification) that they are a part of a graded social hierarchy. This has its concrete expression in the fact that these scientists join professional associations which support management.

Of those who do not share the exercise of authority, some will experience work conditions which emphasize the fact of their subordination. These individuals are likely to have attitudes that are more of a class type (economic stratification). Some elements of class attitudes are found within the professional associations. However, the more these work conditions of subordination configurate, the stronger class attitudes become. Eventually, the strength of class attitudes leads to a recognition of conflict of interest with the employer, an acceptance of collective bargaining, and membership in a trade union (scientists are usually a small proportion of union member-

ship) as a way of dealing with management. This step is crucial as far as behavior is concerned, but it does not involve a complete repudiation of "status" ideology. The class viewpoint is largely restricted to coping with the subordinating employment situation which requires collective bargaining to gain some control over work, salaries, and prestige. Otherwise, attitudes of "status" remain which may, in turn, restrict trade-union activities—such as the effect of scientists feeling that their union should not engage in politics.

Prandy's analysis of scientists and engineers yields excellent data and generalities on the configurating structural conditions which tend to force them to join trade unions for collective-bargaining purposes and to evolve ways of handling the conflict of being professionals in unions. Indeed, his use of a configurating-conditions model of analysis is worthy of study by sociologists. However, I felt doubts as to the relevance of Weber's "class" and "status" categories *as* categories for the analysis of professional employees. These categories do not seem to emerge in the data but, rather, are imposed on it as existing theory which ought to be applicable. Their relevance is implicitly assumed. Unless relevance is shown in some way we cannot tell if they indeed help us analyze professional employees. All we can say is that the data on professional employees provide some information on class-status theory, which, if Prandy then wishes to contribute to stratification theory, requires an analysis of this theory, not professional employees. However, Prandy does not provide this theoretical analysis; his focus, rather, is only on professional employees, using these categories of "class" and "status." Thus, Prandy did not follow through on his intention of adding to the theory of stratification and did restrain the potential richness of his contribution to the sociology of science. We need to know much more about the *bargaining* of scientists, at all levels of the research-organization hierarchy, with management. I am sure Prandy could have told us much more on this subject if he did not constantly feel constrained to mold his thought in a "class" and "status" rhetoric, and then feel that this effort was the accomplishment of his work.

BARNEY G. GLASER

University of California Medical Center

Awareness of Dying. By BARNEY G. GLASER and ANSELM L. STRAUSS. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xi+305. $6.95.

The context in which death and dying are experienced in the United States is undergoing a significant change. This can be seen, for instance, in the selection of the place where people go or are taken to die. Last year considerably more than half of the approximately two million persons who died in this country did so in hospitals or nursing homes. Moreover, with the prospect of Medicare, more sophisticated medical technology, and the progressive segregation of the aged from their families, the number of persons who will go to medical establishments eventually to die can be expected to increase.

But modern, secular medicine is in great part caught up in our contemporary existential condition and, ironically, with a growing hospital population of chronically infirm and dying patients, finds itself increasingly unable to confront death. Recent observers have reported that physicians oftentimes have greater difficulty in dealing with the dying of their patients than the patients themselves, and avoid them as a result. Moreover this burgeoning shift from home to hospital as a place to die has caught hospital staffs woefully untrained and ill-equipped to cope with the psychological needs and social requirements of their dying charges. Like the families who abandon their dying members, hospitals try to cope with a threatened death by euphemisms (that is, the patient is "terminal" or has gone "bad"), by isolating him, or by blanket denial.

Awareness of Dying is an attempt to take cognizance of this development in our American hospitals, and in doing so the authors, who studied intensively six hospitals in the San Francisco Bay area, hope to contribute to a more rational and compassionate treatment of our dying citizens. Their book is certainly a most welcome and important contribution to the development of such treatment and should be required reading for all medical personnel concerned with this aspect of medical service.

This book offers considerably more, however, than simply a study of the interaction between hospital staffs and patients; it offers, in addition, a theoretical scheme for the analysis of such interaction. Called "awareness context," the term, simply stated, refers to who, in the interacting situation knows what about the

patient's life chances. It is Glaser and Strauss's contention that, depending on who knows what during the process of hospitalized dying, many seemingly disconnected events can be organized into discernible patterns of behavior, and explicit knowledge of these behavioral patterns can enhance the quality and effectiveness of the care given the dying patient. This reviewer believes their scheme has much merit, for never before has he read such a clear, explicit, and insightful account of this multifaceted problem. It now remains to be seen whether the medical profession can learn and benefit from this analysis of one phase of their art by two "outsiders." Certainly the application of the "awareness context" theory to other substantive areas of social research only awaits the sociologist's imagination, and, to this end, *Awareness of Dying* is recommended to him as well.

If a minor criticism may be permitted, the reader found certain of the chapters repetitive.

ROBERT FULTON

California State College at Los Angeles

Death, Grief and Mourning. By GEOFFREY GORER. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965. Pp. xxxiv+205. $4.50.

This book reports the findings of a survey conducted in Britain concerning the reactions and adjustment of survivors to a death in the family. The study was based upon interviews solicited from 359 recently bereaved individuals chosen from a preselected sample of 1,628 persons representing every social class and region of the country. Of the group of 359 survivors interviewed, eighty were reinterviewed personally and at greater length by the author, and it is their replies that make up the major share of the quotes and citations found in the book.

It is Gorer's conclusion that in contemporary Britain there is both an individual repudiation and a social denial of grief and mourning—a repudiation and a denial which leaves the survivor grievously alone and ill-equipped to cope with the myriad of personal and social difficulties that are attendant upon a death.

Like the divorced person of several decades ago, ostracized and neglected, the bereaved individual today, Gorer reports, is to a large extent without traditional religious resources or community support and, often, moreover, lacks the skills necessary to deal adequately with his loss.

The personal consequence of this development, Gorer finds, is the appearance of a considerable amount of maladaptive response to death ranging from "meaningless busyness" to "private rituals of mummification" to "the apathy of despair." On the more public level, he hypothesizes a link between the stigmatization of grief and public callousness. Moreover, the refusal or inability to mourn, he believes, may result in adolescent vandalism.

It is his contention that the present preoccupation with death and cruelty, coupled as it is with an excessive squeamishness concerning it, displays the modern irrational attitude toward this inevitable event. Such an attitude toward death makes of it, Gorer argues, something obscene or pornographic and ultimately invites the maladaptive and neurotic behavior observed in his study.

Gorer concludes that new secular customs and social techniques will have to be developed to reach those whom death has touched but for whom there is no longer an adequate social response.

The limitations of this book, and there are several, have to be balanced against its virtues. On the debit side, for instance, there is an apparent lack of acquaintance with recent experimental research in America concerning bereavement and separation, a paucity of information regarding the sample and the sampling techniques employed in the study, a too-meager bibliography, and no index.

On the credit side, however, is the achievement of successfully overcoming the many obstacles inherent in research of such a delicate nature as this. While the study has to be seen as a pilot effort, the clues provided by this research and the fertile intuition of the author more than compensate for the deficiencies briefly noted.

Not to be missed is Gorer's autobiographical statement which must be read by every intellectual who has convinced himself that he has the question of death safely settled. He may discover, as Paul Goodman suggests in his article, "On the Intellectual Inhibition of Explosive Grief and Anger," that what appears as mastery of a situation may,

closer view, turn out to be mere abdication of it.

The book also offers a brief résumé of the theories of grief as expounded by Freud, Klein, Bowlby, and others. In addition, it includes the author's well-known and often reprinted article, "The Pornography of Death."

It is the opinion of this writer that we are all indebted to Gorer not only for his research efforts in this taboo area of death but also for his insights into our modern secular condition.

ROBERT FULTON

California State College at Los Angeles

The Market for College Teachers: An Economic Analysis of Career Patterns among Southeastern Social Scientists. By DAVID G. BROWN. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965. Pp. xv+301. $7.50.

This book represents the results of an empirical study of the (or an) academic labor market by a labor economist written "primarily" *for* labor economists. Based on interviews with 103 newly arrived faculty members and fifty department chairmen in economics, history, and sociology in the eighteen largest institutions in the southeastern portion of the United States, it represents, in essence, the first large-scale study known to this reviewer of what might be called the academic labor market of "minor league" (as opposed to "major league" and "bush league") institutions.

The stated purpose of the book is to "develop an understanding of the economic and institutional factors bearing upon the distribution of one of the most scarce species of professional manpower . . . (the professor)." This purpose is attacked through the attempt to answer with interview data the following five questions: (1) What are the channels of communication in academic labor markets? (2) What are the characteristics of the supply of college professors? (3) What is the nature of the demand for college faculty? (4) What are the sources of imperfection in labor markets? (5) Do the observed imperfections cause a misallocation of teaching manpower? The answers to these questions are found in chapters dealing with the nature and extent of the actual scarcity of professorial labor, the nature and extent of actual demand for such labor (which is not the equivalent of scarcity at all), the supply of faculty for both, the ways in which demand meets supply in the event, and the various perspectives and techniques through and by which departments evaluate potential labor and labor evaluates potential employer. It is an honest, direct, and clearly written book, and although the sociologist may be somewhat put off in its early sections by its determinedly "economic" orientation and occasional jargon, he will be rewarded by pursuit which reveals that essentially sociological factors are determinative after all.

Perhaps most important from the perspective of the literature of the academic labor market, however, is the fact that the work fills a gap in coverage heretofore glossed over or left vacant. The work turns out to be (I think unequivocally) a study of the labor market of what have been called minor league institutions and for this reason is of considerable value as that market has been largely ignored. There have been specific studies of the major league universities and of the private liberal arts colleges, teacher's colleges, junior colleges, and a number (some of which are cited in the book, which has an excellent working bibliography of academic labor studies) which span the range. The nature and location of the institutions sampled for this work, however, place the inquiry squarely into the middle range of adequate but generally unprestigious universities and reveals that, while they may hold few surprises for the student of such matters, things *are* somewhat different there. It is unclear whether the author himself was aware of this aspect of his study, although he is usually careful to limit his generalizations to the institutions sampled. The data, nonetheless, are convincing, (and in some instances fascinating as well). David G. Brown's work should and undoubtedly will be read with care by any student of professorial manpower and markets. It is rarely exciting but repays careful study and rates as "must" buying for researchers in this field of inquiry.

REECE MCGEE

Macalester College

Essays on Comparative Institutions. By S. N. Eisenstadt. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. xiii+376. $7.95.

The author has collected here thirteen papers that he has published over the last fifteen years and introduces the collection with another essay written especially for this volume. It is useful to have them in this form for two reasons, one utilitarian and the other substantive. The utilitarian reason concerns the desirability of having in one place a number of important but otherwise fugitive papers. The substantive reason is a tribute to the author's very considerable talent, exemplified in his ability constantly to interweave theory and research, the abstract and the concrete, the behaviorial and the structural, into meaningful patterns.

The essays fall easily into five groups: theoretical orientations, age groups and youth culture, bureaucracy and bureaucratization, social mobility, and communication and reference-group behavior. The three essays on bureaucracy illustrate the kind of analysis in which the author indulges. Always sensitive to theoretical implications, he sets out in the first of them the classical formulations of bureaucracy and asks himself whether bureaucracy is master or servant, whether the efficiency it affords is in fact worth the regimentation it entails. He suggests further that bureaucracies, themselves power phenomena, are necessarily responsive to other kinds of power in a society, that a basic dilemma is involved in the establishment of control over the bureaucracy without at the same time rendering it impotent, and that a fundamental problem is to give the bureaucracy sufficient power to fulfil its function in accordance with society's goals but not enough to alter or displace those goals. A study in another paper in this section, of the influx of immigrants to Israel, shows that increasing bureaucratic activity does not necessarily lead to increasing bureaucratic controls and that—although the words are awkward—debureaucratization can occur along with bureaucratization.

It is in the first essay, however, the one written for this book, that the author attempts to reduce somewhat the structural emphasis which characterizes the older essays and to introduce an appreciation of behavioral factors as well. All of the essays are perceptive, and all of them, in spite of an occasional infelicity of expression, contribute to our understanding of the phenomena with which the author is concerned.

Robert Bierstedt

New York University

Organizational Choice: Capabilities of Groups at the Coal Face under Changing Technologies. By E. L. Trist, G. W. Higgin, H. Murray, and A. B. Pollock. New York: Humanities Press, 1963. Pp. xv+332. $8.00.

Although the fact that work organizations exhibit social psychological characteristics is probably generally accepted in industry today, many industrial managers nevertheless seem to believe that these characteristics are really "optional"—that they actually exist when and only when management has specifically decided to be interested in them. This book, dealing as it does with certain ways in which social psychological characteristics are intrinsic to sociotechnical systems independently of their actual recognition, should, if it reaches an industrial audience, go further toward dispelling this belief than have most works in this area, simply by dint of its detailed, sober presentation of data.

Specifically, this book, using data from some twenty-four "source papers" (many of which have appeared as separate publications), is a summary report of the well-known series of field studies conducted over roughly the past fifteen years by the Tavistock Institute on British coal-mining operations in northwest Durham. The exposition is divided into two parts. The first 106 pages, after a brief discussion of basic concepts and methods, describes the general sociotechnical features of traditional single-place mining, conventional longwall working, composite longwall working, and more highly mechanized forms of coal mining. "Rationalization" of work and the highly specialized division of labor occasioned by the partial mechanization of the conventional longwall process had the effect of breaking up the self-selected and largely self-managed work groups operating with common pay notes characteristic of the premechanized single-place tradition, and, as a consequence, led not only to problems of dissatisfaction, turnover, and absenteeism, but also

to the realization of considerably less productive potential than might have been expected on purely technological grounds. The composite longwall, by reintroducing certain of the sociological features of the single-place system, resulted in obviating some of these problems in ways which not only have immediate applied implications but suggest various desirable organizational strategies in achieving higher mechanization.

The remaining 189 pages is devoted to "comparative studies and field experiments" which very successfully and meticulously document and elaborate this general theme—to which, it must be said, our brief summary hardly does justice, in view of the truly unusual richness of detail presented. The method is basically that of comparing and contrasting intensive case studies of work situations. But it goes far beyond the usual piecemeal comparative analysis. Not only are static comparisons made between cases representing the major technological types, but cases representing transitional forms are also introduced, as well as extended case descriptions of situations in the process of changing from one system to another. This processual analysis is particularly valuable; it is all too seldom that painstaking observations of work groups are made for sufficiently long periods to find out what is really going on and to make possible the study of change per se. Other notable features of the research include the attention given technology as a source of independent variation, the truly exhaustive character of the reporting, and the fact that some really good performance-criterion variables were developed, including not only the usual ones having to do with job satisfaction, turnover rates, and so on, but also some well-controlled comparative measures of actual physical production. The rarity of such measures in studies of this type is embarrassing. Apart from support of the general theme, numerous specific findings are presented. One of the most interesting is that groups of upwards of forty workers were able, under certain conditions (which are spelled out and discussed) to function effectively as self-organizing work groups.

This book deserves an enthusiastic reception. Most of the criticisms to be made are either based on faults which are unavoidable by-products of its virtues, or arise from American objections to certain features of the style of British social science. On the former score, the very wealth of thoroughgoing detail presented, with its involvement in mining technology and northwest Durham mining argot, makes the book extraordinarily difficult to read in spots, though a glossary of terms helps. In the latter area, the American sociologist may find an insufficient amount of material on organization structure and an overly psychologistic emphasis. He will also find that this book shares with much of British social science a tendency to be long on empirical description and short on theory, with such of the latter as is attempted scarcely, to say the least, up to the high standard of the former. But such matters of taste certainly do not mar this excellent book. Hard going is a low price to pay for such fine material, and no doubt our British colleagues would with considerable justice defend their lack of abstract theorizing with the observation that a wealth of data capable of informing the thoughts of every man is preferable to trivial bits of information forced into a procrustean bed. And indeed, despite its lack of explicit theorizing, the book is extremely suggestive in ways much more general than its announced topic might indicate. Along with the other work of the Tavistock Institute it must be regarded as required reading for anyone interested in the sociology of technology and organization.

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The Practice of Local Union Leadership: A Study of Five Local Unions. By ROBERT W. MILLER, FREDERICK A. ZELLER, and GLENN W. MILLER. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965. Pp. xiv+282. $6.25.

This book is a report of a study of the leaders and the members of five middle-sized (400–700 members) local union organizations in Columbus, Ohio. These orgnizations are of the industrial type and are affiliates of the steelworkers, the automobile workers, and the rubber workers international unions.

The data presented are excellent. Also, and from the perspective of this sociologist-reader, the authors' analysis of them, refreshingly, is largely devoid of many overworked statements about unions common to defending and de-

tractors of these organizations. Nevertheless, the book is far from successful in its attempt to find a solution to the problem which provoked the investigation: "what to teach" union members and leaders in the educational program of the state university's Labor Education and Research Service. Perhaps, if the approach to the problem and the data had been somewhat less empirical and more analytical, the resulting investigation might have been more successful. A more elaborate analytical framework would have converted the data into much more meaningful findings.

Another problem which makes it difficult to evaluate the scientific merit of this study is the authors' tendency, in the face of the facts, to interpose personal beliefs about what members and leaders should be like. Even when technically perfect, if beliefs are substituted for scientifically valid assumptions about the nature of relationships among phenomena being investigated, the capacity to entertain alternative perspectives upon the problem of the data which then present themselves for explanation is impaired. For example, the authors believe that good local unions are those in which members attend local union meetings regularly and en masse. Yet, in the unions they studied, the members did not behave this way. The authors then place a large measure of blame for deficiencies of members upon the shoulders of local union officers. For the authors believe tht leaders of local union organizations should extend themselves greatly in a search for far-reaching and imaginative new organizational goals which might possibly capture the sustained interest of large numbers of members.

To someone who has studied local unions of all sizes and from a knowledge of other literature on the topic, there emerges from a reading of this book the interesting possibility that leadership of middle-sized local union organizations *in large cities* offers fewer socially valued rewards than does any other variety of leadership position in the American labor movement. This proposition probably will remain unattended in the back pages of the issue of the journal in which this review is printed. For, among many students of labor unions, it has long and thoroughly been taken for granted that union organizations with middle-sized memberships tend to approach the ideal-typical model of what such organizations are and even should be like, a sort of statistical organizational mean. (Let me hasten to add that such failings are common among specialized fields of inquiry.) In the present instance, a widespread idyll about middle-sized local unions possibly is an unintended existential consequence of the fact that it is easier to study members and leaders of middle-sized than of either large or small local union organizations. In other words, had the investigators included large and small unions in their study, the results might have been quite different. In all fairness, the authors do not claim large generalizations from their limited sample of five middle-sized organizations. What this sociologist-reader found most disconcerting was the authors' large disregard of existing theoretical and substantive literature on what happens when organizations, for one reason or another, must seek new goals.

The authors are psychologists and a political scientist. However, an application of some of that sociological theory about urbanization, industrialization, and bureaucratization, which now in part is popular culture, might have enlivened the given interpretations. Finally, while the book has the subtitle "A Study of Five Local Unions," by far the greater effort is invested in the study of members and officers combined across organizations. Only minor attention is devoted to organizational comparisons.

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Professionalization and Stratification Patterns in an Industrial Community[1]

William A. Faunce and Donald A. Clelland

ABSTRACT

In this paper, data collected in a community in which the major employer is a highly automated chemical-processing firm are compared with data from studies dealing with earlier stages in the process of industrialization. These data suggest that the effects of contemporary technological changes upon the occupational structure and, consequently, upon class, status, and power arrangements may be quite different from the effects of technological changes observed in earlier studies.

Various studies, notably the Lynds' *Middletown*[2] and Warner and Low's *The Social System of the Modern Factory*,[3] demonstrate that technologically induced changes in occupational structure have important consequences for community stratification patterns. These studies involved analysis of technological changes characteristic of a relatively early stage in the evolution of industrial production systems. Major changes in production technology have occurred since these studies were conducted. In this paper we will compare the results of earlier community studies with some data recently collected from a community in which the major employer is a highly automated, chemical-processing firm. Our primary concerns will be with the effects of technological change upon the occupational structure of the community and with the attendant effects of change in the distribution of occupations upon community class, status, and power arrangements.

Comparison of data from community studies requires some conceptual framework that relates the specific events occurring in each community to generalized community processes. Maurice Stein, in *The Eclipse of Community*, provides the elements of a framework of this kind.[4] He describes three processes that are largely responsible for shaping the character of contemporary industrial cities: (1) *industrialization* or the development of mass-production and mass-consumption techniques; (2) *urbanization*, which refers to the structural differentiation or segmentalization of the community; and (3) *bureauc-*

[1] An earlier, abbreviated report of this study appeared in the British journal *New Society* (November 7, 1963), with the title, "The Professional Society." The research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation and by the School of Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State University.

[2] Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929).

[3] W. Lloyd Warner and J. O. Low, *The Social System of the Modern Factory* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1947).

[4] Maurice Stein, *The Eclipse of Community* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

ratization or the development of impersonal, legal-rational controls. It is our contention that a fourth process, *professionalization,* is becoming an increasingly important determinant of the character of contemporary communities. This process involves an increase in the proportion of occupations requiring professional skills, that is, certified competence with respect to systematically ordered, abstract knowledge.

While industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization, and professionalization may occur simultaneously, they do not ordinarily develop at the same rate. More typically, they form a sequence with a high level of development of one acting as a spur to development of the next. Increased professionalization is, in part, an outgrowth of the bureaucratic emphasis upon expertise and rationalism. Extensive use of bureaucratic organizational forms is partly a response to problems occasioned by increasing differentiation of community structure (urbanization as defined above). Increased structural differentiation is one of the consequences of industrialization. There is also a series of changes in production technology that parallels and is related to the sequence in which these processes develop.[5]

The initial stage in this sequence is the familiar shift from a handicraft to a mechanized form of production technology. Much has been written about the changes in division of labor and in stratification patterns typical of this early phase in the industrialization process. This period has been seen as characterized (1) by increasing occupational specialization with an increasing proportion of semiskilled machine operators in the labor force, (2) by a status-assignment system in which commodity display is the major status criterion and accumulation of wealth the dominant mobility pattern, (3) by a system of power in which the entrepreneur is dominant by virtue of property ownership, and (4) by a class structure in which there is increasing class cleavage based upon differential access to property.[6]

With the shift from mechanized to automated production processes, the continuing bureaucratization of economic organizations, and the concomitant changes in form of division of labor, major changes in class, status, and power structures could be expected. The attributes of the community we studied are seen as typical of a developing period of professionalization characterized (1) by decreasing occupational specialization with an increasing proportion of professionals and technicians in the labor force, (2) by a status-assignment system in which contribution in one's field of work is a major status criterion and gaining professional recognition an increasingly important mobility pattern, (3) by a system of power in which the professional is increasingly dominant, and (4) by a class structure in which there is decreasing class cleavage with class distinctions based upon access to education.[7]

From a general historical perspective, the period of professionalization has clearly not yet arrived, and the characteristics attributed to this period should be seen as projections of some current trends. Focusing upon contemporary communities, however, it is possible to find cities in which there is a sufficiently high level of professionalization to permit analysis of the effects of this process upon stratification patterns. The rest of this paper will be concerned primarily with data collected in one city of this kind.

[5] Cf. William A. Faunce, "Automation and the Division of Labor," *Social Problems* (Fall, 1965), pp. 149–60.

[6] Lynd, *op. cit.*; Warner and Low, *op. cit.*; E. D. Smith, *Technology and Labor* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1939); and Constance M. Green, *Holyoke, Massachusetts: A Case History of the Industrial Revolution in America* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1939).

[7] These hypotheses grow out of a wide variety of previous studies of professionals. See, e.g., Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills (eds.), *Professionalization* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966).

COMMUNITY OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE

Establishing the nature and extent of relationship between technological change, community occupational structure, and stratification patterns is difficult in large, multi-industry cities. In cities of this kind there are likely to be a large number of alternative possibilities for employment at the same skill level. The effect of technological change upon the distribution of occupations is therefore less immediate and more difficult to establish. For this reason, most of the previous studies in this area have been of small or middle-sized cities in which there is one principal employer.

The research to be reported here was conducted in a community of this type. It is a city of about 25,000 inhabitants in which approximately half of the male labor force is employed by a large chemical-processing company. The chemical company has dominated the economy of the city and employed most of its labor force almost from its inception. Change in production technology has been fairly continuous during the history of this firm with the direction of change being toward increasingly automatic operation. The term "automation," as it is used in this paper, refers to the integration of production processes through the use of automatic materials-handling and automatic control devices. In this sense, chemical-processing is among the most highly automated American industries.

Table 1 indicates that there has been a high proportion of professionals in the labor force of this community for more than twenty years and that the proportion continues to increase more rapidly than in the typical small city. Certain other changes in the occupational composition of this city are also exaggerations of national and small city trends, such as, for example, the sharp decline in the proportion of operatives and laborers. The index of net redistribution indicates that changes in the occupational structure have been much greater than those occurring nationally or in the average small city over the twenty-year period 1940–60 but that the more radical changes had taken place in the earlier decade. Comparison of Table 1 and Figure 1, however, suggests that some of these changes resulted from factors other than change in the composition of the chemical-plant work force. Thus, for example, the large change that occurred during the 1940's was not the result of the relatively slight change

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF CHANGING OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION IN CITY STUDIED AND OTHER CITIES OF 10,000–50,000*

	1940	1950	1960
Professional and technical:			
City studied	19.2%	25.2%	28.7%
Mean, small cities	9.9	11 3	13.7
Managers, proprietors and officials:			
City studied	9.0	10.7	10.4
Mean, small cities	11.6	12.1	11.1
Clerical and sales:			
City studied	17.6	23.0	21 9
Mean, small cities	22.0	23.3	25.2
Craftsmen:			
City studied	14.4	14.6	13.8
Mean, small cities	12.9	14.9	14.0
Operatives:			
City studied	20.3	14.6	12.0
Mean, small cities	21.5	20.9	18.6
Private-household workers:			
City studied	5.9	2 3	4.0
Mean, small cities	6 5	3.4	3.7
Service workers:			
City studied	7.9	7 1	7.0
Mean, small cities	6.5	8.3	9.2
Laborers:			
City studied	5.7	2.5	2.2
Mean, small cities	7.2	5.8	4.5
	1940–50	1950–60	1940–60
Index of net redistribution:†			
City studied	13.3%	5.2%	15.2%
Mean, small cities	6.1	5.5	9.9

* Based on a 5 per cent systematic sample of all urban places with populations ranging between 10,000 and 50,000 during the entire period 1940–60 (source: U.S. Census).

† Computed as the index of dissimilarity between the occupational distributions for any two dates. The index is one-half of the absolute values of the differences between the occupational differences for any two dates, taken occupation by occupation. This index is derived from Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Change in the Occupational Structure of the United States, 1910 to 1950," in Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (eds.), *Cities and Society* (New York: Free Press, 1957), p. 425.

taking place in the occupational composition of the plant labor force. Rather, simple expansion of the plant labor force brought about major changes in the occupational structure of the community. Less than half of the plant employees live within the corporate limits of the city. As the work force doubled between 1940 and 1950, new hourly workers increasingly commuted from the surrounding area, but new salaried workers, especially the professionals, settled within the city. During the fifties, the two major changes in the occupational composition of the plant, an increase in the proportion of professionals and a decrease in the proportion of operatives, were not fully reflected in the community occupational distribution because an expansion of the city limits brought a disproportionate number of blue-collar workers into the city. Thus differential residence patterns exaggerated technologically induced changes in occupational composition during the forties, and annexation dampened the effect of such changes during the fifties.

The automated technology of the chemical-processing plant is, similarly, not the only factor producing changes in the composition of the plant work force. There have been organizational changes that increased efficiency of production, an expansion of research operations, and also growth in the corporate home office which is located in the same city. Automation has contributed, however, to the demand for professionals and has, more importantly, increased the *proportion* of professionals by decreasing the demand for semiskilled machine operators. Figure 2 presents a rough productivity measure and suggests the role that technological change has played in shaping the character of the work force in this firm. While sales have increased by 50 per cent in the past ten years, the hourly work force has remained relatively constant. Interviews with industrial engineers,




FIG. 1.—Percentage distribution by major occupational category for chemical-plant work force, 1930–62. *Left*, white-collar categories; *right*, blue-collar categories.

personnel officers, and other officials in the firm also support the assertion that automation has contributed to the professionalization of the work force.

Recent studies suggest that a decrease in functional specialization or in the *degree* of division of labor accompanies the integration of production processes resulting from automation.[8] While there has not been a decrease in the number of job titles in the particular plant we studied, there does appear to be a decrease in the degree of difference among the actual tasks performed under different job titles.

This pattern of change in division of labor—decreasing functional specialization and an increase in the proportion of professionals in the labor force—is in marked contrast with the findings of earlier community studies dealing with the impact of change in production technology. The dilution of skills and the emergence of an industrial proletariat is a well-documented aspect of the early stages of the industrialization process.[9] The development of special-purpose machinery, which produced the breakup of craft skills, also resulted in increased functional specialization and an increase in the *number* of semiskilled occupational specialties.




FIG. 2.—Sales and employment of hourly and salaried workers, indicating the ratio of yearly figures to 1930 figures. The *Sales* line is sales and transfers at market price from the community location, adjusted to 1939 dollars. Comparison of sales and hourly employment gives a rough indication of productivity. However, the picture of increased productivity is somewhat exaggerated, since increasing value added to products prior to shipment to this location has not been taken into account. The *Hourly* and *Salaried* employment lines are based on monthly means for the year.

[8] Faunce, *op. cit.*

[9] Lynd, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–89; Warner and Low, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–89.

COMMUNITY STRATIFICATION PATTERNS

What are the implications of these differences in patterns of division of labor for community class, status, and power structures? Earlier community studies, like those conducted in Middletown and Yankee City, describe some distinct changes in stratification patterns that accompanied industrialization and its attendant changes in occupational structure.

In the period of craft production preceding industrialization, craft workers were highly respected, politically influential, and well paid. The age-skill hierarchy provided a clearly defined mobility channel and a status structure in which there were no large gaps between different status levels in the community. With the advent of mass-production technology, accumulation of wealth and commodity display supplanted craftsmanship as the basis for status assignment. Business-class mobility models were substituted for previous patterns. A distinct cleavage in the status structure developed between the increasingly wealthy entrepreneurial elite and the rest of the community. Community power, both in the sense of influence and in the sense of occupancy of important decision-making positions, was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the entrepreneur. These changes along with the growing impersonality of employer-employee relations, resulted in increased social-class cleavage and identification.

Our data suggest that the stratification patterns accompanying contemporary changes in the division of labor may be quite different from these. The data were collected through interviews with samples of people drawn from the occupational categories showing the greatest rate of change in the community. The samples were drawn in this way under the assumption that the differences between the responses of people in occupations that are increasing and those that are decreasing as a proportion of the labor force would provide evidence regarding the direction of change in the community. Two samples were drawn from expanding occupations; a sample of 100 professionals, mostly chemists and engineers, and a sample of 100 laboratory and production technicians. A sample of 150 persons was drawn from occupations that are decreasing as a proportion of the work force, such as semiskilled machine operatives. The three samples were drawn randomly from lists of employees of the chemical-processing firm. Only persons living in the city were included in the original lists.

Interviews were eventually conducted with 95 of the professionals, 95 of the technicians, and 137 of the other hourly-rated workers.[10] The primary focus of the interview was upon information regarding attitudes toward the community; patterns of participation in community activities; and class, status, and power arrangements. Supplementary information was also collected through loosely structured interviews with 29 community leaders in major appointive and elective positions in the community.

Our data suggest that a stratification system with characteristics like those attributed above to a period of professionalization is emerging in this community. With respect to status criteria and mobility patterns, recognition in one's field appears in the process of becoming more important than either occupancy of important organizational positions or commodity display. Our respondents were asked what they would have to do to feel that they had gotten ahead or were a success. Of the professionals, who are already the largest occupational group in the community and are the most rapidly expanding, 42 per cent gave responses like making a contribution to knowledge, gaining recognition in one's field, gaining the respect of colleagues, and other achievements related to intrinsic aspects of work. Twenty-one per cent defined getting ahead in terms of promotion

[10] Of the twenty-three persons who were not interviewed, twelve were refusals, six had moved away, four were ill or deceased, and one could not be contacted.

to a better job, while 24 per cent mentioned increased income or more material possessions. The modal response for both the technicians and the hourly workers was security in the sense of having a steady income, being out of debt, or having money in the bank. The technicians, however, were approximately twice as likely as the workers to mention promotion as a definition of getting ahead and gave responses related to recognition in their field more than five times as often. These data are summarized in Table 2.

Additional support for our hypothesis is provided by the responses to the following question: "Different people regard different kinds of things as important in life. When you think about what really matters to you, what would you say are the central interests in your life?" Achievement-oriented responses to this question are interpreted here as the equivalent of statements regarding criteria for status assignment. Among the categories of response was one that included any reference to non-economic aspects of work and another made up of references to increased income or standard of living. Sixty-eight per cent of the professionals listed aspects of work other than income as a central life interest, while only 26 per cent mentioned higher income. Both the technicians and workers mentioned higher standard of living more often than intrinsically work-related goals, but the margin of difference was much smaller for the technicians.

Our data suggest, however, that bureaucratic-mobility patterns are also important. In response to the question, "What sort of goals have you set for yourself in your work or career?" 37 per cent of the professionals referred to goals representing *intra*-positional mobility, such as gaining recognition in one's field, but an equal proportion mentioned promotion or other goals related to *inter*positional mobility. (Only 6 per cent listed economic objectives.) Also, in response to a forced-choice question regarding preference for advancement by moving into a supervisory job or by gaining recognition for technical competence in their present jobs, 47 per cent of the professionals indicated a preference for supervisory work, while 48 per cent preferred recognition for technical competence. Taking all of our data into account, however, it appears that the professional-mobility model is becoming increasingly predominant and that, while the bureaucratic model may be a close second, the entrepreneurial model that characterized the early stages of industrialization is a distant third and is falling further behind.

TABLE 2

"THE PHRASE 'GETTING AHEAD IN THE WORLD' MEANS DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE. WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE TO DO TO FEEL THAT YOU HAD GOTTEN AHEAD OR WERE A SUCCESS?"

	Recognition in One's Field	Promotion to Better Job	More Income or Material Possessions	Security
Professionals ($N=95$)	42%*	21%	24%	21%
Technicians ($N=95$)	16	24	23	32
Workers ($N=137$)	3	12	22	52

* Percentages do not total 100 because more than one answer was coded for each respondent and not all coding categories are included in the table. The percentages are of row rather than column frequencies.

Power arrangements also appear to approximate those we would expect in a community with a high proportion of professionals in its labor force. The professionals are more active in community affairs than either of the other groups, and the workers are least active by a considerable margin. Increasing influence in the community has apparently accompanied the high level of community involvement of professionals. Our respondents were asked whom they would go to see if they wanted to get some action started on any local problem. Fifty-eight per cent of those who could answer the question listed persons with profes-

sional backgrounds. In response to a question dealing with occupational groups that have had most to do with bringing about change in the community, 37 per cent of the combined samples mentioned salaried professionals; 27 per cent, executives and managers; and 21 per cent, merchants and businessmen. The remaining 15 per cent of the responses were scattered among five other occupational categories. In response to another question, a slight majority of the respondents reported that they had observed little or no *change* in the amount of influence of any occupational group in the community. Among those who reported increased influence for any occupation, however, almost twice as many listed salaried professionals as any other group. Among those who reported *decreased* influence for any occupation, two groups, merchants and industrial managers, were mentioned much more frequently than any of the others. These are precisely the occupational groups who reportedly became more powerful as a result of earlier changes in production technology. Salaried professionals were mentioned as having decreasing influence by less than 1 per cent of the respondents.

Professionals appear to recognize their power in the community. In response to the question, "Do you think that people like yourself have much to say about how problems are handled or how the city is run generally?" 74 per cent of the professionals answered "yes" without any qualification and another 14 per cent gave a qualified but affirmative answer. Only 39 per cent of the technicians and 42 per cent of the workers gave an unqualified affirmative response.

The data presented so far suggest that professionals are perceived as having more influence than either the "bureaucrats" or the "entrepreneurs" in this community. There may be some bias in these responses since our samples were not drawn from the whole community but only from occupations that are increasing or decreasing as a proportion of the labor force. People in primarily bureaucratic or entrepreneurial positions are not represented among our respondents since they are a relatively stable segment of the labor force. The opinions expressed by our respondents, however, are consistent with the views of the community leaders who were interviewed, except that the latter attributed somewhat more influence to corporation executives. Fourteen of the twenty-nine community leaders interviewed selected executives as the most influential group in the community, while eleven chose professionals.

The opinions of our respondents are also consistent with data regarding the occupational composition of those holding elective offices in the community. These data are summarized in Table 3. Professionals are the predominant occupational group in these positions currently, and, if the trend suggested by the data continues, they will be increasingly predominant in the future. Industrial executives or local merchants may still wield power behind the scenes, but at least at the level of "on-stage" power the professionals appear to have taken over.[11]

One of the most consistently reported findings from studies of communities undergoing industrialization is increased class cleavage. Our data suggest much less class cleavage than these earlier studies and indicate that class identification may be de-

[11] Schulze reports an instance of withdrawal of industrial executives from participation in community affairs. He interprets this finding as resulting from a policy of non-involvement of absentee-owned corporations in the affairs of the communities in which they are located. Cf. Robert O. Schulze, "Economic Dominants in Community Power Structure," *American Sociological Review* (February, 1958), pp. 3–9. Other studies have found economic leaders highly involved in the power structure of communities where there are locally owned industries. Cf. William H. Form and Delbert C. Miller, *Industry, Labor and Community* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 310. In spite of the fact that the chemical firm in the city we studied is locally owned, professionals are much more active than executives in community affairs.

creasing. Warner and Low cite the organizational strike in the shoe industry as evidence of increased social distance between classes in Yankee City. Various other studies use strikes as an index of class cleavage. There have been only two strikes since the union was organized in the community that we studied. One was a two-day wildcat strike in 1941. The other was a more prolonged strike in 1948 in which the strike vote carried, however, by only 54 per cent of the workers who voted.

Earlier studies also suggest that the elimination of middle-status craft positions tended to increase the cleavage between people in working-class occupations and those in higher status positions. The growing number of technicians required by more advanced industrial technology would appear to fill this gap somewhat. The data in Figure 1 show that the increase in the proportion of technicians and clerical workers, who also fall in the margin between higher and lower status groups in the community, has more than made up for the decline in skilled craftsmen and that the technicians are increasing recently at a rate second only the professionals.

To the extent that technological advances decrease demand for people in working-class positions, they have another important effect upon class structure. Young replacements for older workers are not hired, and the result is an aging working class. The average age of non-salaried workers in the chemical-processing firm that we studied increased from 37.2 to 41.2 in the five years preceding our study. Aging is generally regarded as an important factor producing conservatism in political and economic views. A majority of the people in working-class positions in our sample indicated that they were either Republicans or politically independent. Most of them also labeled their political and economic views as conservative or middle of the road. Only 22 per cent of the workers identified themselves as liberals. Of those in all three samples who reported any change in their views, a majority indicated that they were becoming increasingly conservative. Almost three-fourths of the combined samples reported that there was little difference between Republicans and Democrats on local issues. While there were a number of statistically significant differences between professionals and workers on specific political or economic issues, a majority of all three samples did not *perceive* any great difference between social classes in this community in their general political and economic attitudes.

Class identification does not appear to be strong in this community either. Only 5 per cent of the three samples saw political parties as class based. Also, in answer to an open-ended question asking for a referent to the phrase "people like me," only 18 per cent of the respondents used social class or class-related designations other than occupation. Of those who did, significantly fewer were professionals, suggesting even less class identification as the direction of change. The respondents were also

TABLE 3

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTED OFFICIALS,* 1930–62

	1930–34	1935–39	1940–44	1945–49	1950–54	1955–62
Executives and managers	28%	27%	13%	22%	23%	22%
Salaried professionals	17	27	38	53	55	64
Small business and independent professionals	25	19	23	17	13	14
Blue collar	29	28	26	8	8	0

* City council, school board, and, prior to 1945, the mayor.

asked to name their social class using the question developed originally by Richard Centers. Our data, in comparison with Centers', indicate a stronger tendency for both professionals and workers to call themselves middle class. Responses to various questions suggest that the basis on which these class distinctions are made is, increasingly, amount of formal education.

It is not our contention that automation has eliminated class differences. Social classes in the sense of political and economic interest groups having different styles of life are still very much in evidence in this community. It does appear, however, that the social distance between classes, the amount of class conflict, and the importance of class identification are not so great as in communities at earlier stages in the industrialization process.

SUMMARY

In this paper, data from a community in which the major employer is a highly automated chemical-processing firm have been compared with findings from community studies dealing with the effects of earlier stages in the evolution of industrial production technology. The occupational structure and the stratification patterns in the community we studied differ markedly from those reported in earlier studies. The direction of change suggested by this comparison can also be seen in the contrast between the attitudes and participation in community activities of professionals and technicians, who constitute an increasing proportion of the community labor force, and semiskilled workers, who are declining as a proportion of this labor force. Both the intercommunity comparisons and the pattern of change within the community we studied point to the development of a more cosmopolitan, occupationally based status-assignment system, increasing involvement of professionals in community power structure, and decreased social-class cleavage and identification.

Our concern is not limited to change within this particular community. We are suggesting that a shift toward the pattern of social stratification we have described is a general tendency in industrial communities. The findings of this study are, of course, insufficient to support such an assertion.

The community we studied does, however, contain a relatively unique set of attributes that are representative of the direction of change in industrial societies. Almost half of the male labor force in this community is employed by a company whose organizational structure typifies the direction of change in contemporary industrial firms. The predominant type of production technology in this industry, that is, a production system integrated through the use of automatic control devices and materials-handling, represents the direction of change in most major American industries. The pattern of change in labor-force composition in this community can be easily discerned as the dominant trend in national labor-force statistics.

We regard the research reported here as a case study of a community that in certain important respects has already arrived at the early stages of a period of professionalization toward which much of the rest of the society appears to be moving. The assertion that the contrast between our data and those of earlier studies represents a direction of change in industrial communities rests upon the following three assumptions: (1) that class, status, and power arrangements are in large part a function of the organizational structure, production technology, and form of division of labor in industrial communities; (2) that the evolution of these community attributes tends to occur as a particular sequence of developmental phases; and (3) that the community we studied and those studied earlier are typical of communities to be found at different phases in this sequence.

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Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change[1]

Joseph R. Gusfield

ABSTRACT

"Tradition" and "modernity" are widely used as polar opposites in a linear theory of social change. This theory is examined in the light of Indian and other materials on development. Seven fallacies in this contrast usage are presented. It is incorrect to view traditional societies as static, normatively consistent, or structurally homogeneous. The relations between the traditional and the modern do not necessarily involve displacement, conflict, or exclusiveness. Modernity does not necessarily weaken tradition. Both tradition and modernity form the bases of ideologies and movements in which the polar opposites are converted into aspirations, but traditional forms may supply support for, as well as against, change.

While riding the Kodama express from Tokyo to Kyoto several years ago, I saw what might be taken as a symbolic expression of transitional development. The Japanese passenger in the seat across from mine had made himself comfortable during his nap by unlacing his shoes and pulling his socks partly off. Half in and half out of both shoes and socks, he seemed to make a partial commitment to the Western world which his clothing implied. One could only wonder about his future direction either back into his shoes and socks or out of them and into sandals and bare feet.

This particular example has been chosen because it accentuates the idea of change in contemporary new nations and economically growing societies as one which entails a linear movement from a traditional past toward a modernized future.[2] A significant assumption in this model of change is that existing institutions and values, the content of tradition, are impediments to changes and are obstacles to modernization. It is with this assumption that our paper is concerned. We wish to call attention to the manifold variations in the relation between traditional forms and new institutions and values, variations whose possibilities are either denied or hidden by the polarity of the traditional-modern model of social change. We want, further, to explore the uses of tradition and modernity as explicit ideologies operating in the context of politics in new nations. Our materials are largely drawn from modern India, although we shall refer to other Asian and African countries as well.

The concepts of economic development and of economic modernization have now been generalized to many areas of national life by social scientists. There is now a discussion of communication development, educational development, and, most widely used, of political development.[3] While these are sometimes used to relate specific institutions to economic growth and develop-

[1] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, September 2, 1965.

[2] There is a wide literature analyzing concepts of tradition and modernity or development. Leading efforts to conceptualize these societal types are W. W. Rostov, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), chap. i; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), chaps. ii, iii.

[3] See the various volumes published by Princeton University Press under the series title "Studies in Political Development." Also see A. F. K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, Inc., 1965).

ment as possible correlative influences or effects, they are also utilized as independent concepts. Some writers have viewed political modernization as implying the necessary framework within which nationhood can be achieved and operate. Others have seen certain institutions and political values as inherently valuable and legitimate perspectives toward change.[4]

At the same time that the concept of development has become generalized, a large number of specific studies of new nations (many to be discussed here) have made us aware of the wide variety of outcomes and possibilities for change and continuity. These have led to a more critical appreciation of the many possible interrelations between new and old aspects of social, economic, and political life. The view that tradition and innovation are necessarily in conflict has begun to seem overly abstract and unreal.

In the study of economic growth we have come to be aware that Weber's conception of traditional versus rational economic behavior is a great distortion of the realities of many concrete situations. In the study of political alternatives and possibilities we have become sensitive to the reifying effect of unilinear theories. They make Anglo-American political forms either inevitable or necessarily superior outcomes of political processes in new nations. Functional theories of political and economic development now seem less viable.[5] An emphasis on what Shils calls the issue of consensus at the macrosociological level leads to a concern for how pre-existing values and structures can provide bases for identification with and commitment to larger social frameworks than those of segmental groups and primordial loyalties.[6] Here traditional symbols and leadership forms can be vital parts of the value bases supporting modernizing frameworks.

In exploring the concepts of tradition and modernity we shall discuss the assumptions of conflict between them. These assumptions are inconsistent with recent studies which will reveal a wide range of possible alternatives and show that "tradition" is a more specific and ambiguous phenomenon than usually realized.

FALLACIES IN THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL-MODERN POLARITY

In assuming that new economic and political processes face an unchanging and uniform body of institutional procedures and cultural values, the linear theory of change greatly distorts the history and variety of civilizations. In this section we will examine seven assumptions of this theory and indicate the difficulties in its use.

FALLACY I: DEVELOPING SOCIETIES HAVE BEEN STATIC SOCIETIES

It is fallacious to assume that a traditional society has always existed in its present form or that the recent past represents an unchanged situation. What is seen to-

[4] We can distinguish several different uses of the concept "political development." Sometimes it is used as functional to economic development. Here the writer seeks to determine the political conditions essential to support effective economic change. For one example, see Wilfred Malenbaum, "Economic Factors and Political Development," *Annals*, CCCLVIII (March, 1965), 41–51; in the same volume, Lucien Pye uses the concept as independent of economic forms but gives it a substantive content (see Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," *Annals*, CCCLVIII [March, 1965]). Shils gives the concept of "modernity" a meaning closer to that of a goal toward which political elites aspire. This makes concern for a given state of society a perspective rather than an empirical theory and is thus closer to the use we make of it in the last section of this paper. "Our central concern will be with the vicissitudes of the aspiration toward the establishment of a political society" (Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States," in C. Geertz [ed.], *Old Societies and New States* [New York: Free Press, 1963], pp. 1–26, at p. 6).

[5] Moore has suggested that we now know that a variety of political forms are capable of both congruence and conflict with economic development (Wilbert Moore, *Social Change* [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963], p. 112).

[6] This is a major problem discussed in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *op. cit.* See especially papers by Shils, Geertz, D. Apter, and M. Marriott.

day and labeled as the "traditional society" is often itself a product of change. The conquests of foreign powers and the growth of social and cultural movements deeply influenced the character of family life, religious belief and practice, and social structure in India over many centuries.[7] Islamic civilization provided vital alternatives to caste and to political groupings. The impact of British culture and institutions has been immense.[8] Even India's caste system has by no means been a fixed and invariant system.[9]

The conception of India as a non-industrial and agricultural society, only now opened to industrialism, also needs revision. The decline of native Indian industries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was a consequence of the protection of British textile manufacturers, then spearheading the Industrial Revolution in England. The shift of both rural and urban artisans to the land was an important ingredient in the buildup of an agricultural surplus population. Even the system of land tenure in existence just before independence was the product of fairly recent changes.[10] To speak of the traditional feudal structure of India is to confuse recent history with past history. Tradition has been open to change before its present encounters with the West and with purposeful, planned change.

FALLACY 2: TRADITIONAL CULTURE IS A CONSISTENT BODY OF NORMS AND VALUES

In elaborating the distinction and interaction between the "great tradition" of urban centers and the "little tradition" of village communities, anthropologists have called our attention to the diversity and the existence of alternatives in what has been supposed to be a uniform body of rules and values. We must avoid accepting the written and intellectualized versions of a culture as only the literate form of a common set of beliefs and behavior patterns. The distinction between "popular" religion and the religion of the literati elite has long been a recognition of this difficulty in characterizing the "religion" of a society.[11]

Even within the literate forms of a tradition, inconsistency and opposition are marked; the Sermon on the Mount and *The Wealth of Nations* are both part of Western culture. Catholicism and Protestantism are Christian religions, and even within the single Church of Peter, diverse monastic orders have expressed a catholicity of values. Hindu philosophical and religious teaching is consistent with a number of diverse orientations to life. The

[7] For a critical analysis and refinement of those views of India based on Hindu scriptures, as were those of Max Weber, see M. N. Srinivas, *Caste in Modern India* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), especially Introduction and chaps. i and xii. A similar point is made in Harold Gould, "The West's Real Debt to the East," *Quest* (January-March, 1962), pp. 31–39.

[8] Percival Spears, India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960); Charles Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), chap. i; Srinivas, *op. cit.*, chap. v; Gould, *op. cit.*

[9] Srinivas, *op. cit.*; Bernard Cohn, "Power, Land and Social Relations in 19th Century Banaras" (Paper presented at meeting of the American Asian Studies Society, Washington, D.C., 1964).

[10] R. C. Dutt, *Economic History of India* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1908), pp. 32, 261; S. Bhattacharya, *East India Company and the Economy of Bengal* (London: Luzac, 1954), pp. 158–59; Vikas Misra, *Hinduism and Economic Growth* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), chap. iii; Milton Singer, "Changing Craft Traditions in India," in W. Moore and A. Feldman (eds.), *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Development Areas* (New York: SSRC, 1960), pp. 258–76; Neil Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 109–16; Robert Frykenburg, "Traditional Processes of Power: Land Control in Andrha" (Paper presented to the meeting of the Association for Asian Studies Society, Washington, D.C., 1964); Daniel Thorner, *The Agrarian Prospect in India* (Delhi: University Press, 1956).

[11] In a study of religious behavior among low-caste sweepers, Pauline Kolenda has recently presented a vivid picture of the differences in the Hinduism of higher and of lower social levels ("Religious Anxiety and Hindu Fate," *Journal of Asian Studies,* XXIII [June, 1964], 71–82).

doctrine of the four *ashramas*, for example, conceives of the good life as one in which men pursue different values at different stages in the life cycle.[12]

The importance of this diversity is that it provides legitimizing principles for a wide set of alternative forms of behavior. This point has been rather convincingly made in the recent discussion of economic development and cultural values in India.[13] Neither the behavior of popular religion nor teachings of the scriptures are devoid of moral bases for materialistic motivations or for disciplined and rational pursuit of wealth. Everyone need not be a *sadhu* (holy man) at all times.

FALLACY 3: TRADITIONAL SOCIETY IS A HOMOGENEOUS SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Like other societies, Indian society has institutionalized different styles of life in different groups, both within and without the caste system. Such divisions of labor make it possible for specific communal and status groups to be the bearers of traditions which differ from the dominant streams yet enable valued social functions to be performed. While Weber referred to "the Protestant ethic," the specific sects who carried the ethic were by no means typical of all Protestant groups.[14] The role of foreign and pariah peoples has often been commented upon as a source of economic growth, innovation, and entrepreneurial behavior.[15] The Jews in Europe, the Muslims in West Africa, the Chinese in Indonesia, and the East Indians in East Africa are examples of groups whose marginality has rendered them able to engage in the impersonality of market behavior and to remain aloof from the status consumption demands of the indigenous population. In India, the Parsees and the Jains have been potent carriers of economic innovation and the development of large-scale industrial production.

Generalizations about the anti-economic character of the Hindu traditions lose sight of the provision for specific groups which are ethically capable of carrying a logic of economic growth and change. Within the caste system of Hinduism, the untouchables have been able to perform tabooed occupations necessary to the economy. Other castes have developed traditions of business and commerce which, although dishonored in Hindu "tradition," are permissible and even obligatory for the Marwari, the Chettiar, and the Baniya. It is their very legitimation within existing structure that permits their acceptance and implementation of innovating economic behavior.

FALLACY 4: OLD TRADITIONS ARE DISPLACED BY NEW CHANGES

The capacity of old and new cultures and structures to exist without conflict and even with mutual adaptations is a frequent phenomenon of social change; the old is not necessarily *replaced* by the new. The acceptance of a new product, a new religion, a new mode of decision-making does not necessarily lead to the disappearance of the older form. New forms may only increase the range of alternatives. Both magic and medicine can exist side by side, used alternatively by the same people.

[12] For a description of the doctrine of Ashramas, see K. M. Sen, *Hinduism* (London: Penguin Books, 1961), chap. iii.

[13] Milton Singer, "Cultural Values in India's Economic Development," *Annals*, CCCV (May, 1956), 81–91. See the clash of viewpoints among Goheen, Singer, and Srinivas in the discussion of "India's Cultural Values and Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VIII (October, 1958), 1–13. Vikas Misra (*op. cit.*), similarly to Singer and Srinivas, does not see the cultural elements of Hinduism as an impediment to economic growth.

[14] For an account of the atypicality of Quaker economic rationality among American colonials, see F. B. Tolles, *Meeting House and Counting House; The Quaker Merchants of Colonial Philadelphia, 1682–1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948).

[15] Sheldon Stryker, "Social Structure and Prejudice," *Social Problems*, VI (1959), 340–54; Bert Hoselitz, "Main Concepts in the Analysis of the Social Implications of Technical Change," in Hoselitz and Moore, *Industrialization and Society* (New York: UNESCO, 1963), pp. 11–29, especially pp. 24–28.

The syncretism of inconsistent elements has long been noted in the acceptance of religious usages and beliefs. Paganism and Catholicism have often achieved a mutual tolerance into a new form of ritualism drawn from each in Spanish-speaking countries.[16] The "great tradition" of the urban world in India has by no means pushed aside the "little tradition" of the village as they made contact. Interaction has led to a fusion and mutual penetration.[17] We have become increasingly aware that the outcome of modernizing processes and traditional forms is often an admixture in which each derives a degree of support from the other, rather than a clash of opposites.

FALLACY 5: TRADITIONAL AND MODERN FORMS ARE ALWAYS IN CONFLICT

The abstraction of a "traditional society" as a type separate from a specific historical and cultural setting ignores the diversity of content in specific traditions which influence the acceptance, rejection, or fusion of modernist forms. Japan is unlike the Western societies in the ways in which "feudalism" and industrial development have been fused to promote economic growth.[18] Commitment to emperor and to family, a collectivistic orientation, and a high degree of vertical immobility have been factors supporting social and economic change in the Japanese context while they appear to have been factors producing resistance in the individualistic culture of the West. In this context the hardened commitment of labor to a specific employer operated to promote economic growth while the same process appeared an impediment in the West.[19]

Traditional structures can supply skills, and traditional values can supply sources of legitimation which are capable of being utilized in pursuit of new goals and with new processes. In one Indonesian town, Geertz found the sources of economic expansion largely among the *prijaji*, the Muslim group representing new forces in religion as well as in business. In another town, the source of economic innovation and business expansion was in the traditional nobility. The *prijaji* could build on, but were also hampered by, the characteristics of the bazaar modes of trading and the closed social networks of a pariah group. The traditional nobility, however, was well equipped to form a business class through the wide social networks and the strength of their authority, which rested on a traditional base.[20]

Anthropologists have made the same point in connection with problems of selective culture change. One traditional culture may possess values more clearly congruent with modernization than another; another may cling more tenaciously to its old ways than another. Ottenberg's study

[16] For one account of such syncretisms, see Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), chap. ix.

[17] "While elements of the great tradition have become parts of local festivals, they do not appear to have entered village festival custom 'at the expense of' much that is or was the little tradition. Instead we see evidence of accretion in a transmutation form without apparent replacement and without rationalization of the accumulated and transformed elements" (McKim Marriott, "Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization," in M. Marriott [ed.] *Village India* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955], p. 196).

[18] For some analyses of this phenomenon in Japan, see Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), chap. vi; Robert Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernization: The Japanese Case," in D. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 93–127; Everett Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962), chap. xiv.

[19] For a description and analysis of labor commitment in Japan, see James Abegglen, *The Japanese Factory* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Solomon B. Levine, *Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958), chap. ii. Richard Lambert describes a similar process operating in western India but sees it as a possible impediment to economic growth (Lambert, *Workers, Factories and Social Change in India* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963], especially chap. iii and pp. 214–21).

[20] Clifford Geertz, "Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian Towns," in Hagen, *op. cit.*, chap. xvi.

of tribes in West Africa found them able to accept and utilize the British culture in Nigeria to a much greater extent than was true of the other major Nigerian tribes. The Ibo's system of voluntary associations, coupled with their values of individualism and achievement, adapted them well to the kinds of opportunities and demands which British colonialism brought. In contrast, the Masai in East Africa are a notorious case of resistance to culture change, fiercely upholding existing ways with very little accommodation.[21]

FALLACY 6: TRADITION AND MODERNITY ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE SYSTEMS

A given institution or cultural system contains several aspects or dimensions. Each dimension does not function in the same way in response to new influences on a society. Tradition and modernity are frequently mutually reinforcing, rather than systems in conflict.

Earlier theories of economic growth viewed extended family systems and caste structure as impediments to economic growth.[22] We now recognize, however, that such relations are complex and can vary from one context to another. Caste as an unalloyed impediment to economic growth has been much exaggerated through failing to balance its role in the division of labor and in caste mobility (one dimension) against its tendencies toward status demands as limitations on desire to accumulate capital (a second dimension).[23] Efforts on the part of castes to become mobile, to attempt improvements in their material as well as their ritual position are by no means new to Indian life. The expanded scope of regional castes, the development of caste associations, and the importance of castes in politics are not impediments to economic growth.[24] They enable credit facility, occupational sponsorship and training, and political influence to be made available on a basis of segmental, traditional loyalties. This brings an element of trust and obligation into an economic context where suspicion and distrust are otherwise frequently the rule between persons unconnected by other ties than the "purely" economic.

Studies of the impact of industrialization on family life in preindustrial and primitive societies similarly indicate the compatibility of extended family forms with industrialism.[25] In the context of Indian economic growth, the large extended families of the Tatas, Birlas, and Dalmias are among the most striking instances of major industrial organizations growing out of and supported by traditional family units. Berna's study of entrepreneurship in Madras provides additional information, among small businesses, of the extended family as

[21] Simon Ottenberg, "Ibo Receptivity to Change," in M. Herskovits and W. Bascom, *Continuity and Change in African Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 130–43; Harold Schneider, "Pakot Resistance to Change," *ibid.*, pp. 144–67. Also see the description and analysis of labor commitment in East Africa in A. Elkin and L. Fallers, "The Mobility of Labor," in W. Moore and A. Feldman, *op. cit.*, pp. 238–54.

[22] For a generalized statement of this view, stressing an open system of social mobility as a prerequisite for economic growth, see Kingsley Davis, "The Role of Class Mobility in Economic Development," *Population Review*, VI (July, 1962), 67–73.

[23] This is a major conclusion of V. Misra, *op. cit.*

[24] Caste associations and caste loyalties appear to be important sources of social support in urban India and are growing in size and number (see Srinivas, *op. cit.*; M. Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), chap. iii; Bernard Cohn, "Changing Traditions of a Low Caste," *Journal of American Folklore*, LXXI (July-September, 1958), 413–21; Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph, "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIII (March, 1960), 5–22.

[25] William Goode, "Industrialization and Family Change," in B. Hoselitz and W. Moore, *op. cit.*, chap. xii; Jean Comhaire, "Economic Change and the Extended Family," *Annals*, CCCV (May, 1956), 45–52; Manning Nash, *Machine Age Maya* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).

a major source of savings and capital accumulation.[26]

The role of traditional values in the form of segmental loyalties and principles of legitimate authority are of great importance in understanding the possibilities for the occurrence of unified and stable polities at a national level. The contemporary Indian political process utilizes caste, village, and religious community as basic segmental groups through which the individual and the family are drawn into modern political institutions. Primary ties of kinship and clan are in process of fusion to centralized structures of national, participative politics.[27]

The "stuff" of much modern politics in India is itself drawn from the pre-existing struggles between caste, religion, region, and economic groupings. We have become aware that much of what appears to be ideological and economic conflict in Indian politics is actuated and bolstered by struggles for social and economic position among the various caste groups.[28]

The setting of traditional and pre-existing conflicts in the context of new institutions is crucial to understanding Indian educational change. Critics of Indian education often point to the intensive desire for humanistic curriculums among both educators and students, contrasting this with the presumed necessities of technical and agricultural skills in economic development. They fail to see that the politics of egalitarianism revolves around the quest for status in traditional terms. Groups that have not been part of the educational structure in the past now utilize it to gain status increases as well as jobs. This is of great importance in a nation attempting to draw formerly isolated groups into a national identity.[29]

FALLACY 7: MODERNIZING PROCESSES WEAKEN TRADITIONS

This discussion of Indian education suggests that new institutions and values may, and often do, fuse and interpenetrate the old. In his influential paper on caste mobility, M. N. Srinivas has shown that, while higher social levels appear to be "westernizing" their life styles, when lower and middle levels seek mobility they do so by becoming more devotedly Hinduistic, following more Brahminical styles, and otherwise Sanskritizing their behavior.[30] The fluidity introduced by political competition under independence and democracy becomes harnessed to a more traditional orientation.

The technological consequences of increased transportation, communication, literacy, and horizontal mobility, in furthering the spread of ideas, also intensifies the spread and influence of the "great tradition" into more and more communities and across various social levels.[31] Pilgrimages to distant shrines become easier and enable

[26] James Berna, "Patterns of Entrepreneurship in South India," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VII (April, 1959), 343–62.

[27] This is a dominant theme in contemporary discussion of Indian politics (Joseph Gusfield, "Political Community and Group Interests in Modern India," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVI [Summer, 1965], 123–41, and the literature cited there).

[28] "The 'revolution of rising expectations' is in reality an explosion of social competition . . . not aimed at American, British or Russian living standards, but are demands by one group for improvement . . . vis-à-vis another group within India" (Weiner, *op. cit.*, p. 71).

[29] The social composition of university students in India shows a very high preponderance of high castes in the student bodies, although leveling processes are at work. This situation, and its significance is described in my forthcoming "Equality and Education in India," in Joseph Fisher [ed.], *Social Science and the Comparative Study of Educational Systems* (Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Publishers, 1967). For a general analysis of Indian higher education, see Allen Grimshaw, "National Goals, Planned Social Change and Higher Education: The Indian Case," in R. Feldmesser and B. Z. Sobel, *Education and Social Change* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, in press).

[30] "Sanskritization and Westernization," in Srinivas, *op. cit.*

[31] McKim Marriott, "Changing Channels of Cultural Transmission in Indian Civilization," in L. P. Vidyarthi (ed.), *Aspects of Religion in Indian Society* (Meerut: Kedar Nath Ram Nath, 1961), pp. 13–25.

the conception of a unified, national religion to take firmer root. Caste groups can now be formed on regional and even national lines, buttressed by associational life and written journals. The spread of community development and of educational facilities brings in its wake new, semiurban personnel who carry the Sanskritic traditions fully as much, if not more so, than they do the westernizing influences.[32] The communities of the "little tradition" are, in fact, more open to such traditional winds of change than to wholly new movements. The holy men and the wandering players who carry religious messages and dramas drawn from the Hindu great traditions are more likely to effect attention than the movies.[33]

TRADITION, IDEOLOGY, AND NATIONHOOD

Tradition is not something waiting out there, always over one's shoulder. It is rather plucked, created, and shaped to present needs and aspirations in a given historical situation. Men refer to aspects of the past as tradition in grounding their present actions in some legitimating principle. In this fashion, tradition becomes an ideology, a program of action in which it functions as a goal or as a justificatory base. The concern for tradition as an explicit policy is not an automatic response to change but is itself a movement capable of analysis.

In similar fashion, to be "modern" appears in many new nations as an aspiration toward which certain groups seek to move the society. "Modern" becomes a perceived state of things functioning as a criterion against which to judge specific actions and a program of actions to guide policy. In Scalapino's apt phrase, intellectuals in new nations utilize "teleological insight"—the assumed ability to read the future of their own society by projecting it in accordance with the experience and trends of "advanced" nations.[34] Such insight operates as a crucial determinant in developing goals, but it too is a creation of choice among possibilities, not a fixed and self-evident set of propositions.

The desire to be modern and the desire to preserve tradition operate as significant movements in the new nations and developing economies. It is our basic point here that these desires, functioning as ideologies, are not always in conflict; that the quest for modernity depends upon and often finds support in the ideological upsurge of traditionalism. In this process, tradition may be changed, stretched, and modified, but a unified and nationalized society makes great use of the traditional in its search for a consensual base to political authority and economic development.

TRADITION AND NATIONAL UNIFICATION

Writing about African intellectuals in the formerly French colonies, Immanuel Wallerstein remarks that these parts of Africa are the chief centers for the ideological development of "Negritude"—the preservation and development of a uniquely indigenous African culture.[35] Here, where the intellectuals were trained in the French language and where they fully accepted the French culture, it is necessary to identify and discover a national cultural tradition and to self-consciously aid its development. In a similar fashion, an Indian colleague of mine once remarked that "Indians are obsessed with Indianness."

Many observers have noted the phenomenon of the revival of indigenous tradition as a phase of nationalistic and independence movements, especially where intellec-

[32] The schoolteacher, in these decades of expanding primary education, is a source of Sanskritic as well as Western influences. See David Mandelbaum's account in "The World and the World View of the Koda," in M. Marriott (ed.), *Village India*, pp. 223–54, especially pp. 239 ff.

[33] John Gumperz, "Religion as a Form of Communication in North India," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIII (June, 1964), 89–98.

[34] Scalapino, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[35] Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa—the Politics of Independence* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 75–76.

tuals had come to look to some other country as a basic source of new values.[36] Such reactions have set in among Russian intellectuals against France in the nineteenth century, among the Indonesians against the Dutch, among the Japanese against Europe; and against the British among the Indians both during and after the struggle for independence. The Indian intellectuals, westernized and European in cultural orientation, underwent a renaissance of traditional Hinduism as one aspect of the struggle against colonial dominion.[37] Despite their general commitment to modernization (often against the British post-Sepoy rebellion policy of maintaining native custom), a recrudescence of Indian national identity was partially fostered by explicit adoption of customs and styles which were both traditional and closer to popular behavior. It was this ideology which Gandhi gave to the movement, even as he sought the abolition of many features of that tradition.

The issue of the nationalist movement is not abated in its victory. For the new elites of newly independent nations, the issue is not so much that of overcoming tradition but of finding ways of synthesizing and blending tradition and modernity. While it is now possible for the urbanized and intellectual elite to wear Saville Row and avoid the clothes of Chowri Bazaar without being a traitor, the issues of personal integrity and of political functions still remain.

Those who depict the elites in India as cut off from roots in an indigenous civilization ignore the ways in which Hinduism and Indian family life exert strong pulls as continuing aspects of Indian life, even where highly westernized. Almost always the Indian intellectual speaks a regional language as his mother tongue, is steeped in classic Sanskrit literature, and is deeply tied to an extended family. Parental arrangement is still the very dominant mode of marital selection, and he is often married to a highly traditional wife.[38]

Independence, even within the westernized circles, has given continuing support to a movement toward the recapturing of Hindu folklore and the furtherance of tradition as a source of national unity in a common culture. What Indian book or journal does not have its section that links modern thought or institutions to analogues in Hindu scripture? How often is the romanticization of the village and the rejection of the city not found among vigorous exponents of political democracy and economic change? This ideological construction of Indian tradition is offered as a "great tradition," and this Indian populism is found among intellectual and urbanized elites as it is in the provincial and peasant villages.

Nationalism is deeply committed to both horns of the dilemma of tradition and modernity. The effort to define a national heritage in the form of a set of continuing traditions is also a way of coping with the wide gap that separates elite and mass, city and village, region and region in the Indian context. It is a complement to the modernizing processes which are involved in the aspiration toward a unified nation. A common culture that cuts across the segmental and primordial loyalties is a basis for national identity and consensus. Without it, the modernization based on nationhood lacks a foundation for legitimating central authority.

In describing these movements we are

[36] *Ibid.*, chap. vii; John Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Areas* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 53–54; Heimsath, *op. cit.*, chap. xii; Mary Mattosian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (April, 1958), pp. 217–28.

[37] This "revivalist" stream was only one of the major themes in Indian nationalism, but it had a great impact throughout the movement (Heimsath, *op. cit.*; A. R. Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism* [Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1959], chaps. xiii, xviii).

[38] Shils has made this point in his study of Indian intellectuals (Edward Shils, *The Intellectual between Tradition and Modernity* [The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1961], especially pp. 60–67).

not referring to efforts to pit tradition against modernity. This is certainly to be discovered in populist and aristocratic movements which call for the rejection of economic growth and the resistance or abolition of imported institutions and values. In India this can be seen in the xenophobic and militant Hinduism which characterized the RSS and still is a potent political force in the Hindu Mahasabha and, to a lesser degree, in the Jan Sangh party.[39] This appeal to an undisturbed society avoids the dilemma fully as much as does the ideology based on a linear theory of change.

The synthesis of tradition and modernity is evident in Gandhian influence. Was Gandhi a traditionalist or a modernizer? Asking the question poses the immense difficulty in separating the various streams in reform and social change blowing over the Indian subcontinent. Certainly his genius lay in uniting disparities, in utilizing the traditional authority of the holy man for social reforms and for political union. His leadership of the independence movement gave India a common experience which has been one of the crucial legacies of the independence movement to its present national existence and to the authority of the Congress Party.

The Gandhianism of the neo-Gandhians, such as Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan, represents an important ideological development in the search for political institutions which will cope with the problems of nationhood within indigenous cultural forms.[40] But Gandhian Socialism represents only one form in which this drive toward a synthesis is manifest. The recent movement toward the development of local autonomy and participation in India rests both on the growing political power of village communities and the ideological force which has recreated a tradition of Indian village democracy. In the various proposals for a system of Panchayati Raj (movement toward greater local power in economic decisions at the village level), Indian government and politics are wrestling with the problem of creating a consensus for developmental policies which will have the legitimating support in tradition, even if the tradition is newly discovered.[41]

THE MEDIATING ELITES

Elsewhere we have analyzed the growing political power of new, less westernized, and more localistic political elites and subelites in India.[42] Such people, with sources of power in state and region, mediate between the westernized elites and the mass of the Indian society in ways which bring a greater degree of traditional commitments and styles, of caste and other primordial ties, into the political and cultural arena.

The very process of political egalitarianism and modernization contains the seeds of new ideologies of tradition. Literacy in India not only stimulates a common cultural content but has also led to ideologies of regionalism, extolling the virtues of regional languages and cultures.[43] While

[39] See Richard Lambert, "Hindu Communal Groups in Indian Politics," in R. Park and I. Tinker (eds.), *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 211–24). Even in the Swatantra Party, a movement led by an antitraditionalist set of ideologies, its anti-Congress character has drawn to it strong forces of antimodernism (see Howard Erdman, "India's Swatantra Party," *Pacific Affairs* [Winter, 1963–64], pp. 394–410).

[40] This quest for an indigenous form of political democracy is marked in Narayan's writings, as well as in conversation (see Jaya Prakash Narayan, *The Dual Revolution* [Tanjore: Sarvodaya Prachuralaya, 1959]; *Swaraj for the People* [Varanasi: Ahkhih Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh, 1961]).

[41] See the analysis of the Panchayats in my paper on Indian political community, cited above (n. 27); and in Reinhard Bendix, "Public Authority in a Developing Political Community: The Case of India," *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie*, IV (1963), 39–85, especially 61 ff.

[42] Gusfield, "Political Community and Group Interests in Modern India," *op. cit.*

[43] Witness the rise of self-conscious rediscovery of Hindi literary tradition. The linguistic and cultural renaissances in many parts of India are postindependence phenomena (see Selig Harrison, *In-*

such movements impede the development of an all-India cultural consensus, they are neither antimodern nor specifically anti-India. They do, however, presage the decline of that form of national elite that has been associated with colonial cultural influences. India appears to be approaching and entering a phase in which modernization will be directed and implemented by persons whose loyalties and ideologies are considerably more traditionalized than has been true in the past decades.

THE AMBIGUITIES OF MODERNITY

Just as "tradition" is renewed, created, and discovered, so too "modernity" as a goal toward which men aspire appears in some specific historical guise. The postcolonial elites owed much to the cultures of the colonial powers in India. Through travel, through language and literature, through colonial educational institutions, they had absorbed a picture of modernity as it was practiced in one country at one time. It is not a random selection that led the Indian elites to conceive of politics in the British mode or led Nehru's political pronouncements and judgments of the 1950's to echo the liberalism of Harold Laski in the 1920's.

But being modern is far more ambiguous than being British. The disappearance of the postcolonial elites carries with it an increase in the range of alternatives ideologically open to the new, more traditionalized political groups. The possible routes to economic wealth and political nationhood are considerable, as we have shown in the earlier section of this paper. As countries come onto the scene of self-conscious aspiration toward the modern, they are presented with more and more successful models of the process. England, Germany, the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union are highly diverse in political institutions and histories. In the sense of having achieved high standards of living and egalitarian societies, they are all reasonably "developed."

THE CULTURAL FRAMEWORK OF MODERNITY

We cannot easily separate modernity and tradition from some *specific* tradition and some *specific* modernity, some version which functions ideologically as a directive. The modern comes to the traditional society as a particular culture with its own traditions. In this respect it has been impossible to divorce modernization from some process of westernization. McKim Marriott has made this point most vividly in analyzing the reasons for villagers' rejection of Western and westernized doctors. The role of the doctor, as a technical expert, grants him authority in modern culture but not in the Indian village where technical and commercial skills have a low approval. Efficiency and thrift, those two great Western virtues, are not such in the eyes of the peasant in Utter Pradesh.[44]

The social scientist's designation of specific institutional forms as modern may also function as ideology and as aspiration, specifying what it is in a particular culture which is emulative. The concept of political development is far more difficult and culture-bound than is that of economic development. Even with the latter, we clearly recognize a diversity of institutional routes to industrialization and higher incomes. To label, apart from a specific context, either a capitalistic, socialistic, or communistic approach to economic growth

dia: The Most Dangerous Decade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

[44] "It is important to note that a distinction can be made between 'Western' and 'scientific' medicine. Westerners conceive of a Western medicine as a system of curing based on 'rational' techniques and 'scientific' concepts of cause and effect. But this characteristic . . . only partly determines the total range of practices involved in treatment and cure. Treatment is bedded in a social as well as a scientific matrix, and many practices of the Western doctor are based on cultural values and ideas of personal relationships that are peculiar to Western society" (McKim Marriott, "Western Medicine in a Village of Northern India," in S. N. Eisenstadt [ed.], *Comparative Social Problems* [New York: Free Press, 1964], pp. 47–60, at p. 59).

as antithetical to economic growth would certainly seem fallacious to the economist. Similarly, the industrialized and egalitarian societies of the West have by no means demonstrated either a uniform or an unchanging form of polity. The Soviet Union, France, Germany, and the United States (and we might well include Japan) are hardly a single form of political structure, and each of these has in turn undergone many changes during its history. They are all national polities, to be sure, and all ones in which the population is mobilized, to a degree, to political participation and loyalty. These facts, however, state problems in a wider fashion, without specific institutional directives.

To conclude, the all too common practice of pitting tradition and modernity against each other as paired opposites tends to overlook the mixtures and blends which reality displays. Above all, it becomes an ideology of antitraditionalism, denying the necessary and usable ways in which the past serves as support, especially in the sphere of values and political legitimation, to the present and the future. We need a perspective toward change which does not deny the specific and contextual character of events.

I do not know much about the total style of life of that passenger on the Kodama express. To think of him as fixed on a continuum between tradition and modernity (as well as between Kyoto and Tokyo) hides the immense variations and possibilities, the capacity for blending opposites, which human beings and nations possess. In the concepts of the traditional and the modern, we are certainly wrestling with a feature of social change. We need to recognize that there is a variety of events on the wrestling program and that the outcomes, unlike many wrestling matches, are quite in doubt.

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Education and Social Background[1]

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ABSTRACT

Tabulations of school years completed by family type, family head's education and occupation, and number of siblings were obtained for five-year birth cohorts of adult native males from a 1962 survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. No more than three-tenths of the variance in attainment can be attributed to the four family factors, although each has an independent effect on schooling. Stability in the relations among the family factors and their respective effects on schooling is pronounced over cohorts, and intercohort differences in family circumstances do not account for the variable gains in mean attainment recorded between successive cohorts.

The March, 1962, Current Population Survey of the Bureau of the Census asked each civilian non-institutional male between the ages of twenty and sixty-four in the sample to complete a supplementary questionnaire, Occupational Changes in a Generation, which dealt with his social background. Tabulations obtained from the Current Population Survey–Occupational Changes in a Generation data make possible a quantitative assessment of the effects of social background on educational attainment for several groups of men identified by age and color.[2]

[1] The research reported herein was supported through the Cooperative Research Program of the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Ruthe C. Sweet ably supervised the data-processing. Results first were reported at the 1966 meeting of the Population Association of America.

[2] Selected data have appeared in U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Lifetime Occupational Mobility of Adult Males: March, 1962," *Current Population Reports*, Ser. P-23, No. 11, and "Educational Change in a Generation: March, 1962," *Current Population Reports*, Ser. P-20, No. 132. Professors Peter M. Blau of the University of Chicago and Otis Dudley Duncan of the University of Michigan, principal investigators on the co-operating projects "Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in the United States" (funded by the National Science Foundation) and "Differential Fertility and Social Mobility" (supported by the Public Health Service), were responsible for the design of the Occupational Changes in a Generation supplement.

To evaluate the persistence of social differentials in schooling and the impact of structural change on such differentials from reports of a single survey, age in 1962 was translated into the year when, as a sixteen-year-old, the respondent was making decisions about continuing in school. Nativity, fixed at birth, was used to identify men whose schooling can be presumed to have occurred wholly in the United States. The record of schooling in relation to social background can then be reconstructed from the world War I years to the post–World War II period for the nation.

RECALL

The success with which the record can be constructed hinges on the accuracy of recall by respondents. Each respondent reported his age, color, birthplace, and the number of school years he had completed. In addition, reports on seven items pertaining to the family milieu and community context in which he grew up were obtained. Each respondent was asked his father's birthplace, how many brothers and sisters he had, whether he lived with both parents most of the time until he was sixteen, and the occupation and education of the head of the family in which he was living at age sixteen. He also was asked what types of school he attended before he was sixteen and the regional location

and rural-urban status of the community in which he lived at sixteen.

Two sorts of checks on the accuracy of response for retrospective items can be made. One set involves comparison of retrospective data with appropriately matched data from decennial censuses. Two examples of such a check appear in Table 1. An estimate of siblings was derived from distributions by children ever born of women in the childbearing ages at the birthdate of respondents, and the proportion of boys ten to fourteen years of age residing in rural-farm areas when respondents were sixteen years old was calculated. The other set involves comparison of the reports of males about their boyhood family milieu with the reports made by males about the family milieu in which their wives grew up. Reports on siblings and family head's occupation are shown for males and wives in identical five-year birth cohorts in Table 1. (Since husbands and wives frequently belong to different five-year birth cohorts, there is more independence in this comparison than may appear at first sight.) The checks always are rendered somewhat inconclusive because of slippage in the populations compared, but in no instance were the retrospective reports demonstrably inconsistent with other evidence.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF RETROSPECTIVE REPORTS ON SIBLINGS AND FAMILY HEAD'S OCCUPATION MADE BY NATIVE MALES AND FOR CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN IN SPECIFIED BIRTH COHORTS, AND SELECTED INDEPENDENT CHECKS ON RECALL

Color and Age in 1962	Year Age 16	Mean Siblings			Per Cent Heads					Regression: Siblings on Head's SES Score			
					W-c		Farm			r, M	r, W	b, M	b, W
		M	W	C	M	W	M	W	C				
White:													
27–31	1946–50	3.8	3.6	3.6	14	15	21	22	21	−.26	−.32	−.35	− 41
32–36	1941–45	3.8	3.8	4.0	15	15	23	23	27	−.26	−.28	−.34	−.36
37–41	1936–40	4.1	4.1	4.3	15	14	27	26		− 32	−.26	− 42	−.35
42–46	1931–35	4.4	4.3	...	13	13	31	29	30	−.26	−.26	−.37	−.35
47–51	1926–30	4.6	4.5	4.7	13	14	33	31		−.30	−.24	−.42	−.32
52–56	1921–25	4.7	4.6	4.8	10	11	36	33	34	−.27	−.23	−.40	−.31
57–61	1916–20	5.0	4.9	4.9	11	13	43	36		−.25	−.28	−.37	−.40
Non-white:													
27–36	1941–50	5.5	4.9	5.8	5	5	43	38	45	−.28	−.09	−.59	− 19
37–46	1931–40	5.1	...	...	6	...	52	...	51	−.05	...	−.13	...
47–61*	1916–30	5.8	5.7	6.2	4	7	59	58	61	−.15	−.19	−.36	− 39

NOTE.—*M*, native males; *W*, women married to a male aged twenty to sixty-four in 1962; *C*, independent check on recall, and *W-c*, professional, salaried managerial, and sales occupations Leaders (. . .), not available or not calculated.

* Women aged forty-two to sixty-one.

SOURCE: Data for native males and currently married women from March, 1962, Current Population Survey and supplement thereto, Occupational Changes in a Generation, conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census; checks are estimates calculated from data published in Decennial Censuses.

A check on the magnitude of association between family characteristics implied by the retrospective data can be provided in only one instance. As alternative estimates of the relation at various points in time, regression analyses of number of siblings on family head's occupation Socioeconomic Status (SES) Score for native males and for the wives of all males are summarized in Table 1.[8] Both series sug-

[8] The Socioeconomic Status Score appears in Albert J. Reiss, Jr., with the collaboration of Otis

gest that the relation has been stable over time and that the coefficient of correlation measuring the relation has been on the order of — .27.

THE RECORD

Temporal change in educational attainment can be documented fully from reports in the decennial censuses. Here I note only that each successive cohort has received more schooling than the preceding one. The distribution of teen-agers by place of residence and their composition by nativity and parentage also can be ascertained from decennial-census data. The existing historical record is less complete with respect to the other social-background factors, however.

In interpreting the record that appears in Table 2, bear in mind its form. It tells us how many sixteen-year-old boys at the time of World War I were living in a family whose head pursued a farm occupation rather than how many family heads were engaged in farm work around 1918. It tells us how many sixteen-year-olds were living with both parents in the post-World War II period rather than how many families were intact around 1948. This is, then, a record of the social background of teenage boys measured at different points in time.

For members of the oldest cohort of white males, the teen-agers of World War I, the mean number of brothers and sisters was 5.0. For the youngest cohort of white males, the teen-agers of the post–World War II years, the mean number of brothers and sisters was only 3.8. The record to date shows a continuing decrease in the mean number of siblings of white teenagers, and when a recently published distribution of the number of children expected by white wives of childbearing age is translated into siblings of "expected" children, a mean of only 2.9 is obtained.[4]

TABLE 2

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SELECTED MEASURES OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND FOR NATIVE MALES IN THE UNITED STATES

Color and Year Age 16	Mean			Standard Deviation				Proportion			
	E	X*	V	E	S	X*	V	Intact Family	Public School	Rural South	Native Father
White:											
1946–50	12.0	28 9	8.7	3.3	2.9	21.3	3.6	.856	.811	.151	.863
1941–45	11.8	29.1	8.3	3.2	2.9	22.2	3.7	.841	.817	.142	.815
1936–40	11.4	28.2	8.0	3.4	2.9	22.4	3.9	.848	.826	.175	.797
1931–35	11.1	26.2	7.8	3.3	2.9	21.1	3.8	.829	.795	.157	.735
1926–30	10.6	26.3	7.5	3.4	2.9	21.1	3 9	.859	.830	.174	.725
1921–25	10 1	24.5	7.4	3 6	3 0	20.2	3.8	.831	.842	.179	.763
1916–20	9.4	23.8	7.4	3.8	3.0	20 3	3.8	.833	.838	.207	.736
Non-white:											
1941–50	9.8	16.9	7.0	3.2	3.2	14.8	3.6	.731	.936	.343	.909
1931–40	8.1	14.7	5.8	4.1	3.2	12.3	3.8	.675	.886	.401	.939
1916–30	6.6	15.2	4.9	4.0	3.0	12.1	3.8	.652	.917	.494	.969

Note.—E, school years completed by respondent; X, Socioeconomic Status Score of family head's occupation; V, school years completed by family head; and S, number of siblings of respondent (mean S in Table 1).

* Values in scale of 10 X.

Source: March, 1962, Current Population Survey and supplement thereto, Occupational Changes in a Generation, conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Dudley Duncan, Paul K. Hatt, and Cecil C. North, *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

[4] The distribution is reported in Ronald Freedman, David Goldberg, and Larry Bumpass, "Current Fertility Expectations of Married Couples in

(Incidentally, a decrease in mean siblings can coincide with an increase in mean family size.) For the non-white males, evidence of trend in number of siblings is not clear cut, however.

The proportion of white teen-agers living in a farm family after World War II was some 22 percentage points lower than during World War I. White teen-agers were somewhat more likely to live in a family headed by a "top white-collar" worker or a worker engaged in an occupation with a high SES Score in 1948 than in 1918. The decrease in the proportion of teen-agers living in a farm family appears fully as pronounced for non-whites as for whites, but over-all upgrading of the occupations pursued by family heads appears less pronounced for the non-whites.

With respect to education of the family head, substantial gains have been recorded

the United States: 1963," *Population Index*, XXXI (1965), 3–20.

TABLE 3

MULTIPLE-REGRESSION ANALYSES OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN RELATION TO SIBLINGS, FAMILY TYPE, AND HEAD'S OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION, MULTIPLE-REGRESSION ANALYSES OF SIBLINGS IN RELATION TO FAMILY TYPE AND HEAD'S OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION, AND REGRESSION ANALYSES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN FAMILY TYPE AND HEAD'S OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION, FOR NATIVE MALES IN THE UNITED STATES

COLOR AND YEAR AGE 16	*E* ON				*S* ON			*F* ON		*X* ON
	S	*F*	*X*	*V*	*F*	*X*	*V*	*X*	*V*	*V*
	Partial Regression, Standard Form							Correlation		
White:										
1946–50	−.22	.08	.26	.22	− 01	−.15	−.24	.00	−.01	.45
1941–45	−.17	.06	.28	.21	.00	−.17	−.20	.00	−.03	.48
1936–40	−.21	.06	.29	.21	04	−.24	−.18	.06	−.03	.50
1931–35	−.18	.08	.25	.24	.03	−.19	−.17	.02	.01	.46
1926–30	−.19	.09	.32	.19	.04	−.21	−.20	.00	−.02	.44
1921–25	−.21	.13	.20	.29	.05	−.19	−.18	.04	−.05	.42
1916–20	−.14	.15	.28	.24	.15	−.16	−.20	.07	.04	.50
Non-white:										
1941–50	−.04	.10	.16	.24	.15	−.24	−.08	−.02	−.05	.46
1931–40	−.19	.08	.17	.18	.25	−.03	−.08	.06	.04	.43
1916–30	−.13	.05	.15	.31	.23	−.14	−.03	−.02	.02	.19
	Partial Regression							Regression		
White:										
1946–50	−.26	.79	.40	.20	−.08	−.21	−.19	.00	.00	.26
1941–45	−.19	.54	.40	.18	−.03	−.22	−.15	.00	.00	.29
1936–40	−.24	.58	.45	.19	.35	−.31	−.14	.01	.00	.29
1931–35	−.20	.64	.37	.20	.20	−.26	−.13	.00	.00	.26
1926–30	−.22	.83	.50	.17	.38	−.29	−.15	.00	.00	.24
1921–25	−.25	1.26	.36	.27	.43	−.29	−.14	.01	.00	.23
1916–20	−.17	1.46	.50	.23	1.26	−.24	−.16	.01	.00	.27
Non-white:										
1941–50	−.04	.77	.34	.22	1.10	−.52	−.07	−.01	−.01	.19
1931–40	−.25	.72	.55	.20	1.66	−.09	−.07	.02	.00	.13
1916–30	−.17	.43	.51	.33	1.43	−.34	−.02	−.01	.00	.06

NOTE.—*E*, school years completed by respondent; *S*, number of siblings of respondent; *F*, type of family in which respondent grew up; *X*, Socioeconomic Status Score of family head's occupation; and *V*, school years completed by family head.

for both white and non-white teen-agers. As indexed by the mean school years completed by the family head, gains over the thirty-year span amounted to well over a year for whites and at least two years for non-whites. A continuation of this trend can be foreseen from the reports of respondents themselves, since the fathers of teen-agers some years hence will be drawn from among them.

Trend in the proportion of teen-agers growing up in an intact family or attending exclusively public schools until age sixteen is not evident. The proportion of white boys in intact families fluctuates around 84 per cent; the proportion for non-white boys is some 15 percentage points lower. The proportions attending exclusively public schools have fluctuated around 82 per cent for white boys and 91 per cent for non-white boys. Proportions of roughly the same magnitude have been reported for teen-agers *circa* 1960 by the Bureau of the Census.

RELATIONS AMONG FAMILY FACTORS

Four elements of the family milieu can be scored and handled analytically as quantitative variables. They are: family type, that is, intact versus broken family scored, respectively, unity and zero; head's occupation, indexed by the SES Score; head's education, indexed by number of school years completed; and siblings, indexed by number. These family factors ranked among the more important determinants of attainment in a cross-section of the nation's population surveyed in 1960. The sample size did not permit evaluation of their relations with one another or their effects on schooling within age groups, however; and no assessment of trend could be made.[5]

The observed relations among family type, head's occupation SES Score, and head's education can be summarized succinctly, for trend over time is found in none of the relations. Family type varies independently of head's occupation SES Score and head's education. A moderate positive association between head's occupation SES Score and head's education obtains. The set of relations for whites is similar to that for non-whites. Measures of these relations appear in Table 3.

I assume that family type, head's occupation, and head's education directly influence the number of siblings and that their independent effects are best described by partial regression coefficients in standard form. The net effect of head's occupation SES Score on siblings does not evidence trend; is consistently negative; and, in magnitude, does not differ sharply between whites and non-whites. The net effect of head's education does not evidence trend, is consistently negative, and is substantially greater for whites than for non-whites. The net effect of growing up in an intact family on number of siblings does appear to change over time, however. For white teen-agers at the time of World War I, a strong positive net effect is observed; but by the 1940's the net effect had become negligible for white teen-agers. For non-white teen-agers, the net effect of intact-family status consistently has been positive in direction and appreciable in magnitude.

A path diagram consistent with the verbal description of the relations among the family factors is shown in Figure 1.[6] Relations among head's occupation and education and the type of family are taken as given. Values of the appropriate correla-

[5] Results of the survey are reported in Martin David, Harvey Brazer, James Morgan, and Wilbur Cohen, *Educational Achievement—Its Causes and Effects* (Monogr. No. 23 [Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, 1961]). With respect to stability over time, they observe: "To ascertain whether the relationships shown are independent of the time when the head of the spending unit was educated, we repeated the analysis for spending unit heads under thirty-five years of age and omitted characteristics shown to be insignificant in the analysis of the entire cross section. . . . the relationships obtained were very similar to those already presented" (pp. 31–32).

[6] See Otis Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXII (1966), 1–16.

tion coefficients appear beside the curved, double-headed arrows linking the symbols that stand for these variables. Causal paths, depicted by straight, single-headed arrows, lead from these three variables to the sibling variable. Beside each arrow is the appropriate partial regression coefficient in standard form obtained when number of siblings is regressed on family type and head's occupation and education. A fourth




FIG. 1.—Path diagram of the influence of family type (F), head's education (V), head's occupation (X), and siblings (S) on educational attainment (E) for native civilian males aged twenty-seven to sixty-one, by color: United States, 1962.

straight, single-headed arrow pointing to the sibling variable leads from outside the system of variables depicted. The coefficient associated with this arrow is the square root of the proportion of variance in the sibling variable not accounted for by family type and head's occupation and education; it therefore measures the effect on siblings of residual factors taken to be uncorrelated with the specified family factors.

The values of coefficients that appear in Figure 1*A* are based on analyses for native white males ages twenty-seven to sixty-one in 1962; the values in Figure 1*B* are based on analyses for native non-white males of the same ages. Inasmuch as stability of relations over cohorts for whites and non-whites, respectively, is pronounced, the diagrams presented in Figure 1 offer a convenient summary of the results of intracohort analyses reported in Table 3.

SCHOOLING AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

I assume that siblings, family type, head's occupation SES Score, and head's education directly influence the amount of schooling a boy obtains. In the path diagram, causal paths lead from these four family factors to the educational-attainment variable. Beside each arrow is the appropriate partial regression coefficient in standard form obtained when number of school years completed by the respondent is regressed on the four family factors. A fifth arrow leads from outside the system of variables depicted; the coefficient associated with it measures the effect of residual factors which influence attainment independently of the four specified family factors.

With the possible exception of family type, none of the family factors evidences trend in its effect on schooling. For substantive summary, therefore, I rely on the coefficients that appear in Figure 1. Each of the four family factors has a detectable independent effect on how much schooling a boy obtains. The net effect on attainment of growing up in an intact family is positive, indexed by a coefficient of .09 for both whites and non-whites. The net effect of head's occupation SES Score is positive, indexed by coefficients of .26 for whites and .13 for non-whites. The net effect of head's education is positive, indexed by coefficients of .23 for whites and .30 for non-whites. The net effect of siblings is negative, indexed by coefficients of — .20 for whites and — .12 for non-whites.

Results of the corresponding intra-cohort analyses are reported in Table 3.

I now want to explore whether these effects persist when allowance is made for their associations with three other social characteristics that may influence schooling: ethnic status, types of school attended, and the regional location and rural-urban status of the community of residence.[7] Linear regression no longer can be relied on as an analytical technique, for classificatory variables whose categories lack implicit order are being introduced. Accordingly, I turn to multiple-classification analysis in which relations are described by series of category-specific means. I first re-evaluate the net effects of the four family factors on schooling, describing the effect of each by the slope of a line fitted

[7] The results of David *et al.*, *op. cit.*, with respect to the effects of nativity, residential background, or religious preference on educational attainment are not as clear cut as the findings with respect to the effects of the family factors.

TABLE 4

MULTIPLE-CLASSIFICATION ANALYSES OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN RELATION TO SOCIAL BACKGROUND, FOR SELECTED COHORTS OF NATIVE MALES IN THE UNITED STATES IDENTIFIED BY COLOR AND YEAR AGE SIXTEEN

ITEMS RELATED AND ITEMS CONTROLLED IN MULTIPLE-CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS	WHITE					NON-WHITE
	1916-50	1946-50	1942-46	1932-36	1922-26	1916-50
	Slope, Line Fitted to Deviations					
E on *S*, net *F*, *X*, *V*	−.24	−.26	−.18	−.22	−.25	−.11
E on *S*, net *F*, *X*, *V*, *R*, *T*, *C*	−.22	−.20	−.15	−.18	−.21	−.05
E on *X*, net *S*, *F*, *V*	.41	.38	.41	.32	.36	.51
E on *X*, net *S*, *F*, *V*, *R*, *T*, *C*	.34	.31	.37	.29	.22	.27
E on *V*, net *S*, *F*, *X*	.22	.20	.18	.21	.28	.29
E on *V*, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *R*, *T*, *C*	.21	.20	.18	.20	.25	.23
	Deviation from Grand Mean					
E on father:						
Native, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*	−0.1	−0.1	−0.1	−0.2	−0.1	−0.1
C-E European, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*	1.1	...	1.3	0.9	...	...
Native, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*, *R*, *T*	−0.1	−0.1	−0.1	−0.1	0.0	−0.1
C-E European, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*, *R*, *T*	0.8	...	1.3	0.8	...	...
E on schooling:						
Public only, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	−0.1	0.1
Parochial only, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*	0.1	0.7	−0.1	0.2	...	...
Public only, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*, *R*, *C*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Parochial only, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*, *R*, *C*	0.0	0.5	−0.1	−0.1	...	...
E on residence:						
Urban West, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.5	...	...
Urban North, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.7	2.5
Rural South, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*	−1.0	−0.9	...	...	...	−0.9
Farm South, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*	−1.1	−1.3	−0.6	−0.7	−1.4	−1.3
Urban West, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*, *T*, *C*	0.9	0.5	0.9	0.6	...	...
Urban North, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*, *T*, *C*	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.6	2.3
Rural South, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*, *T*, *C*	−0.8	−0.6	...	...	...	−0.5
Farm South, net *S*, *F*, *X*, *V*, *T*, *C*	−0.9	−1.2	−0.9	−0.7	−1.4	−1.3

NOTE.—*E*, school years completed by respondent; *S*, number of siblings of respondent; *X*, Socioeconomic Status Score of family head's occupation; *V*, school years completed by family head; *F*, type of family in which respondent grew up; *R*, region and rural-urban status of community in which respondent grew up; *T*, types of school respondent attended by age sixteen; and *C*, country of birth of respondent's father. Leaders (...), base is under 250,000 (*ca.* one hundred sample cases).

to the adjusted category-specific means on the criterion of least squares. This slope I consider the counterpart to the partial regression coefficient. The effect of each family factor net of the other family factors is found to be estimated similarly by the two techniques. (Selected comparisons can be made from data presented in Tables 3 and 4.)

When allowance is made for the effects of ethnic status, types of school attended, and place of residence on attainment and for their associations with the family factors, the respective effects of the family factors are reduced only slightly. The reduction appears most pronounced for head's occupation, but this is in part artifactual given that "farm" enters both the occupational and the residential classifications. There is no need to modify the description of family effects on schooling offered earlier. Family type, head's occupation and education, and siblings had detectable independent effects of essentially constant magnitude on schooling in the thirty-year span following World War I. No systematic variation in the strength of relations with changes in economic conditions or the timing of innovative social legislation can be discerned.

Ethnic status, types of school attended, and place of residence do have some detectable effects on attainment net of the family factors, however. As illustrative of these effects, net deviations of selected category-specific means from the grand mean are shown in Table 4. Five ethnic statuses were included in the analysis; native males whose fathers had been born in central or eastern Europe were the most distinctive group, characterized by relatively high attainment. Four type-of-school statuses were included in the analysis; none was found to have a consistently distinctive net effect. Nine place-of-residence statuses were included in the analysis; typically, residence in the urban North or West was most conducive to schooling and residence in the rural South was least conducive to schooling.

As an alternative perspective on the effects of the family factors and other social characteristics, a summary of variance in attainment attributable to specified var-

TABLE 5

PROPORTION OF VARIANCE IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EXPLAINED BY SOCIAL BACKGROUND, FOR NATIVE MALES IN THE UNITED STATES

FACTOR	WHITE, AGE 16 IN								NON-WHITE, AGE 16 IN			
	1916–46	1946–50	1941–45	1936–40	1931–35	1926–30	1921–25	1916–20	1916–46	1941–50	1931–40	1916–30
V	.171	.160	.153	.175	.155	.151	.180	.175	.134	.102	.076	.123
X, *F*, net *V*	.081	.075	.077	.092	.068	.109	.066	.086	.022	.032	.027	.029
S, net *V*, *X*, *F*	.036	.044	.027	.038	.030	.032	.039	.017	.013	.002	.034	.015
V, *X*, *F*, *S*:												
Est. a	.288	.279	.257	.305	.253	.292	.285	.278	.169	.136	.137	.167
Est. b	.293	.304	.277	.315	.266	.309	.296	.293	.221	.273	.268	.221
R, net *V*, *X*, *F*, *S*	.020	.020	.013	.020	.026	.020	.040	.042	.065	.077	.099	.059
T, *C*, net *V*, *X*, *F*, *S*, *R*	.027	.052	.034	.031	.023	.009	.025	.062	.060	.050	.065	.094
All	.340	.376	.324	.366	.315	.338	.361	.397	.346	.400	.432	.374

NOTE.—*V*, school years completed by family head; *X*, Socioeconomic Status Score of family head's occupation; *F*, type of family in which respondent grew up; *S*, number of siblings of respondent; *R*, region and rural-urban status of community in which respondent grew up; *T*, types of school respondent attended by age sixteen, and *C*, country of birth of respondent's father. Estimate a for *V*, *X*, *F*, *S*; *S*, net; *X*, *F*, net; and *V* based on linear regression and multiple-regression analyses. Estimate b for *V*, *X*, *F*, *S*; *R*, net; *T*, *C* net; and All based on multiple-classification analyses.

iables is offered in Table 5. The form of presentation is guided by the model of the paths of influence which I assumed at the outset. About a third of the variance in attainment for both whites and non-whites can be attributed to the four family factors and three additional social characteristics.[8] The respective contributions of the several variables differ for whites and non-whites, however. A sixth of the variance in attainment for whites and a seventh for non-whites can be attributed to head's education alone. The incremental variance attributable to family type, head's occupation, and siblings amounts to an eighth for whites but less than a twentieth for non-whites. The increment for place of residence, types of school, and ethnic status net of the family factors amounts to only a twentieth for whites but an eighth for non-whites; these social characteristics are tantamount to a racial classification for the non-whites, of course.

SOME SPECULATION

A first observation might be that the relation of schooling to social background is sufficiently loose that a boy's attainment is not strictly determined or even sharply limited by the circumstances of the family into which he is born. What does this imply for programs to "equalize" educational opportunities?

Assume that with equalization the cost of schooling offspring is not borne directly by the family of procreation but, rather, that a "maintenance allowance" is provided for each in-school child which covers the full cost of his support as well as compensation to the family for income lost by virtue of his non-participation in the work force. The formula under which funds for maintenance allowances are raised is not tied to family composition. With such equalization, social differentials in schooling probably would still obtain. First, insofar as the relation between attainment and social background can be traced to an association of parental abilities with family circumstances, the transmission of abilities, and the ceiling on a boy's attainment set by his abilities, family background will continue to influence educational attainment. Positive relations have been reported between measured intelligence and occupational status for adult males and between the measured intelligence of young men and the social circumstances of their families.[9] Even compensatory educational programs presumably cannot eliminate the transmission of abilities insofar as these are genetically determined.

A second basis for anticipating a continuing influence of family background on educational attainment is the possibility of social differentials in the acceptance of opportunity. The social background that appears favorable to high attainment may be simply that in which sons take full advantage of existing opportunities. This need not be so much a matter of desire as an ability to gain access to and make effective use of relevant information.[10] The

[8] The "not-reported" categories, membership in which is highly selective, are included in the multiple-classification analyses in order to exhaust the population; but they are excluded in the multiple-regression analyses. In the non-white population where non-reporting is relatively high, the proportion of explained variance estimated from the multiple-classification analyses may be spuriously high because of the selectivity of non-respondents. See Beverly Duncan, *Family Factors and School Dropout: 1920–1960* (Cooperative Research Project No. 2258, Office of Education [Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1965]), pp. 80–83.

[9] C. Arnold Anderson, James C. Brown, and Mary Jean Bowman, "Intelligence and Occupational Mobility," *Journal of Political Economy*, LX (1952), 218–39, and William H. Sewell and Vimal P. Shah, "Socioeconomic Status, Intelligence, and the Attainment of Higher Education" (paper for the Research Group on the Sociology of Education, 6th World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Evian, France, September, 1966).

[10] A recent study reports that the percentage of twelfth-grade pupils who desire to finish college ranges only from 42 to 46 over six groups identified by race or ethnic status, but the percentage who "have read a college catalogue" ranges from 45 to 70. See James S. Coleman, Ernest Q. Camp-

diminution in social differentials in schooling that might follow from equalized opportunities cannot be estimated from observational data, of course; but the stability of family effects in the face of sweeping social change in this century cannot be ignored in forecasting the outcome of programs to equalize educational opportunity. As an illustration, no lessening in the effect of family background on schooling is observed for the cohorts that include recipients of the "G.I. Bill." (About three-fourths of the white males aged sixteen in 1936–40, three-fifths of those aged sixteen in 1931–35, and half of those aged sixteen in 1941–45 were reported as civilian veterans of World War II in 1960.[11] Data in Tables 3 and 5 do not suggest a lesser family effect on attainment for these cohorts.)

Whether programs to equalize educational opportunity should be undertaken is a separable issue. Because the advantage of one child always appears as the disadvantage of another, there is no single answer. To negate wholly the effect of family circumstances on son's attainment would eliminate generational transmission of social advantage as an incentive for parental prudence. Even now the transmissable advantage associated with investment in the father's training and career and the limitation of family size may seem small indeed. From the standpoint of the son, however, any educational penalty that can be traced to his social background may appear both large and unjust, for he cannot be held accountable for the social circumstances of the family into which he is born. From a societal perspective another issue becomes salient: the current cost of training youth as intensively as their abilities permit must be weighed against the loss in societal income some years hence which would result from a suboptimally trained manpower pool.

Finally, would equalization of opportunity accelerate the upward secular trend in educational attainment? The record presented here shows variable gains in mean attainment occurring between successive birth cohorts in the absence of concurrent intercohort differences in the effect of the family factors. The net effects of the family factors are essentially constant, and changes in their mean levels between successive cohorts imply intercohort gains in attainment on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 school years. The observed intercohort gains, by contrast, range from 0.2 to 0.7 school years. Thus, the primary bases of secular change in attainment appear to be external to the family.[12] Should acceleration in the upward secular trend in educational attainment occur concurrently with implementation of an equal-opportunities policy, the coincidence in timing alone would not justify a causal interpretation.

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bell, Carol J. Hobson, James McPartland, Alexander Mood, Frederic D. Weinfeld, and Robert L. York, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), Table 10.

[11] Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), Vol. I, Part I, Tables 65 and 175.

[12] Fluctuations about the long-term trend toward rising educational attainment for males have been found to coincide with changes in the job market, for example. See Beverly Duncan, "Dropouts and the Unemployed," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXXIII (1965), 121–34.

Lawyer Attitudes on Judicial Selection[1]

Richard A. Watson

ABSTRACT

A study done in 1964 of lawyers practicing in Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri, found that those with high social status in the legal profession, representing the most prestigeful clients, are more likely to support a Nonpartisan Court Plan developed by leaders of the bar for selecting judges than are attorneys with lesser professional status who handle the legal affairs of lower social classes. Partisan affiliation was shown to have a limited effect on preferences concerning judicial selection. Attorneys with extensive trial experience are less favorable to the plan than those in similar practice specialties without such experience.

The central position that professions occupy in present-day society[2] has stimulated a spate of studies of the subject, which are now categorized under the general rubric of the sociology of the professions. Although some such studies are concerned with identifying the characteristics common to all professions,[3] there is a marked tendency toward determining the differences that are present within them.[4] Recent inquiries in what has now been termed the sociology of the legal profession[5] have been in this latter direction: studies of specialized practitioners[6] and those dealing with

[1] The material for this article is drawn from a general study, "The Politics of the Bench and the Bar: Judicial Selection under the Nonpartisan Court Plan," conducted by the author and two of his colleagues, Rondal G. Downing and Frederick C. Spiegel, with the assistance of grants from the Social Science Research Council and the Research Center of the University of Missouri. The forthcoming full-length study is to be published by John Wiley & Sons, New York.

[2] Talcott Parsons has suggested that a "comparative study of the social structures of the most important civilizations shows that the professions occupy a position of importance in society which is, in any comparable degree of development, unique in history" ("The Professions and the Social Structure," in Talcott Parsons [ed.], *Essays in Sociological Theory* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954], p. 34).

[3] For a discussion of attributes of a profession, see Barnard Barber, "Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions," *Daedalus*, XCII (Fall, 1963), 671 ff.; A. M. Carr-Sanders and P. A. Wilson, "Professions," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (1933), 479; Roscoe Pound, *The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 4 ff.; and Ernest Greenwood, "Attributes of a Profession," *Social Work*, II (July, 1957), 45 ff.

[4] For examples of studies of this nature, see Rue Bucher and Anselm Straus, "Professions in Process," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (January, 1961), 325–34; H. L. Smith, "Contingencies of Professional Differentiation," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (January, 1958), 410–14; W. S. Mason and N. Gross, "Intra-Occupational Prestige Differentiation: The School Superintendency," *American Sociological Review*, XX (June, 1955), 326–31; and Dennis C. McElrath, "Perspective and Participation of Physicians in Prepaid Group Practice," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (August, 1961), 596–607.

[5] See Jerome E. Carlin, "Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession" (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, August, 1962 [mimeographed]).

[6] See Jerome Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962); William Hale, "The Career Development of the Negro Lawyer" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1949); Dan C. Lortie, "The Striving Young Lawyer: A Study of Early Career Differentiation in the Chicago Bar" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958); *idem*, "Laymen to Lawmen: Law School, Careers and Professional Socialization," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXIX (1959), 353–69; Hubert J. O'Gorman, "Lawyers in Matrimonial Cases" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1961); and Erwin Smigel, *The Wall Street Lawyer* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

broader segments of the metropolitan bar[7] have emphasized the great differences that exist among lawyers in fields of specialty, clients, income, legal education, and other matters. Moreover, some of them have delineated the problems such divergencies create for issues of common interest to the profession and the public, such as the enforcement of canons of legal ethics.[8]

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect that differences among lawyers have on their attitudes toward another matter of central concern to the legal profession (as well as to society as a whole), namely, the selection of judges. Since the first modern bar association was founded in New York City in 1870 to fight Boss Tweed's control over the courts, the activities of the organized bar in the United States have been closely linked to this issue.[9] Over the years, the leaders of the bar have "professed"[10] a special competence in judging which of their brethren should ascend to the bench and have sought to bring that judgment to bear on the selection process. When attempts to work within the framework of popular election failed to bring the profession the influence its leaders desired,[11] two national organizations, the American Bar Association and the American Judicature Society, developed a system adopted by Missouri in 1940 that gives the bar the dominant voice in the selection of judges.[12] Under its provisions, commissions composed of lawyers, judges, and laymen nominate panels of judicial candidates from which the governor makes his appointment. The superior knowledge the lawyers and judges possess about the potential candidates, and the fact that they outnumber the representatives of the public on the commissions, means that members of the legal profession dominate the nomination process. Moreover, the governor is restricted in his appointment to the three persons suggested by the commission. The system also provides judges with protection from political forces after they are in office, since subsequent elections are in reality plebiscites in which the appointees run "on their records" with no opponents.[13]

Heralded by one of the leaders of the

[7] Carlin's study, "Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession" (see n. 5) covers a broad segment of the bar in New York City. Jack Ladinsky has investigated the Detroit bar. See his "Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice and Legal Institutions," *American Sociological Review,* XXVIII (February, 1963), 47–54, and "The Impact of Social Background of Lawyers on Law Practice and the Law," *Journal of Legal Education,* XVI (December, 1963), 127–44.

[8] For a discussion of the problem of enforcing compliance with such canons of legal ethics, and the way in which the stratification of the bar affects attitudes toward them, see Carlin, *Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966), and Kenneth Reichstein, "Ambulance Chasing and the Legal Profession," *Social Problems,* XIII (Summer, 1965), 3–17.

[9] Within the decade following the establishment of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, a number of similar organizations, including the American Bar Association, were formed to improve the administration of justice. See Pound, *op. cit.,* chap. ix.

[10] Everett C. Hughes suggests that "professions profess. They profess to know better than others the nature of certain matters." See his "Professions," *Daedalus,* XCII (Fall, 1963), 656.

[11] Attempts were made to minimize the power of political-party organizations in electing judges through such devices as judicial nominating conventions, nonpartisan judicial ballots, and separate judicial elections and to enhance the influence of the legal profession by means of referendums in which bar associations evaluated the capabilities of the various judicial candidates and passed on their recommendations to the electorate. Chicago conducted its first bar primary in 1887. For an analysis of this and subsequent primaries in this metropolitan community, see Edward M. Martin, *The Role of the Bar in Electing the Bench in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936).

[12] Jack W. Peltason, *The Missouri Plan for the Selection of Judges* ("University of Missouri Studies," Vol. XX, No. 2 [Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1945]), chap. ii, contains an excellent account of the judicial reform movement in the United States and the role of various organizations and individuals in its development.

[13] In the twenty-five year operation of the plan, only one judge has been voted out of office. This occurred in 1941.

American Judicature Society as "the greatest single event of this century in the field of judicial administration,"[14] the Nonpartisan Court Plan (also referred to as the Missouri or the Merit Plan) has become the model of a nationwide crusade that seeks to spread the system to every state in the union and, most recently, to the federal bench as well.[15] The nature of this concerted campaign to wrest control over the selection of judges from political parties and the general electorate and the deluge of hortatory articles on the plan that appear in the legal periodicals[16] create the general impression that the issue is solely a matter of the bar versus the public and that the former group is essentially monolithic with a single mind on the subject. Yet, despite the fact that lawyers might be expected to respond favorably to a selection system that gives them a dominant role in choosing judges, there are differences within the profession on this issue, some of which have been expressed in print.[17]

This paper examines the relevance of certain cleavages within the legal profession for attitudes on judicial selection. The first section tests the associations that exist between the kind of clientele and legal practice a lawyer has and his preferences concerning methods of selecting judges. Partisan affiliation and trial experience are also related to such preferences. The second section explores the attitudes that underlie such preferences by analyzing the reactions of members of the bar to certain consequences which are commonly associated with the operation of the Nonpartisan Court Plan.

THE METHOD AND THE DATA

As a part of our general study of the Nonpartisan Court Plan, we conducted personal interviews with some two hundred lawyers in various parts of the state of Missouri. In these interviews we employed open-ended questions to solicit general reactions of members of the bar toward the operation of the plan. We thus gained an understanding of how lawyers themselves look at the issue of judicial selection and the factors they identify as important in the process. On this basis, we formulated specific questions for the questionnaires we utilized in our sample survey. In addition, the questionnaire itself was pretested on members of the bar.

Since the Missouri bar is integrated,[18]

[14] Address by Glenn R. Winters, executive director of the American Judicature Society, before the Lawyers' Association of Kansas City on April 8, 1964, p. 8.

[15] Since 1956 the plan has been adopted in Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska, and features of it apply to courts in six other states. The American Judicature Society published in the August, 1965, issue of its *Journal* (pp. 47–52) a speech by Royce H. Savage, general counsel of Gulf Oil Corporation, suggesting that the plan be extended to the federal courts, and noted in the December, 1965, issue of the publication (p. 124), that the furor over the nomination of Francis X. Morrissey of Boston to the U.S. district court had heightened public interest in Savage's suggestion.

[16] Recent examples of such articles include W. W. Crowdus, "Twenty Years of the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan," *Oklahoma Bar Association Journal*, XXXI (1960), 2270 ff.; Forrest Hemker, "Experience under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan," *Journal of the American Judicature Society*, XLIII (1960), 159 ff.; Laurance Hyde, "The Missouri Method of Choosing Jurges," *Journal of the American Judicature Society*, XLI (1957), 74 ff.; Robert A. Schroeder, "Twenty-five Years under the Missouri Plan," *Journal of the American Judicature Society*, XLIX (1965), 105 ff.; and Glenn Winters, "One-Man Judicial Selection," *Journal of the American Judicature Society*, XLV (1962), 198 ff.

[17] For an attack on the plan by a member of the Illinois bar, see George Moran, "Counter-Missouri Plan for Method of Selecting Judges," *Florida Bar Journal*, XXXII (1958), 471 ff. Other criticisms of it include William Anderson's "Reorganization of Minnesota's Judiciary," *Minnesota Law Review*, XXVII (1943), 383 ff., and Francis D. Wormuth and Rich Grover's "Politics, the Bar and the Selection of Judges," *Utah Law Review*, III (1953), 459 ff.

[18] An integrated bar is one that requires all attorneys to belong to the official bar organization. The Missouri bar was integrated by court order in 1944. For a general study of the subject, see Dayton McKean, *The Integrated Bar* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1963).

we were able to use the membership of the State Bar Association as our "population." We randomly selected 3,303 of the 6,606 Missouri lawyers who belonged to the association and mailed questionnaires to them in May of 1964. We received 1,233 usable replies, a 37 per cent response,[19] which means that almost one-fifth of the lawyers in the state are included in the sample. The comparison of the sample with the total population of Missouri lawyers as of the same year[20] indicates that it is very representative on such characteristics as geographical location of practice, law-school education, and kind of practice arrangement. The age composition of the sample also reflects that of the state bar with the exception that older lawyers are slightly underrepresented.

This particular paper, however, uses data only from lawyers whose main practice is in either Kansas City or St. Louis. The reason for this is that the plan applies at the circuit-court level (the court of original, general jurisdiction in Missouri) only in Jackson County (Kansas City) and St. Louis City-County; judges in the remaining forty-one "outstate" circuits are chosen by popular election. Thus the attorneys in the two major urban areas have had the most extensive experience with the plan over the period of the last twenty-five years.[21] Also, over three-fifths of the state's attorneys practice law in one of these two cities.

THE FINDINGS

One of our major assumptions concerning the preferences of lawyers on methods of choosing judges was that such preferences will reflect the factor of "client-caretaking,"[22] that is, that an attorney will tend to favor a selection system that puts men on the bench he feels will be generally favorable (or at least not hostile) to persons or organizations he represents. The link between that general assumption and the Nonpartisan Court Plan is provided by a suggestive comment made recently by Justice Charles E. Clark of the U.S. Circuit Court that the plan has a "unique bias towards professional competence."[23] He goes on to explain:

> Since in our economy the rewards of professional competence are, quite naturally and properly, the confidence of and employment by all the settled institutions of our society—the banks, the insurance companies, the mammoth business combines, and so on—the imbalance toward mere preservation of the status quo and notably its aristocratic elements is a potential danger for the courts. Thus if an executive can make his judicial choice only from a limited roster supplied him by a commission composed of the successful and conservative members of the community, then it is obvious that no one who deviates from the professional norm—labor lawyers, for example—need apply.[24]

If attorneys generally tend to agree with Justice Clark on the kinds of lawyers the plan favors as judges (whether this result

[19] The Missouri Bar Association received a 36 per cent response to an official survey it conducted a few years ago. The results of this survey were published by the bar in 1963 under the title of *The Missouri Bar—Prentice Hall Survey: A Motivational Study of Public Attitudes and Law Office Management.*

[20] *The 1964 Lawyer Statistical Report* (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1965) contains an analysis of the backgrounds and practices of lawyers in the United States. Chapter iii contains data on a state-by-state basis, and chapter iv has similar data for all cities over 100,000.

[21] The plan is also utilized to select judges to the three intermediate courts of appeal in the state, as well as to the Supreme Court, but there are far fewer cases tried in these courts than in the lower courts of Jackson County and St. Louis City-County. Moreover, not as many judges have been appointed to the appellate courts as to the lower courts of the two metropolitan areas over the twenty-five year operation of the plan.

[22] Pound uses the phrase "client-caretaker" (*op. cit.*, p. 184), as does James Willard Hurst in his study, *The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950), p. 366.

[23] Charles E. Clark and David M. Trubek, "The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition," *Yale Law Journal*, LXXI (1961), 272. (Trubek was Judge Clark's law clerk in 1961–62.)

[24] *Ibid.*

in fact occurs is a separate question), we might anticipate that lawyers representing the "settled institutions" and other upper-status clients in society will be more favorable to the plan than those handling the legal affairs of lower-status clients. In turn, the latter might be expected to look more favorably than the former on other methods commonly employed to select judges, such as popular elections,[25] where the potential influence of the groups they represent is presumably greater than it is in the Nonpartisan Court Plan.

In order to test this hypothesis, it is necessary to develop some kind of method to categorize attorneys on the basis of their clientele. One approach is to do it with reference to the fields of law in which lawyers specialize, since studies show that different social classes in our society have different kinds of legal problems.[26] Thus the upper classes are concerned with corporation and general business matters, as well as trusts, wills, estates, tax, and property problems. The middle classes have some of the same legal problems, particularly those involving property matters, but they are less concerned with corporate affairs and more with personal-liability suits and, particularly in the lower middle class, with domestic-relations problems as well. The latter two concerns also involve the lower classes, along with criminal matters, which are almost exclusively the problem of the social class.[27]

TABLE 1

SELECTED FIELDS OF LEGAL PRACTICE AND PREFERENCE ON JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHODS

Field of Practice*	Nonpartisan Court Plan (Per Cent)	Popular Election† (Per Cent)	Other‡ (Per Cent)	Not Ascertained (Per Cent)	Total (Per Cent)	No. of Cases
Defendants	83	9	5	3	100	129
Corporation and business	81	10	7	2	100	335
Real estate	81	10	4	5	100	86
Probate, trust, and taxation	76	14	7	3	100	253
Domestic relations	72	23	2	3	100	78
Labor	58	32	10	0	100	19
Plaintiffs	55	30	13	2	100	162
Criminal	54	41	5	0	100	37

* Includes lawyers listing the field exclusively or as one of the two or three major fields of their practice.

† Includes partisan and nonpartisan elections.

‡ Includes straight gubernatorial appointment, gubernatorial appointment with Senate confirmation, selection by lawyers only, and a scattering of other suggestions.

[25] A variety of methods besides the Nonpartisan Court Plan are utilized to choose state judges in the United States including gubernatorial appointment, legislative selection, nonpartisan and partisan elections, with about two-thirds of the states using one of the two elective systems. See *The Book of the States. 1964–65* (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1964), p. 126.

[26] For a study of the use of lawyers by middle- and working-class families, see Earl Koos, "The Family and the Law" (Rochester, N.Y.: National Legal Aid Association, 1949 [mimeographed]). A series of selections treating the issue is contained in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CCLXXXVII (1953), under the general title of "Judicial Administration and the Common Man." Problems involving legal aid for the poor are discussed in Emery Brownell, *Legal Aid in the United States* (Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Co., 1951) and the supplement to this volume, published in 1961. General treatments of use of lawyers' services by the various classes in our society are contained in F. James Davis, Henry H. Foster, Jr., C. Ray Jeffery, and E. Eugene Davis, *Society and the Law: New Meanings for an Old Profession* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 335 ff., and Albert Blaustein and Charles O. Porter, *The American Lawyer: A Summary of the Survey of the Legal Profession* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 43 ff.

[27] See Davis *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

In our questionnaire we asked each of the respondents to choose from a list of possibilities the fields (up to three) in which he had earned most of his income or salary since being admitted to practice. Each lawyer was also asked to indicate which of the alternative methods of choosing circuit-court judges he preferred: Nonpartisan Court Plan, straight gubernatorial appointment, or popular election by the people on a partisan or nonpartisan ballot. (An "other" alternative was also provided in which respondents could write in methods they preferred over the ones indicated.) Table 1 reveals the way the lawyers with different practice specialities responded to the various selection methods.

The table shows that there is a general preference for the Nonpartisan Court Plan among lawyers in all fields of specialty examined, indicating that members of the bar generally react favorably to this system which gives the legal profession a special role in the selection process. However, there are considerable differences in the choice of selection methods among lawyers practicing in the various fields of law, and these differences relate to the kind of clientele served. Defendants' lawyers representing "settled" institutions such as insurance companies and corporations in personal-injury cases are the strongest supporters of the plan, while those least favorable to it are criminal attorneys representing the lower classes. Between these extremes, the differences in preferences are in the general direction anticipated. Attorneys handling upper- and middle-class legal problems involving general corporate and business affairs, real estate, probate, trust, and taxation problems strongly favor the plan; those servicing middle- and lower-class legal concerns, such as domestic-relations issues, and particularly personal-injury matters (plaintiffs' lawyers represent injured persons in such suits), are less disposed toward it. Lawyers specializing in labor matters are a small group,[28] but their attitudes reflect those of a lower-middle-class practice and are generally consistent with the attitudes of the labor movement on this and similar issues.[29]

Although an analysis of the clientele of lawyers on the basis of their fields of legal specialty is generally valid, it also has some distinct limitations. Many lawyers do not concentrate all their practice in one field, and this means that the categories are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, some of the specialties are broad and thus obscure distinctions between kinds of legal problems included within them. For example, some attorneys with a corporate and business practice represent huge corporations, while others service partnerships or individual concerns. Likewise, the size and complexity of legal transactions involving real estate, probate, trust, and tax problems vary greatly. The domestic-relations issues of middle-class clients typically involve property settlements, while those of the lower class are more concerned with desertion and non-support of children. These factors contribute to the considerable overlap in the legal affairs of adjoining social classes which appears when the categorization is based on broad fields of legal practice.

More precise measures of the kinds of clients a lawyer services are provided by recent studies in the sociology of the legal profession. Such analyses indicate that status differences within the legal profession are related to those of clientele, that is,

[28] A recent article, "The Lawyers of Labor," *Fortune* (March, 1961), p. 213, estimates that some five hundred American attorneys serve unions, either as salaried "house counsel" or as lawyers in private practice who are on a retainer fee. *The 1964 Lawyer Statistical Report* (see n. 20), p. 26, sets the total number of lawyers in the United States in 1963 as 296,069.

[29] Organized labor was one of the few groups to oppose the introduction of the plan in Missouri, but not all unions joined in the opposition. See Peltason, *op. cit.*, p. 55. The labor movement has generally been hostile to governmental proposals that advocate the appointment, rather than the election, of officials in policy-making positions. E.g., labor has been one of the chief antagonists of the city-manager form of government.

the legal affairs of the most affluent and highest status institutions and individuals in the society are handled by attorneys who thereby attain the highest standing among their fellow lawyers.[80] Furthermore, such status differences among attorneys are associated with three major factors: the particular arrangement under which practice is carried on (that is, solo, firm, corporate, etc.), the legal education received by a lawyer, and the income he earns in that profession.[81] Therefore, under our general hypothesis, attorneys in large firms, those educated in prestigious law schools,[82] and those with the highest incomes[83] should be most favorably disposed toward the plan.

An analysis of the data indicates that factors associated with the social stratification of the legal profession also relate closely to preferences in judicial selection. In fact, the best measure of status in the legal community, namely, practice arrangement,[84] is also most relevant for selection attitudes. Lawyers most favorable to the plan are employed on the legal staffs of corporations and are partners in the larger law firms. Solo practitioners[85] are least disposed toward it, while small-firm and government lawyers hold an intermediate position. Similarly, persons who received their legal education at an outstate institution (there are no differences, however, between those who went to prestige and non-prestige schools there) favor the plan most, while those who attended local law schools with a nighttime curriculum[86] react the least favorably toward it. The attitudes of lawyers who were educated at instate, full-time law schools fall between the two positions. Income levels of lawyers also generally relate, as anticipated, to attitudes toward the plan, with the exception that many young attorneys who currently earn less than $10,000 a year are among its strongest supporters.[87] Many respondents in this group are presently associates in law firms and undoubtedly identify with senior partners and their firms' clients on the selection issue.

A precise measure of the association that exists between social status in the legal profession and preferences in judicial selection can be determined by combining the factors discussed above that relate most closely to such preferences, namely, practice arrangement and legal education. An index, reflecting both these indicators of status, was constructed by assigning points to respondents on the basis of their

[80] Carlin, "Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession," p. 12.

[81] *Ibid.* and the two articles by Ladinsky, *op. cit.*, emphasize these factors as important elements in the social stratification of the bars of New York City and Detroit.

[82] We realize there is no completely satisfactory criteria by which to evaluate law schools. We decided on Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan and Yale as the most prestigious ones on the basis of general reputation. Moreover, it is an objective fact that the latter four law schools, as of 1954 at least, had the largest law libraries in the nation (Blaustein and Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 206).

[83] The average net income of a lawyer over the period of the three years preceding the survey was used as the basis for the income data.

[84] Carlin suggests that size of firm is the "single most significant indicator of status" in the legal profession. ("Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession," p. 21.

[85] Paul Freund notes that the solo practitioner in the United States and the sole practitioner in Great Britain are at the opposite poles of the profession. In the latter country, he is the barrister who may not enter into a partnership, who deals with clients only through solicitors, and who enjoys a special prestige. Moreover, older, successful barristers have the highest earnings in the profession. See Freund, "The Legal Profession," *Daedalus,* XCII (1963), 689.

[86] Such law schools are sometimes called "multiple-division" law schools and frequently just "night" law schools. In 1963, about 90 per cent of the students enrolled in schools not approved by the American Bar Association were attending night classes compared to less than 10 per cent in morning classes. See *Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements in the United States Review of Legal Education* (Chicago: American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 1963), p. 19.

[87] Sixty-seven per cent of the lawyers earning less than $10,000 a year are under forty years of age, compared to 38 per cent of the total sample who are in this age group.

characteristics on these two matters.[38] Table 2 shows that the index is very relevant for preferences on judicial selection, with the percentage of the very-high-status respondents favoring the Nonpartisan Court Plan being almost twice that of those with very low status. Moreover, between these extremes, preferences correlate with status.

The above analysis indicates the relevance of kind of legal practice for lawyer preferences on methods of judicial selection. Another potential factor to be considered is the partisan affiliation of attorneys. Since the plan replaced the popular-election system in Missouri (this method of selection is still the dominant one in the United States) and was expressly designed to eliminate the influence of "politics" in choosing judges, one might expect the partisan orientation of attorneys to bear on the selection issue. For example, the oft-heard assertion that Democrats have more faith in the "common people" than Republicans might lead them to be less favorably disposed toward the plan than Republicans. Also, there are practical political considerations present, since both Kansas City and St. Louis are heavily Democratic, and, therefore, the popular election of judges would probably result in the selection of all Democratic judges in contrast to the situation under the plan whereby some Republicans have been appointed to the circuit courts of the two cities.[39] This might serve as an additional reason for the Republicans to favor the plan more than Democrats.

TABLE 2

SOCIAL STATUS (PRACTICE ARRANGEMENT AND LEGAL EDUCATION)* AND PREFERENCE ON METHOD OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

Social-Status Levels	Nonpartisan Court Plan (Per Cent)	Popular Election (Per Cent)	Other (Per Cent)	Not Ascertained (Per Cent)	Total (Per Cent)	No. of Cases
Very high...	92	3	3	2	100	108
High........	87	7	4	2	100	151
Medium.....	80	12	7	1	100	184
Low........	60	27	12	1	100	139
Very low....	47	41	12	0	100	76

* Respondents for whom there was no information on either practice arrangement or legal education were eliminated from the analysis.

Table 3 contains data to test the relevance of party affiliation for attitudes on methods of judicial selection. It seeks to determine not only whether more Republicans generally favor the plan than Democrats but also whether this tendency holds

[38] A three-point scale was used for each factor, with three points assigned to partners of law firms with six or more members, associates of law firms, and attorneys employed by corporations; two points to partners in firms from two to five members and attorneys employed by the government; and one point for solo practitioners. Similarly, three points are assigned to respondents who attended law schools outside the state; two points to those who went to instate, full-time law schools; and one point to those who attended instate, night law schools. A combination of these two scales means that the largest possible number of points is six and the smallest, two. The five categories of social status ranging from six through two points are designated "very high," "high," "medium," "low," and "very low."

[39] The Republicans have not held the governorship in Missouri since 1944. Since 1953, however, seven Republicans have been appointed to the circuit courts in Kansas City and St. Louis by three Democratic governors. One study in West Virginia showed that, under the partisan elective system there, judges won by a majority which, on the average, deviated from the party vote by not more than 1 per cent. See Claude J. Davis, *Judicial Selection in West Virginia* (Publication No. 25 [Morgantown, W. Va.: Bureau for Government Research, 1959], p. 26).

true within particular categories of social status that were previously shown to bear closely on selection preferences. For example, a more favorable attitude of Republicans toward the plan might actually be a reflection of the fact that more of them practice in larger firms and went outstate for their legal education, while more Democrats are in solo practice and attended a local night law school. By holding constant social-status levels reflecting both these factors, it is possible to ascertain whether partisan affiliation is an independent factor associated with attitudes on judicial selection.

Table 3 shows that partisan affiliation has limited relevance for preferences on judicial selection among Kansas City and St. Louis lawyers. More Republicans do prefer the Nonpartisan Court Plan than Democrats, but the differences between them are not great. Moreover, even these differences tend to "wash out" to a considerable degree when social status in the profession is held constant. Thus, preferences on judicial selection among metropolitan lawyers in Missouri relate much more closely to professional factors than to political-party loyalties.

TABLE 3

PARTISAN AFFILIATION,* SOCIAL STATUS,* AND PREFERENCE ON METHOD OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

	Nonpartisan Court Plan (Per Cent)	Popular Election (Per Cent)	Other (Per Cent)	Not Ascertained (Per Cent)	Total (Per Cent)	No. of Cases
	Partisan Affiliation					
Republicans	83	11	5	1	100	324
Democrats	68	20	10	2	100	381
Independents†	73	16	10	1	100	26
	Partisan Affiliation by Social-Status Level					
Very high:						
Republicans	93	3	4	0	100	69
Democrats	89	3	8	0	100	38
High:						
Republicans	91	5	3	1	100	76
Democrats	83	9	6	2	100	69
Medium:						
Republicans	85	8	7	0	100	74
Democrats	76	15	7	2	100	95
Low:						
Republicans	66	17	12	5	100	41
Democrats	58	30	11	1	100	92
Very low:						
Republicans	50	45	5	0	100	22
Democrats	47	37	16	0	100	49

* Those respondents whose partisan affiliation, practice arrangement, or legal education are not known are not included in the table.

† Since there are so few respondents in this category, they are not included in the subanalysis by status level.

One final professional matter we explored in relation to preferences on judicial selection was trial experience. Our general hypothesis was that the more often attorneys appear in court, the more likely it would be that their general attitudes on judicial selection would be intensified. For

example, those attorneys in practice specialities generally disposed toward the plan, such as defendants' and corporation lawyers, would be even more favorable to the plan if they had had extensive trial experience than if they had not. Conversely, attorneys in fields of practice that did not support the plan as much, such as those handling criminal and plaintiffs' work, would be even less favorable to it if they had been in court frequently. Table 4 contains the data to test these assumptions.

TABLE 4

SELECTED FIELDS OF LEGAL PRACTICE, TRIAL EXPERIENCE,* AND PREFERENCE ON METHOD OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

Trial Experience by Field of Practice	Nonpartisan Court Plan (Per Cent)	Popular Election (Per Cent)	Other (Per Cent)	Not Ascertained (Per Cent)	Total (Per Cent)	No. of Cases
Defendants:						
Less than 100 cases	86	10	3	1	100	88
100 Cases or more	77	11	9	3	100	35
Corporation:						
Less than 100 cases	85	8	5	2	100	238
100 Cases or more	67	18	10	5	100	79
Real estate:						
Less than 100 cases	86	8	4	2	100	51
100 Cases or more	67	19	7	7	100	27
Probate and trust:						
Less than 100 cases	81	10	7	2	100	169
100 Cases or more	60	28	7	5	100	67
Domestic relations:						
Less than 100 cases	72	23	3	2	100	39
100 Cases or more	50	44	3	3	100	38
Labor:						
Less than 100 cases	73	18	0	9	100	11
100 Cases or more	38	50	12	0	100	8
Plaintiffs:						
Less than 100 cases	64	23	11	2	100	90
100 Cases or more	41	39	11	9	100	70
Criminal:						
Less than 100 cases	81	19	0	0	100	16
100 Cases or more	30	60	5	5	100	20

* Trial experience refers to that before the circuit court. Respondents whose trial experience was not ascertained are not included in the table.

Our hypothesis concerning the effect of trial experience on attorneys in fields of practice generally less favorable to the plan was confirmed. The contrast in attitudes between labor, plaintiffs', and criminal lawyers who have tried more than one hundred cases with those who have not is striking. Preference for the Nonpartisan Court Plan falls below the 50 per cent level for active trial attorneys in all three fields, and, in the case of active labor and criminal lawyers, more of them prefer popular election of judges than the Nonpartisan Court Plan. However, the preferences of the active trial attorneys in fields generally disposed toward the plan, such as defendants' and corporation specialties, are precisely the opposite of what we had anticipated: those in court frequently are less likely to favor the plan than attorneys in those fields without such an extensive trial practice. In fact, this was true in all the fields analyzed, including real estate, probate, and trust, as well as domestic relations. Why this should be so is not known at this point,[40] since the study thus far

[40] One possibility we explored was that age was the real factor associated with greater opposition

has merely identified certain factors as being associated with preferences on methods of judicial selection. The following section carries the analysis a step further by examining some of the reasons why lawyers favor or oppose the Nonpartisan Court Plan.

LAWYER ATTITUDES TOWARD OPERATION OF THE PLAN

In our personal interviews with lawyers, we sought not only their preferences concerning methods of judicial selection but also their attitudes on how the Nonpartisan Court Plan had operated over the years. By probing with open-ended questions, we tried to determine the reasons why lawyers supported or opposed the plan, and specifically how they felt it functioned compared to the elective system. From their responses we were able to identify certain common consequences lawyers associate with the operation of the plan. These consequences relate to three major aspects of the plan's operation: the process by which persons are chosen for the bench, the kinds of individuals who are selected under this process, and the effect the plan has on the behavior of judges once they are in office.

With respect to the selection process, two general reactions occurred again and again in the interviews. One was that the plan had succeeded for the most part in doing what the bar leaders who developed it had sought to do, namely, taken "politics" out of the selection of judges. However, other lawyers saw the process differently. Many of them suggested that changing the selection system from popular elections to the Nonpartisan Court Plan had not eliminated "politics" but merely substituted bar politics and gubernatorial politics for the traditional politics of party leaders and machines.

As far as the kinds of persons who become judges under the plan are concerned, again the lawyers we interviewed hold two disparate conceptions. Supporters of the plan are inclined to think it recruits "better" judges than the elective system does. The major reasons advanced for this consequence include the greater willingness of able lawyers to seek positions on the bench under a system that spares them the rigors, expense, and uncertainties of elective campaigns, as well as the more rational nature of the selection process itself. Many attorneys who oppose the plan agree that it results in the selection of different kinds of lawyers to the bench than the elective system does but believe that defendants' lawyers and those representing corporate clients are favored by the system.

Again there is agreement among lawyers that the election provisions of the plan whereby judges run "on their records" against no opponent in effect gives members of the bench life tenure and that this fact has important consequences for their behavior in office. However, supporters and opponents of the plan emphasize different aspects of the independence that Nonpartisan Court Plan judges enjoy. The former see it as permitting them to make decisions based on the merits of the case rather than subjecting them to pressures that elective judges must often face; the latter say it tends to make judges arbitrary in the treatment of lawyers and laymen with business before the courts.

We took these general reactions to the operation of the plan on which there appeared to be substantial disagreement among supporters and opponents of the plan whom we personally interviewed, and we framed six statements containing these assertions. Each respondent in our sample was asked to indicate his reaction to each

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to the plan, and the fact that the older attorneys had been in court more often made it appear that trial experience was the important variable. However, an analysis of the data demonstrated that this hypothesis was not correct: within levels of trial experience, differences in attitudes based on age are not significant, but when age is held constant there are marked differences in preferences concerning the plan between respondents with and without extensive trial experience.

statement, utilizing a five-category response ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Thus general attitudes of favorableness, neutrality, or unfavorableness toward the operation of the Nonpartisan Court Plan are measured by a six-item, Likert-type scale.[41]

The results indicate that lawyers as a group vary considerably in their reactions to the six statements concerning the plan. They feel most strongly about those aspects of its operation concerned with the kinds of individuals chosen under the process (it recruits better judges and does not favor the selection of defendants' and corporation lawyers) and the effect the plan has on the behavior of judges once they are in office (it encourages judges to make decisions based on the merits of the case and does not tend to make them arbitrary in the treatment of lawyers and witnesses). They are less agreed on the functioning of the selection process itself. The respondents are fairly evenly divided on the issue of whether the plan has taken the "politics" out of judicial selection. Moreover, more attorneys agreed than disagreed with the statement concerning bar and gubernatorial politics, even though it was considered to be unfavorable to the plan on the basis of its source. (It came primarily from persons we personally interviewed who opposed the plan.) One explanation for the result (suggested by comments respondents added to the questionnaire) is that some attorneys do not regard this feature of the operation of the plan as unfavorable if it is compared with what they consider to be the only alternative possibility, namely, the use of traditional party politics to select judges; in other words, they feel that politics of some kind is inevitable, but they prefer that engendered by the plan over that produced by an elective system. Therefore, this assertion should be considered the least helpful in distinguishing lawyer attitudes toward the operation of the plan, even though it meets the test of discriminating sufficiently between the attitudes of persons who are generally favorable or unfavorable to the plan.[42]

It will be recalled that lawyers practicing in certain fields of law clearly preferred the plan as the best method of selecting judges, while others are considerably less disposed toward it. For example, defendants' and corporation lawyers, who handle the legal affairs of upper-class clientele, are its greatest advocates, while plaintiffs' and criminal lawyers, who represent lower-class clients, support it far less. Moreover, it will be remembered that lawyers with extensive trial experience in all practice specialties (those highly favorable to the plan, as well as those less favorable)

[41] Agreement with the assertions concerning the plan's taking "politics" out of judicial selection, its recruitment of "better" judges, and its permitting judges to make decisions based on the merits of the case are considered favorable attitudes toward the plan, as are disagreement with its alleged negative features, namely, substituting bar and gubernatorial politics for party and machine politics, favoring the selection of defendants' and corporation lawyers as judges, and contributing to the arbitrary treatment of lawyers and laymen by members of the bench.

[42] To test whether the six statements are internally consistent, that is, the extent to which the attitudes on each of them are consistent with those on the others, a score ranging from one to five (from least to most favorable to the plan) was assigned for each statement, and then a total score on all six items was compiled for each respondent. The respondents were then divided into high- and low-scoring groups (approximately the upper and lower quintiles) on the basis of their total scores. The discriminatory power of each statement, determined by comparing the mean scores of the high- and low-scoring groups on each item, is as follows:

Mean Score of:	Statement Number*					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Upper one-fifth	4.8	4.8	4.3	4.4	4.4	3.8
Lower one-fifth	2.4	2.7	1.8	2.4	2.0	1.7
Discriminatory power	2.4	2.1	2.5	2.0	2.4	2.1

* 1, Recruits better judges; 2, permits decisions on merits of case; 3, takes "politics" out of judicial selection; 4, favors selection of defendants' and corporation lawyers as judges; 5, tends to make judges arbitrary in treatment of lawyers and laymen, 6, substitutes bar and gubernatorial politics for party politics.

are less inclined to prefer the plan for the selection of judges than attorneys in the same specialties with less time in the courtroom. A comparison of the attitudes of these various groups toward specific consequences of the plan indicates what particular aspects of its operation they regard with most favor and disfavor. Table 5 provides this data for those statements that relate most closely to matters of legal practice, namely, the kinds of judges chosen under the plan and its effect on the behavior of the judges once in office.

TABLE 5

SELECTED FIELDS OF PRACTICE, TRIAL EXPERIENCE,* AND ATTITUDES† TOWARD CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OPERATION OF THE NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN

	Recruits Better Judges (Per Cent)		Permits Decision on Merits of Case (Per Cent)		Favors Selection of Defendants' and Corporation Attorneys as Judges (Per Cent)		Tends toward Arbitrary Treatment of Lawyers and Laymen (Per Cent)		No. of Cases
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	
Field of practice:									
Defendants	83	8	81	10	11	78	16	64	129
Corporation	81	7	78	6	14	64	15	64	335
Plaintiffs	54	29	62	22	44	33	43	33	162
Criminal	54	22	51	27	43	41	49	27	37
Trial experience:									
Less than 100 cases	76	9	76	10	18	57	19	56	485
100 Cases or more	62	26	64	18	29	53	38	41	217

* Trial experience refers to that before the circuit court. Respondents whose trial experience was not ascertained are not included in the table.

† A favorable attitude to the plan is indicated by agreement with the first two statements and disagreement with the latter two statements. Responses of "strongly agree" and "agree" are combined in the table, as are those of "disagree" and "strongly disagree."

The most obvious differences of opinion concerning the plan's operation involve the assertions that it favors the selection of defendants' and corporation attorneys as judges and tends to make judges arbitrary in their treatment of lawyers and laymen. Attitudes toward the former statement definitely reflect the practice specialties of the respondents. Defendants' and corporation lawyers, the groups alleged to be favored as judges by the plan, feel that this is not the case, while the plaintiffs' and criminal attorneys believe it is; moreover, the two groups that have the most disparate views on this matter (the defendants' and the plaintiffs' lawyers) are also the ones most directly involved in it, since they are courtroom rivals in personal-injury litigation. The charge of arbitrary treatment of lawyers and laymen draws most support from criminal lawyers but also is generally believed by plaintiffs' lawyers, as well as by a number of lawyers in all practice specialties who have an extensive trial experience. One would not be justified in assuming that familiarity breeds

Table 5 indicates that attorneys who are less supportive of the plan as a method of selecting judges, namely, plaintiffs' and criminal attorneys, as well as those in all practice specialties who appear in court more often, are less favorable toward all four aspects of the plan's operation than are corporation and defendants' lawyers and those who have more limited trial experience. However, all the groups examined agree that the plan results in the recruitment of better judges and permits decisions to be made on the merits of the case.

contempt, but it does appear that attorneys who are in court the most frequently are more sensitive to the way judges treat them and laymen than are their colleagues who do not appear before judges as often.[43]

DISCUSSION

The attitudes of lawyers toward judicial selection are shaped by certain basic professional values. First, there is a long-standing philosophy among leaders of the bar that the expertise of the lawyer extends beyond the handling of legal affairs of society to matters of judicial administration; this credo holds that professional judgments on the selection of members of the bench are likely to be more objective and more knowledgeable than those of political leaders and the electorate. Of equal consideration is the duty of the professional man to his client. Such a duty requires him not only to present the client's case to its best advantage but also to use his influence to the end that men are chosen for the bench who will give his client's interests full and fair consideration when judicial decisions are made.

Some members of the profession experience little or no conflict between these professional values in making judgments on judicial selection. The lawyers in the upper social strata of the bar who service the legal affairs of the most prestigeful institutions and individuals in society see no threat to such interests in the plan the profession has developed to implement its judgments on who should ascend to the bench. However, lawyers from other elements of the bar representing lower-status groups are likely to experience cross-pressures at work: they have been educated and socialized in a profession that makes claims of special competence in selecting judges, but they also represent clients whose interests they frequently believe are not fully protected by a plan they conceive to favor the selection of conservative members of the bar as judges.

Our inquiries into the selection process under the plan also indicate that other matters besides the interests of clients help shape the attitudes of lawyers toward judicial selection. The adversary nature of litigation tends to make natural rivals of plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, and each group has developed a set of rationalizations to support its cause. The former conceive of themselves as protectors of the "little man" against unscrupulous insurance companies and claims adjusters who try to get injured persons to settle claims out of court at below their real value, while the defendants' lawyers often perceive plaintiffs' attorneys as "ambulance chasers" who attempt to get "something for nothing" by blackmailing established institutions into settling claims rather than bearing the cost and inconvenience of litigation. These antagonisms, in turn, result in plaintiffs' lawyers being suspicious of the plan as a selection method simply because their courtroom opponents, the defendants' attorneys, are for it.

Cleavages in the legal profession, however, go deeper than those occasioned by personal-injury litigation and affect attorneys who never appear in the courtroom. The disparate styles of practice of large-firm lawyers and solo practitioners, and the fact that they have so little contact in the profession with each other,[44] leads

[43] In contrast to the situation among metropolitan lawyers, an analysis of attitudes of lawyers practicing in outstate areas of Missouri where judges are elected shows that those with the most extensive trial practices are also most in favor of the elective system. Thus one cannot conclude that familiarity breeds contempt, that is, that lawyers most experienced with any system are necessarily most opposed to it. Comments made on some of the questionnaires indicate that lawyers resent the fact that the independence that circuit judges enjoy under the plan gives them "the power to press attorneys to trial prematurely" and that such judges "should be responsive to the convenience of litigants and the Bar." Presumably, elective judges are more inclined to take the desires of these groups into account on on such matters.

[44] Carlin, "Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession," p. 19, discusses the lack of

them to regard each other with what one author calls "mutually derogating images."[45] Lawyers occupying lower-status positions in the profession are inclined to regard those in higher positions as "bluebloods" or as individuals "without a heart," while many members of the latter group display a kind of patronizing attitude toward those who "have never made it in the profession." Again, such perceptions tend to polarize the attitudes of lawyers on judicial selection, particularly since upper-status attorneys were the ones who originally worked to get the plan adopted and have been its most vigorous advocates over the years.[46]

The findings here have implications for the current national reform movement led by the American Judicature Society designed to spread the plan to court systems throughout the nation. There are difficulties at best in persuading the electorate to forsake its right of electing judges, a tradition that dates in this country to the Jacksonian period, particularly when party leaders who benefit from the elective system are present to galvanize opposition to change. The task becomes even more difficult if the legal profession itself is divided on the matter. Attempts to have the plan adopted in the large urban areas where the abuses of the elective system are considered to be most flagrant by leaders of the movement may encounter resistance not only from the party organizations there but also from some elements of the metropolitan bar itself.[47]

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professional and social contact between the various strata of the New York bar. The same general situation prevails in the two metropolitan communities in Missouri.

[45] Smigel, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

[46] For a fuller development of this point, including an analysis of the activities of rival bar associations in both Kansas City and St. Louis that represent different social strata of the profession, see Richard A. Watson, Rondal G. Downing, and Frederick C. Spiegel, "Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXI (March, 1967).

[47] It is interesting to note that the states to date that have followed Missouri in the adoption of the plan, namely, Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska, are not highly urbanized.

The Cocktail Lounge: A Study of Heterosexual Relations in a Public Organization[1]

Julian Roebuck and S. Lee Spray

ABSTRACT

This paper covers a body of data in a relatively neglected area of research, namely, the social life found in a high-status public organization. Using a variety of methods (participant observation, interviews, having the employees of the organization systematically gather data on the clientele), it was found that the cocktail lounge was frequented by regular patrons who engaged in organized activities around which stable expectations for "proper" behavior had developed. The major function of the cocktail lounge was the facilitation of casual sexual affairs between high-status married men and young, unattached women. The organization of the cocktail lounge is described, and the relationship between activities in the lounge and outside social ties is discussed.

An important setting for social contact among urban residents from the upper-middle and upper classes is the cocktail lounge. Despite this obvious fact, little, if any, research has been done on such establishments. The reasons for the surprising paucity of data on this social setting seem to stem from (1) the assumption that the cocktail lounge caters to an individualized, transient population and (2) the assumption that any organized group behavior found in such a setting is for instrumental purposes. As a result, the literature includes materials on the neighborhood bar and on taverns and restaurants where musicians, entertainers, prostitutes, criminals, and others gather for a variety of purposes. There are virtually no data available on the social organization of the plush cocktail lounge.[2]

Who frequents these quiet, well-furnished establishments where the employees are well dressed, where the bartenders often have college degrees, where the patrons are well dressed and well behaved, where formal entertainment is limited to soft music, and where one never sees a uniformed policeman? The existing popular literature suggests that attendance at a cocktail lounge is a pattern of the affluent but lonely transients without their spouses, alcoholics, call girls, young people out for kicks, men and women looking for spouses, etc. Undoubtedly all these types do frequent cocktail lounges. But is this the only support base for such an establishment, or does it, like the working-class bar, also draw support from persons whose attendance is sufficiently frequent as to classify them as regulars? If so, who are they, and what are their reasons for going to the lounge? The purpose of this paper is to provide tentative answers to these questions by presenting data gathered in the course of a two-year study of an upper- and upper-middle-class cocktail lounge in a middle-sized West Coast city (250,000 population).

[1] The authors are indebted to David Riesman, Robert J. Potter, Jeanne Watson Eisenstadt, John Marx, and Thomas Cottle for their helpful comments on this paper.

[2] Most of the literature dealing with establishments of this type focuses either on the extent to which the tavern or bar contributes to various "social problems" or on the deviant behavior of the patrons, rather than on the organization of the establishment. For a notable exception to this statement, see David Gottlieb, "The Neighborhood Tavern and Cocktail Lounge: A Study of Class Differences," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXII (May, 1957), 559–62.

METHODS

Our interests led to the adoption of the following methods of investigation. First, a variety of persons who were knowledgeable about the city were interviewed regarding the presence of "high-class" cocktail lounges in the city. Those contacted included cab drivers, bartenders, bar owners, employees of the local Chamber of Commerce, businessmen, psychiatrists, college professors, ministers, and restaurateurs. Consensus was reached on two cocktail lounges in the central area as meeting the criteria outlined above. The attributes most often mentioned in identifying these lounges as "high class" were: (1) the quality of service was polite and attentive; (2) the clientele included successful business and professional men who frequented these bars at the cocktail hour (and later); and (3) young, attractive, sociable females were generally present. One of the two cocktail lounges was located in what was generally considered the finest hotel in the city, and it was under the general supervision of the manager of the hotel, who agreed to co-operate in the study. With the help of the manager, the co-operation of all the employees of the lounge—four bartenders (three of them college graduates), two cocktail waitresses, and a female pianist—was secured.[8] After sufficient rapport was established, the purpose of the project was explained to each employee individually, and the anonymity of their responses was guaranteed. At the same time, the necessity of keeping the data collection procedures and all information absolutely confidential was stressed. The employees initially served as informants and were told to work alone and to reveal their information to no one but the researcher.

The first step was to secure information on the characteristics of the lounge patrons. To this end, each of the employees was given four cards and instructed to list the regular male patrons on one card and the regular female patrons on another card. A "regular" was defined as a person who visited the lounge at least once a week. On the remaining two cards, the employees were instructed to list the irregular male and female patrons; an "irregular" was defined as a man or woman who visited the lounge at least once every three weeks. The employees were instructed to withhold their lists from each other so the ratings would be independent. When all the lists had been completed, they were pooled and discussed by all of the employees, the manager, and the researcher. Unanimous agreement was reached on the four lists of names composed of twenty female regulars, twenty male regulars, ten female irregulars, and ten male irregulars. Those listed were well known to all members of the group. The list of patrons was used to construct a set of cards, each containing the code number of the patron and a list of variables (22 for the men and 24 for the women) considered important to the research objectives. A set of cards was

[8] Several factors contributed to the excellent co-operation of the employees of the lounge. First, the hotel manager was a long-time friend of one of the researchers and, hence, accepted the promise of confidentiality without question. Second, the manager had had a great deal of experience managing large, exclusive hotels throughout California and elsewhere and did not feel threatened in any way by the researchers' desire to gather data on a lounge that even the manager felt was rather typical of establishments of its kind. Third, two of the bartenders were part-time graduate students in sociology who used their experiences in the lounge to develop Masters' theses which were later written under the supervision of one of the researchers. A third bartender was a college graduate who had taken courses in sociology, understood the research objectives, and was interested in participating in the research project. These three employees were invaluable aids in assuring the other employees that the research was important and that the researchers could be trusted. Finally, it quickly became known to the patrons that the observer was a college professor (though they never knew that he was doing research in the lounge). While this fact made him somewhat "different" from the other patrons, it also carried a certain amount of prestige and gave him a "license" to ask questions which were not normally asked by other patrons.

given to each employee, and the variables were defined and explained to them. The instructions were for each employee to keep the cards behind the bar and to record information acquired by listening to conversations or by occasionally asking direct questions. Information coming directly from the patrons was to be checked with information coming from other patrons about their peers in the lounge. The employees were also instructed to use any information about patrons gained from sources outside the lounge (e.g., from acquaintances of the patrons, from reading about them in the newspapers, or by driving by a patron's home and rating his house by type and neighborhood). Both direct and indirect information were recorded immediately after the period of observation. At the end of two years, the cards were examined and edited by the researcher and the hotel manager. Few inconsistencies were found in the data on each card. Since the manager was well acquainted with the study sample, he was able to resolve the few inconsistencies found.

The second method of data gathering was that of participant observation. By "participant observation" we mean that the fieldworker observed and participated in the group in the sense that he had durable social relations with members of the study group.[4] The researcher was present a minimum of five hours a week in the lounge for the two-year duration of the study. A minimum of two visits per week was maintained during this period, with all hours of the day from 4:00 P.M. to 2:00 A.M. and all days of the week being covered systematically. In addition, each of the sixty members of the study sample were informally interviewed on three separate occasions over the two-year observation period, with each interview lasting approximately one hour.[5]

For the purpose of analysis, the data on regulars and irregulars of each sex were combined, since the data collected by the lounge employees and those obtained by the researcher in the interviews revealed no differences between them.

FINDINGS

In analyzing the data, it was apparent that the patrons studied spent a sufficiently large amount of time in the lounge to warrant classifying their behavior as habitual. (The men averaged ten visits per week and the women six visits per week.) The fact that the initial sample of sixty persons remained available, without attrition, for the entire two-year period of observation indicates that the voluntary relationships in the lounge were highly stable. Clearly, the lounge was an important center of activity for these people.

In attempting to assess the importance of engaging in the activities of the cocktail lounge, two broad alternative interpretations were available. The first alternative, which is consistent with the deviant-behavior approach to the study of activities in settings of this type, would start with two assumptions: (1) the activities in the lounge would be related to the disruption of other social ties (e.g., family, occupation, community, etc.), and (2) the importance of the lounge to the patrons would be related to the extent to which the individual has failed to achieve primary goals in other settings and has turned to the lounge as a second-best alternative setting. The second alternative, and the one considered most consistent with the findings, was to consider the importance of participating in the activities of the lounge to be related to obtaining gratifications in this

[4] For a discussion of this particular definition of "participant observation," see Morris Zelditch, Jr., "Some Methodological Problems of Field Studies," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (March, 1962), 566–76.

[5] These informal interviews seemed to have no adverse effect on the on-going observations that were being made. For an interesting discussion of interviewing during a period of field observation, see Howard Becker, "Interviewing Medical Students," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXII (September, 1956), 199–201.

setting that were not possible in other settings.

An examination of these two alternatives led to a focus on three questions: (1) What kinds of social ties characterize the regular patrons of the lounge? (2) What kinds of goals were the individuals pursuing in this particular social setting? (3) How did the social organization of the lounge contribute to the attainment of personal goals at a level sufficient to retain the participation of these persons over an extended period of time?

We will first consider some of the major social characteristics of these people. In addition to the findings presented in Table 1, it should be added that two-thirds of the men had an annual income over \$10,000 (the top being \$75,000) with the remainder earning between \$8,500 and \$10,000. (None of the employed women earned as much as \$9,000 annually.) With regard to religion, two-thirds of the men were Catholics and the remainder were Protestants, while 60 per cent of the women were Catholics and the remainder were Protestants. All the respondents expressed a belief in God, and all attended church.[6] Finally, we had the employees of the lounge rate the women patrons as to their relative attractiveness. The following distribution resulted: "Very Sharp" = 30 per cent; "Sharp" = 50 per cent; "Average" = 20 per cent.[7]

Table 1 clearly indicates a general difference between the men and women in terms of social status, although none of the patrons was lower class in origin or current position. Specifically, the men who frequent the cocktail lounge tend to be older, married men of high-class position

TABLE 1

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

Variable	Men (N = 30)	Women* (N = 30)
Marital status:		
Single	13%	60%
Married	70	0
Divorced or separated	17	40
Age (median: men = 39; women = 24):		
20 and under	0	13
21–25	0	37
26–30	7	37
31–35	27	13
36–40	27	0
41–45	23	0
46 and over	16	0
Occupation of father:		
Professional	37	30
Manager, official, proprietor	33	10
Clerical and sales	10	27
Craftsman	7	13
Farm manager and owner	13	20
Education of respondent:		
College graduate	53	20
Attended college	20	40
High school graduate	27	33
Less than high school graduate	0	7
Home ownership of respondent:		
Owned own home:		
Upper class (dwelling and neighborhood, \$60,000 homes)	23	0
Upper-middle class (dwelling and neighborhood, \$40,000–\$59,000 homes)	17	0
Middle class (dwelling and neighborhood, \$30,000–\$39,000 homes)	37	3
Rented apartment	23	83
Lived with parents	0	13
Occupation of respondent:		
Professional	40	10
Manager, official, or proprietor	53	....
Farm owner and manager	7	....
Secretary	....	33
Clerk	....	17
Cocktail waitress	....	17
Service worker	....	3
College student	....	20

* The percentages do not always total to 100 because of rounding error.

[6] All of the respondents were Caucasian, and none were members of ethnic minority groups. With regard to nativity, twenty-six of the males and twenty-seven of the females were born in urban areas outside of California, while the remaining three females were born in rural areas outside of California.

[7] The terms used to classify the women as to their attractiveness were those given by the employees of the lounge. While these are very general categories, they were commonly defined by the employees of the lounge inasmuch as they were able to reach complete consensus on which of the three categories each of the women should be placed in.

while the women are young, attractive, unattached and of somewhat lower-class position. What influence does this status differential have on the development of social relationships in the lounge? Does it provide support for a distinct sex-role differentiation in the cocktail lounge that the patrons believe is absent in their relationships outside the lounge? Or is it simply irrelevant because the regular patrons frequent the lounge to engage in "retreatist," "criminalistic," or "escapist" sexual deviation and drinking behavior? To answer the last question first, the interviews revealed that none of these men and women

TABLE 2

PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS OF REGULAR PATRONS

Type of Personality*	Men ($N=30$)	Women† ($N=30$)
Stable.........	80%	80%
Unstable......	20	20

* While the terms "stable" and "unstable" may not be satisfactory from a clinical point of view, they were the terms used by the employees of the lounge and seemed to be very meaningful to them. Using these terms, the employees were able to achieve complete agreement in classifying the patrons of the lounge.

† Two of the women were referred to as "Very Unstable," while none of the men was referred to in this manner.

considered themselves, or were considered by their peers, to have a drinking problem. This was further supported by the employees of the lounge who believed that only four of the men and four of the women could be considered to be relatively heavy drinkers. Similarly, while both men and women admitted to occasional sexual relations with other regular patrons, none of the women were considered, either by themselves or by the employees and other patrons, to be prostitutes or call girls. None of the patrons had a delinquent or criminal history. None of the male patrons had illegitimate children, and only one female had an illegitimate child. Finally, with regard to personal aberration, we had the employees classify the patrons according to their personality stability. The results shown in Table 2 indicate that the vast majority of both the men and women were considered to be reliable, predictable persons.

The evidence indicates, then, that the regular patrons of the cocktail lounge were not anomic, personally disorganized or disturbed individuals driven to frequent the lounge for deviant purposes. Rather, these people seemed to visit the lounge because it was a preferred recreational pattern. Furthermore, this particular preference did not seem to set them apart from other persons of similar social status. Finally, the other activities they mentioned as preferred recreational activities were quite standard. For example, when the women were asked to list their preferred recreational patterns, they most often mentioned dancing, going to parties, and listening to jazz music, while the men mentioned playing golf, fishing, and hunting. Given these findings, the important question becomes one of determining what it is about the cocktail lounge that makes it such a desirable setting for these individuals.

In the interviews, each respondent was asked to list his reasons for frequenting the cocktail lounge. Table 3 presents the answers given by the men and women. In examining these findings, it is apparent that they are direct extensions of the various dimensions of feminine and masculine roles. That is, the emphasis the women placed on financial dependence and the maintenance of a "good reputation" combined with the emphasis the men placed on having earned the rewards of relaxation with attractive young women portrays sex-role differentiation in a heightened form. The fact that a great emphasis was placed on conducting these heterosexual activities between married men and unattached women according to a specific code of "proper" behavior clearly indicates that the behavior was institutionalized. Basically, what

these men and women had done was to accept the definition of appropriate behavior for one age level (youth) and certain settings (marital) and apply them to new age categories (those represented in the lounge) and new social settings (the lounge and hotel). The popularity of the cocktail lounge, then, stems from the fact that it is a setting in which casual sexual affairs between unattached women and higher-class men can be conducted in a context of respectability. From the standpoint of the patrons, these activities tend to be viewed more in terms of reaffirming social identities than rejecting social norms.

The above argument implies that participating in the activities of the cocktail lounge may not necessarily disrupt marital and other social ties. To gain evidence on this point, we asked the respondents to evaluate their behavior in and related to the lounge. The men explained their behavior in the following terms:

1. They accepted part of their behavior as wrong in a technical-legal sense but not in a social sense.

2. They insisted that certain extenuating circumstances (e.g., busy wives, family pressures, business pressures, "cold" wives, etc.) created a need for extracurricular activities in the cocktail lounge.

3. They deserved romantic interludes with attractive, decent women because earlier in life they did not have the time for such interludes, and such women were not available to them.

4. They did not permit themselves or the young women with whom they consorted to become emotionally involved.

5. They maintained friendly relationships with the young women which were devoid of exploitation.

6. The women were not *virgins*.

7. They were discreet and protective of the women and themselves in securing safe places of assignation and in preventing pregnancy.

8. They believed in the double standard.

9. They remained good husbands and fathers at home where they were loved and loved in return.

10. They did not feel guilty but would feel shame if caught.

The female respondents' rationale for consorting with older married men, as reported during the interviews, closely parallels the reasons they gave for frequenting the cocktail lounge. In sum, with men who were older, married, sophisticated, protective, and friendly, they could enjoy sex and companionship in pleasant and discreet circumstances without having to play a competitive, exploitive courtship game. They all insisted that they were not interested in breaking up any man's home. Moreover, they did not feel that their behavior in the lounge in any way precluded or endangered their social and occupational roles in the larger community.[8] As in the case of

TABLE 3

REASONS FOR FREQUENTING THE COCKTAIL LOUNGE

Reasons Stated by Respondents	Percentage*
Male ($N=30$):†	
To meet attractive women	73
To relax	23
To meet male friends	20
To meet business acquaintances	14
Female ($N=30$):‡	
To meet men with money who could take her out	48
To meet men who would keep quiet about sexual and drinking behavior	19
To meet men who did not want to get involved	15
To enjoy the company of older men	10
To meet eligible men for marriage	7

* The percentage figures do not total 100 because multiple reasons for frequenting the lounge could be given by each respondent.

† Total number of reasons = 51. Total number of sex-linked reasons = 48.

‡ Total number of reasons = 52. Total number of sex-linked reasons = 52.

[8] A follow-up study, conducted two years after the completion of the original study, indicated that the women's views were correct. By this time, slightly more than one-half of the women were married and no longer frequented the cocktail lounge. By all available evidence, the women had

the male respondents, the women expressed no guilt feelings about their behavior but did express the fear of shame if exposed.

Given these findings we have to conclude that participation in the activities of the cocktail lounge does not lead to a disruption of family ties. Further, it seems clear that the married men were not driven to participate in the activities of the lounge by disintegrating marriage and family relations. Finally, if the cocktail lounge does provide a setting in which gratifications can be obtained, which cannot be achieved in other settings, it becomes important to ask what type of social organization makes this possible. To throw some light on this question, we will turn to a consideration of the structural properties of the cocktail lounge.

In investigating the social organization of the cocktail lounge, it was expected that the strongest normative regulation of behavior would be found in areas having the greatest consequence to the group, such as the motives that brought the people together and the activities affecting the maintenance of the group. As we have indicated, most of the norms surrounded heterosexual interaction. These included the following patterns, which were rarely violated by the regular patrons. First, women usually came in alone and did not sit at the bar unless a previous date had been arranged with a man already at the bar. The men came in alone or in pairs and took a position at the bar. Women who did not have dates sat at a table, and men who were well acquainted with them might ask if they could join them at a table. The usual pattern was for one couple to occupy a table, but occasionally two couples would share a table. When this happened, however, the interaction still took place primarily on a couple basis and not as a group. Men who were not acquainted with the women sitting at tables would watch them and look for social cues defining their status. Women who were waiting for a date pointedly looked at their watches, asked the waitresses and the bartenders if the awaited party had been in yet, and in other ways signaled their unavailability. The unattached males at the bar who were interested were expected to wait out a woman through one drink, during which time they made inquiries to the bartenders and/or cocktail waitresses about them and their attachments. If they found the woman unattached, they would ask that she be served a drink of her choice. By accepting the drink and nodding her thanks, the woman indicated her willingness to engage in conversation. It was only at that time that the man could go over to the woman's table. At times the invitee would ask the cocktail waitress for a rundown on the inviter before accepting the drink.

In short, the bartenders and cocktail waitresses played an important mediating role in the proper introduction; they knew the male and female patrons well, and they accepted the responsibility of facilitating contact between people who would be compatible. They knew the social, emotional, and physical attributes that appealed to the various patrons. Occasionally the bartender or waitress would parry an introduction by politely remarking something as follows: "Lorraine, I tried to check Joe's play. I told him you were not his type. I know you can't stand bald-headed fat men, but he insisted. It's up to you now. Do you

made "good" marriages with high-status men. However, none of the women had married regular patrons of the cocktail lounge. The follow-up study also revealed that the women who left the cocktail lounge were replaced by other young, unattached women with similar characteristics. Much less attrition had occurred among the men, involving at most five of the regular patrons. The reason given by the employees for the disappearance of these men was that they had either become too old for the activities in the cocktail lounge or they had moved out of the area. Among the married men, none was known to have been divorced since the study ended. Finally, observation (averaging three times per week over a three-month period) during the follow-up study revealed that the same pattern of behavior among the patrons still persisted even though the personnel had changed somewhat.

want to drink with him or not?" The regular patrons who were well acquainted were very informal in their polite salutations. However, they invariably made their "play" through the hired help. The exceptions to this rule occurred among the patrons who were first-timers or who came in very infrequently. The aggressive male or female who bypassed the hired help in a direct approach to an unknown person was referred to as a "burglar." He was not appreciated by his fellows, the hired help, or the unknown person contacted. At times such a person would be "called down" by any one or all three of these categories of persons; the expression used by the employees would be something like: "Charlie, slow down and use a little class. If she is available and interested, everything will work out. You know what is right. Of course, you do what you want." The women, of course, by declining or accepting a drink, exerted some control over the choice; but they did not enjoy unlimited freedom. Should an unattached woman (alone or in twos or threes) decline more than two invitations, she took the chance of losing the aid of the employees. The bartenders and waitresses could and did discourage other males from making further invitations. As one bartender put it, "If they come to play, O.K., we'll help, but if they get too choosy or just come to build their egos and look pretty, let them hustle their drinks elsewhere." In essence, the expectations were that polite behavior was to be used at all times, and the power of initiating interaction always resided in the men but was supposed to be channeled through the employees of the lounge.

CONCLUSION

Popular myth has it that the cocktail lounge is a place where strangers pick up sexual partners. The major role of the high-class cocktail lounge studied was to facilitate casual sexual affairs in the context of respectability but not among strangers. In fact, the regular patrons of the lounge constituted a highly stable group of persons who considered the lounge to be an important center of activity. The implication is that the cocktail lounge (*a*) provides gratifications that may not be available in other spheres of life for these people and (*b*) serves to drain off energies which might otherwise be invested in change by the individuals of other aspects of their life situations. For the unattached women this means that the availability of the "consort status" at the lounge may operate as a substitute for, or enable them to postpone, the ordinary heterosexual concern of women their age—the location of a suitable marriage partner.[9] For the married men, the relationships established in the cocktail lounge may actually serve to maintain marital ties that would otherwise be dissolved. In general, then, the cocktail lounge seems to perform many of the functions frequently attributed to the "mistress complex" in society and may, in fact, be related to the practical disappearance of this pattern in American society. This suggests, if true, that other public organizations (e.g., ski lodges, resorts, night clubs, etc.) may perform similar functions and that one key to understanding the sexual norms in upper-middle- and upper-class society lies in the study of such settings.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO
AND
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

[9] This idea was suggested by Jeanne Watson Eisenstadt in a personal communication.

Reflections on the Education of George Herbert Mead

David Wallace

ABSTRACT

A series of letters, written over a period of seventeen years from 1876 to 1893 by Henry Northrup Castle, is drawn upon here to illuminate a little-known period in the intellectual development of George Herbert Mead. Castle was a schoolmate and intimate "chum" of Mead's, commencing in their freshman year at Oberlin and continuing through a decade's later study in Germany and elsewhere. Ultimately, Mead married Castle's sister. Although little is known about Mead's youth, a surprisingly clear picture emerges as Castle writes home about their mutual studies and experiences. Many letters refer specifically to Mead, while others are written to him. They call to mind the shadows on Plato's cave, which give a semblance of what is going on, although the actors themselves are hidden from view.

Sometime in late 1890, George Herbert Mead, then doing graduate study in Germany, received the following letter from a college friend of more than a decade:

HONOLULU
August 24, 1890

MY DEAR GEORGE:

Your letter reached me on my birthday, and came as a ray of light in great darkness. . . .

I had not heard from you for so long—you can imagine how my heart has turned to you in these last weeks. You have already heard no doubt what has happened to me—to us, for I know you loved her too. It is a relief for me to turn to you who knew so much, who were so near Frida, and tell you everything.

It is a terrible history—so short, so awful—before I had time to realize that misfortune was there, she was dead. It was just after lunch, and she had put on a lovely white dress, and was going to drive into town to do some errands and bring me home, perhaps. No one saw what happened; no one knows just what must have occurred. . . . Something frightened the horse, and he darted off. The nurse heard her scream. She was holding the reins and pulling as hard as she could, poor girl, but doubtless fright lamed her arms—and her strength had not all come back to her since her confinement—the baby was only four weeks old.

I thank God that all she had to suffer was four or five seconds of what I know full well must have been intense terror. That was all. The carriage was on the lawn in a minute, and struck a tree. She was thrown out and her brain received a shock. Doubtless, she never felt even the blow—but stepped in an instant into night. She only breathed a few minutes after I got there—only a few minutes—that was all—and then she was gone. . . .

There was nothing gloomy about the burial, nothing black. A creamy white cloth thrown over the coffin, and on that and everywhere nothing but flowers, roses, lilies, magnolias—growing, living, blooming—not one of them all so fair as she was. . . . Oh, George, if you could only have been there.

Why should I say more? You see what I have to think about. I comfort myself with the remembrance of her happiness. She had *lived.* She had tasted the pure joys of wifehood and motherhood. Surely her happiness was at its culmination. She never could have been happier, perhaps she could never be so happy again. She went away before care and trouble, and bitter sorrow and weariness, and disillusion and age, could come upon her. She had all the best of life—its freshness, its rapture, its youth.

I shall begin to live again, but with a difference. I cannot live as though I had not lived through this past year. I am only twenty-eight, already with a good deal behind me. The past is sacred. I would not forget it, would not break with it. I hope and pray that I am not so base as to do either.

I will not write any longer now. There is so much that I might say, and yet I have already said much—more than many would speak. But to you, my better self, I can say anything.

Please write me—long letters. Letters from you now will do everything for me. Tell me the details of your study and thinking; I am hungering to hear.

Frida thought of you often, with constant affection. I am as always,

Affectionately yours,
HENRY N. CASTLE

The writer of this singularly moving document was Henry Northrup Castle, perhaps Mead's closest friend at Oberlin College and his companion and brother-in-law during many years thereafter. For, as a partial outgrowth of Frida's tragedy, Mead married Castle's sister, Helen, the following year.

This letter is but one of an extraordinary series written by Castle during a crucial seventeen-year period of Mead's early intellectual development.[1] The first was dated 1876, two years before Castle first met Mead at Oberlin. The last was in 1893, after the "chums," to use Castle's word, had spent ten additional years of travel and study together in Europe and after they had been formally joined through family ties.

A near-void has long existed as to Mead's early years. For quite aside from the fact that he never wrote a major book—the four volumes now extant were compiled and edited posthumously by devoted colleagues and students[2]—almost nothing is recorded of the day-by-day accumulation of Mead's preschool and in-school study and experiences. Even such an authority on Mead as Charles W. Morris notes that little is known about "the entrance of the other factor, the social, into Mead's thought . . . since he himself has not traced this development."[3]

As will be seen shortly, Castle's letters help admirably to fill that gap. For, due to the unusually close association that existed between the two young men, Castle's letters serve as an intimate mirror into their mutual daily interests, reading, study, and discussion. Like the shadows on the wall of Plato's cave, they offer a semblance of Mead's experiences even though the original cannot be known.

In his brief Biographical Notes in *Philosophy of the Act*—about the only hitherto available notation on these years, incidentally—Mead's son and only child, Henry C. A. Mead, writes that while at Oberlin "he [George Mead] and Henry Castle became very intimate, for intellectually they were congenial." And, as will be amply

[1] The source of the letters is an eight hundred-page, privately printed volume entitled *Henry Northrup Castle—Letters.* A subtitle reads, "Printed by Mary Castle, for Her Children," The printer was I. W. Sands, Ltd., of London. As an example of the volume's obscurity, neither Charles W. Morris, who was Mead's student assistant at Chicago for three years and the editor of *Mind, Self and Society,* nor Anselm Strauss, nor John McKinney, other important writers on Mead, had been familiar with it. The copy that I studied was presented to the Harper Memorial Library at the University of Chicago by John U. Nef, presently chairman of the Committee on Social Thought there. Nef married Elinor Castle, the only daughter of Henry Castle and his second wife, Mabel Wing Castle, and is thus a family member. The volume is kept under considerable restriction in the rare-books room of the library. Correspondence with the librarian at Oberlin College indicates two additional copies there. No others are known to me.

Other relationships to the Castle family—the present "Pineapple" Castles of Hawaii—of interest to sociologists are that Henry's brother, James, was the husband of a great-aunt of Matilda White Riley (so I am informed by M. W. R.) and that Mabel Wing Castle and her daughter, Elinor Castle Nef, for many years presided over an imposing intellectual, literary, musical, and artistic salon at Chicago, which was attended by, among others, Robert E. Park, Robert Redfield, and Everett C. Hughes (so I am informed by E. C. H.).

[2] *The Philosophy of the Present,* ed. Arthur E. Murphy (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1932); *Mind, Self and Society* (hereafter cited as "*MSS*"), ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century,* ed. Merritt H. Moore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936); *The Philosophy of the Act* (hereafter cited as "*PA*"), ed. John M. Brewster, Albert H. Dunham, and Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

[3] *MSS,* p. xii.

validated in the letters, "argumentation occupied the bulk of their intercourse."[4]

Henry Castle and George Mead were young men of remarkably similar backgrounds. Castle's father, Samuel N. Castle, had gone to Honolulu some forty years earlier as financial advisor to the Hawaiian Protestant Missions. Henry lived in the Islands from childhood in an atmosphere of understandably religious and intellectual activity.

Meanwhile, on almost the opposite side of the globe, George Mead was born in February, 1863, in South Hadley, Massachusetts. His father, Hiram, was a minister, descended from a long line of New England Puritan farmers and clergymen. His mother was Elizabeth Storrs Billings, herself the product of an intellectual family of some note. In 1870, when young George was but seven years old, Hiram Mead was called to the new Oberlin Theological Seminary, in Ohio, to assume the chair of homiletics (art of preaching) there.[5]

In his Biographical Notes, Mead's son points to his father's enjoyment of the considerable library of classical literature found in the Mead home and says that "Macauley [*sic*], Buckley and Motley opened the door to him for the magnificent drama of conflicting social forces."[6] The town of Oberlin itself was a center of social drama. It had been an active station of the Underground Railway, which assisted thousands of Negroes to the North and to Canada prior to the Civil War. In 1833, a militant Congregationalist reformer, the Reverend John Jay Shipherd, founded Oberlin College there. Its first president was Asa Mahan, who preached a watered-down brand of perfectionism, the communal and utopian doctrine that later made sensational headlines under John Humphrey Noyes at Putney, Vermont, and Oneida, New York. Two years later, Oberlin became one of the first colleges in the United States to admit Negroes and, in 1841, became the first coeducational college to grant a Bachelor's degree to women. Among its early graduates was feminist Lucy Stone. Soon thereafter, Oberlin's rich soil of righteousness produced the Anti-Saloon League.[7]

But if the town of Oberlin and its new college possessed a strong and aggressive social conscience, there appears to have been some heavy-footedness about it. Mead's son recalls that his father's education consisted principally of "the classics, rhetoric and literature, moral philosophy, mathematics, and a smattering of elementary science—chemistry and botany. Questioning was discouraged, ultimate values being determined by men learned in the dogmas and passed on to the moral philosophers for dissemination."[8] And, as will be seen in Castle's letters during this period, there is ample indication that the two friends found this attitude frustrating and that it served to push them together into long and frequent private discourses on aspects of metaphysical matters for which they could find no adequate outlet in their classes. Indeed, this atmosphere seems even to have provoked direct rebellion, for Mead's son adds, "It was during this period that he and Henry Castle succeeded in refuting the dogma of the church to their own satisfaction"—a startling outcome for two lads who were the products of long generations of Puritan theology. From thence, "their thought was no longer limited by theological considerations."[9]

But before moving to Mead's undergraduate and graduate years as seen through Castle's letters, it might be well to summarize briefly some of Mead's later concepts, particularly those dealing with the social origin and development of the mind

4 *PA*, p. [illegible]

5 *Ibid.*, p. lxxv.

6 *Ibid.*, [illegible]

7 *Time*, October 27, 1958, p. 71.

8 *PA*, p. lxxvi. Another account of the same dogmatic church-dominated college education of the 1870's is contained in Joseph Dorfman, *Thorstein Veblen and His America* (New York: Viking Press, 1934), chaps. ii–iii.

9 *PA*, p. lxxvii.

and of the self.[10] And, of necessity, we are restricted to the ideas expressed in Mead's lectures of 1927 and 1930, which are preserved in *Mind, Self and Society*. For, as another colleague reminds us, it was notorious that each year, under the same title and to the same end, Mead gave a new course in social psychology at Chicago.[11]

Mind, according to Mead, is not a biological "thing" or an "organ" but a *process,* through which, by means of perception and communication, the human being selects and internalizes meaning. Such an external view, Mead held, "enables us to give a detailed account and actually to explain the genesis and development of the mind; whereas the view that mind is a congenital biological endowment of the individual organism does not really enable us to explain its nature and origin at all."[12] Externality is required by any truly scientific approach such as the social behaviorism to which he adhered, because "starting off with an observable activity. . . . It simply works from the outside to the inside instead of from the inside to the outside, so to speak."[13]

Mead also viewed the *self* as an emergent from the social process. "The self has a character which is different from that of the physiological organism proper. The self is something which has development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process."[14] McKinney points out that the crux of Mead's development of the self is his explanation of how, through the internalization of the attitude of others toward himself, of himself to himself, the individual becomes a plurality of selves and that, because he carries on a whole series of different relationships to different people, the individual appears in an almost infinite variety of roles which then are objective material for examination by the social scientists.[15] Thus, Mead offers not only a theory of behavior but a mechanism for its validation.

Herbert Blumer, a one-time student with Mead, recently summarized Mead's central theme by saying that the ongoing process of "human group life was the essential condition for the emergence of consciousness, the mind, a world of objects, human beings as organisms possessing selves, and human conduct in the form of constructed acts."[16]

This brief dip into the substance of Mead's thinking introduces us immediately to the one superconcept that pervades his ideas—that human activity of all kinds is an "ongoing social process" and that rational minds, selves, or whatever, are *emergents* from that process. "What I want particularly to emphasize is the temporal and logical pre-existence of the social process to the self-conscious individual that arises in it."[17] In short, that social activity, or society, precedes and produces the rational individual, rather than the opposing biological notion that society is an agglomeration of organically minded individuals. Almost every avenue of Mead's social thought is an elaboration of this one central notion.

Apart from Mead's early schooling, mention should be made of several other influences on the development of his thought.

[10] We will not spend much space on this summary; it has been done more completely by better authorities elsewhere. See especially Charles W. Morris' Introduction to *MSS;* Anselm Strauss, Introduction to *The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); John C. McKinney, "The Contribution of George Mead to the Sociology of Knowledge," *Social Forces,* Vol. XXXIV (December, 1955); and Herbert Blumer, "Sociological Implications of the Thought of George Herbert Mead," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. LXXI (March, 1966).

[11] Charles W. Morris, personal conversation.

[12] *MSS,* p. 224.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 7, 8.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 135.

[15] McKinney, *op. cit.,* p. 146.

[16] Blumer, *op. cit.,* p. 535.

[17] *MSS,* p. 186.

Perhaps the greatest of these was the publication, in 1859, of Darwin's theory of natural selection. Darwin's theory, and more especially, his mountain of evidence, caused searching re-examination of almost every discipline of thought in the later 1800's, but particularly in the fields of theology and philosophy, which were so personal a part of the Mead household. By introducing the idea of limitless time and the gradual evolution of life, Darwin rocked all Christian religion which was built on a dogma of special creation and of finite time. Furthermore, by introducing the idea that *chance* begets order and that fortuitous events, not planned or rational, result in physical law, Darwin had openly contradicted all orthodox metaphysics.

It will be remembered that Mead's father was not only a Puritan minister but a professor at the Oberlin Theological Seminary—a literal center of the theological controversy that raged throughout the 1860's and 1870's. Hence, both the theological and philosophical implications of Darwin's theory would have been liberally discussed in the Mead home during his youth.

Passing note must also be made of the influence of two other writers on Mead. Charles Morris reports that Mead was a lifelong student of Aristotle,[18] who in Book I, chapter ii of *Politics* wrote, "Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. . . . Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part."[19] And T. V. Smith recalls that Mead often admitted coming under the influence of Adam Smith and, while at Harvard, had written an admiring paper on him.[20] In Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, as well as in Aristotle's *Politics*, one finds repeated references to man's social nature, the logical priority of society to the individual, the uniqueness of man's power of speech, and his capacity to put himself in another's place—all of which turn up so prominently in Mead's work.

Henry Castle had just returned from a year's tour of Europe, having visited London, Venice, Rome, and Interlachen, when in 1879 he, too, entered Oberlin College as a freshman. In his first letter from Oberlin he mentions that "George Mead was among those who met me at the station."

The following September (1880), Castle describes some of his new studies, which presumably, were standard for most sophomores, Mead included. "I am studying the *Odyssey*, Tacitus, and German. I have been examined in Horace, Cicero, de Senuctute, and *The Memorabilia*, tell Father, all of which I have passed successfully." Then comes the spark of a rebel. "I have read Felix Holt, the Radical. . . . Felix is a splendid character, sturdy, independent, conscientious, but lowly at heart. He is not a character drawn in the Christian mold, though he is an excellent Christian, but after the model of some of the grand old heathen philosophers, only an improvement on them." Later in the same year, Castle writes that he will stay in Oberlin for the coming summer vacation; "George Mead and I propose to read a little Greek out together."

Mead's son has stated that his father enjoyed reading Macaulay and others who "opened the door to him for the magnificent drama of conflicting social forces." In December of 1880, young Castle writes, "I

[18] *Ibid.*, p. xxx.

[19] By not writing his own books, Mead followed another Aristotelian tradition. Introducing one edition of *Politics*, Lincoln Diamant writes, "In the narrow sense, none of these books are written by Aristotle; they are actually collections of his lecture notes edited and filled in after his death by former students" (*Aristotle's Politics and Poetics*, trans. Benjamin Jowett and Thomas Twining [New York: Viking Press, 1957]). T. V. Smith adds another similarity, "Conversation was Mead's best medium; writing was a poor second best" ("The Social Philosophy of George Herbert Mead," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVII, No. 3 [November, 1931], 369).

[20] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

have bought Macaulay's essays and have taken a good dose of them. I admire him more every day, his style is unrivaled. I do not think much of him, though, in other respects. . . . I have a desire to read Dante now, and am doing Keats, Shelley, Milton. I feel my ignorance more every day."

During the junior and senior years Castle's letters reveal more fully the maturing friendship and intellectual companionship that has grown up between the two youths, as well as the substance of many of their experiences together. In 1881, Mead's father died, and George, his mother, and sister Alice "took rooms" in Oberlin. George waited on tables for his board; his mother taught at the college. Alice married a young preacher shortly thereafter and moved to Nebraska.[21]

In early September of 1881, Castle writes that he is "living with Auntie, but it is going to be lonely. . . . nobody but flippant girls and foolish boys across the hall: how much better to take Gibbon and Wordsworth and Shelley for my friends." Subsequent letters indicate a state of mental depression: he is blue, homesick; in the graying fall, Oberlin is "dull," "dismal," "scraggly." Castle is evidently a frail youth; He speaks often of not being able to saw wood and having to get this chore done by others in order to have heat. Later he mentions "being the lightest man in the class." There is repeated buying of books; his reading includes *Silas Marner, The Scarlet Letter, The House of the Seven Gables*, and others. In November there is a glimpse of interest again: "Astronomy is a grand study . . . it stimulates the imagination."

On December 27 (with no mention of Christmas),[22] "I am getting my library pretty well stocked with poets. . . . Emerson is an author whom it is not profitable to draw from the library, read, and return. You want him perpetually by you to refer to. . . . I have finished Green's *History of the English People*, the larger one, and do not hesitate to pronounce it the best history I ever read. It is inferior to Gibbon, indeed, in every respect save one, but that single one places it ahead of them all. That is, it is not a history of kings, and of wars, but of the people."

In January, he writes a long outpouring to his sister Helen, much of which is suggestive of the pragmatic philosophy to which Mead later adhered.

> The "discouraged feeling" that you speak of Helen, in reference to your reading and studying, arising from the numberless new fields of knowledge which rise so fast before you, should not trouble you. It is a good sign. There can be none better. . . . the days are gone by when we could look upon our elders with awe and reverence, and say, they know everything.
>
> Much as we may affect to despise material things, it is still useless to ignore the fact that our poor souls in this world are inextricably intertwined and connected with matter, so that moral conditions are involved in physical conditions, and physical in moral. Can I feel the emotion of the sublime when I have a stomach-ache? . . . Can I appreciate poetry when I am sea-sick? Can I listen to a moral appeal when suffering the pangs of hunger? . . . Then does not a good dinner help moral regeneration?

A few paragraphs away comes an impassioned commentary on the process of language which seems rather obviously to have been the subject of many after-hours sessions of schoolboy metaphysics.

> When you come to express feelings and emotions of the soul, language becomes comparatively inadequate. The real fault is partly in the language and partly in your auditor. If your auditor has never had the feeling you are trying to express, he cannot understand you, never mind how clearly you put it. If you should say it is a cold day to a man who has no sense of feeling. he would not understand you, although you repeated the sentiment in every variety of form for a thousand years. . . .
>
> How fine it will be in heaven where we can

[21] *PA*, pp. lxxvi–lxxvii.

[22] I had included the word "oddly" in this phrase, but Everett C. Hughes demurred, "It was *not* odd that these people did not mention Christmas. The Puritans did not like festivities in the name of religion. Religion was a serious business to Calvinists" (personal correspondence).

communicate as we *sometimes* do now, by a pressure of the hand or a glance of the eye (by a method, that is, analogous to this, when soul communicates with soul *directly*, without the medium of language). This stuff about the origin of language I got from the Logic!

Castle's observations on a career for himself offer an additional glimpse into the possibly shared attitudes of the two youths—and suggests, again, a strong independence of mind.

I have no special desire to be a lawyer. . . . My tastes are inclined to something more literary—either to something directly literary or to the ministry. The latter would suit me excellently. . . . An easy, scholarly, sedentary, studious life, affording abundant opportunity for reading and enjoyment. . . . But horrors!—visiting parishioners—that does not suit my tastes. I would not preach more than one sermon a week. . . . I would not confine myself to religious topics, but would not hesitate to preach on any subject which bore on reform of any kind. I would try to make myself an intellectual and literary leader. . . . but unfortunately in these days, they won't allow a man to enter that profession unless he will swear that he believes certain things. And they choose just the things he doesn't believe. Then again, they expect a minister to be the best Christian in his parish. . . . another absurd requirement, to which I am quite unwilling to conform.

In March, 1882, he wrote:

I am becoming immensely interested in philosophy. I have had incipient longings after it a good while back, but I heroically determined to withstand them until my Senior year, when I would be able to understand what I read better. . . . I am reading a good deal. I have abandoned (temporarily) pure literature and am reading a little science, etc. . . . I have read *Edwards on the Will* and am now reading Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* and Carpenter's *Mental Physiology*. . . . You ask what histories I have read. I have read Gibbon; Guigot's *France*; Carlyle's *French Revolution*; Lanfrey's *Napoleon*; Schiller's *Thirty Years War*; Motley's *Dutch Republic* twice; the *History of the United Netherlands*; Prescott's *Conquest of Mexico* and *Conquest of Peru*; Irving's *Mahomet and his Successors* and *Conquest of Granada*; Carlyle's *Early Kings of Norway*. . . . Of course, there are others . . . but these are the *great* ones. . . . I wouldn't be in a hurry to read Froude . . . Macaulay is on the decline . . . it is probably a brilliant but not profound or remarkably just production.

By the close of his junior year in 1882, Castle's studies had brought him to mental philosophy—a subject that he shared with Mead and that both obviously relished. There is evidence of many hours of dedicated preparation, for "we have lots of fun in Porter (Mental Philosophy) catechising the professor and arguing with him."

A month later, Castle sends this worldly counsel to Helen, "I had the sense long ago to discover that marks furnish no criterion of scholarship whatever. A really good scholar will generally (though not always) get good marks, but the reverse is far from true. Therefore, I stopped long ago thinking about my marks and have never condescended to recite for the sake of a four, but always preferred taking a zero."

In early July of 1882, during the summer recess, Castle and Mead set out together to sell books from door to door in Ironton, Ohio. The venture appears to have been short lived. Eleven days later they were back at Oberlin, obviously discouraged with the commercial world. Castle summed up their sentiment: "the business is disreputable because it requires infinite cheek, meanness, gab, and depravity in general, and it requires lying for success."

The senior year at Oberlin found Henry and George joined in a number of common endeavors. Helen Castle had arrived from Honolulu, and the three spent much time together. It is during this year that Castle's letters reveal most clearly, not only the studies and ideas that he and Mead shared together, but the closeness of their personal relationship. For, throughout the next eight years, the trio were to spend practically all of their time together, almost as brothers and sister.

Among his other activities at Oberlin in the fall of 1882, Castle edited a literary

paper called the *Oberlin Review*. On its staff was "George H. Mead '83." To his family, Castle wrote, "I will send you a couple of *Reviews*. . . . I recommend the article on Charles Lamb as worthy of perusal. George Mead, my chum, wrote it."

Then there is this description of the study in which he and Mead were engaged.

> Just now, my attention is occupied with argument in favor of Materialism. Prof. Ellis has our Rhetoricals this year, and he assigns metaphysical topics exclusively . . . I am going to read Mill's *Logic*. I have Huxley, Maudsley, G. H. Lewis, Bain, Lange's *History of Materialism*, and Haeckel. . . . Huxley goes to work to prove there is no substance but matter . . . and crawls out of the conclusion by taking refuge in Agnosticism. . . . I do not find anywhere a full statement of the argument for Materialism, but by patching together Bain, Huxley, and Haeckel, I can make out a powerful case. . . . I have always recognized the strength of Dualism—i.e., that system of philosophy which recognizes two substances, mind and matter . . . as lying in the fact that the phenomena of the mind are totally unlike the phenomena of matter, and never can be resolved into them. . . . I can always take refuge in Idealism and say that we know nothing but matter, except through the agency of mind, so that instead of saying that there is nothing but matter, I shall say there is nothing but mind.

Note the suggestion here of Mead's later monism—the issue on which he departed from the dualistic notions of Cooley and James. "Idealism . . . has always possessed great fascination for me. It is perfectly consistent with the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, etc., while Materialism is destructive to both."

Castle speaks of a debate on the question of "Is a Miracle Credible?" "We presented the discussion on the following Monday in class. Prof. Ellis said he thought it furnished an illustration of what might be called logic run wild. . . . I felt rather flattered than otherwise by the comment. I wonder what Prof. Ellis thinks of George Mead and myself? He must regard us as a perfect nuisance, because hardly a day passes in Mental Philosophy when we do not start a discussion with him. We have lots of fun, too, asking questions of Pres. Fairchild, who has our Bible class. He, however, is inclined to bulldoze a little."

A few weeks later, in October, 1882, Castle wrote about another of their activities and attitudes,

> It will be a wonder if George Mead and I do not run *The Review* into the ground before the end of the year. We have our own notions as to what a college paper should be, and are very uncompromising in carrying them out. We do not trouble ourselves to cater to the popular taste, and with our lofty transcendental ideas, and superlative scorn of all things practical, it will be strange indeed if we do not have the whole establishment in the ditch. . . .
>
> . . . I have about . . . definitely decided to be either a literary man or a preacher. . . . No church except the Unitarian would ordain me, and as I do not take too much stock in the Unitarians, I shall probably, if I became a minister, go without ordination. . . . George Mead and I want to start a literary paper in New York. That is our favorite dream.

In November of the same year he wrote:

> By the way, Prof. Ellis, in his lectures on Psychology, has just reached the subject of the Will, so that now we propose to have some fun questioning and arguing with him. The subject of the Freedom of the Will perhaps monopolizes more of the attention of two or three of us here than any other whatever. . . . I was going to prove (to Pres. Fairchild) one morning by quoting some laws of logic that the Will could not be free, but he got out of it by stating the Will is not subject to the laws of logic. . . . If [motives] *do cause* a man's actions, then, of course, he is no more free, and no more responsible for his actions than a wave is, which falls and rises solely under the influence of physical causes. I have never seen anything which could be considered an answer to this argument.
>
> . . . You will not understand from anything which I have said that I do not believe in the Freedom of the Will. My judgement . . . is held in suspension . . . I have already read Hamilton, Bain, Porter, and Mill, besides, on closely related topics, Dr. Carpenter, Edwards, Dar-

win, Huxley, Tyndall, Le Comte, and Maudsley.

By early November—after approximately six weeks as editor of *The Review*—the outspoken Castle had stirred up a storm of controversy on the doctrinaire Oberlin campus. Forgetting his earlier lecture on the frailty of attempted communication of unshared viewpoints through language, he frets,

> They think that I am a scoffer, and am in a hostile frame of mind toward Christianity and Christian influences. Nothing could be farther from the truth. . . . A few unguarded remarks made lately in speaking of Thursday lectures were most outrageously construed into an attack on religion. . . . By what perverse ingenuity or what species of logic this extraordinary conclusion was reached, I am utterly at a loss to conjecture. . . .
>
> But it is not merely on religious subjects that I have been getting into hot water. The musical criticisms in the last *Review* were violently attacked. . . . You see I am terribly uncompromising, and so is George Mead, and the result is, that we are in trouble of some kind about all of the time.

A gap ensues in the correspondence, during which time the boys have graduated and, temporarily, have gone their separate ways in life. Castle has returned to his home in Honolulu, and Mead, according to his son's account, had taken a brief turn at teaching school. This career lasted six months and was culminated by Mead's flight from a place "overrun with rowdies." For the following three years, Mead tutored and then worked in a railroad surveying party in the Northwest. His son reports that this was a period of alternate elation, as when Mead's party came within four inches of meeting an opposite party after miles of mapping, and of being "at sea mentally."[23] It is evidently to one of the latter moods that Castle replied in April, 1884.

[23] *PA*, pp. lxxvii–lxxviii.

> HONOLULU, April 10, '84
>
> DEAR GEORGE,
>
> . . . I am afraid that your scheme of "working for others" by means of philosophical criticism is rather chimerical. . . . Of all the species of human employment, metaphysical speculation seems to me the most utterly useless and selfish. . . . Just contrast the results achieved in the world of the metaphysician and man of science. The former girds his loins and expends his fine energies in a noisy and heated debate about words . . . the smoke clears away, and things are just where they were before. . . . The man of science, on the other hand, invents a life preserver, a fire engine, a cure for disease. His blessings are omnipresent. . . . How different from this is the metaphysician.
>
> I am surprised, George, that you should doubt the candor of your course on the ground that you read "entirely on one side.". . . What "side," pray? Are Berkeley and Hume and Kant and Hamilton classifiable together? . . . I read all these men as philosophers, and never think of reading one rather than another because of any religious opinion. Neither do you.

Castle then replies to another question from Mead, "You ask me what I think about the new creed of congregationalism? I am unable to discover anything new about it."

In June of 1884, Castle again writes to Mead, from Honolulu, reflecting his own letdown from the cocksuredness at Oberlin.

> My views and standards have changed a great deal. In nothing is this more marked than in my feelings about our management of the college paper. I now think we were absurdly particular about the poetry that was presented. We judged everything by too severe a standard. . . . I must choose between the life of the world and the intellectual life. Often when I am in society I am filled with a sense of loathing. . . . If there is anything that I despise, it is worldliness. I hate it. I do not believe you have seen much of what I mean, because you have not lived in a large business community. . . .
>
> Well, my dear George, here I am at the bottom of my fourth page, and I have left myself no room to discuss Kant's theory of space and time, nor . . . the mutilated Boscovitchianism which the President [Fairchild, of Oberlin] and Billy [Metcalf, a professor] are

attempting to foist upon the world as honest natural realism and orthodox philosophy. . . . By the way, I am to have the pleasure of seeing that dear old gentleman before long. . . . Query, what shall I ask him? I can't let the chance go by without propounding some knotty question on him. I guess I will ask him whether influence is a relation of power or not? Then I may ask him what the essence of the idea of cause is?

Meanwhile, Helen Castle has moved on to Germany and, reflecting further the depressed mental states of the two friends—Castle in Honolulu and Mead in the American Northwest—Castle writes her, "George is continually flooding me with letters. . . . I am conscious indeed of deterioration [in me] in some directions, in power of expression with both logic and pen, and a loss of readiness and concentration in extempore argument. I have a feeling that I could hardly meet George Mead and Billy Metcalf as I could a year ago. This loss . . . arises from a mere lack of practice."

In the same letter, Castle offers his own, and perhaps Mead's attitude toward the then very popular Herbert Spencer. Speaking of a "Prof. Scott" in Honolulu, Castle writes, "He is a great admirer of Herbert Spencer, which of itself raises a strong presumption against him in my mind. Every dabbler in philosophy dips into Herbert Spencer, if he never reads a line of another author. . . . It is fortunate that a knowledge of Metaphysics is not an indispensable element of culture."

After two years' further endurance of the shallow intellectual life of Honolulu, Castle appears to have reconsidered one of his earlier alternative careers, for, in early 1887, he is in attendance at the law school at Harvard. There is no mention, but it seems evident that there has been some correspondence on this move with Mead and that Mead himself has decided to rejoin his friend at Harvard. In July of 1887, Castle writes to Mead, "The one important thing now, my boy, is for you to get into Royce's private course on Kant . . . you must not miss it. It will be the first chance that either you or I have had, for direct immediate contact with an important thinker."

In his Introduction to *Philosophy of the Act,* Mead's son relates that his father "entered Harvard in the autumn of 1887 and graduated with the class of 1888 the following June. His work was chiefly with Royce and James; he tutored the James children during that year and the following summer."[24]

It is apparently of the latter event that Castle writes in October to Helen, who now has returned from Germany to Honolulu, "George Mead has left me and I am utterly desolate. He has taken charge of a youth of eleven years and this has necessitated his moving and going to live with him. It is a blow to us both, but he could not afford to let the chance go by. He lives about ten minutes from here." The following March (1888) Castle again bemoans the loss of Mead's company and adds, "George is not only an exceedingly able fellow, but he is noble as well, and our companionship has been a great treat to me."

After the year at Harvard, the friends separated again, Castle returning to Honolulu, while Mead remained in Boston. A crucial event seems to have occurred at this point which, unfortunately, is only alluded to in a letter to Mead in late July: "You have covered yourself with glory as I knew you would. No doubt you will get a fellowship at the end of next year, which will take you to Berlin." In November of the same year another letter mentions, "I am strongly tempted to join George Mead in Leipzig," and, later in the same month, "So I finally concluded to join George Mead in Leipzig."

Part of the reason this event may be called crucial is that Wundt was working out his parallelism in Leipzig at the time, a psychology that Mead later went to considerable length to refute. But much more

[24] *Ibid.*, p. lxxviii.

important is the fact that Mead gives Wundt direct credit for conceptualizing the "gesture," a central mechanism in Mead's development of the mind. "Wundt isolated a very valuable conception of the gesture as that which becomes later a symbol, but which is to be found in its earlier stages as a part of a social act."[25]

In a letter datelined "Leipzig,"[26] Castle writes in January of 1889, "George is in the next room reading aloud to the Fraulein [Frida, whom Castle later married; she was the daughter of their landlady] out of a German novel. It is cruel to the poor young lady, but it is good for his pronunciation, and we make no scrupulous objections to making the people around us useful."

Also from Leipzig in February, Castle speaks of what could well have been another major influence on young Mead.

> By the rarest piece of good luck in the world, George ran across Professor G. Stanley Hall of Johns Hopkins,[27] just the one man on our planet whom for the moment he most wanted to see. Stanley Hall is the most eminent physiological psychologist in America, and having been through the whole mill here, could advise George just what to do, how and where to go to work to do it. Physiological Psychology is a science as yet very much up in the air, . . . and poor George was utterly at a loss how to begin. . . . George thinks he must make a speciality of this branch, because in America, where poor bated, unhappy Christianity, trembling for its life, claps the gag into the mouth of Free Thought and says, "Hush, hush, not a word, or nobody will believe in me any more." He thinks it would be hard for him to get a chance to utter any ultimate philosophical opinions savoring of independence. In Physiological Psychology, on the other hand, he has a harmless territory in which he can work quietly without drawing down upon himself the anathema and excommunication of all-potent Evangelicanism. . . .
>
> I am merely attacking the preposterous system by which the sects in America have taken possession of the higher education everywhere, so that no mathematical, chemical, or mineralogical fact can get into the world, and come into contact with susceptible youth, without having received the official methodistical or congregational pat on the back. . . . How often has the church been found in this melancholy situation, fighting the truth to the death. This is natural enough, certainly, for religion is from its very essence one of the conservative forces of society, always enlisted against every reform. . . .
>
> I was going to tell you more about Prof. Hall's recommendations to George: one was that it would be very desirable to spend part of a year, at any rate in Turin—Italy—at the University there. . . .[28] We are awaiting now a letter from Prof. Morselli, the great light in this line. . . . It seems likely that we will go to Italy for the coming half year.

There is no record that they ever did so, however.

Of the sixty-eight articles and papers that Mead wrote in later life, many bear the stamp of a cosmopolitanism in politics, as well as in the sciences and philosophy, that Mead gained, in part at least, from these days in Germany. From Leipzig, again, Castle tells of the effect on his thought.

> I have just dropped my Wundt to devote my time to a letter. . . . I have learned, in a way, more in these few months about German life than I did in the year before. . . . You

[25] *MSS*, p. 42.

[26] In his introduction to *MSS*, Morris says of Mead's studies in Germany, "Although he was at Berlin, and *not at Leipzig with Wundt*, there can be no doubt that the influence of Wundt must be given credit for helping to isolate the concepts of the gesture" (*MSS*, p. xiii; italics mine). To this we must enter small quibble. For the testimony here is that Mead was very much at Leipzig—for a full term at least—and that Castle, from whom we have direct evidence, was a student of Wundt's while there. It would seem odd indeed if Mead, his companion and fellow student in so many subjects, who had gone specifically to Leipzig—the apparent subject of the previous note of congratulations—had not also studied with Wundt.

[27] Hall later arranged Sigmund Freud's introduction to America through the famed lectures at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts.

[28] Vilfredo Pareto was a graduate of the Turin Polytechnic Institute in 1870, nineteen years earlier.

never can be said to understand an opponent's position until you have looked at the world through his eyes. The moment you do that, of course, his views acquire plausibility for you. . . .

The only preparation for dealing with [the social question] successfully is in the careful study of anthropology and sociology, of political and economic history. . . . It is to the branches above indicated that I propose to devote myself for the next year and a half, . . . I hope I shall be ten times as competent to edit the *Gazette*, if I ever do that again, as I was before.

From this point on, the pertinence of Henry Castle's letters to our interest in Mead's early education and intellectual development thins. Briefly, though, the letters tell of moving to Berlin later in the year, where "George and I have the same room which Murray and I had three years ago." Then Castle married Frida, and the couple moved to Honolulu, from where, scarcely a year later, Castle wrote of her tragic accident. Emotionally broken, Castle returned to Berlin to be with Helen and Mead; "Helen is going to have a room there and I am going to room with George. . . . I would like to eulogize George Mead. He has his faults, I am thankful to say, but he is one of those rare persons whom nothing could induce to do wrong. There must be a root of goodness in me, else how could I have such a friend?"

In August of 1891, George Mead and Helen Castle, having been drawn more closely together by Henry's sorrow and Frida's tragedy, were married and moved to Ann Arbor to take up a teaching post that John Dewey had offered. Castle's final letter in this series (June, 1893) reads, "Last Monday morning I arrived in Ann Arbor to find Helen, George, and the baby well. . . . I did not have time to go to a single lecture, either of George's or Mr. Dewey's . . . Helen and George are on terms of delightful intimacy with the Deweys. [They lived one house apart.] Mrs. D., I found more charming than ever. . . . Mr. Dewey is a tall, dark, thin young man with long black hair, and a soft penetrating eye, and looks like a cross between a Nihilist and a poet. He is, I believe, about thirty-five, but seems much younger."

EPILOGUE

George Mead was twenty-eight years of age when he joined John Dewey in Ann Arbor in 1891. There he met Charles H. Cooley, aged twenty-seven. They came to be good friends and staunch advocates of the individual social being, the social self, as an emergent from society, rather than a simple biological component of it. Mead, however, later took the stronger stand and chided Cooley for not coming the whole way with him.

Three years later, President William Rainey Harper of the newly opened University of Chicago, set out on a raid of other campuses to furbish his institution as handsomely in an intellectual way as John D. Rockefeller, Sr., had done architecturally.[29] One of his prizes was young John Dewey from Michigan. In the archives of the Harper Memorial Library today there is a note written by Dewey to President Harper telling him of an exceedingly promising young man at Ann Arbor who would make a worthy addition to the Chicago staff. George Mead followed in the same year, 1894.

With Dewey as its chief spokesman, the dazzling faculty at Chicago at the turn of the century developed an affinity for the new pragmatic philosophy, which held that

[29] However, Joseph Dorfman points out that "the new university [Chicago] followed the American theological tradition of higher learning." Harper himself "had been an active clergyman. . . . Out of the original thirty-one full professors in residence, ten were professors of theology and two others had attended theological seminaries. . . . 'Moral Philosophy' nominally was not in the curriculum, but actually it continued to play an important role under the new designation of Social Science or Sociology. Albion Small, who had received an M.A. from Newton Theological Seminary and had been president of Colby College, was made head of the sociology department and dean of the Liberal Arts College" (Dorfman, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–92).

man could use ideas to create social reform. As Herbert Spencer earlier had stood for determinism and the inescapable control of man by his environment, the pragmatists stood for freedom and the control of the environment by man. The movement ideally fitted the mood of Teddy Roosevelt's "Progressive Era" and rapidly gained acceptance as the dominant American philosophy. "A real school, and real thought. Important thought, too," was the reaction of William James at Harvard.

George Mead remained at Chicago until his death in February, 1931. This would have been his last year there, for Charles Morris says he had accepted an invitation to join the faculty of Columbia University in the fall.

Henry Castle, meanwhile, had been lost in a shipwreck in the North Atlantic during one of his many crossings between Honolulu and Europe, in 1902. Although he could not have forseen this usage of his writings, we are grateful to him for his inadvertent account of the early years of his friend, George Herbert Mead—and to Mary Castle for her prideful publication of her son's encyclopedic letters.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

COMMENTARY AND DEBATE

Comment on the Blumer-Bales Dialogue concerning the Interpretation of Mead's Thought

The brief debate between Professors Blumer and Bales in the March, 1966, "Commentary and Debate" is interesting and instructive to those with a penchant for symbolic interactionist thought, particularly because it illustrates some of the difficulties which have kept this school of thought from being as theoretically useful to sociology as it might be. Blumer says that Bales is "ill-informed and misinformed on the *nature* of Mead's thought" (emphasis mine). Presumably, Blumer means that Bales misunderstands what Mead "really meant."

But elsewhere, in his discussion of what Mead meant by "objects," Blumer says:

> . . . for Mead, objects are human constructs and not self-existing entities with intrinsic *natures*. Their *nature* is dependent on the orientation and action of people toward them. [Emphasis mine.]

He goes further to specify what may be objects:

> For Mead, an object is anything that can be designated or referred to. It may be physical as a chair . . . or vague as a philosophical doctrine.

What Mead said is clearly a philosophical doctrine, and, as such, constitutes an object. As such, according to Blumer's interpretation of Mead, it has no "intrinsic nature"; its "Nature is dependent on the orientation and action of people toward [it]." Consequently, it makes no sense at all to try to discover what Mead "really said" or "really meant." Blumer's article itself, then, which is an attempt to lay out the nature of Mead's thought, as well as his criticism of Bales for failing to understand that nature, is logically absurd according to Blumer's own reasoning.

Professor Bales is engaged in empirical research. If the nature of a philosophical doctrine is dependent on the orientation and action of people toward it, then obviously Bales's interpretation will reflect these empirical concerns; he will find in Mead what is useful to what he is doing, and he is doing empirical research.

I would suggest that this is the proper approach to Mead's work. Perhaps we should be less concerned with "getting it right," with finding out what Mead "really said," and pay more attention to what he could have said and should have said using the concepts he developed, or something like them.

JOSEPH WOELFEL

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Further Comment on the Blumer-Bales Dialogue concerning the Implications of the Thought of George Herbert Mead

At the risk of being appreciated as presumptuous by one who one of us has always regarded as a mentor in the symbolic interactionist perspective of social psychology, we wish humbly to observe that neither Professor Blumer nor Professor Bales has penetrated to that core of Mead's thought that may hopefully generate a relevant methodology (*AJS*, March, 1966). What is lacking in Blumer's presentation is a firm grasp and explicated statement of the significant symbol as a *universal*—its meaning fundamentally established, transformed, and re-established in an on-going universe of discourse or on-going conversation. Indeed, sociology is perhaps best conceived as such a discourse or conversation. "Today's truth is tomorrow's error," as Durkheim observed in his final epistemological struggle—with, of course, prag-

matism. Bales, as we might expect, overlooks this shortcoming in his effort to place Blumer in the phenomenological or introspectionist camp.

Indeed, there is an apparent dilemma, stated by Blumer and rejected by Bales—a conception of man as a being who selectively apprehends and sustains a unique perspective of the universe, as over and against a conception of man who, in the context of his joint activity, must appropriately adapt his own tested apprehensions and the attitudes and responses they mobilize with those of others in a way that the "business" of concerted living can proceed. If man is to be free and novel, the former conception must be adopted; if man is to relate his existence to the demands of concerted conduct (what we take to be Blumer's "conditions of life," e.g., p. 541), then the latter conception must be adopted.

Now we presume that Mead's great contribution is the demonstration that this dilemma is false: the production of a significant symbol everywhere and always is a *particular* production which mobilizes shared perspectives by its very *universality*. For some problems, then, we may wish to focus on the *particular* act, noting the sources of surprise or disappointment. Such a focus need not lead us into the atomism that Bales fears, for general processes (suggested by Mead's uncertain "I" and subsequently given more content by, for example, Sullivan's notion of parataxic distortion—mispersonification or misidentification—or studies of the selective inattention involved in all symbolization) account for many aspects of particular acts. For other problems, we may wish to focus on the universal—the career of the conversation, the discourse, or the "joint action." Above all, particulars enter into the transformations of discourse that may be used to mark careers.

At any rate, the stance of the observer is a universal stance. He must grasp his datum in terms of his generalization of the world that asks him to take that datum into account. All this is, *for the most part*, implicit in Blumer's account, but, too often, he implies a subjective nominalism that reminds us of Cooley's sympathetic introspection, and here we must insist on the *objective* significance of the universal. Mead was clear on this in his critique of Cooley: "for social theory a great deal hinges upon the answer to the question whether society is itself psychical or whether the form of the psychical is a sort of communication which arises within primitive behavior." It is truly difficult, given our grammar, to develop a methodology centered on process, but Mead has shown that permanence and structure are anchored in universal symbolism, a point ignored by many symbolic interactionists. This is *not* to pose a methodological dilemma between focuses on process *or* structure, but to show that Mead insisted the explanation of the one cannot be accomplished without the explanation of the other.

As a parting word, let us acknowledge our agreement with Bales's interpretation of the "I" and the "me." The "I" is transforming; the "me" transformed. As Mead put it, "the me is a me which was an I at an earlier time," *and not the other way around*. As Louis Wirth used to emphasize: "In the beginning was the act!" Clearly, only as a result of action can we transform unformulated experience into formulated knowledge. We *must* socialize, formulate, or universalize experience to maintain the human dialogue that is human life. In this way, the unique, relative, and percipient "I" emerges as the universal, structured, communally organized "me."

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Reply to Woelfel, Stone, and Farberman

Joseph Woelfel is correct in saying that Mead's scheme of thought is an "object"; it would be an object to anyone who makes an indication of it, and it would be a different object, depending on how it is approached and viewed. Woelfel is further correct in saying (in interpreting me) that as an object Mead's scheme of thought has no "intrinsic nature"; in the Meadian sense no object has an indigenous or self-existing character apart from the way in which it is identified by human observation. Still further, any person is obviously privileged to construct his own object or picture of Mead's scheme. So far I am in accord with Woelfel's line of argument, but from this point on I must disagree sharply with him. When, on the basis of the above points, he declares that "it makes no sense at all to discover what Mead 'really said' or 'really meant,'" Woelfel is uttering nonsense. I am not concerned with the adjective "really"—Woelfel, not I, has introduced this word—but I am definitely concerned with what Mead *said* and *meant*. The task here is not that of trying to unearth some "intrinsic nature" or "inner essence" of Mead's scheme of thought (Mead would have shuddered at the philosophical implications of such an idea) but, instead, that of trying to determine what kind of object his scheme of thought was to Mead himself. This is what we always do whenever we seek to find out what a person meant in the disclosures of his thought. In his argument, Woelfel would have us renounce the need of ascertaining the nature of Mead's thought, as it appeared to Mead, on the quaint ground that any commentator such as Professor Bales can form his own version or object of it to meet his own empirical concerns. To dismiss so cavalierly the need of understanding accurately the thought of as distinguished an intellectual contributor as Mead and to imply that any version by any commentator of such a man's thought qualifies as a depiction of that thought, constitutes scholarship at its lowest level.

The statement by Professors Stone and Farberman is none too clear. I assume that they are making the following points: (1) a failure on my part to note and appreciate the "universal" character of significant symbols; (2) a consequent introduction of a false opposition between a view of human action as consisting of unique and particular individual acts and a view of human action as composed of individual acts that share a common or "universal" character; (3) a need of recognizing that for Mead "permanence and structure are anchored in universal symbolism"; and (4) a claim that for Mead both "process" and "structure" have to be explained in terms of each other. Let me comment briefly on each point.

1. To be truthful, I did not treat the concept of "universals" in my article on Mead's thought; space limitations compelled me to omit many matters of importance. However, the implications of that concept are embodied in my discussion of social interaction and, particularly, in my remarks on "common definitions" on page 541.

2. I have not set an opposition of the sort that is alleged. Let me restate briefly some of the relevant thoughts in the article. Human group life consists of a *fitting together* of the lines of action of the participants. Participants thus find it necessary to adapt their developing acts to each other, to take each other's roles and to grasp each other's perspectives. In doing so, they necessarily make continuous use of "significant symbols"—which by definition are "universals" or gestures with common meaning. The significant symbol enables the actor to foretell how others, whose actions he must meet, will act; it also enables him to indicate to others how they should act. However, while participants use "universals" or common mean-

ings in fitting their actions to one another, it is a grievous error to think of their actions as being the same or common. A buyer and a seller, while using common symbols, engage in different actions, but their actions *fit together*. The stuff of human group life is not common action but articulated actions. I am at a complete loss to understand how Stone and Farberman are able to interpret such an account of group life as setting an opposition between "a conception of man as a being who apprehends and sustains a unique perspective of the universe" and "a conception of man who . . . must appropriately adapt his own tested apprehensions . . . with those of others." It is they, not I, who have introduced the "apparent dilemma."

3. I agree with the third above-cited point. I have said the same thing on page 541 of the article in declaring ". . . common definitions serve to account for the regularity, stability, and repetitiveness of joint action in vast areas of group life."

4. The catch question here is, "What kind of explanation?" Mead *did not* explain process as an expression of structure—as sociologists do when they try to account for group behavior by such terms as roles, status positions, norms, values, and system requirements. For Mead, the structural aspects of group life *enter into*—not determine—the process of fitting lines of action to each other. Mead regarded group life as consisting of this process.

The discussion of the "I" and the "me" in the final paragraph of Stone and Farberman's statement is badly confused. First, they do not make clear what is meant by saying that "The 'I' is transforming." What is it transforming? Next, in what sense is the "me" transformed? The "me" is not a transformed "I," if this is what they wish to say; instead, it is a depiction of an "I" that is already gone. The significance of the "me" lies not in being some kind of recasted "I" but, instead, in the control of the "I" which it allows. A recognition of this point brings us back to the way in which Mead viewed the "I" and the "me," namely, as aspects of a self-process in which the "I" calls for a response to guide it, and the "me" outlines or sets the stage in which the "I" may be expressed. Since both the "I" and the "me" are ingredients of such an on-going process, it is inaccurate, in depicting Mead, to view one as process and the other as structure.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Sociological Theories of Today. By PITIRIM A. SOROKIN. New York and London: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. xii+676. $10.50.

Endeavoring to be intersocietal and cross-cultural, if not also multicivilizational, *Sociological Theories of Today* develops a classificatory scheme for analyzing and criticizing the main varieties of sociological theory emerging since the publication of *Contemporary Sociological Theories* in 1928. Individual sociologists are studied only insofar as they are representative of these main types. The new classification employs as its distinctive *fundamentum divisionis* the basic conceptions of the nature of the group. On the one hand are the nominalistic-singularistic-atomistic theories conceiving of the group as an "aggregate of singularistic or separate individuals and their social actions, behind and beyond which there is no ontological entity called society." On the other hand are the realistic-universalistic-holistic—or as Sorokin prefers, systemic—theories presumably regarding the group as a genuine whole, unity, or system, transsubjective and superindividual, neither derivative from nor coincidental with the reality of its members. In any such distinctive system, each part is dependent on all of the important parts and the whole, and the whole in turn is dependent on all of the important parts.

Because any real human (superorganic) group "is invariably a cultural phenomenon, and any living cultural phenomenon is always a social phenomenon," the varying stress on, and the non-coterminability and non-coincidability of, the cultural (versus the social) or the social (versus the cultural) can be invoked to provide a basis for subclassifying such systemic theories. Cultural systemic theories (i.e., theories of cultural systems) are subdivided into four subvarieties (totalitarian, non-totalitarian, dichotomic, and typological). Social systemic theories (i.e., theories of social systems) are subdivided into six subtypes (social-action and analytic, functional-structural and nomenclatural, dialectic, pseudobehavioral [mixed], mixed taxonomies of social systems [groups], and mixed theories of social change).

Of the eighteen chapters in the book, two are allocated to the nominalistic-singularistic-atomistic type of theory. Seven chapters are devoted to theories of cultural systems and six concern theories of social systems.

American sociologists are not distributed evenly as representatvies of cultural and social system theories. Only the late Florian Znaniecki and Howard P. Becker appear in the former category, in which they are also in fact the only sociologists. The latter category includes Znaniecki, Parsons, Levy (as social action exponents), Merton (as a functionalist), Loomis (as a psychological nomenclaturalist), Homans (pseudobehavioral and empirical sociologies), Bierstedt (empirical taxonomies), and Martindale (social change studies). Of all the American theorists, Parsons received major attention, although twelve of the thirty-six pages involve reprinting of the earlier mimeographed comparison of Parsons' and Sorokin's theories. Homans ranked second with about twenty-three pages. But the most extensive treatment (thirty pages) was accorded Gurvitch, a European advocate of a dialectic theory of social and cultural systems.

Among the more serious difficulties in the classificatory scheme and its use seem to be the following:

1. An excessive theoretical and disciplinary latitudinarianism resulting from a disinclination to employ professional identification with sociology as a criterion for inclusion (e.g., eleven of the thirteen representatives of cultural systemic theories are philosophers, historians, or anthropologists).

2. An occasional unnecessarily ambiguous, amorphous, and erratic argument stemming from a failure to distinguish substantive and methodological theory (e.g., the bulk of the analysis in the chapters on nominalistic-singularistic-atomistic theory is actually methodological, and when substantive, it predominantly concerns non-sociologists).

3. Inconsistency in the use of the classificatory scheme (e.g., refusal to place Parsons' and Znaniecki's social action and Loomis' PAS formulations in the nominalistic-singularistic-atomistic category. Sorokin explicitly acknowledged the appropriateness of such classification on p. 459, ll. 6–7. He also ignored similar implications of Martindale's elementaristic, anticollectivistic social behaviorism).

4. A noticeable awkwardness in handling theorists with a plural commitment, or a changing, or even inconsistent orientation (e.g., Parsons is treated entirely under the social action rubric, and Merton is presented only as a functional theorist).

5. Failure to include specific analyses on certain major figures in American sociological theory (e.g., sociologists associated with the prominence of the University of Chicago's Department of Sociology during the 1920's and 1930's: Thomas, Mead, Faris, Park, and Wirth).

However, this volume is uncompromisingly and irrepressibly a testimony to Sorokin's intellectual and personal qualities in his relation with American sociology. *Sociological Theories of Today* is uncomfortably blunt, contentious in spirit, exasperatingly confident in tone, disturbingly erudite (though relieved by traces of haste), contemptuous of pretense, intolerant of ponderous neologisms and verbalisms, and iconoclastic of the American sociological establishment. Certainly, American sociology is incalculably indebted to Sorokin for his part in revitalizing interest in general sociological theory during his more than forty years in this country. Yet, symptoms of mutual distrust, estrangement, and rejection have frequently characterized the encounters between American sociology and Sorokin, and these features are again apparent in his latest work. *Sociological Theories of Today* affords an indispensable perspective on the enigmatic relationship between its author and the discipline in America.

Roscoe C. Hinkle

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The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962. By John Stewart Ambler. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. Pp. xi+427. $6.50.

Among the several studies on the recent strained history of French civil-military relations now available in English, this one by John S. Ambler strikes me in many respects as the most sociologically illuminating, less so because of any highly original thesis it advances or any strikingly new evidence brought to light than because of the skill with which the author draws on material about social structure and ideology to clarify why a large segment of the French officer corps first helped bring about the fall of the Fourth Republic by their poorly concealed sympathy with the actions of civilian conspirators and then embarked on the road toward open military insurrection against the regime of the de Gaulle and his policies. The study is not simply a historical account of events. Thus it lacks, for example, the richness of anecdotal detail that characterizes de La Gorce's *History of the French Army* or the overtones of tragedy that sometimes show through Kelly's *Lost Soldiers*. Though fully and heavily documented, Ambler is evidently most interested in social and political trends that affected the internal structure of the military and the development of cleavages within the officer corps as well as between it and the representatives of the civilian society. He deals with all these subjects in analytical fashion, avoiding, however, the heavy philosophizing that characterizes Meisel's *Fall of the Republic*, which deals with these same events.

A military insurrection in an army without a history of political adventurism takes years to crystallize and cannot, therefore, be attributed directly to any single cause or event. Among the aspects that stand out about the Algerian revolt, however, is that its mainstay was in the army, rather than the air force or navy, with most of the prime movers recruited from just below the general officer ranks. The shrinkage of the colonial empire deprived the French officer corps of a safety valve through which the energies of ambitious young officers could find release, while the maintenance of Algeria and other possessions, given the political and social conditions of the 1950's, required the full support of a nation which did not seem to share these goals and from which many officers found themselves ever more estranged. The cumulation of frustrations within the military led to a sharpening of conflict. Little by little French officers, their allegiance to the Republic tenuous to begin with, came to see

themselves as the only true representatives of the permanent national interest. These feelings, shared by most officers, were most strongly espoused by advocates of new doctrines of revolutionary warfare and by the commanders of elite paratrooper regiments provided the largest share of activists.

In this reviewer's judgment, Ambler is correct in his de-emphasis of class origin and political ideology as an explanation of the uprising. It was the tendency toward increasing self-recruitment which helped strengthen the corporate spirit, and the imperatives of traditional military honor constituted both an impetus for revolt and—once the military were confronted by a determined civil government—a reason for its failure. Perhaps the one point on which one might expect more clarification than Ambler offers concerns the kind of military role that facilitates the incorporation of the military into the political system under conditions where conflict is endemic. The analysis does not go beyond an advocacy of "subjective" control.

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Readings in Mathematical Psychology. Edited by R. DUNCAN LUCE, ROBERT R. BUSH, and EUGENE GALANTER. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Vol. I, 1963, pp. ix+535, $8.95; Vol. II, 1965, pp. ix+568, $8.95.

The rapid growth of mathematical applications in psychology during the last ten to fifteen years is reflected in the appearance of several books, edited volumes, mathematical primers for the social scientist, and a new journal. One of the most comprehensive surveys of this field is the three-volume *Handbook of Mathematical Psychology,* edited by Luce, Bush, and Galanter. The two-volume *Readings in Mathematical Psychology,* reviewed here, is a collection of previously published journal articles selected by the editors and the authors of the *Handbook* chapters to provide contemporary source materials for the *Handbook.*

The collection of papers in the *Readings* is more diverse than the general rubric "mathematical psychology" might suggest. In addition to psychologists, the contributors include biologists, physiologists, mathematicians, statisticians, engineers, philosophers, and linguists. Packed into the first volume are thirty-five papers on measurement, individual choice behavior, psychophysics, reaction time, learning, and stochastic processes. The second volume contains thirty-three papers on computer techniques, language, social interaction, sensory processes, preference, and utility.

Stochastic learning theory has the largest single representation in the collection; there are eighteen articles that deal with learning, including most of the foundation papers that first appeared in the 1950's. A number of the basic papers on formal grammars has also been reprinted, two or three of which most readers (even those with some math training) will find mathematically recondite. The reprints on psychophysics, reaction time, and sensory processes—although they are important contributions in their fields—are likely to be of tangential interest to sociologists. Two papers on computer simulation, an area of potential interest to sociologists, are concerned primarily with analyses of intellectual rather than social processes.

The five selections on social interaction are likely to be the ones of greatest interest to social psychologists and sociologists. Included are papers on graph theory and group structure, dominance, parasitism and symbiosis, sociometric choice, and an application of learning models to social interaction. However, the sample of reprints on this topic, while of high quality, is too small to give the reader a good idea of the ways in which mathematical ideas have been applied in this area.

But one can always find omissions in a reader, especially one that is a companion for a work of handbook proportions. Also, it was not intended that the primary audience of the *Handbook* and *Readings* be social psychologists and sociologists. Nevertheless, *Readings in Mathematical Psychology* is an excellent sampler for anyone who is interested in finding out what is going on in this active area and wishes to have direct contact with source materials.

A final comment on format. Most of the articles were not reset but, rather, were reproduced by an offset method. For most of the articles there is no objection to this reprinting procedure, particularly since the quality of the reproduction in the *Readings* is excellent. Also, this method makes it economically feasible to

reprint articles heavily laden with mathematical notation. However, in the case of some journals, the method used by Wiley resulted in a reduction in type size which makes for uncomfortable reading. The two-column page from the *Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers*, for example, which is approximately 9¾ inches long was reduced to 6⅜ inches. Almost as severe are the reductions of page size from the *Journal of the Optical Society of America* (!) and the *Journal of the Acoustical Society of America*.

SEYMOUR ROSENBERG

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Sociological Theories in Progress, Vol. I. Edited by JOSEPH BERGER, MORRIS ZELDITCH, JR., and BO ANDERSON. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966. Pp. xii+306. $5.95.

This book is a series of examples of "formalization" of social theories, the development of theories in mathematical form. A reviewer has a job similar to that of an editor of a mathematics journal. Everything he receives is true. His judgment can only be based on aesthetic criteria. A variety of tastes and different aesthetic sensibilities will produce varying judgments. Let me therefore try to analyze my own aesthetic sensibilities for formalized theory, using examples from the book in question.

I found the paper by Johan Galtung on "Rank and Social Integration" very exciting, and the paper by Berger, Cohen, Conner, and Zelditch on Markov chain analysis of certain simple social-psychological processes (chap. iii) tedious. I would classify the differences along three dimensions: economy, power or fruitfulness, and the newness of the empirical predictions derivable from the theory.

The Galtung paper conceives a group as being made up of a number of status dimensions, and then develops concepts of causal forces tending to disrupt the group as a whole and disturb the individuals in it by specifying three characteristics of the joint multivariate distribution of ranks on these dimensions: Equality, status consistency, and cross-cutting ties between groups are the main structural concepts defined. The Markov paper tries to break down an interaction process into general temporal stages and to associate with each of these stages a probability of entering into a given action or psychological state in the next period.

The economy of the Galtung paper is that, from three characteristics of the joint distribution of statuses, he forms concepts of causal forces which seem to me to be likely to be very important in explaining social behavior. These causes can be measured separately from the effects. The Markov paper's mathematical part is raw empiricism, which allows as many probabilities as one happens to want, none of which has a distinct causal meaning, with no causal reason to believe they are constant. The probabilities do not correspond to distinct *causes* of behavior, but to distinct *temporal stages*, and the measurement of the cause and the effect are identically the same operation. Temporal stages are uneconomical concepts because one must have more of them, the longer things take.

The power or fruitfulness of the Galtung paper is in the variety of derivations about class conflict, who will associate with whom, what kinds of groups will form, which people will be happy and which unhappy. All may be empirically wrong. A scientific derivation from a theory is a falsifiable statement which one would care whether it were false or not. I cannot see any derivations from the Markov chain theory that might be wrong, nor any that I would care whether they were wrong or not.

On newness, it seems to me that any intelligent sophomore would naturally think that activity might be analyzed by saying that first a man does one thing, then he does another which depends on the reaction to the first, and that what he does will depend on what he previously thought about how important that reaction was. But to say, as Galtung does, that the contingency or correlation between status dimensions might be a cause (i.e., the size of the correlation coefficient is a *measure* of a causal force, rather than of *association between* causal forces) of social action is something I have difficulty getting across to graduate students.

The Markov paper "multiplies entities," and I do not like that. It has so many free parameters, none with any reason for being and none with several independent ways of measuring them, that it will fit anything. It is a tarpaulin rather than *haute couture*. It does not give rise to many empirical predictions that can be wrong. It yields predictions that we already

knew, so does not add to the corpus of potential empirical work. Other formalizations, like the Galtung paper, yield marvelous and strange results, which only make sense in terms of the theory, and which it would be exciting to investigate. All this is only saying that formalized theories are like any other kind of theories, except for having usually fewer logical mistakes and less fuzziness. And there are many Ptolemys for every Kepler or Newton, in formalized or verbal theory. The Markov authors are a Ptolemy, with many complicated movements; Galtung is a Kepler, with a few simple movements (though without a Brahe for empirical fit).

Aside from these two papers, there are papers on bargaining processes (relating character traits of bargaining strategy to outcomes under different bargaining conditions); a reprint of James Davis' great paper on derivations from balance theory for mass phenomena; a weak paper on the shape of the distribution of sociometric choices received; an explication by Hans Zetterberg of the current theory of ambition and status striving; a theory of the learning of role norms; a contribution to the psychology of status inconsistency; an analysis of the effects of competition on items of mass culture; and a couple more status-consistency papers which labor to generate a few known empirical results from balance-type assumptions (and then urge that these results "will be true only if the assumptions of our theory are true" [p. 292]. I think they did not try any other assumptions. There are many which would give the same results).

The mathematics involved in the formalizations is quite simple. A person who once got a B in a matrix algebra course ought to be able to read the book as fast as he reads a clearly written verbal theory book like those of Homans or Merton. Those with less mathematics will have to work harder, about as hard as they work for Parsons or Eisenstadt.

It is quite likely that everyone will find something to his taste and perhaps something useful to his research in the book. I suspect it would be fun for intelligent advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students in a theory course.

ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE

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The Social Structure of Revolutionary America. By JACKSON TURNER MAIN. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. viii+330. $6.50.

Acquaintance "with recent literature on the class structure of contemporary America suggested that similar techniques might profitably be applied to an earlier period," writes Jackson Turner Main. And so we are treated to a feast of information on the economic class structure of the colonies, north and south; the rate of social and geographical mobility; the styles of life of the different social classes; the relation between economic and social status and the formal aspects of culture; and eighteenth-century American views of social order. Even if we did not have Main's explicit admission, his very list of topics would suggest the degree to which his book finds its intellectual roots in contemporary sociology.

We should be—indeed we are—delighted by this demonstration of academic catholicity, yet our sense of delight is, I fear, tempered by the uneasy feeling that the high hopes we all have for such intellectual efforts are not, in this case, fully realized. How can it happen that the self-conscious use of the most modern techniques and concepts of current social science can yet produce conclusions whose intellectual mustiness is not quite concealed by the throbbing prose:

> The American of the 1780's therefore had reason, as he viewed his society, for some cautious optimism. Classes remained, to be sure, and he might note with alarm the concentration of wealth and the growing number of poor, but the Revolution had made great changes, and westward the land was bright [p. 287].

Northern and Southern historians, Democratic and Republican historians, "humanistic" and "scientific" historians have been saying the same thing for generations, without benefit, obviously, of the tools of modern social science. An author is perhaps to be pardoned for allowing eloquence to take precedence in the concluding sentence of his book, but the same brooding sense of intellectual *déjà vu*—somewhere, someplace, I have seen these conclusions before—is the likely response as well to the major intellectual conclusions of the book, which are less apt to be compromised by considerations of rhetoric.

We are told that four main types of social

structure, each of which represented a different stage of social development, comprehended all of the innumerable variations of social structure that were to be found in the late eighteenth-century colonies. The first, or frontier, type was characterized by easy access to easily available land, economic equality, high social mobility, and an overwhelmingly agrarian population. The second, or subsistence farm, type was characterized by a continuation of the dominance of farming, but because of the greater difficulty of obtaining land, the rate of social mobility was somewhat lower. Still, there was no large class of landless families, as there was no large class of the markedly wealthy. The third, or commercial farm, type took its character from the growth of markets and the greater availability of capital; social mobility declined even more greatly, but, at the extremes, the numbers of landless and of wealthy increased. The fourth, or urban, type was characterized by a greater range of occupational diversity, a smaller middle class, larger wealthy and propertyless classes, and a higher rate of social mobility.

Now, it may very well be the case that these sentences characterize the different types of social structures in late eighteenth-century America, and, if so, they deserve to be stated. But the point is that all of them can be made in utter ignorance of the tools and concepts of social science, and they have been; indeed, they add up in general to the received view of late colonial society.

Does this mean that the best that social science can offer is confirmation of truths whose production was not dependent upon knowledge of social science to begin with? Of course not. The fact is that Main's book is less innovative than it appears to be. Despite his literary genuflections before the altar of social science, Main works with traditional materials within well-defined limits, and it is important —lest more illusions be created—that both historians and sociologists recognize this. Main has not adopted a method from sociology; he has not used sociological theory to suggest relationships among historical phenomena that were hitherto unperceived; he has not derived from any theory—sociological or otherwise—any hypotheses that might be used to explore the historical events he is interested in. What Main has taken over from sociology is a collection of terms, and this is at once the source of whatever advance his work marks over that of his predecessors and of the limitations from which it suffers. It is no small accomplishment to recognize that the things historians have written about in their discussion of eighteenth-century society are assimilable into the more general categories developed for the description of societies irrespective of time and place. At the very least, the new language permits comparisons to be made. But the use of the new terms does not tell us anything we did not already know about the phenomena to which they are applied. If, after reading Main's book, we know somewhat more about, say, styles of living in colonial America than we knew before, it is not because Main used a technique that made the evidence reveal more than it did before, or because, armed with a hypothesis from sociology, he brought phenomena into a relationship that was not before perceived. It is because Main, working indefatigably in the archives, ferreted out additional evidence, but he could have done that in blissful ignorance of any theory and of any method save that of accurate note-taking.

Lest I be accused of adopting as a slogan "Sociology si, History no," let me quickly add that what really concerns me most is the opportunity that was lost to make historical knowledge contribute to the development of sociological theory. Main is interested in social structure, and he makes much of the difference between class position and position in the rank order of other social attributes. He is also interested in the American Revolution, in its causes and in its consequences for the social structure of the colonies. Why did he not investigate Loyalists and Patriots at the outbreak of the Revolution to see if the latter were characterized by possession of certain status inconsistencies—high economic rank, let us say, combined with lower social or religious rank—that the former did not suffer from? And was one of the social consequences of the American Revolution the elimination of such status inconsistencies for its major beneficiaries by bringing the class system and the status system into greater congruence? To answer such questions Main would have had to seek a different kind of evidence, he would have had to look for relationships where now he does not. To the charge that this would have required Main to write a book different

from the one he did, I would reply that this is so, and also that one hopes for something better only from those who, like Main, have already done so much.

SIGMUND DIAMOND
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Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's View. By LEWIS A. COSER. New York: Free Press, 1965. Pp. xviii+374. $6.95.

The publication of Lewis Coser's *Men of Ideas* has to be ranked as a welcome event. The book is written in the *Wissenssoziologie* tradition and might well have been titled "The Social Context and Institutions of Men of Ideas." Admittedly, this would have been a clumsy title. Yet, it would have removed a number of possible lines of objection to the book, since in fact the work is more concerned with contextual problems and institutional grids than with ideas as such.

The main innovative feature of Coser's book is to show how ideas and ideologies which are employed in the battle for social change oftentimes end up in the service of bureaucratic management. In effect, he shows that there is a dialectic of ideology and organization which takes the form of high innovation in prerevolutionary phases or in active periods of social change, and a form of high integration in post-revolutionary or non-revolutionary periods—from France of Napoleon Bonaparte, the "brain-trust" founded in the New Deal period, and finally to the bureaucratic concentration of ideology in the tumultuous Gomulka period in Poland. Each is an illustration of this dialectic of ideology and organization. Similar lines of analyses might be performed on such regimes as Sekou Touré's in Guinea, and Fidel Castro's in Cuba. The dynamics of intellectual role performance described by Coser is by no means restricted to the examples adduced.

The book is composed of a series of short (sometimes too short) essays on selective themes in the institutional networks that intellectuals find themselves in. The various essays are divided into three large sections: (1) "Settings for Intellectual Life," (2) "Intellectuals in the House of Power," and (3) "The Intellectual in Contemporary America." While the essay form is obviously Coser's natural métier, it is also clear that it imposes certain methodological restrictions, so that the connections among the twenty-six chapters often remain tenuous. For the most part, few connections are made directly. Only inferentially are systematic relationships provided.

The first section provides some fine vignettes of the French salon, the English coffee houses, the rise of the Royal Society in England, the professionalization of literary production in England, and the movement among writers from dilettantism to commercialization. But just as we settle into England and France of past centuries we are quickly moved into twentieth-century United States and life in the literary bohemia of Greenwich Village. Interesting opportunities for comparison of Berkeley in the sixties with Greenwich Village in the twenties are not taken advantage of. But since Coser makes no pretense at being definitive, these gaps can easily be filled in by the intelligent reader.

The second section, on "Intellectuals in the House of Power," is partially a celebration of "Men of Ideas," as well as a warning that they not fuse the world of ideas with the house of power. It is Coser's view that while the two often intersect they do so at great risk to both science and policy. A forthright discussion of the concept of "policy-science" is, however, more implied than stated. As the reader is led to examinations of the Fabians, the Brain Trust, the Abolitionists, the Dreyfusards, and others, there emerges a large-scale critique of the notion of applied social science. Throughout this section, there is an implicit warning that Men of Ideas do not generate the careful exercise of power. However, Coser does not show that non-intellectuals or anti-intellectuals use power and authority more wisely. Issues now confronting Men of Ideas perhaps require a somewhat different statement. The dichotomy is decreasingly one between pure and applied social research, as it is a conflict among different forms of application. In other words, the value problem, rather than diminishing in the present period of rising scientific expectations, has become increasingly significant—but not quite in the same way that emerges in Coser's book.

The third section, on "The Intellectual in Contemporary America," will be of unquestionable interest to all social scientists concerned with relations between social science and public policy. This section has the merit

of taking up materials that are often neglected by sociologists. Here Coser provides a framework, not just for the sociology of knowledge, but more significantly a point of departure for handling problems in the sociology of sociology. The examination of such phenomena as unattached intellectuals, academic intellectuals, scientific intellectuals, and policy-related intellectuals as well as those involved in the production of mass culture enables us to piece together a model for studying the intellectual in comparative terms.

Perhaps the major problem with the book is Coser's definition of intellectuals: While meritorious, and based very much on the kind of position I personally would like to see more widespread, it can by no means be considered universal. Weber's distinction between men who live off of politics and men who live for politics is used as a takeoff point. Coser's notion of intellectuals is one of men who live for, rather than off of, ideas. But this leads to an extremely narrow appraisal of what intellectual activity is about. It is based on a notion of immortal perfection which can hardly be operationally sustained as characteristic of intellectuals across either historic time or geographical space. A more generic and less priestly definition of intellectuals might have stood Coser in good stead.

In all fairness, it must be pointed out that he provides essentially six (not one) criteria for intellectual behavior: (1) men who live for, rather than off of, ideas; (2) men who go beyond the immediate and the concrete to a more general realm of meaning and values; (3) men with a pronounced concern with core social values; (4) men concerned with style and taste; (5) men exempt from the ordinary run of mundane slogans and norms and, at the same time, exempt from everyday life styles; and finally (6) men who have a need to exercise a play of the mind for its own sake. However, even if we add all of these criteria together there remains a self-congratulatory note that is not warranted by examining the career lines of many intellectuals.

It is not clear whether those who exercise the play of the mind for its own sake are necessarily free of base power interests. It is quite possible to be concerned with the play of ideas and to relinquish a concern for the core values of society. Not a few men who work in the area of political policy have a high regard for the life of the mind and the play of ideas, but whether they have the same concern for core values or whether they define themselves as men living for, rather than off of, ideas is another matter. Even if Coser's propositions defining the intellectual are necessary elements, they are by no means sufficient for a meaningful definition; nor are they free of the kind of rationalistic bias that casts suspicion on traditional sociological definitions of intellectuals. Especially surprising is how little attention Coser has given to egoistically based, even crudely monetary, sources of intellectual "creativity." In this sense, perhaps intellectuals are similar in their class strivings and status ambitions to other social forces, and a deeper penetration of the stratification system of intellectuals would have been warranted.

The book is less than clear in its treatment of the structural differences between the behavior of natural scientists and that of social scientists. Also, there does not seem to be much sense of the relationship of social scientific activity to the unique circumstances of time and place. An extreme premium is placed on historical analogies as the only form of evidence for the points made. The areas and periods selected for examination, while they lend themselves to the kinds of analogies Coser offers, do not prove whether a more precise historical accounting would either confirm or disconfirm his hypotheses about intellectual behavior in general. Along the same lines, the Hobbesian bias that the union of policy-makers and intellectuals tends to be nasty, brutish, and short may be true in a consensus society where there is a normal strain between the intellectual community and the policy-making community, but in societies of a Platonic or more frankly totalitarian variety, it is not so much that the intellectual *relationship* to policy is nasty, brutish, and short, but rather that the intellectual *as such* becomes nasty, brutish, and short-tempered—whether he is policy oriented or policy disoriented.

While Coser has, with genuine modesty, pointed to areas of omission, one cannot help but raise the question why there is an absence of any systematic consideration of the phenomenology of intellectual activity. Even if the book is confined to contextual analysis, it would seem that the work of men such as Raymond Aron, César Graña, and Thomas Molnar, among others, might have enhanced

the framework within which Coser views his theme. Greater attention to others who have been grappling with these problems, not only at a more general theoretical level, but those who, like Richard Westfall in history and Warren Hagstrom in sociology, have been working on these problems at a more systematic and empirical level, might have provided great aid in the final piecing together of a book on *Men of Ideas*. As it is, we have to be content with a volume which is fragmentary when it is brilliant, and brilliant despite its fragmentary qualities.

Never in any previous period of intellectual activity have intellectuals had so much policy potential or actual scientific control over their data, and, at the same time, never has there been such an unabashed cynicism about the life of ideas. Perhaps the rise of professionalism is less a response to outside pressures than an attempt to handle this problem by allowing people to function exclusively in terms of expertise, thereby entirely alleviating them of ideological and moral dilemmas. These anomalies Coser well appreciates. On the basis of his sensibilities and sensitivities this book deserves the attention of "men of ideas."

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ

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Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations. By ANSLEY J. COALE and PAUL DEMENY. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii+871. $20.00.

Those populations which have high mortality among children of school age tend also to have mortality among middle-aged adults; those with high infant mortality have high maternal mortality. From such relations the conclusion may be drawn that a life table showing eighteen five-year age groups does not really contain eighteen different facts; how many different facts it does contain is an empirical matter to be established (e.g., using factor analysis) by comparison of life tables computed for empirically existing populations. Coale and Demeny found in their study that twenty-four levels of mortality in each of four age patterns approximately describe the types of human mortality. In this book they accordingly present the 24×4 life tables, each for males and females.

But the work is not limited to mortality models. For every one of these the authors considered the possible rates of birth, and for each level of births expressed as a Gross Reproduction Rate (and again expressed as an intrinsic rate) they show the age distribution and other characteristics. This provides 24 (levels of mortality) $\times$ 4 (mortality patterns) $\times$ 2 (sexes) $\times$ 26 (levels of fertility) = 4,992 model populations. The tables showing these may be seen as a huge curve-fitting enterprise, assimilating into convenient form all of the information on mortality which exists anywhere. Although the empirical data which underlie the tables consist of that material which is reliable, and hence tend to be confined to statistically advanced countries, yet it turns out that the resulting set of stable models have application far beyond the range of the sources. In studying the Indian female population of 1911, the authors take the pattern of mortality characterized as "West," choose suitable levels of mortality and fertility, and from their printout find the age table which corresponds to these. The result so synthesized comes very close to the age distribution of India observed in the Census of 1911, and indeed where the observed and calculated curves depart from one another it is by no means certain that the observed is more accurate.

This ability of the models to account for the properties of populations other than those on which accurate birth and death data are available is the key to their usefulness. If any statistical device provides something for nothing (informationally speaking), it is this. The present publication, both for its lucid summary of theory and its easily read figures (the latter reproduced by photo-offset for accuracy), will be indispensable to the working demographer—at least until the day when he will have at his disposal accurate vital records for all human populations.

NATHAN KEYFITZ

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Samples from English Cultures, Vols. I and II. ("International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.") By JOSEPHINE KLEIN. New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Pp. xii+435; xi+238. $8.50; $6.00.

This study examines the relationship between social experience and personality in

diverse communities and classes in English society. The data are drawn from a wide variety of reports on the modes of living, family organization, and child-rearing practices of different social strata. In some instances, the source materials seem less than ideal. For instance, Josephine Klein uses the observations of youth workers on the initial enthusiasm and subsequent apathy of slum children for adult-run clubs to illustrate "the lack of persistence, the lack of ego-involvement, the poverty of ideas" (p. 34) which presumably characterizes the modal personality type of this population.

The author discloses that her book was inspired by Benedict's *Patterns of Culture*. She adds that she did not search for overarching cultural configurations because "the sub-cultures with which I was concerned shared too many culture traits and were not static enough to merit the title *Pattern* in the sense in which Benedict used the word" (p. ix). It is quite possible, of course, that highly differentiated societies or even relatively homogeneous social strata lack a unifying ethos—an integrated set of cultural values and beliefs whose influence over conduct in the concrete domains of social life is sustained by common moral sentiments and emotional dispositions. Nevertheless, I find it strange indeed when Klein first points to presumptive evidence of normative elements which transcend the boundaries of distinct social groups (i.e., to the numerous culture traits shared by these communities) and then claims, on a priori grounds, that their meaning somehow changes so quickly that they elude description and analysis.

Much of the study concentrates on those attitudes, social arrangements, and socialization techniques related to social mobility. Klein distinguishes between those persons who accept their position in the larger society (the status "assenters") and those persons who want to rise in its occupational and prestige systems (the status "dissenters"). Depending upon which group is under discussion, Klein treats the desire for personal status improvement as both a dependent and independent variable in the mobility process. In her opinion, the marked absence of strong motivation for self-improvement in the slums and, in a more attenuated form, among the non-mobile working class is due to the pressure of traditional attitudes and child-rearing mores which inhibit the ability to defer immediate gratifications, to concentrate on problem-solving situations for long periods of time, to think abstractly, to restrain many asocial impulses, etc. On the other hand, she informs us that the status aspirations of the mobile segments of the working class are not only responsible for changes in life styles and social networks but for the ways in which these people raise their children as well.

Klein carries the discussion of the "cognitive poverty" of the lower classes beyond the fact that these people often have considerable difficulty learning those intellectual tasks associated with specialized occupational roles. She suggests that their social milieu deprives them of their full imaginative faculties and burdens them with a cognitive apparatus capable of making relatively crude and inefficient discriminations about existential processes in the phenomenological world—a view, incidentally, reminiscent of theories of a primitive prelogical mentality. Yet anthropological studies of the terminological systems of primitive societies have shown that even groups untrained in the art of abstract reasoning have extremely complex cognitive classifications of natural and social phenomena. Compounding the error, she also confuses the extent to which a community or subculture is resistant to new norms and the degree to which its traditional system of beliefs is capable of making fine distinctions among various types of social objects, events, and processes.

As a whole, this work could benefit by judicious editing. Her writing is often so imprecise that the reader is frequently confronted by what seem to be theoretical non sequiturs. We are told, for example, that "the Ship Street superego is a rather peculiar one, because the mother is rather peculiar" (p. 66). Is Klein suggesting an isomorphic relationship between the behavior of particular socialization agents and superego contents?

GARY SCHWARTZ

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The Small World of Khanh Hau. By JAMES B. HENDRY. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1964. Pp. xi+312. $6.00.

The Small World of Khanh Hau portrays more the smallness of vision of this team of social researchers than the world of the average Vietnamese of this era. In this volume, James B. Hendry presents an account of the economic activities of a delta village situated fifty kilometers south of Saigon. The research on which this report is based was conducted during 1957–59. There are two companion volumes on sociology and administration written by Hendry's colleagues which we have not seen. However, the decision of the research team "to avoid all questions which touched on political beliefs and loyalties and to minimize questions which dealt with sensitive areas such as savings and crop yields" seems to have foredoomed the value of this entire project for understanding the psychology of the Vietnamese people or the motivation of their economic enterprise.

The delta villages of South Vietnam, unlike those in the northern and central regions, have been settled mainly by refugees, entrepreneurs, former or potential soldiers, and retired aristocrats during the past century and a half. In this sense, these villages are transitional. For instance, they retain the cult of ancestor worship, and yet they are generally nuclear family-oriented and look to education and technology for improving individual statuses. However, the struggles and the ensuing climate of opinion in the country, which have affected the lives of these villagers for decades, may have more to do with their material activities than their indigenous institutions. The "interesting" finding of the author, that military career ("the most readily available means to economic advancement") was given low priority by the villagers, may be a better clue to the economic motivation of the people of Khanh Hau than the bench-mark data collected by Hendry and his colleagues. This book fails to convince one that the researchers were able to have a real glimpse of the world of Khanh Hau. It does not advance thinking on economic development in any significant way either.

Baidya Nath Varma

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Microcosm: Structural, Psychological and Religious Evolution in Groups. By Philip E. Slater. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966. Pp. xii+276. $7.95.

R. W. B. Lewis (in his *Trials of the Word*, 1965, p. 97) writes of an old Boston lady who, telling Emerson "about the extreme religious sensibility of an earlier generation, said about those pious folk that 'they had to hold on hard to the huckleberry bushes to hinder themselves from being translated.'" In Slater's book, reader and author are drawn toward visions clonic of a world more real than the author's evidence. The evidence, given a post factum interpretation, consists of protocols from recordings of groups in session.

To the uninspired eye there is only a scuffed classroom or a comfortable, institutional lounge; in the chairs, either a college "training" group or patients in group therapy. The groups have similarities. The setting is institutional, and the institution's authority is present in teacher or therapist. The objective is growth in awareness of self, of others, and of social relations through analysis by participants of their own interaction. The official leader will not give instruction or direction, offering instead interpretations of the group's life in the light of his otherwise unexpressed understanding of behavior and organizations. All participants confront each other and the leader's power over them (to determine their grades or release them from confinement), the institutional requirement that they meet regularly for several months, and the leader's interpretations (supplemented in the classroom by readings in psychopathology, in psychoanalysis, and in the imagery of ancient and modern myths). What happens?

On the surface it is not mysterious. The first sessions are wary but polite. There is restiveness over the leader's silence; uneasiness about the tape recorder and the observers unseen behind opaque glass. Participants sit around a table, ostensibly for an important purpose which requires them to talk. So they do talk. But the only things that bring them together silently dominate that talk: the readings, the occasional interpretations, the hovering day of judgment, their uncertainty about the means of salvation—salvation for which each individually, not the group, must be justified. Finally they take matters into their own hands.

This act is a new torment. It contradicts the condition of their being together. So does lack of initiative. They must shape their own course but, to be meaningful under the terms of their institutional "contract," their efforts must be consistent with their leader's unknown preformances. They must stop waiting for his initiatives. In that sense, they commonly depose him. But his power continues. He rules whether or not he reigns.

Once thus ambiguously on their own, what do they do? Readings, interpretations, and the final judgment still set directions. All these reiterate a certain content: fear, ambition, ambivalence, competition, unconscious strivings, mythic modes of thought, the primal horde, the primal scene, growing up, the threshold of independence, the terrors and power of rationality. On these themes they fixate. These provide their vocabulary. And these symbols are singularly appropriate, for who is surprised at being unable to define and measure the unknowable? Perhaps one can capture its significance if not its nature. This the new vocabulary permits, directs.

Is there in these protocols the resonance of a cry at birth? Of Great Earth turning? Of a failure of kings? Of oracular dampness? All can be heard by those who will. Slater gives a long chapter to such perceptions.

Make no mistake, Slater's is not another foolish explanation of social organization as psychopathology. He knows what sociologists mean by a group. He also knows the logic of psychoanalysis. But he uses his knowledge in an odd fashion. Unlike Freud or Jung he never declares that the members of groups he has led or otherwise known are "working through" specific personal or racial problems, proceeding then to identify the evidence that makes his explanation more plausible than some other. Nor, like most sociologists or social psychologists, does he pinpoint main features of the social situation in which his subjects find themselves, seeking from those features to explain systematically the events that follow. He does seem to approve both approaches but is regularly committed to neither. He takes, rather, the stance of some modern students of myth and of those who demythologize in order to reveal a still inexpressible truth behind each myth, treating with great seriousness all meanings and passion he can find in even the trivialities of his subjects' talk and gesture, seeking the lawfulness of their irrationalities and in their action a rationality that they may not perceive. His single most extensive effort to root these meanings in experience comes through showing how they change in the course of a group's development how they prepare each stage in that process and how new meanings then aid a group's members in consolidating and interpreting their work. He notes resemblances to Piaget's discussion of the moral development of the child and to the cultural evolution of whole societies. Many, many meanings escape his framework. He alludes to their being grounded elsewhere but does not abandon them or explicate a scheme adequate for ordering them.

What has he achieved? Something I think quite remarkable. Bales is best known for treating the development of small, informal groups as a process of collective problem-solving. Homans, Blau, and Goffman give us the small group as a marketplace, its development a product of bargaining, aggregate effects, or the workings of a hidden "dramatistic" hand. Perhaps Slater should be understood as moving toward a social psychology of culture—especially of the development of culture in small groups, of the appearance there of essential collective meanings that objectify any group's career. The small group, even a group as atypical as those he pictures here, is important for him as a microcosm containing and evolving universal collective meanings. *Microcosm* is a significant step toward what he seems to want. I shall assign it at the first opportunity.

GUY E. SWANSON

University of Michigan

On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript. By ROBERT K. MERTON, New York: Free Press, 1965. Pp. ix+290. $5.95.

Robert K. Merton has written a book that is elegantly styled, occasionally amusing, frequently tiresome, and profoundly trivial. One is almost tempted to apply the term "camp." Tracing the use of the aphorism involving pygmies or dwarfs and giants, Merton dedicates his great talent and gift for scholarship to what should have been an amusement but that rarely becomes anything more than a private joke.

The volume, shaped as a long, digressive letter to an academic friend, is full of commentary on original sources, backtracking, and changes of mind that stereotypically mark the epistolary style of the closeted scholar. The book ranges over origins, the accuracy of quotations, variant editions, name counts, and amusing sidelights, and ends with an index of names and subjects in the same tone as the text.

Were it not for Merton's position in our profession, this book would not merit review in a sociological journal. Its relevance to sociology—however broadly conceived—is slight and, when it occurs, is only slightly amusing, particularly if one is not involved with the author as a personality. Catherine Drinker Bowen, who writes a wildly positive Introduction, singles out for special praise the book's quality as a spoof on excessive and picky academic scholarship. For parts of some academic disciplines—notably to be found in the humanities—the work may well be a chilling spoof; however, while contemporary sociology may be charged with many faults, excessive and picky scholarship is manifestly not one of them.

Beyond being a book, however, *OTSOG* (a neologism that Merton fashions in one of his rare lapses from high camp) is also a social event and, as such, deserves some comment. We were not the first to be asked to review this book. We speculated on who were among those who opted not to review it, and we found speculation on reasons for passing the opportunity of equal interest. One obvious reason is that few could match Merton for command of languages or breadth of reading; he moves back and forth among several literatures as if dealing with old friends. A second reason, less obvious but more significant, is a reluctance to say that someone of Merton's stature has produced so trivial a book. Merton is obviously free to do what he wants. Nonetheless, we suspect we are not alone in the feeling of frustration *OTSOG* produces. One wonders about the prospect of a major, sustained work from Merton, for which *OTSOG* is obviously no substitute and for which the field has waited a long time. Underlying a reviewer's uneasiness is the sense of a tragic implication in this satiric work: It is possible that the very character of contemporary sociology—which reflects the influence of Merton perhaps more than any other single figure—has rendered Merton's major talent irrelevant. And perhaps *OTSOG*, which did not appear pseudonymously, which is the convention for this genre, but with all the trappings of Merton the sociologist, represents expression of his own frustration with the sociology he helped fashion.

William Simon
John H. Gagnon
Indiana University

A Survey of Dar es Salaam. By J. A. K. Leslie. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pp. 305. $4.80.

I started reading this book with great interest but finished it with anguish and despair. J. A. K. Leslie, in an unconventional way, gives the summary of his text in the opening sixteen pages. It is exciting reading. However, the survey of this strategic city as presented in this book is impressionistic and marred by many personal judgments of doubtful nature. The moral concern which the author shows for his subjects becomes a jarring note in spite of a cautious cultural relativity to which he reverts from time to time.

The questions of morality in human dealings and cultural standards as well as progress in man's pursuit of knowledge and his control of nature are central points of controversy in today's applied research. British anthropologists, in their role of advisors to colonial governments in Africa and Asia, gave one answer; American anthropologists and social scientists, in their role of diagnosticians and consultants on economic development in underdeveloped areas are giving another answer. The first is generally in favor of cultural monism (the culture of Great Britain and the West being the beacon lights for all other cultures); the second is practically determined by cultural pluralism (each culture is free to choose its moorings, e.g., American, British, Western, Eastern, or whatever, and develop in terms of the traditions selected by the peoples themselves according to their own free will). This book obviously represents the former standpoint with regard to cultural development. The delineation of the religious life and beliefs of the Africans bears

ample evidence on this score. The issue of cultural idealism (in the sense of certain standards of valuation and behavior being superior to others) versus cultural relativism (i.e., no values or behavior have any intrinsic moral superiority over others) will be very much with us as the newly independent countries start on their heady race toward industrialization and nationhood.

There is another important issue which this book brings to mind. It is the question of the meaning of the concept "community." Is a village, a tribal "route" to town, a fringe, a suburb, or a township a community today? If so, is the community under eclipse everywhere as it is in the West in the opinion of some authorities? How meaningful is the study of a single community today in understanding social processes in a country?

This book portrays the life of the people who have settled (or been uprooted?) in Dar es Salaam during the past century of its existence. The author claims that his "figures are the least inaccurate" for the "virtually uneducated and highly suspicious community" of Africans whom he studied. He presents a journalistic survey of the lives of the former slaves and ex-soldiers as well as the newer clerks, businessmen, and unskilled workers who carry on a life of "active tensions and strains" and suffer from a touch of "loneliness" in this capital city. The prostitutes and the criminals get their due portrayal here. However, in spite of the "interludes" (i.e., anecdotes and inside views skilfully woven throughout the text in every chapter), one fails to have a real understanding of the life and goals of these people who are managing their own destiny today as a free nation. I wonder if Leslie's anecdotal "survey" was acceptable to the British administration, which ordered it in 1956. I wonder more why Leslie decided to publish it under hard cover, when what he has to say here has been outdated and practically superseded by the events since 1960.

BAIDYA NATH VARMA

City College of New York

Handbook of Organizations. Edited by JAMES G. MARCH. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965. Pp. xvi+1,247. $20.00.

This is not a handbook at all. My office dictionary states that a handbook is "A small book or treatise, serving for guidance, as in an occupation or study: *handbook of radio*." No book of 1,247 two-column pages could be considered small. And it is certainly not a treatise. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to call it a "footbook"—it not only kicks around a lot of problems, but it also takes positive steps toward more adequate theories of organization.

Organization has become *the* interdisciplinary field replacing the once exalted field of social psychology. It has many of the same problems: defining its units and objects of analysis; integrating a mass of concepts, methods, and findings into usable orders; and preventing differences in training and perspective from impeding the flow of ideas. And, of course, it also holds forth the same promise of a greater knowledge of human behavior. James G. March has successfully put together the most important single sourcebook in this burgeoning field, and for this, we should all be grateful.

Considered collectively, the chapters represent the careful work of acknowledged experts in their areas. At least two deficiencies were immediately evident:

1. There is little consensus as to how an organization ought to be defined and what its basic parameters are. (Compare, e.g., the definitions of Cartwright [p. 1], Stinchcombe [p. 142], Starbuck [p. 452], and Perrow [p. 913].) On the other hand, there appears to be considerable consensus that there is no single unifying theory of organization, nor one best or only approach to their study.

2. The study of organizations currently means primarily the study of American organizations. Studies of organizations in other societies are rare, and one consequence of this has been a serious tendency to neglect the impact of cultural factors on organizational behavior and development. (Crozier's recent study of *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* helps to correct this deficiency.)

Four chapters are organized under the subtitle "Foundations." The first, by Cartwright, "Influence, Leadership, Control," is a smooth and tightly written social psychological analysis that examines the literature on social influence processes. The focus is on the characteristics of the person who influences (O), the ways of exerting influence, and the person who

is subject to influence (P). Equally artful is Taylor's chapter on "Decision-making and Problem-solving." Stinchcombe's piece, the only one of the four by a sociologist, is a veritable avalanche of new ideas, some absurd, some ingenious, all interesting. The usefulness of Golembiewski's review on "Small Groups and Large Organizations" is hampered by his writing style.

Of the four chapters on methods, the first two, Weick, "Laboratory Experimentation with Organization," and Scott, "Field Methods in the Study of Organization," were wholly successful; while the latter two, Cohen and Cyert, "Simulation of Organizational Behavior," and Starbuck, "Mathematics and Organization Theory," were of more limited value.

Eight chapters were grouped under "Theoretical-Substantive Areas." Massie's on "Management" is an excellent critique of the major classical and neoclassical theorists including Fayol, Mooney, Sheldon, Davis, Urwick, Newman, Dale, and Drucker. Sociologists will find this chapter especially useful as there is simply nothing equal to it in the literature. On the other hand, Marschak's "Economic Theories of Organization" and Starbuck's "Organization Growth and Development" are only peripherally concerned with sociological problems; their focus is primarily on economic systems. Guetzkow, "Communications in Organizations," presents a superb review of the literature from an information-processing perspective. It is tightly written and considerably more balanced in approach than Zaleznick's chapter on "Interpersonal Relations in Organizations." This essay is strongly oriented toward psychoanalytic theory and overly concerned with social action approaches. It would have been more appropriately placed in the last section on applications; and, on the other hand, the very last chapter in the book, that by Haberstroh on "Organization Design and Systems Analysis," would have been more appropriate under the heading of theoretical-substantive areas.

Feldman and Kanter's "Organizational Decision-making" reflects the March-Simon-Cyert or Carnegie Tech approach. In addition to theirs, the chapters by Taylor, Cohen and Cyert, Marschak, and Dill on "Business Organizations," all represent this point of view. Frankly, I feel this orientation is given more space than necessary.

Etzioni's essay on "Organizational Control Structure" adds relatively little to his major work on this problem. Udy's "The Comparative Analysis of Organizations" provides a much-needed discussion of problems of comparative organizational research. A second and, to me, less exciting part of the paper presents a model and thirty-eight "derived" propositions. The care and precision of thought we have come to expect from Udy is demonstrated once again.

Nine chapters are on "Specific Institutions" and, with few exceptions, are bound to be extraordinarily useful for a long time to come. Tannenbaum's on "Unions" is a thorough account and analysis of American union organization. It is a splendid job. Schlesinger's piece on "Political Party Organization" is rather unexciting, since it focuses much too heavily on the formal elements of party organization. Nevertheless, it is a worthwhile addition. The terminological problems of the field are reflected in the fact that Peabody and Rourke title their essay "Public *Bureaucracies,*" while Lang's is called "Military *Organization.*" The former fails to integrate organization theory, even in rough fashion, with the public administration literature; the latter is, on the whole, a fine review, although it inevitably reveals the rather sad state of theorizing typical of the military organization literature. Dibble's fascinating chapter on "The Organization of Traditional Authority: English County Government 1558–1640" is a strong argument for study of Weber's neglected ideal type of traditional authority. It also demonstrates the potential contributions of historical research for the study of organizations.

Perrow, "Hospitals: Technology, Structure, and Goals" is a forced and very critical attack on milieu therapy and its implications for hospital administration. The style borders on the polemical and therefore is fun to read after all the heavier prose around it. Perrow's comments are mainly negative, but they are stimulating as well. He also turns his guns on the general hospital literature.

A more conventional appraisal of treatment-oriented approaches in total institutions is presented by Cressey in "Prison Organizations." Cressey demonstrates his thorough command of the prison and organization literature. However, the approach is mainly descriptive and lacks the close reasoning and careful presentation of major theoretical problems presented,

for example, in Bidwell's paper. Bidwell's "The School as a Formal Organization" is a brilliant, scholarly review of the public elementary and secondary school research. A gold mine of important research problems is revealed. It is ironic, however, that there is nowhere to be found in this gigantic book an examination of higher educational systems.

Although three chapters are listed under the heading "Applications," only two really were so concerned. Shepard's "Changing Interpersonal and Intergroup Relationships in Organizations," is an attack on the so-called primary mentality, meaning a competitive, instrumental, personal adaptation. There follows a plea for "authentic, non-exploitative interpersonal relations." This essay seemed to me to be out of place in the *Handbook*. Leavitt's chapter on "Applied Organizational Change in Industry: Structural, Technological, and Humanistic Approaches" distinguishes between structural, technological, and "people" approaches to change. The major focus is on the latter or human-relations type. The author's approach is considerably more objective than Shepard's. Despite this, the work presented in the last section is incongruent with the rest of the volume. Most of it concerns *T*-group training, primarily in industrial settings, and is situated on the outer edges of social science.

The most effective chapters were those that either (1) assembled the literature in a particular area in a theoretically meaningful way; or (2) demonstrated the importance of a unit of study or an approach for the central problems of organizational theory; or (3) provided a fresh perspective, thereby identifying a series of new and vital theoretical problems. Fortunately, a good many chapters fulfilled one or more of these criteria.

In sum, this is a monumental volume, of great significance to the field, and I am pleased to have secured a free copy.

OSCAR GRUSKY

University of California
Los Angeles

Timetables: Structuring the Passage of Time in Hospital Treatment and Other Careers. By JULIUS ROTH. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963. Pp. xix+124. $1.95 (paper).

This small book deals with an important but neglected aspect of social life, the propensity of groups to develop conceptions of the sequence and timing of events and to orient their behavior accordingly. Over half of the volume is devoted to timetables in the tuberculosis hospital, based upon the author's observations in five hospitals, varying in size, location, control, and characteristics of staff and patients. In three of these hospitals, the author made his observations from the vantage point of a patient, while he was openly a social science observer in the other two hospitals. He tells us something of the advantages and disadvantages of both vantage points in terms of the kind of data which becomes available to the observer. Unlike the authors of *Boys in White*, Julius Roth makes no attempt to present his material so that the reader can make judgments concerning the quantity and quality of the evidence for his assertions. On the other hand, his presentation is succinct, pointed, and holds the reader's interest throughout.

In an introduction, Roth graphically plunges the reader into the world of the tuberculosis patient and his concern with time. The first chapter describes the timetables concerning the course of hospitalization held by patients in his various hospitals, the bench marks along the way, and the criteria used to establish bench marks. In the following chapter, he argues that conceptions of time also figure heavily in the staff's perceptions of the patient's course and in their decisions about how to handle patients. The last chapter in this section explores the interaction between staff and patients around issues aroused by their respective timetables. Conflict between staff and patients over the timetable originates out of their different positions in the organization and differences in the timetable categories evolved by each group. Although Roth sees patients as victims, he does not see them as passive pawns. Rather, patients make every attempt to influence their condition, and frequently enough, they succeed, according to Roth. He devotes considerable space to describing the strategies that patients may use and the cards that the various participants can play in this game.

In the remainder of the book, Roth is concerned with demonstrating that his concepts of timetables and the interactions associated with them apply in diverse situations, and with

elucidating some of the general conditions and characteristics of timetables. In these chapters, he makes use of published accounts on other types of illnesses, occupational careers, life cycles, and ethnological reports. Timetable norms can be found in all of these different situations, but their saliency for the life of the group is far greater in some situations than others. For Roth, timetables cease to be trivial and become worthy of study when they are relatively indeterminate and uncertain, since these are the conditions when they become an issue within a group, and conflict and bargaining occur. Here Roth overlooks one of the potentially most exciting uses of the timetables concept. It could be a powerful analytic tool in comparative studies. Attention to differences in the organization and uses of time can reveal a great deal about the values and structures of groups.

Some readers may feel that this book is marred by Roth's obvious value position, namely, that patients are the victims of high-handed and arbitrary treatment on the part of staff. This reviewer believes that Roth is entitled to his feelings and, furthermore, that it would be difficult to argue the correctness of such assertions. The issue, however, is, what consequences does this position have for his research? Roth pays some attention to the staff, but his position prevents him from properly understanding the framework within which the staff operates. More important, he is not very likely to investigate the conditions that give rise to the staff's behavior, which is the kind of research that has to be done if the lot of patients is to be improved over the long haul. On the other hand, the author's personal perspective increases our insight into what this kind of total institution does to its inmates, and that is very worthwhile.

It would be a pity if the audience for this book consisted mostly of social scientists and other professionals working in the area of medicine. It has far wider significance, and should stimulate readers to take another look at their own particular subject matter.

RUE BUCHER

University of Illinois

The Dry Years: Prohibition and Social Change in Washington. By NORMAN D. CLARK. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965. Pp. ix+304. $6.95.

For those who have studied it, the American temperance movement is an important clue to unique qualities in American politics. The efforts to reform drinking habits by legislation reveal the implication of diverse cultural styles for political tensions and demonstrate an evangelical utopianism not readily deducible from the qualities of industrialization or the traits of an egalitarian society. Norman D. Clark's history of prohibition in the state of Washington is a most valuable addition to several recent studies which have emphasized the importance of prohibition in American politics and placed it in the context of social structure and culture.

This excellent study emphasizes the interaction between social change and evangelical morality in one state, rather than the entire nation. Using local history and voting records, Clark is able to bring greater depth to his analysis than has been possible in the other major analyses of temperance and prohibition. He begins with the description of the early Indian for trade and the attempts to limit the sale of liquor. Several chapters are devoted to the mid-nineteenth-century attempt of the Protestant churches and missionaries to bring sobriety to the newly settled land.

The central contribution of the study is in its analysis of how prohibition came to Washington before it came to the nation. Clark finds the initiating element of the early-twentieth-century movement in the development of railroads and industry in Washington. The economic expansion brought into Washington an industrial working class whose consumption habits came sharply into conflict with the church-going middle class that had settled in Washington earlier and that was now swelled by middle-class additions lured from other states by the economic growth.

Analysis of county and city voting on prohibition referenda in 1910–14 leads him to question the common view of the prohibition issue as a straight fight between the rural and the urban components of American society. Analysis of votes by wards in large cities, however, leads Clark to a recognition of the conflict between middle and lower class as crucial to an understanding of the political process involved. He reconceptualizes the rural-urban conflict as one of two styles of life—

"the country" and "the city"—which are in conflict within the city as well as between rural and urban areas. It is the urban middle class, the backbone of the Protestant churches, that represents this "dry" style in the city and that formed the source of "dry" voting strength in the cities. Thus Clark finds progressivism and populism closely intertwined with prohibition. While he fails to examine the ethnic and religious differences between the drys and wets in Washington, his ecological indexes point to cultural differences.

The study is weakest in its analysis of the prohibition era and the advent of repeal. Here Clark is less analytical and repeats the historian's usual preoccupation with the details of enforcement of the Volstead Act. He adds little to solving the problem of the decline in dry sentiment and power that occurred in the later part of the dry decade. The decline in support for the Anti-Saloon League and the disintegration of the progressivist alliance between unions, farmers, and the urban middle class is described, but we are not given much understanding of what brought it about.

Clark's work is an excellent study which we hope will be replicated in other states. The streak of utopianism in American political culture has been neglected too long by American scholars intent on the economic issues. Is it now a quality of the past or does it still move men and events? Is Clark correct when he writes, "For when all the old Prohibs are dead —as soon they will be—one may look in vain for the old America"?

JOSEPH GUSFIELD

University of Illinois

Hoffa and the Teamsters: A Study of Union Power. By RALPH C. JAMES and ESTELLE DINERSTEIN JAMES. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1965. Pp. xviii+430. $6.95.

This book is one of the most fascinating studies of a union leader ever made. Ralph and Estelle James, invited by Hoffa to examine the powerful Teamsters Union from the inside, found the union and all its secrets open to their investigations; they attended all sorts of meetings as Hoffa's "assistants," obtained explanations about any of his actions that they questioned, and received access to confidential union files. From their efforts, they have drawn a revealing and absorbing picture of one of the most effective and certainly the most controversial labor leader of our time.

Concerned primarily with Hoffa's techniques of power, the Jameses concentrated on his organizing and collective bargaining methods, his concentration of power within the union, and his manipulation of the huge Teamster Union pension fund. They outline his exploitation of differences of interest among the employers, his uses of secondary pressures to compel unionization, his threats of selective strikes under his open-ended grievance procedure to bend employers to his will. The threat of such strikes sufficed to give him effective control over investment of the $300 million pension fund, with the result that large sums were lent to high-risk projects at low rates of interest whenever Hoffa wished to reward old friends or make powerful new ones.

Hoffa steadily extended his area of domination from his original base in Detroit to the Midwest over-the-road drivers and then to the South, the West, the East, and local cartage, until he negotiated his first national truck-freight agreement in 1964. He persuaded local groups to let him do their bargaining by promising to match or exceed the benefits won elsewhere—and then proceeded, time after time, to make good on his promise. A master strategist and tactician, an expert in the intricacies of his industry committee to the use of power techniques undisturbed by moral scruples—these qualities made possible Hoffa's rise to power. A revealing chapter analyzes Hoffa's complex personality, his brilliant but non-intellectual mind, his agility and his physical and mental toughness, his explosive temper, his belief in his own infallibility, his rejection of law and religion, his contempt for the moral standards professed by contemporary society.

Books on union leadership tend to be dreary reading. Many are simply public relations jobs, whereas the critical ones suffer from limited co-operation and lack of access to confidential material. The James's volume, with its brilliant analysis of Hoffa's manipulation of power techniques, will be of interest to union and management bargainers, social scientists, and legislators alike.

JOEL SEIDMAN

University of Chicago

Staff Leadership in Public Schools: A Sociological Inquiry. By NEAL GROSS and ROBERT E. HERRIOTT, with an Appendix by ARTHUR P. DEMPSTER and FREDERICK MOSTELLER. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. xi+247. $6.95.

This remarkable research report is concerned with a major segment of a larger on-going effort, the National Principalship Study, which was initiated at Harvard University in 1959. The present inquiry concentrates on elementary school principals and seeks to discover what factors affect their achievement of executive professional leadership, which is defined as "their efforts to conform to a definition of their role that stresses an obligation to improve the performance of their teachers."

The universe for this phase of the study was a national cross-section of 175 elementary school principals in forty large systems. Extensive interviews were conducted with their subordinate teachers, with the principals themselves, and with their immediate superiors. A complex matrix of social forces was perceived as bearing upon the individual principal's leadership role. It was theorized that these administrators characteristically internalize a direction-giving definition of their role during their training, and subsequently encounter resistance to that definition from the professionals whom they, in turn, supervise.

The objectives of the study were to determine the influence of the principal's behavior upon his organization and to isolate the determinants of that behavior. The hypotheses attempted to evaluate the effects of a series of factors such as the training of the principal, his personal background and characteristics, the nature of his school, the quality of supervision he received, the morale and professional efforts of his teachers, and the success of his pupils.

The adjectives which may best be used to describe this work are "orderly," "elegant," and "sophisticated." They all apply to the conceptualization, to the writing, and to the statistics. The sharp edge of Occam's razor is everywhere evident. The results, which should shake and may instruct educationists, ought to delight sociologists, for they constitute the clearest analysis of the leadership concept since Rensis Likert's *New Patterns of Management*.

FREDERIC W. TERRIEN

San Francisco State College

Survey Sampling. By LESLIE KISH. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. xvi+643. $10.95.

In *Survey Sampling*, Leslie Kish gives us the fruits of twenty years of experience at the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. The result is a fine book which will certainly join the ranks of the classics in sampling. The book is distinguished by its lucid writing, its many practical examples and exercises, and the attention it focuses on the real world (as well as the theoretical) aspects of sampling.

Kish intended this book primarily as a text for students in social statistics, and it can be highly recommended for classroom use. But the practicing statistician and sampler will also find this to be an invaluable reference book. The book has been well produced, and the relatively few typographical errors are mainly in the exercises.

To suggest where this book is most useful, it may be compared with Cochran's *Sampling Techniques* and *Sample Survey Methods and Theory* by Hansen, Hurwitz, and Madow. While all are fine books, the readers of this journal and most social scientists will find Kish most useful for their applied problems and for classroom teaching. Mathematical statisticians, on the other hand, will prefer either the elegence of Cochran or the completeness of Hansen, Hurwitz, and Madow. The derivations given in Kish do cover the essentials, but this is primarily an applied and not a theoretical book.

Kish is most concerned with the sampling of individuals or households. The researcher mainly interested in samples of business firms, universities, or other institutions will probably find Hansen, Hurwitz, and Madow more useful, and their discussion of cost functions is also presented in greater detail.

Kish, on the other hand, is superior to the other books in his discussions of practical methods for estimating variances. It is particularly helpful for the broader audience which will use this book to have his discussion of

"Simple Variances for Complex Samples," which until now has been available only in the *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. As a satisfied user, I can attest that the method is well suited to computer applications and makes it possible to compute the large number of variance estimates required in a complex national study with many variables.

While students will be mainly interested in the first part of the volume, practicing samplers will be most grateful for the latter half, which deals with special problems, techniques, and related concepts. The detailed discussion of area sampling procedures, and particularly the discussion of listing techniques, is unsurpassed even by the excellent discussion in Hansen, Hurwitz, and Madow. The chapters on biases and non-sampling errors and inference from survey data are also especially insightful. This is a worthy addition to the other Wiley books in sampling, and it should have a long, useful life as a reference for all survey samplers.

SEYMOUR SUDMAN

National Opinion Research Center

American Cities: Their Social Characteristics. By JEFFREY K. HADDEN and EDGAR F. BORGATTA. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965. Pp. vi+193. $6.00.

This monograph attempts to provide an alternate approach to the classification of cities. Eight parallel-factor analytic studies of cities categorized by size and geographical location are used to extract sixteen factors from a matrix of sixty-five variables. Decile factor scores are developed, and cities of 25,000 population and over in the United States are profiled.

The expediency of selecting single variables as indicators of a factor content might be questioned, as might be the decision to use as an adequate profile only twelve of the sixteen factors which the factor analysis produced. The output of a factor analysis depends on the input, and the sixty-five variables included in the matrix and the twelve "factors" on which the profiles are based represent a very limited part of the significant spectrum of variables of an urban social system. While the study is called *American Cities: Their Social Characteristics*, it does not include many variables which most sociologists would consider to be key *social* characteristics. Since the profiles are based on aggregate statistics, significant variations within cities are masked. From the profile of Los Angeles, for example, one could never discover that that city harbored a Watts district with its potentials for social disaster.

Some years ago, in a series of publications, I proposed and demonstrated the approach to community typology and description used in this monograph. My experience over a number of years with profiles based on factor analysis of an 83-variable matrix using county data shows that their utility for social research is quite limited. The profiles in the Hadden-Borgatta monograph are significant only for the relatively small range of specific problems for which the variables and units of analysis used are relevant.

The opportunity to contribute significantly to urban theory is not realized, since the authors chose to make their review of classificatory systems and factor-analysis studies of communities selective, rather than representative and exhaustive, and since they fail to integrate adequately the previous studies they do mention with their own findings.

The announced intention of the monograph was to provide an adequate alternate approach to classification of cities and to provide a brief sourcebook of urban data. It has succeeded to a degree in the latter purpose. The main contribution of the volume is the basic reference material which may be useful for further analysis and synthetic evaluation. Particularly valuable are the many tables of intercorrelations of variables and of factor loadings. The evidence of parallel structure in the eight parallel-factor analyses and other regularities demonstrated are impressive. The basic data from this monograph, when combined with results of past and future investigations, should lead to theoretical statements and dimensions which will describe communities with ever increasing reliability, validity, and social relevance.

CHRISTEN T. JONASSEN

Ohio State University

Who's Running This Town? Community Leadership and Social Change. By RITCHIE P. LOWRY. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Pp. xxxv+250. $5.95.

Like *The Rulers and the Ruled* and *Four Cities*, Lowry's study is concerned with value patterns in American cities. While the first two advanced their arguments by way of a comparative analysis, Lowry deals with only one city of 30,000 in northern California—a community which he calls "Micro City."

The first half of the book deals with the history and political culture of Micro City. Drawing on a debatable interpretation of Mannheim, Lowry applies the distinction between utopian and "conservative" ideologies to the city and indicates how each operates to the context of community issues. To the extent that either prevails, it is the conservative perspective, but Lowry argues that the city does not have the capacity to be even consistently conservative. Rather, Micro City is marked by a "fear, negativism and provincialism" (p. 36) which underwrites no more than a defense of the status quo. The author appears dissatisfied that local leaders do not have consistent public philosophies, although one suspects that life might be even more trying to the utopians (with whom Lowry identifies) if that were the case. Indeed, Lowry reports that the city's leaders do yield on occasion to the opinion of the outside world, because they are so uncommitted to a thoroughgoing ideology. Yet the disputes involved were extremely bitter. This seems inconsistent with Lowry's major argument that the local commitment to ideology is superficial and apathetic.

The second section, which is more concrete in conception, involves the generation of a typology of leaders and a consideration of the roles which each performs in the public life of Micro City. Lowry expands Merton's local-cosmopolitan distinction to include a third type, which he calls the "mediator." Using the utopian-conservative dimension as a separate axis, Lowry derives six types of leaders, each having their own style and approach to issues and social relations in the city. The most interesting argument developed by the author is that commitment to the status quo is, in part, the result of an acute failure or alienation of leadership elements from the community. Furthermore, each leadership type has its own characteristic style of alienation. Lowry develops this argument by distinguishing between social and cultural alienation as distinct dimensions of leadership attitudes.

Along with personal observations and published materials gathered over a six-year period (while he was on the faculty of the local college), Lowry includes interviews with a sample of seventy-seven leaders. While he presents data for some of their more obvious personal characteristics, he is rarely explicit about his treatment of attitudes and behavior. Unfortunately, Lowry's appendixes do not speak for themselves in the matter of methodology. How he operationalizes "locals," "cosmopolitans," and "mediators," for example, is never made clear. In another instance, the author remarks that "only a few (eleven of the total of seventy-seven leaders) can be considered . . . effective" (p. 152), but nowhere does he tell us what his measure of "effectiveness" might be.

While this study is neither as original in its approach nor as exceptional in its findings as the author seems to believe, it is useful for its treatment of a small city where the power "problem" is not so much the presence of a power elite as the apparent absence of "effective" local leadership.

DONALD B. ROSENTHAL

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Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform. By FRANK SMALLWOOD. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965. Pp. xi+342. $2.95 (paper).

Frank Smallwood has written a detailed political history of efforts to reform the boundaries and governmental apparatus of metropolitan London. His book makes a sound contribution to the growing literature about contemporary metropolitan reform. He succeeds in his attempt to give a comparative dimension to the work of Sofen (*The Miami Metropolitan Experiment*), Schmandt *et al.* (*Metropolitan Reform in St. Louis*), Martin and Munger (*Decisions in Syracuse*), Greer (*Metropolitics*), and others.

His historical review ranges from the ancient Roman evacuation through the establishment in 1957 of a new Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London. The coverage is somewhat tedious and overwhelming, yet it is appropriately balanced toward recent changes. Its historical sweep offers a meaningful contrast with the shallow background characteristic of North American community development.

Smallwood's description is marred only by

his unexplicated assumption that extended metropolitan government is a goal toward which generations of decision-makers *ought* to have moved. This is a normative intrusion and a deficient historiography as well. For, in reconstructing events, Smallwood tends to look back from 1957, rather than narrating toward it.

One of the most interesting chapters for this reviewer is entitled "The Missing Stakes." Here, in identifying interest groups which did not engage the metropolitan issue, Smallwood contrasts the English with the North American scene. Ethnic and religious groups, trade unions, and organized local associations like the London County Council Association, did not involve themselves, where in the United States one is certain they would have been in the thick of the controversy. In this chapter, Smallwood effectively relates differences in participation procedure to differences in political structure, although his recourse to the concept of public apathy at the end of the chapter is disappointing.

The book is ornamented with theoretical trappings, as Smallwood attempts to connect his findings to various political theories of local power. His effort to consider the Greater London case in the light of Dahl's theories of New Haven power politics is particularly unsatisfying. Smallwood has relied chiefly on secondary sources—government papers, news reports, and organizational memoranda—for his study. He obviously conducted meaningful interviews with officials and with students of London politics, but his research was in no sense geared to the microanalysis of power structure. The maps and illustrations are excellent.

ROBERT A. DENTLER

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Mental Illness in the Negro Community. By SEYMOUR PARKER and ROBERT J. KLEINER. New York: Free Press, 1966. Pp. xiv+408. $9.95.

This book is an empirical and positivistic nightmare. I offer this opening gambit with a clear recognition of the monetary investment in this project; of the thousands of man-hours of work devoted to this research; of the attempt to develop a firm methodological foundation; and of the use that has been made of existing theory to order the hypotheses. In addition to all this, the investigators have adhered to all of the well-formulated procedures for this brand of scientific social research. Careful construction and reworking of a questionnaire with 208 items, pretesting of the questionnaire, training of interviewers, selection of carefully constructed representative samples, the developing of operationally defined concepts, and the utilizing of limited mathematical models wherever possible have been done. However, you get out of such research exactly what you put into it, and if the problem, with its specified factors, has not been subjected to a complete logical analysis at the outset, the results are apt to be of extremely dubious quality.

The research reported in this volume is an attempt to investigate the relationship between goal-striving stress and the development of mental disorder in two contrasting samples of Negroes: (1) the mentally ill selected from the first admissions to all public and private in- and out-patient psychiatric facilities, including psychiatrists in private practice; and (2) the non-mentally ill selected at random from the community. In the course of this inquiry, reference-group behavior, self-evaluations, migratory status, class status, and social mobility are also analyzed in their relation to the development of mental disorder. Two assumptions underly the entire study. "Proneness to mental disorder increases directly (1) with anticipation of, or actual, failure to reach desired goals, namely frustration i.e.; and (2) with unrelieved and prolonged high levels of stress involved in striving for goals" (p. 10). With these assumptions and on the basis of some of Merton's theories with respect to goal-striving and reference-group behavior, the investigators erect a series of five hypotheses. While, in their conclusions, they assert that their hypotheses have been confirmed, there is nevertheless much doubt as reflected in various qualifications and the fact that many of these tests for establishing significant differences between means are not significant and sometimes are the opposite of the predictions.

The investigators might well have been advised at the beginning to concentrate on their first hypothesis: "Goal-striving stress would be significantly higher in the mentally ill population than in the community population" (p.

20). The question immediately arises, what is the nature of the data that would be essential to establish this proposition? In my judgment, there is real complexity here, and there is a question as to whether any reliable measurement of stress can be obtained by asking persons in the sample, one-half of whom have received some psychiatric diagnosis, what was the highest education you wanted to get and what is the job you would like to get in contrast to the education that you have and the present job that you hold down. This would appear particularly dubious with respect to the educational question when asked some years beyond the actual experience.

Or again, one might attack the investigators' assumptions, which are hardly proven and probably not generally accepted. The idea, of course, is not new, as Warner and Horney, among others, have suggested this also; but there have never been any satisfactory empirical observations that would establish it. Goal-striving stress, if it can be measured satisfactorily, may have some pathological behavior effects on a person, and so the investigators might have been wiser if they had selected some type of entity like alcoholism and then tried to determine if it is actually true that alcoholics have more goal-striving stress than do non-alcoholics. Mental disorder covers a wide range of organic, psychic, and emotional symptoms and is far too complex a phenomenon to serve as an adequate test of the hypotheses that the investigators have advanced. Then, too, even if their data clearly supported the hypothesis, as stated above, it would not follow that goal-striving stress is an antecedent factor to mental disorder as their equation (goal-striving stress, maladaptation, physiological reactions, physic stress, mental disorder) would have it. And finally, it should be noted that the investigators have gained nothing by attempting tests of their hypotheses with samples composed exclusively of Negroes, unless it might be the journalistic feat of tying together two popular subjects that are much in the mass media these turbulent days—mental illness and the American Negro.

I realize that this review has been negative in tone, but in making it so I hope to bring a challenge to future investigators who will research the problem that Parker and Kleiner have raised: What are the psychic and behavioral consequences of goal-striving stress in a social system with an open opportunity structure?

H. WARREN DUNHAM

Wayne State University
and
Lafayette Clinic

Work and Mental Illness: Eight Case Studies. By OZZIE G. SIMMONS, with the collaboration of HELEN MACGILL HUGHES. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. x+271. $6.95.

It is a puzzle to me how any publisher's editor or referee ever came to think of this as a book. That the author should do so is a little more understandable.

I speculate that it happened like this: A large-scale study was conducted of the lives of mental patients who had been discharged from a hospital. Several manuscripts were prepared and published. There remained a batch of case histories which had not been consumed by these manuscripts. It would be too bad to let them go to waste. So eight of the better ones were selected, introductory and concluding chapters were pasted on fore and aft, and, lo and behold, a *book*—or at least 271 printed pages bound together in a cover.

With so few cases, we might expect that they would be exceptional in some way—perhaps minutely detailed chronicles based on long-term firsthand observation and repeated contacts with the subjects and their significant others. This is not the case. There are only four to seventeen interviews over one to four years with each of the subjects, equally small numbers of interviews for the same time span with one or two family members, a highly variable (but usually small) number of interviews with therapists, a few second- and thirdhand reports about the patient's behavior, and institutional records of dubious validity. On the basis of such data, careers lasting a decade or two have been reconstructed. No doubt the data obtained are adequate for some purposes, but they do not justify special presentation in what, after all, is nothing but a collection of case studies.

The introductory chapter gives some general background concerning occupational careers, including the important point that a mental patient's work career can be understood in the

same terms as that of anyone else. This is all right in itself, but the points are not developed in the rest of the book, and the first chapter becomes a more or less independent essay. The "conclusions" chapter reaches no general conclusion other than that mental hospitals fail to help patients re-establish themselves in a work career or even in a job. This last chapter is mainly a rehash of some aspects of the case studies.

JULIUS A. ROTH

University of California, Davis

Social Change in Israel. By JUDAH MATRAS. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. x+211. $6.95.

This is a moderately useful work once one penetrates the veils surrounding it. In the first instance, the title is clearly inappropriate—perhaps the most generous suggestion would be "Some Demographic Aspects of Social Change in Israel." Additionally, the introductory and concluding thirty pages or so of historical and theoretical materials have little, if any, connection with the heart of the text.

The bulk of the volume is a detailed, sometimes longitudinal, exposition of demographic characteristics of the Israeli population. This discussion is largely esoteric, not to say routine—age composition, labor-force data, and the like. Opportunities for pointed and significant elaboration are often missed.

There are several exceptions to this characterization. The discussion of extent of religious observance is interesting, drawing upon survey data and some inventive use of the author's own studies of maternity cases in Israel. (Even here, with his study constituting something approaching 10 per cent of the volume, the author withholds even a sketchy outline of the actual methods employed in the survey.) Similarly, the material on family formation, including family size and political affiliation, represents creative use of the author's previous research—the latter material apparently done with the collaboration of Louis Guttman.

The presentation of work by Guttman and Antonovsky on political ideological types and general party affiliation joins Seligman's *Leadership in the New Nation* in creating new understanding of Israeli politics in genuine sociological terms as opposed to the rather insipid party-program analysis which in the past has too often been accepted at face value. In addition to sample surveys and the classification of scale types, there is an attempt to apply ecological correlation techniques to patterns or party voting and distribution of the population in terms of country of origin. These findings are hedged in by qualifications that the conditions for proper application of the techniques may not exist. Most of the conclusions, nonetheless, are much as would be expected, except that Herut, by reputation presumed to have had a special appeal for East Europeans, in fact shows highly negative correlations with locales with such population concentrations. Matras does not comment on this, nor does he explain why only the 1961 election was used for his analysis.

The historical and theoretical material in the introduction and conclusion are, in contrast, meaty and provocative, although sketchy and undeveloped. Matras develops notions of social role, and he constructs hypothetical tables of data that might be assembled in studying the transformation of the Jewish population as it moved from Europe to Israel under conditions of stress. He suggests the possibility of analyzing societies as "dependent" or "marginal" as opposed to relatively self-sufficient ones, with ramifications in terms of role distributions. Perhaps some day he will write the book he outlines.

SAMUEL KRISLOV

University of Minnesota

Crimes of Violence: An Enquiry by the Cambridge Institute of Criminology into the Crimes of Violence against the Person in London. By FREDERICK H. MCCLINTOCK, assisted by N. HOWARD AVISON, N. C. SAUILL, and V. L. WORTHINGTON. New York: St Martin's Press, 1963. Pp. x+287. $11.00.

Crimes of Violence, Frederick H. McClintock's second of two works on this subject, attempts to analyze the trends in these types of crimes in England and Wales and to examine the different facets of this form of behavior for a decade, 1950–60. Recognizing that some limits must be set, he confines his attention to an examination of crimes committed in the Metropolitan Police District of London. His sample included indictable and non-indictable offenses, 3,000 and 700 cases respectively, and

162 cases of sex crimes with some element of violence. This sample, he informs us, reveals the range of social and penal problems found found throughout the United Kingdom.

In the first two chapters, the author appears to assume the role of apologist for the existing penal system. His talents seem drawn into disproving the popular beliefs about increase in teen-age crime and hooliganism, increase in "stranger" perpetrated violence, and a decrease in the court's ability to control the rising tide of crimes of violence. McClintock's defense arsenal contains valuable artillery: two classification schema which combat the tendency to make simplistic and hysterical judgments about this type of crime and promotes the exploration of the matrixes in which these crimes occur. The utility of such matrixes has not been fully explored, but they do point to the unlikelihood that persons living in the better residential neighborhood will be involved in crimes of violence and to the fact that the one major exception to this generalization is that sexual crimes tend to occur in all areas.

The next chapters move from crime detection and conviction to punishment for crime, and examine how punishment relates to subsequent recidivistic behavior.

The prevention of crimes of violence and the curtailment of recidivism seem to be of such urgency that many alarmed citizens ask for stronger penal legislation; they feel, as Jeremy Bentham did, that the way to deter crime is to make the punishment so heinous that criminal pleasure could not overbalance the pain incurred in the punishment. The author responds to these concerns in a twofold manner. First, he proves that stronger penalties for crimes of violence are not needed, since judges in most courts usually do not impose the maximum sentence allowed by law. Second, he shows that the rate of violent-crime-recidivism is smaller than recidivism in other types of crime, so while some recidivism does undoubtedly occur (and there are some hidden cases), it is not the major problem in this type of crime.

When McClintock began the description of the nature and substance of this form of crime, I was convinced that he would proceed beyond the mere statement of what his classification tables describe to a "second-level" explanatory analysis of his data. He never does this. The study can be described as a series of not too well-integrated essays; at no place in the work do these essays become interdependent parts in a unified whole. This is unfortunate, since such integration may have inspired meaningful explanations rather than redundant descriptions. That he has given important directions for future research cannot be denied, but this work has not formulated the kind of testable hypotheses that are being used to make criminological research a truly scientific endeavor.

RUDOLPH B. PRUDEN

Fordham University

Adolescence and Religion: The Jewish Teenager in American Society. By BERNARD CARL ROSEN. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xviii+218. $4.95.

Bernard Carl Rosen's book is concerned with the religious orientations and behavior of Jewish teenagers and the factors which are related to these religious patterns. Using reference-group theory, the author explores the relationship between the adolescent's religiosity and his membership in various groups, the family, peer group, the Jewish ethnic group, and American society. Much of the analysis focuses on fifty adolescents, assumed to be the total number of Jewish teenagers who are part of the Jewish community in a town of 60,000. The other extensively analyzed groups represent adolescents involved in Jewish community centers in Philadelphia and Nebraska.

The author shows that an adolescent whose parents are traditional in religion is more likely to be traditional than an adolescent whose parents are non-traditional. Adolescents whose parents are not only traditional themselves but also expect their children to act traditionally are also more likely than other adolescents to conform to traditional religious norms. Parental expectations are not only linked to greater adolescent conformity to traditional norms but also to the feeling experienced by the adolescents that they should conform even more than they already do.

The author explains these last findings within the framework of reference-group theory. It seems to this reader that the expectations are what is crucial, and, therefore, the concept of a socializing agent would be more apropos. Indeed, the data presented in the book suggest that a parent who has traditional expectations

about adolescents' religious behavior is likely to have greater influence than a parent who, though traditional himself, may not expect his adolescent child to be traditional.

While adolescents are not likely to see their age peers as religious referents, peer groups seem to influence the adolescent's religious ideas. Jewish adolescents formed tightly knit, informal peer groups in the small town studied, and respondents were likely to plan the exclusive use of kosher meat in their own families if the peer group did so.

When parents and peers differ, adolescents are overwhelmingly more likely to hold religious views which are similar to those of their primary reference group, even though that group was not named as a *religious* referent.

When adolescents deviate from the norms of one reference group (be it peers or parents), it is argued that they are conforming to the norms of the other group, and thus Rosen sees the adolescents in a cross-pressure situation. Those who differed with one reference group were not more likely than other adolescents to agree with the views held by the other reference group. Therefore, the value of the cross-pressure model of peer group and parental influence is called into doubt.

The Jewish minority group and its formal organizations also influenced the adolescent's religiosity. Religious education does insure an increase in religious knowledge, but it is most effective for adolescents from traditional family backgrounds. Rosen attempts to specify how the adolescent perceives the Jewish community's religious expectations. While different respondents may be using different referents in determining community expectations, the author was able to show that observant adolescents felt they would be more observant if adult community expectations were greater, and non-observant adolescents felt they would be less observant if expectations were lower.

Society-wide influences on Jewish adolescents are seen primarily as secularizing processes; they make it psychologically difficult for the Jewish adolescent to maintain his separateness. By ignoring Herberg's insightful hypothesis that the larger community encourages and supports religious differences, the author not only seems to oversimplify the operation of society-wide processes but also obscures the internal sources of strain experienced by Jewish adolescents. In spite of this fact, Rosen creatively explores certain aspects of ethnic identity and religious identification.

Modern Judaism, it seems to this reader, comes closest to the ancient religions which theologically and cultically linked religiousness with a biological and cultural sense of peoplehood. It is of more than passing interest, therefore, that Rosen finds religiously involved adolescents more likely to identify Jewishness with religiosity than with birth and that these same adolescents are also more likely than others to support ethnic separateness. The first finding may mean that religiously involved Jews are more likely than other Jews to define their religion in ways non-Jews define religion in contemporary Western society. To interpret as purely chauvinistic the desire of religious respondents to insure ethnic separateness by the introduction of cultural but not religious programs and traditions, may be shortsighted. Non-religious cultural patterns could eventually free the community from religiocultural patterns, such as the dietary laws, which presently insure the preservation of the group but also conflict with rationalized thought systems. A change from religiocultural patterns would be of great importance if, as Rosen suggests, emphasis on these patterns detracts from other Jewish religious commitments.

Reference-group theory is advanced by the author's statement that a reference group must be specified as such independently of opinions held by the referents and the subjects involved. The fact that age peers are not seen by adolescents as religious referents, while parents are, but do influence the religious opinions of adolescents, is ignored rather than used further to explore reference-group theory. Unfortunately, the author overextends the concept of the reference group, taking the most rigorous norms espoused in the Jewish religion and turning them into a reference group.

This study seems to have grave methodological problems. The influence and power of the family, peer, and other Jewish reference groups may well be heightened for Jewish adolescents who use Jewish community centers and for those who are part of a highly cohesive minority group situated in a small town. Moreover, because the author shifts from one sample to another, sometimes without explanation, and lumps together samples which are clearly different, the reader cannot help but feel uneasy.

In spite of these limitations, the material presented furnishes a provocative contribution to the study of Jewish adolescents' religiosity.

LEONARD J. PINTO

University of Colorado

Men near the Top: Filling Key Posts in the Federal Service. By JOHN J. CORSON and R. SHALE PAUL. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xvii+189. $6.00.

Corson and Paul attempt to describe the work performed by those at the upper levels of the federal career service (GS 16 and above) and to identify what skills are needed by these "men near the top." After identifying the skills needed and examining the work actually performed, the authors make some recommendations on how the government should recruit, train, and retain higher-level civil service personnel.

The book is based on both mailed questionnaires sent to a random sample of all GS 16's and above and eighty in-depth interviews with a subsample. Its major contribution is the delineation of three major types of federal executives (professionals, program managers, and staff managers), the skills they possess and the work they do. Although Corson and Paul do not pay any attention to the different types of organizations their respondents may serve in, their classification of executives should prove useful in the comparative study of bureaucratic organizations. This book really does not give any answers to questions such as whether a professional in an agency whose main function is research (e.g., the U.S. Tariff Commission) fulfils the same function as a professional in a regulatory agency (e.g., the C.A.B.).

Although the recommendations set forth by Corson and Paul as a means to insure the supply of top-level civil servants of quality are both sensible and lucid, there is a need to examine more than the career patterns and functions performed by those near the top of the present federal civil service. The recommendations are good, but the evidence upon which they are based is incomplete. For instance, recommendations about improving the system of recruitment used by the federal civil service are made with little data being presented to show that the individuals presently being recruited are deficient in skills needed near the top in the future.

In the final assessment, this book does clarify the nature of the work which federal executives perform and makes some useful recommendations for the improvement of the federal civil service.

DANIEL H. WILLICK

University of Chicago

Community and Schizophrenia: An Epidemiological Analysis. By H. WARREN DUNHAM. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965. Pp. xxv+312. $12.50.

In this monograph, Dunham reports the results of a psychiatric study of two areas within the Detroit metropolitan area and offers theoretical discussions of certain issues concerning the sociological study of psychiatric disorders. Although several forms of mental illness are discussed, this study concentrates primarily on the schizophrenic disorders. The two urban areas were selected after being categorized as having high and low rates of first admissions to public mental hospitals. A subsequent follow-up if all known cases from all potential treatment sources from these two areas indicated that their differences in treated schizophrenia were reduced to non-significance. An attempted replication of Hollingshead and Redlich's social class and schizophrenia findings did not find any significant relationship. In fact, Dunham and his investigators claim to find no significant relationship between schizophrenia and its symptoms and the variables they classify as "community organization" and "social structures," and conclude that "the evidence examined so far in this research raises a large element of doubt concerning the validity of any proposition asserting a specific causal linkage between sociocultural organization of an urban community and schizophrenia." Taking issue with other studies asserting sociologic and social psychologic factors related to mental illness as well as to schizophrenia, Dunham asserts that their findings lend support to the "social selection" theory first proposed by Odegaard.

Dunham is at his best in exposing many theoretical, conceptual, and methodological shortcomings of some well-known sociological stud-

ies of mental disorders, particularly criticizing their shifting frames of reference and other illogical deductions, misuse of data such as prevalence, incidence, and hospitalization rates, ignoring possible genetic aspects of schizophrenia, lack of knowledge of schizophrenic symptoms and related psychiatric conditions, and even taking them to task along with psychiatrists for their "humanistic" orientation. Dunham is also struck by the consistent *lack* of differences in rates of schizophrenia reported in many studies of divergent areas and at different times, seeming to imply that such constancy of rates support a genetic explanation for the etiology of schizophrenia which is further supported in an Epilogue written by Jacques S. Gottlieb, director of the psychiatric clinic sponsoring this project.

Space does not permit a full account of all the findings and discussion of the many important issues raised in this monograph. This reviewer, however, must mention a few of the discrepancies and faults in the research study and in the theoretical discussions presented in this book. Some major methodological questions concern the basic research design: Why were not the high- and low-rate areas not delineated *initially* by a *total* screening of psychiatric cases rather than by mere first admissions to state hospitals, which was admittedly a bias reported in other studies? A total schizophrenic census may have revealed other areas than those indicated by state hospital admissions as having more divergent rates.

But even more serious and disappointing is finding that Dunham uses questionable if not invalid "measures" of social organization, such as residential mobility and length of residence, marital and family status to stand for measures of community organizations. Dunham admits later in his book that these were ecological or spatial factors—certainly not social factors! He also offers more of a journalistic description than a *sociological* analysis of the two areas that were studied. Indeed, apart from his social class factors, this study does not include one true measure of social system or community organization whatsoever! The same shortcoming also holds for his alleged "measures" of stress, based upon nativity of fathers versus patients, and persons per room in households as an index of "overcrowdedness," which in turn is supposed to be indicative of "stress." The time is long overdue to reject ecological and demographic variables as valid measures of social conditions in sociological as well as social psychiatric research. Consequently, Dunham does not truly offer valid data to reject any relationship between *social* factors and schizophrenia, but rather, he has sounded the death-knell for so-called ecological and other pseudo-sociologic variables!

A more severe methodological weakness of this study is the omission of control cases from the comparative analysis of psychiatric cases from the two study areas. Dunham's measures of mobility, family status, etc., were on the schizophrenic cases themselves and computed for the two study areas. The omission of "normal-control" subjects drawn from these two communities to compare with the measures based on the morbid cases prevents the important and necessary determination as to whether the schizophrenic cases validly represent their areas or were divergent from the so-called normal cases in the same or different areas. Consequently, again Dunham is logically unable to draw the conclusions he did from his data.

Another methodological problem is the use of the so-called high- and low-rate communities in the design. We are not convinced that two study areas are as distinct communities in the *sociological* sense or as divergent in sociological character as Dunham would have us believe. Indeed, they are more heuristically categorized *census areas* than substantive sociological communities, in this reviewer's opinion, based upon the scanty and rather superficial descriptions of these two areas presented in this book. This make even more questionable the delineation of true sociologic variables to be related to mental disease and the occurrence of such cases in this type of area analysis. Certainly Dunham is unable either to dispute or support the relationship between social variables to schizophrenia or the "production" of mental cases in such areas as opposed to social systems.

Dunham contributes a valuable criticism of Hollingshead and Redlich's well-known study of social class and mental illness, similar to previous criticisms by Kramer and this reviewer. He also calls critical attention to the procedure that measures social class of mental patients which may be contaminated by their illness or family status, that is, the mixture of using the occupation and education of mental patients for some cases and that of their father's and husband's in other cases.

The chapter on "Social Structures and Schizophrenic Symptoms" reports an interesting effort that fails to connect "objective measures" of social structure to acute and chronic schizophrenic symptoms. This reviewer urges caution in accepting the hard and fast conclusions by Dunham from these results, since the basic data on the extremely small number of cases were obtained by a psychiatrist seeking *psychiatric* rather than *sociologic* conditions in his analysis.

But perhaps the most disappointing part of this monograph to this reviewer is the author's theoretical and methodological discussions. Each starts off promisingly by tackling some major issues but veers off into tangential discourses and belatedly returns to the main theme to conclude with an essentially superficial analysis after all the dust has settled. While Dunham concludes that his entire project supports the social selection theory, his data were not properly designed to test any of the major hypotheses of that theory. Although he criticizes others in "leaping" from social epidemiological data to asserting social etiological theories or explanations of mental illness, Dunham, in turn, does precisely the same thing regarding the social selectivity theory!

Part of the difficulty in following much of Dunham's analysis is the confusion he generates by mixing studies that contribute to an understanding of *etiology* of mental illness with those that merely attempt to explain the *differential distribution* of mental cases in social structures and communities. In fact, it is not until the very last paragraph of this book (p. 256) that we find the statement, "If our explanation for community and class distributions is valid, epidemiological studies of this character are likely to have little direct significance for isolating etiological factors. In the near future, however, they should be continued in order to check on the interpretations advanced here. They will thus continue to enlarge our knowledge about *where* mental disease develops and *how prevalent* it is in any given social system" (italics added). If by this Dunham admits that the social selection theory helps to explain the *distribution* of mental cases within society and its systems and does not contribute to an understanding of the *causation* of the disease itself, then he will get no argument from this reviewer. This is simply stating that the social selection approach is more meaningful than the traditional, so-called ecological approach—so what else is new? But this is far different from taking other sociologists to task (including this reviewer) for failing to explain why some individuals become mentally ill under such conditions as anomie, social disorganization, etc., and others do not, since it may be argued that this level of explanation is not the essential purpose of such inquiries, nor need it be.

Dunham also criticizes as illogical those studies that leap from a social systems level of analysis to social psychological to etiological and vice versa. Apparently he feels that the various analytic levels of the social and behavioral sciences are not interrelated, nor have mutual impact or interaction, but are independent and unrelated analytical systems. Again, he offers no convincing evidence of his own interpretations of these conceptual and theoretical systems nor any necessary logic to prove his point. Nor does he present the social selection theory in sufficient detail to convince the critical reader that this theory is also free from similar conceptual and theoretical faults as the other theories and approaches he criticizes.

It would be grossly unfair to dwell too long on these and other negative aspects of Dunham's study, since there are many significant and stimulating aspects of the work. Social scientists involved in psychiatric inquiry should study this volume thoroughly, for Dunham's criticisms of such effort are provocative and worthy of further examination. It is even more regrettable that in this work Dunham, one of the most knowledgeable sociologists in the mental health field, falls prey to similar shortcomings for which he criticizes others.

E. Gartly Jaco

University of California
Riverside

The Economics of Delinquency. By Belton M. Fleischer. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. Pp. 127. $4.50.

This is a bold attempt to determine by statistical means the relationships between income, unemployment, and delinquency. The theoretical model used to select relevant variables is a calculating, choice-making individual—in this instance extended to boy as well as man. Decisions to engage in illegitimate be-

havior are conceived as products of a demand-and-supply (opportunities) relationship involving costs and benefits. The sociological factors either assumed or held constant as the context of analysis are designated by the strangely bland term "tastes"—taken to mean commitments to legal codes, and measured by family structure (proportion of females over fourteen years of age separated or divorced), mobility, race, and region. Data are times series rates for arrests in the United States and Great Britain, and intracity comparisons for Chicago census tracts and suburbs. The statistical instrument is multiple regression.

The large number of assumptions required to make the author's methods and results acceptable leave his open to a number of preemptory critical challenges, but these are shrugged off with a kind of "proof of the pudding" attitude. The confidence reposed in arrest rates and court appearances as measures of delinquency is difficult to share in the light the large proportion of cases of youths under seventeen years of age, who in the United States customarily are handled informally in juvenile courts and probation departments. In this connection, the author's discussion of the distinction between official and official delinquency is halting and by no means clear. What may be a serious flaw in the method magnifies when it is recognized that the relationships discovered are those between rates of illegitimate actions (not cases) and proportions of particular families in income categories and rates of adult male persons unemployed. The arrest rates and court appearances thus measure recidivism as well as first delinquencies. This may well account for the finding that the association between income and delinquency was highest in the high-delinquency subgroups in Chicago.

The model and method employed in this research are most congenial to the hard science approach to delinquency in terms of anomie, which conceives delinquency as isometric in form and determinable. Those who regard youthful crime as a function of definitions and variable control as well as of youthful actions will question the position that differences in arrest practices are simple problems of measurement based upon police reactions to differences in socioeconomic status of families, which the sample standardizes. Other factors, well known to affect police action, are demeanor of the suspect and past record. These are more likely the products of transition to a delinquent status than they are of income or unemployment.

Whether costs and benefits are perceived by stigmatized delinquents or recidivists in the same way as the economic man or boy with uncomplicated status is doubtful. Furthermore, however laudable is the effort to research the process by which values and costs are aggregated in decisions to violate law, the individual as a model seems poorly chosen where serious property offenses are emphasized as the measure. These, more than other offenses, characteristically get committed by two or more persons, and speak of the need for a group interaction model.

The author of this research can justifiably claim to have broken new ground, and his work can be read with profit by persons of any or all theoretical persuasions. Among other things it provides a kind of view of sociology from the terrace, as it were, of a neighboring discipline generally committed to macrocosmic analysis. This can be sobering, particularly for those moving in the rarefied airs of phenomenological sociology.

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Ethnos und Demos: Soziologische Beiträge zur Volkstheorie ("Ethnos and Demos: Sociological Contributions to the Theory of the Nation-State"). By Emerich Francis. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1965. Pp. 410. DM. 62.80.

This volume is a collection of articles and essays written by the author over a period of some thirty years. The greater part of it appeared first in articles in American, Canadian, and English periodicals; many of these were extensively revised at the time of their translation into German. Others, such as those previously published in *Kölner Zeitschrift für Sozologie,* were merely reprinted. Some passages appear here in print for the first time.

The first part of the book, about two-thirds of the text, is devoted to theoretical and analytical aspects of ethnic research. It is aimed at the refinement of such concepts as nation and nationality; ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic groups; primary and secondary (derivative)

minorities; and the two key terms of the title. The complex relationships among ethnic groups of various types are illustrated by examples from the Austro-Hungarian empire and Canada, and from Nigeria and South Africa. The inclusion of the latter two countries follows the author's 1963 study trip to Africa, which enabled him to test European and American ethnic concepts in the situation of developing nations.

The second part of the text deals with material obtained from two extensive research projects: on the Mennonites in Manitoba and the Spanish minority in New Mexico. The brief final chapter on Catholic enlightenment and nationalism explores the historic influence of Bernard Bolzano in Bohemia and Martínez in New Mexico.

Ethnos und Demos encompasses a great wealth of material in a compact volume; it is well organized and is provided with a name and subject index. Published since the departure of Emerich Francis from America to the University of Munich, it makes available to the reader in German a valuable contribution to the literature of ethnic relations.

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Urban Renewal and American Cities: The Dilemma of Democratic Intervention. By SCOTT GREER. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965. Pp. xiii+201. $1.95 (paper).

Scott Greer serves two publics with the presentation of this essay. First, he serves the new and probably young student of urban renewal with a cogent and concise description of the problems and the program associated with urban renewal. Second, he presents serious and knowledgeable students of urban renewal and federal housing programs in general with a quite definite perspective and position which will generate light through the dialectic provoked, if through no other means. Standing somewhere on the borderline between these two reading roles, I will discuss the book from each viewpoint in turn.

In service to the initiate student of urban renewal, Greer covers a great deal of territory in the space of very few pages. He presents a historical picture of the development of the theory of urban renewal from the Housing Act of 1937 through the major amendments of 1961. He points out the whole range of problems which come under the rubric of intergovernmental relations—local initiative, local control, inconsistent standards, etc. More importantly, Greer points out the inadequacy of a seemingly enormous program which spent $2,481,103,000 through 1961, but which actually accounts for only 1/120 of the total amount of building expenditures. It is little wonder that the effectiveness of the program is so loudly questioned. Through all of this explication, Greer carefully acknowledges his debts to previous analysts of urban renewal and other federal housing programs, and in fact little of what he says is original. The value of the exposition comes, rather, from a consistent analytical framework which is used throughout. This framework is provided by the realization that the urban renewal program as it has existed for at least the past five years and probably longer contains within it three quite distinct, usually conflicting, and often contradictory goals: (1) "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family," (2) "well-planned, integrated residential neighborhoods," (3) "sound standards of design" and "the development and redevelopment of communities." These are the federal government's approximation of "the good, the true, the beautiful." In more pragmatic terms, they are the provision of housing for those who cannot obtain it through the private market, centrally planned growth, and the revival of the central city. It is in hanging his exposition of the federal urban renewal program on the trichotomous dilemma involved in seeking these goals that Greer serves well those seeking to learn who is this creature, Irving Renewal.

The informed and critical student of urban renewal is not served so well by this essay. This is due in great part to the fact that this is not more than an essay, that the basic method of empirical confirmation for stated positions is anecdote. Greer evidently took a leisurely journey through fifteen American cities (Boston; Chicago; Eugene, Oregon; Los Angeles; Little Rock and North Little Rock, Arkansas; Milwaukee; Miami; New Orleans; Pittsburgh; Saint Louis; San Francisco; Tacoma, Washington; and Springfield, Oregon),

chatting with local and federal urban renewal administrators. One would not expect a more closed and rigid approach to such a problem, but one would expect some discussion of the variation between communities, especially given the importance assigned to local initiative in the analysis. No comparisons are made between cities; the anecdotes are used only to illustrate what is common.

Chapter vi of this book, "The Program in the Light of Social Trends," would seem to contain the key contributions that a sociologist could make to the understanding of the urban renewal program. Yet, it is this chapter more than the others which disappoints. Perhaps Greer thinks the data are all in, and anyone interested will find them published elsewhere, but the failure to use "hard" statistical data to back up contentions which are in essence aggregate trends is disturbing. For example, a large part of the argument put forth in this book is that there has been a substantial increase in the amount of standard uncrowded housing in the past fifteen years, due not to federal housing programs so much as to the over-all increase in the housing supply, especially suburban growth. The effect of FHA and VA programs in inducing suburban growth is of course acknowledged but then ignored when it comes to analyzing the relative effects of various factors for the three goals outlined above. No data are offered to confirm the assertion that succession of land uses is leading to the development of a central city as "the home of the workingman's family and the segregated ethnics." Surely there is evidence to back this up. My argument is not with the assertion so much as with the fact that very little is offered to back up the assertion. Thus, one is forced to ask why certain things are ignored, such as the fact that very few urban renewal projects were completed at the time this book was written, that officially defined urban renewal projects can serve as an incentive toward propinquious private redevelopment, that changing life styles (including later marriage) are altering the demand for types of dwellings, especially among the young (who are so often ignored in samples based on dwelling units). Thus, while Greer presents a stimulating argument, it is one which is neither confirmed nor denied.

This raises the final point about this book and, in fact, the concluding chapter of the book. The fact is that very little data exist with which to analyze federal housing and redevelopment programs. The bold policy goals and fiscal outlays of the federal government have been accompanied by almost no research into the causes and effects of the problems attacked. Greer cites the shame of this, and in his final chapter, makes his plea for more research. His argument is eloquent, but unfortunately this eloquence is unwittingly reinforced by his own failure to use the meager data which do exist. In short, the book provides an enjoyable and interesting evening's reading but will cause no loss of sleep unless one worries about designing the needed research.

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The Education of Catholic Americans. By Andrew M. Greeley and Peter H. Rossi. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966. Pp. xxii+368. $8.95.

One of the persistent questions in socialization theory and research is the extent to which early learning can be modified by later experience. Do, for example, such moral organizations as denominational schools effect the value changes in their clients for which they presumably exist? Can the church-sponsored college have a significant impact on its students?

With such questions in mind, and with the added intention of bringing some hard data into the debates on the Catholic schools, the Carnegie Corporation commissioned the NORC and Notre Dame studies of Catholic education. In this review of the more impressive of the two surveys, it seems more useful to focus on the above theoretical issue than to rehearse the widely reported findings.

Utilizing an existing NORC representative national sample of 2,753 Catholics between 23 and 57 and several supplemental samples, Greeley and Rossi found some association between Catholic education and a whole range of social and religious attitudes and behavior. While the reported γ's are not impressive (.20's and .30's), and γ is known to give somewhat higher values than other measures, there are remarkably persistent relationships which refuse to disappear when a battery of controls are introduced.

Exposure to the church's schools was less important than the respondents' educational level, however, and the relationship of Catholic education to adult religious behavior was clear only for those who came from strongly religious backgrounds. Family religiosity appeared to predispose individuals to the reinforcing effects of the schools and to marriage to a religious spouse, in turn; it is the marriage itself which may well account for the adult behavior. No one level of education was most important: the greatest impact occurred for those who attended Catholic colleges *after* Catholic grade and high schools.

Somewhat stronger associations between Catholic education and the NORC religious indexes were found in the study of adolescents in the respondents' homes, leading the authors to suggest this reflects either an increased latter-day effectiveness of Catholic schooling or a temporary impact which quickly erodes in the post-school environment, most likely the latter. They are on shakier ground in their discussion of the slight but persistent relationships found between Catholic education and economic success for respondents with a majority of Catholic friends at seventeen and with low anomie scores. Drawing from Rosenberg's work on the "dissonant religious context," the authors are led to speculate that a consistency between the religious orientation of one's school and the religion of his friends is productive of an "emotional well-being," making for greater educational and occupational success. But this tentative explanation goes well beyond the present data.

And here is the major shortcoming of the volume, at least from the perspective of this review. The utilization of survey research to uncover socialization effects leaves largely uncontrolled the input of students into the organization. Greeley and Rossi's own findings of the importance of the family support the suggestion that at least some of the apparent "impact" of the schools is due to selectivity: We do not know from this study if high school or college seniors look much different than freshmen (although it might well be that the school experiences prevent attrition occurring in non-reinforcing settings). When dynamic variables are the object of investigation, it is questionable whether the limited controls of survey research allow us safely to draw conclusions about the socialization process. This will require longitudinal study.

The results of this study are suggestive, not conclusive. That they are the best presently available makes the volume indispensable for anyone who would discuss Catholic education intelligently. Those interested in socialization have something to learn from it as well.

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Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs. By Frank Harary, Robert Z. Norman, and Dorwin Cartwright. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. ix+415. $9.95.

Finite Graphs and Networks: An Introduction with Applications. By Robert G. Busacker and Thomas L. Saaty. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. Pp. xiv+294. $11.50.

Structural Models may be described as a textbook in graph theory for social scientists, with particular stress on directed graphs. Thus, it is somewhat less ambitious than is its title (there are important structural models, such as those in Harrison C. White's *An Anatomy of Kinship,* which use algebra rather than graph theory) and somewhat more inclusive than its subtitle (it is almost impossible to develop the principles of directed graphs without presenting the principles of graphs in general).

After an introductory chapter, the book falls roughly into three parts. Chapters ii–ix and chapter xii, comprising the first part, ring all possible changes on the eternal question "Can you get there from here?" That is, they treat such properties as connectedness, point bases, cut sets, sources and sinks, etc. Chapter v, for example, is an excellent summary of the correspondences between graph properties and matrix operations. To my mind the absence of strategic social science applications and the authors' habit of giving as much attention to minor variations as to key theorems make this part encyclopedic rather than an integrated treatise.

The second part (chaps. x and xi) is a discussion of acyclic graphs and tournaments, that is, of relationships between directed graphs and partial orders. Here the question of directedness is much more central (in the early chapters the central ideas are not really directional, and the theorems regarding direc-

tion tend to be tacked on as special cases). I found these chapters extremely useful for thinking about stratification, dominance relations, and formal organizations.

The third part (chap. xiii) reviews and expands Cartwright and Harary's classic work on balance theory.

The text is quite accessible to readers with limited mathematical training, and the authors try to employ plausible social science examples, professional puns, and nifty epigrams to smooth the way. Nevertheless, it remains a book on mathematics and not theory, if only because so much of the material covered does not *yet* have much application to substantive social science.

Finite Graphs and Networks may be described as a textbook in graph theory for persons in operations research and related fields. Part 1 states the main mathematics (planar graphs, circuits, trees, cut sets, Hamiltonian lines, coloring problems, matrix representations, etc.), while Part 2 gives brief summaries of applications (linear programing, board games, switching networks, network flows, etc.). Although there is a section on "social science" applications, it is only four pages long and is limited to a trivial kinship graph and a quick pass at Bavelas-Leavitt-type communication networks. There is, nevertheless, a lot to interest social scientists. For what it is worth, I found the section on signal-flow graphs (pp. 186–92) very stimulating, especially in the light of recent sociological interest in path coefficients and their related equations. I also suspect that structural sociologists will soon become quite interested in network flows (pp. 236–66), since if social structures are really important, they are probably important because they affect the flow of something—information, influence, women, or whatever. (*Structural Models* also has a chapter on networks.)

This book, too, can be read by the nonmathematician, although the authors do not try as hard as do Harary, Norman, and Cartwright to cater to the novice, and some sections require considerable familiarity with matrix and vector multiplication. Furthermore, the material is quite condensed (the relations between algebraic groups and graphs is knocked off in two pages, which is a pretty brisk clip for a reader who is unfamiliar with groups), and the authors have a penchant for using elaborate notation for ideas I would find clearer if expressed in words.

In sum, *Structural Models* (or at least chaps. v–xi and chap. xiii, along with a sample of the others) should be required reading for any sociologist who is seeking rigorous thinking about structure. *Finite Graphs* is useful supplementary reading for the "graphwise" sociologist seeking new applications. For the complete novice, the best introduction to graph theory still is Oystein Ore's paperback *Graphs and Their Uses* (Random House New Mathematical Library, No. 10, 1963).

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The Language of Adolescence: An Anthropological Approach to the Youth Culture[1]

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the youth culture as a cultural system. It proposes that the model of the youth culture as a *contraculture* does not point to many of the most distinctive properties of the adolescent subculture. In order to appreciate the differences between adult and adolescent orientations to social reality, we must look at the meanings that peer-group norms have for adolescents. From this perspective, the youth culture is a genuinely independent subculture: The social categories inherent in the adolescent status terminology provide the members of this age-grade with their own world view, life styles, and moral standards.

> For insiders language becomes a chief key to the taste socialization and mood currents that are prevalent in this group at any moment. For outsiders, including adult observers, language becomes a mysterious opacity, constantly carrying peer-group messages which are full of precisions that remain untranslatable.—DAVID RIESMAN, *The Lonely Crowd.*

THE PROBLEM

The question of whether there is a relatively self-contained adolescent subculture in this society stimulates recurrent, inconclusive sociological controversy. Contrary to the model of the youth culture as a contraculture, we hold that its reality as a subculture does not rest upon its power to repudiate or undermine basic adult values. We shall argue that peer-group interaction is guided by expectations which do not govern the behavior of other members of the community. And we claim that the understandings which transform what might otherwise be transitory encounters into stable peer-group relationships are not fully comprehensible to the rest of the community. More simply, adolescent social relationships are predicated upon premises not

[1] This paper reports on the first part of an ongoing anthropological study of the youth culture in an urban community which is supported by the National Institute of Mental Health grant MH 12172-01. Our data are derived from field observation of peer groups operating in their natural habitats and from intensive, free-flowing interviews with selected informants. Initial contacts were made with this youth population through an established youth-serving agency, and subsequent relationships were established by following out friendship networks, i.e., meeting and talking with friends of our initial contacts. We found that these networks seldom bridged the several strata of the status system; thus, it was necessary to establish new contacts and follow out friendship networks in each of the strata. Thus far most of our informants have come from the higher reaches of the adolescent status system (24), rather than its lower levels (10). There are more girls (23) than boys (11) at present in our formal

completely accessible or intelligible to adults.[2]

From our point of view, the specifically subcultural aspects of adolescent social life reside in those symbolic elements (values, beliefs, and standards) which integrate various concrete norms[3] into a coherent system of action. Later in this paper we will examine some of the symbolic resolutions of adolescent role dilemmas and ambiguities, for example, adolescent beliefs about their own social world which reduce logical and moral inconsistencies between incongruous orientations to various social situations.

As Riesman suggests, the significance of much of adolescent social life is partially hidden from adults by linguistic devices. Consequently, the data which can best reveal the character of the youth culture are linguistic, and the relevant aspect of adolescent language is obviously semantic.

LANGUAGE AND ACTION

In this paper, we will show that adolescent perceptions and assessments of their own social universe are embodied in a distinctive argot, their status terminology. These status terms refer to moral attributes (those qualities which make some persons admirable, others reprehensible, etc.) and moral dispositions (the kinds of things these people are likely to do and say). The members of a status category are thought to possess common social virtues and defects. Status terms, then, are not affectively neutral labels for structural positions in the youthful social system. They bestow either negative or positive esteem on those who manifest or exemplify these personal characteristics. Consequently, an individual's rank in the local prestige hierarchy is partly a function of the meanings inherent in those terms his peers use to describe his character and his group affiliations.

Following the logic but not the exact method of componential analysis,[4] the lexical set we call the adolescent status termi-

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interview sample. Much of our data on the boys came from less structured contexts, such as conversations in cars, etc. Although the number of interviews with each informant varies, we find that some of our more articulate informants have remained with the study for a year on the basis of two or three hour-and-a-half tape-recorded interviews per month. The interviews were usually with individual informants, although occasionally small groups of 2–4 students were interviewed. A considerable portion of our data was gathered in talks with students at dances, parties, hangouts, card games, etc.

We would like to thank Solomon Kobrin and David M. Schneider both for their comments on this paper and their generous advice on the design of this study. We also would like to thank Cal Cottrell, Daniel Scheinfeld, and Henry McKay for their comments on this paper. We alone are responsible for its deficiencies.

[2] In a comparatively recent view of the "adolescent society," Bennett Berger, "Adolescence and Beyond," *Social Problems*, Vol. X (1963), asserts that "there is absolutely no good body of data on adolescents, Coleman's included, which indicates the existence of a really deviant system of norms which govern adolescent life" (p. 395).

[3] By concrete norms we mean specific prescriptions and proscriptions which refer to particular types of social contexts (e.g., dating) and which govern or which actors feel ought to govern behavior (e.g., sexual) in these kinds of social settings.

[4] Componential analysis is a technique for the investigation of semantic domains modeled after descriptive linguistics. It should enable an observer both to describe and predict the ways in which the members of a culture will classify phenomenological reality. Anthony Wallace, "The Psychic Unity of Human Groups," *Studying Personality Cross-culturally*, ed. Bert Kaplan (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1961), succinctly describes this method: "The fundamental and intuitive idea on which the semantic calculus is based is a simple one: that the signification of a 'term' (which may be an extrinsic linguistic symbol, such as a word, or any other overt behavior) is given by a particular pattern of predicates which evoke or are evoked by, that term. A predicate is a symbol for the common property of the members of a class. In the technique of componential analysis, the various criteria (predicates) relevant to the definition of the terms in a lexicon are conceived of as values on dimensions, such that each cell in the space represents a unique combination of values, one from each dimension. Each term can then be mapped onto the space by stating to which combi-

nology constitutes a semantic domain:[5] a culturally defined and verbally expressed area of social experience bounded by the existence or occurrence of certain types of objects, events, or behaviors. Although the exact boundaries of this semantic domain are sometimes vague, it comprises an internally consistent system of meanings. At one level of meaning, these terms refer to the kind and the amount of respect the occupants of a status category can claim in the adolescent social system. From the perspective of formal linquistic analysis,[6] the problem concerns the conceptual (i.e., cultural) criteria which assign particular status terms to larger status classes or categories. However, we are not interested in arranging these terms so that their value is specified along these conceptual dimensions and so that the intersection of these values predicts the occurrence of each term in this classificatory scheme. Rather, we want to know how the cognitive and evaluative meanings of this semantic domain are related to social contexts.[7]

nation or combinations of criteria it corresponds. When all the terms have been so mapped, their logico-semantic relationships can be explicitly stated" (p. 143).

[5] There has been a good deal of discussion about replicable, empirical discovery procedures for establishing the boundaries of semantic domains, such as the use of standard control questions which specify the exact level of linguistic contrast. But we rely upon more impressionist techniques for delimiting this semantic domain because we are concerned with the expressive (i.e., the connotational) as well as the referential (i.e., the definitional) meanings of this terminology. This is a more elusive universe of discourse than the usual subjects of componential analysis, e.g., kinship, color, plant, and disease terminologies. Even when componential analysis is applied to purely cognitive domains it experiences some difficulty when these terminologies have an oblique or tangential relationship to observable events or physical objects. Thus, Charles Frake, "The Diagnosis of Disease among the Subanum of Mindanao," *Language in Culture and Society*, ed. Dell Hymes (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), says that "it is difficult, then, to define Subanum diagnostic categories in terms of analytic or perceptual attributes of the denotata" (p. 201). And Robbins Burling, "How To Choose a Burmese Numeral Classifier," *Context and Meaning in Cultural Anthropology*, ed. Melford Spiro (New York: Free Press, 1965), has found for a clear-cut semantic domain that "the attempt to find pervasive semantic dimensions which unambiguously apportion the entire set of classifiers into clear subsets has hardly been successful" (p. 263). In light of these considerations, our inability to determine the exact boundaries of this semantic domain does not constitute an insuperable obstacle to discovering the meaning of the cognitive distinctions and moral oppositions inherent in this terminology.

[6] Paul Kay in a comment on R. N. Colby's "Ethnographic Semantics: A Preliminary Survey," *Current Anthropology*, Vol. VII (February, 1966), says that "componential analysis is best conceived as an *analytic process* in which the investigator searches for (a) the *dimensions* of meaning underlying the domain and (b) the mapping of the values on these dimensions (*the features of meaning*) onto the set of lexemes. The process of looking for these mappings is not to be confused with particular types of such mappings such as paradigm, taxonomy, and tree" (pp. 20–21, italics in original).

[7] As we have seen, status terms refer to certain kinds of social predicates. In order to elicit these predicates, we rely upon a basic methodological postulate of componential analysis: the contextualization of meaning. Hymes, "A Perspective for Linguistic Anthropology," *Horizons of Anthropology*, ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1964), says that "as is widely recognized, a term's meaning depends upon the interaction between its own semantic properties and those recognized in the context in which it occurs. A term can indicate a wide range of meanings, and a context can support a range of meanings. In a given case the term does not so much positively name, as does the intersection of the term and context eliminates most, or all but one, of the possible meanings" (p. 97). This stress on the intersection of linguistic meaning and social context is particularly applicable to the study of the evaluative aspects of the youth culture. Here there is a complex relationship among the actor's motives, the norms which govern behavior in a social situation, and the ends or goals this subculture defines as worthwhile, i.e., what its members should strive to achieve or become. We hold that the meaning of a particular status term can only be understood after the observer knows the contexts in which it is used and the norms which govern behavior in this situation. Then, for example, he can ask his informants whether "cool" and "mellow" mean the same or different things. Hymes, *ibid.*, claims that the "fact of contrast, and the dimen-

The linguistically conditioned ways in which the members of a group perceive and evaluate their social environment have determinant consequences for their behavior. Here we follow Clyde Kluckhohn, who says that "the *vocabularies* of different languages both reflect and perpetuate habitual and distinctive ways of categorizing experience or modes of thought."[8] He goes on to say that "how people behave toward one another is, in part, a function of what they call each other and of *how* they conceive objects, themselves, other people and types of events which enter into their relations."[9] Elucidation of the meanings implicit in the adolescent status terminology will illuminate the complex relationships between the norms of this subculture and the behavior of its members in various social settings.

Stated in functional terms, cultural categories contained in language do not usually determine the particulars (i.e., the who, how much, and when) of any behavioral sequence but, rather, provide the cognitive and evaluative parameters of social interaction in any social setting.[10] These categories identify the appropriate motives, values, roles, and rules which transform the actor's external physical world into what Hallowell calls the behavioral environment of the self. "A *second* function of all cultures is the orientation of the self to a diversified world of objects in its behavioral environment, discriminated, classified, and conceptualized with respect to attributes which are culturally constituted and symbolically mediated through language. The role of language in object-orientation is as vital as in self-orientation."[11] As we shall see in the case of the meaning of the term "cool," these categories tie both the actor's moral orientations and cognitive definitions of social situations to the critical motivational dimensions of the self, that is, his judgments about his own worth—"Any kind of self-depreciation, loss of self-esteem, or threat to the self impairs the complex motivational systems that focus upon the self and its needs. At the same time, self-evaluation through culturally recognized norms is inescapable."[12]

THE STRUCTURAL ORIGINS OF THE YOUTH CULTURE

Considered as a phenomenon indigenous to modern societies, the youth culture can be traced to the problem of socialization in industrial societies.[13] Certainly adolescent norms refer to these structural problems at various levels of meaning. But this does not exhaust the cultural connotations and the behavioral implications of distinctively

sions, can be determined only by knowing the context of the situation, and discovering what expressions have functional unity through being mutually substitutable for a given end within it" (p. 98).

[8] "Culture and Behavior," *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. XX, ed. Gardner Lindsey (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1954), p. 938, italics in original.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] For a persuasive statement of a somewhat different point of view, see Frake, "A Structural Description of Subanum 'Religious Behavior,'" *Explorations in Cultural Anthropology*, ed. Ward Goodenough (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964).

[11] A. I. Hallowell, "The Self and Its Behavioral Environment," *Culture and Experience* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955), p. 91, italics in original.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[13] S. N. Eisenstadt's classic study, *From Generation to Generation* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), points out that there is a radical social-psychological transition between childhood and adulthood in industrial societies. Thus, every child in our society must eventually leave his family circle where he is appreciated for *who* rather than *what* he is. According to this theory, the youth culture serves as a "halfway house" between a young person's particularistic and universalistic associations. While youth groups are based upon ascriptive ties, the youth culture enables adolescents to try out roles and form relationships which involve more universalistic considerations: An adolescent must *earn* his status in the peer group. The youth culture, then, allows the adolescent to experiment with objective, universalistic standards without sacrificing the psychological security of highly solidary primary groups.

adolescent modes of communication. For there is great latitude in the selection of the cultural forms which provide adequate solutions to these structural exigencies and concomitant developmental crises—witness the differences in the content of the peer-group norms in various communities and classes.[14] Therefore, it is not possible to account for the substance and imagery of the youth culture solely in terms of the difficult passage from childhood to adulthood in a highly differentiated society.

THE YOUTH CULTURE DEFINED

Part of our society's ideology about the nature of human growth asserts that youth must not prematurely assume adult roles. Thus, it is often said that adolescents need an exemption from the pressures of adult responsibilities in order to discover their individual talents. These ideological sanctions encourage adolescents to transform developmental necessities into aesthetically satisfying as well as socially adaptive modes of behavior. In other words, the efflorescence of adolescent styles results from this license to experiment with the possibilities inherent in adult roles. In turn, the youth culture symbolically affirms and celebrates its freedom from conventional restraints on social behavior which has little or no immediate practical significance. For example, many of our informants lavishly praise what they call "idiot"[15] behavior: actions and attitudes which are childish or foolish from an adult point of view and which sometimes treat situations from seemingly incompatible perspectives, for example, dealing with a love relationship in a manner that is at once flippant and romantic. According to some of our most articulate informants, the ability to engage in any sort of silly collective action requires a certain amount of inner freedom and *joie de vivre*. In general, these informants tend to associate these sorts of peer-group activities with independence from adult supervision and with actions which demonstrate this autonomy.[16]

Stated more formally, the youth culture consists of those adolescent norms, standards, and values which are discussed in a language particularly intelligible to members of this age-grade. At this point, we should note that members of the youth culture do not deal with or even "talk" about all the concerns which vitally interest or agitate adolescents, and they may even ignore or overlook those concerns which are of enduring significance to the members of this society.[17] Yet the youth culture contains a distinctive vision of social reality. It is embodied in a normative order predicated upon conceptions of those personal qualities which its members believe make a male admirable and a female desirable.

[14] For a very detailed account of the attitudes and activities of various types of adolescent peer groups, see Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif, *Reference Groups: Exploration into Conformity and Deviation of Adolescents* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

[15] Words enclosed by quotation marks (e.g., "cool") are terms used with considerable frequency by our informants. This is not to say, however, that the notions contained in these words are not also expressed by circumlocution. These terms are ordinarily used in reference and rarely in address.

[16] According to some of our informants, "idiot" should not be equated with childish behavior. We have been told that those persons who are able to act this way are often the same people who appear most sophisticated (i.e., adult-like) in other social contexts. Perhaps, this connection between silly and sophisticated personal styles is a symbolic means of demonstrating what Erving Goffman (*Encounters* [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961]), calls role distance. They seem to say that we now have mastered the developmental tasks of childhood, and hence these sorts of performances (playing games which have no extrinsic social significance) can now be slightly ridiculed because it no longer constitutes a vital part of our social identities.

[17] This idea was stimulated by James F. Short's remarks on delinquent gangs in "Social Structure and Group Processes in Gang Delinquency," *Problems of Youth: Transition to Adulthood in a Changing World*, ed. Sherif and Sherif (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1965), esp. p. 173.

THE YOUTH CULTURE AS A CONTRACULTURE

The sociological conception of the youth culture as a contraculture assumes that the cultural and structural aspects of the youth culture are inextricably linked. Thus, evidence which reveals serious structural discontinuities between the generations is also supposed to show a set of youth norms which are opposed to adult values.[18] According to the contraculture model, if adolescents substantially accept core adult roles and values, then the youth culture is essentially epiphenomenal.[19] But if they doubt the legitimacy of societal values, then the youth culture is the appropriate label for this truly rebellious posture. In contrast, our approach to the youth culture holds that the symbolic components of adolescent social life form a relatively coherent subculture *irrespective* of whether its norms eventually subvert, reinforce, or have no lasting effect upon adult values. Our position rests upon a basic theoretical assumption: that the cultural categories which shape adolescent orientations to their own social milieu are largely autonomous inasmuch as they are embodied in systems of meanings whose implications are not immediately apparent to adults.[20]

The structure of advanced societies generates a certain amount of adolescent rebelliousness against adult authority.[21] But this does not mean that opposition to the goals of the older generation is the only, or even the most important, disjunction between adolescent and adult views of social reality. Nor is it true that the norms of the youth culture derive their subcultural attributes from intergenerational conflict.

In fact, the traditional cycle of intense intergenerational conflict followed by reconciliation when the younger generation takes its place in society seems less common today than in the past. Instead of direct confrontations over the moral validity, the relevance, and the appropriateness of the other generations' goals and aspirations,[22] both the older and younger members of this society subscribe to a laissez faire ideology. This encourages generational segregation, rather than opposition. Keniston notes that "another salient fact about young people today is a relative lack of *rebelliousness* against their parents or their parent's generation. . . . The result is frequently an unstated 'gentleman's agreement' between the generations that neither will interfere with the other."[23] According to one of our informants, a senior girl:

(Q) Do you know what adults in this community think about various issues?

[18] Cf. James Coleman, *The Adolescent Society* (New York: Free Press, 1961), and F. Elkin and W. Westley, "The Myth of Adolescent Culture," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XX (1955), who have tried to determine whether the norms of the youth culture impede or inhibit the socialization of adolescents into adult occupational roles.

[19] As subordinate and quite powerless members of our society, youth are said to experience social and psychological deprivation because of the conflicting demands which are placed upon them. Viewed as a contraculture, the youth culture evolves out of a normative "reaction-formation" to these pressures. According to Milton Yinger, "Contra-Culture and Subculture," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XXV (1960), it involves "the creation of a series of inverse or counter values (opposed to those of the surrounding society) in face of serious frustration or conflict" (p. 627).

[20] For example, most adults in this community are aware of, and many approve of, the fraternity and sorority system which operates despite an official school ban on such activity. However, if our adolescent informants are correct, very few adults know why one person is "rushed" and another is not. Though many parents seem to want their children to succeed in this social world, most adults are ignorant of the specific social criteria fraternity and sorority youth use to select certain kinds of persons for their exclusive social circles.

[21] See K. Davis, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," *Social Perspectives on Behavior*, ed. H. D. Stein and R. A. Cloward (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).

[22] See Walter Laquer, *Young Germany* (New York: Basic Books, 1962), for a description of youth movements which opposed the prevailing ethos of their society in their early stages of development.

[23] K. Keniston, "Social Change and Youth in America," *Daedalus*, XCI (1962), 151–56, italics in original.

(A) I'd say there is a very small amount of contact between the teen-agers and the adults because we're self-centered, I think, and the adults are too. We think 'I'll leave them alone,' and they do too.

Our informants almost instinctively measured their own worth against the standards of the youth culture. And the cardinal concerns of the youth culture are in those domains over which they exercise direct control: friendships, relations with the opposite sex, and various types of expressive activities. This sort of partial cultural isolation is reinforced by the paucity of enduring intergenerational contacts outside of formal socializing agencies, such as the school and family.[24] Thus most of the adolescents we have observed accept a socially imposed hiatus in their life cycle, regardless of whether they are eager, reluctant, or uninterested in becoming an adult; and most of them assume that only their peers can truly understand those kinds of interpersonal accomplishments and failures which make their lives in the adolescent world either gratifying or mortifying.

Open intergenerational conflict in this community revolves around the question of how much control adults rightfully can exercise over adolescents.[25] Both sides in these disputes agree that intrusion into private generational matters is generally unwarranted, for example, adults usually allow adolescents to arrange their own social affairs. The issue, then, concerns the definition of those aspects of adolescent behavior which are legitimately public and hence subject to adult control.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADULT VALUES AND YOUTH NORMS

In our study of this upper-middle-class urban community,[26] we found that these adolescents successfully internalized adult occupational goals. None of our informants questioned the notion that a high school diploma was a minimal requirement for even a half-decent job, and comparatively few students in the local high school dropped out before graduation. Most of these adolescents intended to go to college, and many of them worked reasonably hard to get good grades. They wanted a college degree because they felt it would help them get the professional job or husband which insures a middle-class way of life. However, very few of these adolescents, even the best students, had marked intellectual or scholarly interests. In short, we discovered that adolescent conceptions of the validity of adult roles and values are, at least, largely independent of the standards they use to

[24] See F. Musgrove, *Youth and the Social Order* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1965), for an interesting historical perspective on the present separation of the generations.

[25] According to the data collected by Henry McKay for the Institute for Juvenile Research, this area, in the 35-year period from 1927 to 1962, had the lowest mean delinquency rate in the city (these rates are based upon official Juvenile Court cases). However, this low rate of delinquency should not be interpreted as evidence of a complete lack of intergenerational conflict. We have observed that behavior which slightly violates adult norms, such as surreptitiously playing poker for high stakes or putting a fraternity picture in the school annual (fraternities and sororities are forbidden), is often sufficient to demonstrate one's autonomy vis-à-vis adult controls. Since the tolerance of deviant youth behavior in the community is small, one can establish one's autonomy through relatively minor acts of defiance of adult authority.

[26] The community we studied is located in a large midwestern city and has a population of approximately 25,000. It has most of the socioeconomic characteristics commonly associated with upper-middle-class residential areas. Since it may be useful to compare this community to the city as a whole, the figures for the latter will be given in parentheses; and the figures for both will be given in approximate percentages. According to data from the 1960 Census, the median family income in this community was $11,000 ($6,700). Only 5 per cent (14 per cent) of the families earned less than $3,000 a year, and 58 per cent (21 per cent) had an income of $10,000 a year or more. Eighty-six per cent (24 per cent) of the families lived in single-dwelling units, and of these 82 per cent (33 per cent) were owned by the occupants. For this population the median number of years of education was almost 13 (10), and 21 per cent (6 per cent) had four years of college or more. Seventy-two per cent (37 per cent) of this population held white-collar jobs.

estimate the relative excellence of their peers.[27]

The youth culture in this area is not completely oblivious to an individual's potential capacity to assume his adult roles. But, as far as his peers are concerned, his success or failure in the academic system of the high school (i.e., his grades) is a relatively minor component of his social identity, although very negative connotations are associated with the status of a "brain"—a person who devotes all his energies to getting high marks. Our informants usually call such a person "twinky," which implies that his demeanor manifests an underlying effeminacy. The choice of a term which connotes less-than-manly behavior follows a peculiarly subcultural logic. The standards of the youth culture are focused on those sorts of behaviors which its members think reflect one's sex-role identity. Their judgments of personal worth are closely linked to general conceptions of those attributes and performances which are thought to reveal a person's masculinity or femininity. For boys, the crucial external signs of inner manhood are physical strength, athletic talent, courage in the face of aggression, a willingness to defend one's honor at all costs, and sexual and drinking prowess. According to girls, the most admirable feminine traits are physical attractiveness, personal vivacity, and the ability to delicately manipulate various sorts of interpersonal relationships.

As a cultural system, the youth culture in this area consists of those norms, life styles, and ideals which are intimately associated with a *variant,* age-graded system of cultural meanings. Of course, the youth culture does not emerge out of a cultural vacuum. Adolescent social patterns obviously are based upon adult conceptions of the desirable types of social relationships and upon adult images of personal virtue. Adolescents, however, do not slavishly copy these general cultural norms. The youth culture experiments with and elaborates on some of the partially unrealized or alternative possibilities in the adult moral order. This is particularly true in the interpersonal realm: Adolescents distinguish various kinds and degrees of trust among friends. Our informants habitually discriminate among "good," "best," and "casual" friends. One informant distinguished among these types of friends in the following terms:

(Q) What are some of the things you expect of a friend?

(A) When you leave [a group], when you walk out, they don't all of a sudden start stabbing knives in your back. It all depends upon the degree of friendship you want [in response to the question].

(Q) What are the various degrees of friendship?

(A) With some girls you just have a casual friendship, and she's got her friends and I've got mine, but we'll sit down and talk. Then like the girls in my club, we are pretty good friends. We know who we are going out with. With the casual friend you don't sit and talk about your boyfriend to them. I have one best friend.

(Q) Are there certain things you share with a best friend that you don't share with a fellow club member [i.e., a "pretty good friend"]?

(A) You talk about your boyfriends if you had an argument, but you wouldn't tell them personal things [i.e., to a "pretty good friend"]. I could tell my best friend anything, and she wouldn't think badly of you. You don't have to worry that, will she tell anybody else? While the members of my club, I expect them not

[27] In "Values and Gang Delinquency: A Study of Street-Corner Groups," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. LXIX (1963), R. A. Gordon, J. F. Short, D. S. Cartwright, and F. L. Strodtbeck report that even the most socially disadvantaged, delinquent youth not only evaluate a middle-class way of life very highly but that they also see the conventional path to this end—saving, working at a steady job, and education—as a legitimate, although not always realistic, way to attain a respectable adult status. Yet, as Short, *op. cit.*, points out, these adolescents do not use these values to regulate peer-group life. Similarly, it is wrong to infer that, just because middle-class adolescents are even less ambivalent about adult values, these standards determine the norms of their peer groups.

> to stab knives in my back when I leave, *but my best friend, if someone else does, I expect her to stand up for me. My club members, I wouldn't expect them to stand up for me.*

From a comparative point of view, then, the differences among the cultural categories which shape adult and adolescent orientations to some social situations are admittedly slight. Nevertheless, and this is the important point, the differences between adult standards of personal worth and the meaning of adolescent status terms are great enough to sustain an independent adolescent status system. The multitude of discrete norms which regulate a person's relations with his peers are integrated into a meaningful system of action by distinctively adolescent conceptions of personal worth. The cultural core of the adolescent social system is formed by the meanings of adolescent status terms and prestige categories. An adolescent's estimation of his own interpersonal competence depends, to a great extent, upon whether the particular terms his peers use to describe his status have laudatory or pejorative connotations. These terms indicate whether he is able convincingly to present a "cool" self-image in highly competitive social contexts.

THE MEANING OF KEY STATUS TERMS

The adolescents in this community do not see their status system as a perfectly linear, clearly defined series of hierarchically arranged status positions. Rather, they perceive it as a set of ranked, slightly ambiguous prestige categories which are internally differentiated. This status system is structured along two dimensions. First, there are horizontal social strata defined by differentially evaluated life styles, that is, modes of dress, speech, and interpersonal demeanor. In general, our informants perceive two salient life styles which they refer to as "hoody" and "socie." However, we see another way of life which lacks an explicit folk designation, though most of our informants distinguish it from "socie" and "hoody" styles. For the lack of a better term, we call this the conventional way of life. It is an essentially residual category which includes all those patterns which are neither clearly "socie" nor "hoody."

The dominant values institutionalized in the status system of the local high school are those held by the majority of the upper-middle-class segment of this youthful population (the high school draws students from a stable working- and lower-middle-class community as well as from our upper-middle-class area).[28] Consequently, most adolescents in this area perceive the "socies" as the top stratum of this prestige system. Since "hoody" and "socie" youth do not agree about who has the most valuable way of life (e.g., our "hoody" informants tell us that "socies" are hypocrites, etc.), an individual's estimation of his own status depends, in part, upon his particular adolescent reference group. From an observer's point of view, the "hoody" adolescents have evolved a truly independent style of life. Nevertheless, our "hoody" informants see their own life style as at least a partly antagonistic response to "socie" values and material advantages. "Hoody" adolescents, by and large, refuse to and often cannot financially afford to compete with "socies" on the latter's terms, and they feel that their mode of life is not accorded general esteem in this system. Those who adopt what we have called a conventional way of life gain some social recognition only to the extent to which they can imitate "socie" patterns.

The vertical component of this status system locates an individual's rank within

[28] In numerical terms, this upper-middle-class group does not constitute a majority of this school population. Yet, through the fraternity and sorority system which it dominates and through less overtly stratified, adult-sponsored youth groups which it co-opts as a recruiting ground, these adolescents control both the formal (e.g., the cheerleaders at this high school are not only restricted to sorority girls but to the members of one sorority) and informal activity systems which emerge out of school associations but which are definitely not confined to this location.

one of these horizontal strata. As far as we can ascertain, a person's rank is a function of how well he is known by the other members of his stratum, and this, in turn, seems closely related to his ability to conspicuously live up to its standards of excellence. This vertical dimension, then, is quantitative rather than qualitative and refers to what our informants mean when they say someone is more or less "popular." Since public renown is a basic value in the "socie" world, those who achieve fame are called "elites." This, however, says nothing about their commitment to one of the various substyles available to the members of this stratum. Although all our informants subscribe to a highly egalitarian social ideology (no one is inherently better than anyone else), "hoody" adolescents take it very seriously. Though many of our "hoody" informants admitted that certain persons in their social circle are more "popular" than others, they have no term which designates high position.

An adolescent's socioeconomic status certainly affects his ability to assimilate "socie" styles. Nevertheless, the decisive factor is his ability to act in terms of these standards whatever his family background. In other words, an adolescent's status identity is created by his overt commitment to an adolescent life style.[29] Some of our lower-middle- and stable working-class informants are among the most influential "socies," while a few of our informants from upper-middle-class homes are labeled "hoods" by their peers. "Socies" tend to associate "hoody" life styles with very stereotyped conceptions of the attitudes and aspirations which distinguish the lower and middle classes. For instance, even those "socie" informants from stable working- and lower-middle-class families, repeatedly tell us that "hoods" are the sort of people who do not care about their grades, about school activities, about their personal appearance, about morals, etc. In essence, they believe that the "hoods" incorporate what they think is the critical lower-class social-psychological attribute—a complete lack of interest in "bettering oneself."

At this point, we should note that there are alternate terms for these status categories; for example, the words "socie" and "socialite" are used interchangeably. Also, certain status terms change over time. For instance, many of our informants feel that it is more "in" to use the term "mellow" in those contexts where they formerly used the term "cool," but they also agree that these terms have the same meanings. Status terms also take on special meanings according to the structural position of the speaker. Thus, a "socie" speaker will use the term "hoods" interchangeably with "greasers," "scraggs," etc; all of these terms have very derogatory implications. Similarly, "hoods" use the terms "snob" and "stuck-up" as synonyms for "socie."

"Hoods" and "socies" very rarely use these terms to describe themselves but almost obsessively use them to describe each other. It is difficult for adults to appreciate the discrepancy between the adolescent meaning of a term like "hoody" and its conventional referents, that is, to delinquents. For example, one of our most articulate informants belongs to the "hoody" stratum, and she accepts this designation insofar as she defines her own personal style as one which consistently opposes "socie" styles. Yet adults would not ordinarily call her "hoody" because she takes a college mathematics course in her spare time and participates in a tutoring project for culturally deprived children.

These status terms do not refer directly to bounded social units which have a clear-

[29] Most of the adolescents who fall into the conventional category seem more oriented to "socie" than "hoody" dress styles, and some have attempted and failed to join "socie" groups. In contrast to "socies" and "hoods," conventionals have a life style which does not appear to involve a code of honor vis-à-vis other groups. Conventionals, however, seem to define the local social system in terms of what all its members perceive as polar, antagonistic social categories, i.e., "socie" and "hoody." Hence conventionals are difficult to place unambiguously in the status system and lack the definite social identities ascribed to "socies" and "hoods."

ly demarcated membership. Yet membership in certain cliques, clubs, fraternities, and sororities makes it very likely that a person will be considered a "socie" by his peers. The precise meaning of these terms, however, cannot be understood apart from the nature of the youth culture in an upper-middle-class community. Here adolescents have a dual orientation to the standards of the youth culture and to the values of the adult world.[80]

The adult world is represented by the achievement orientation of the high school. Our "socie" informants claim that this stratum is divided into the "clean-cut" or "all-around" and the "hoody-socie" segments. The "clean-cut socies" stress role performances which are explicitly linked to the school's activity system. They usually do well in team sports, get fairly good but not necessarily high grades, and most importantly, know how to get along with their teachers and classmates—they are very "sociable."[31] In fact, it seems that part of a non-"socie" social identity involves the belief that one does not have enough social skill and organizational ability to give a "swinging" or "cool" affair, and non-"socie" social gatherings generally reinforce this self-fulfilling prophecy.

"Clean-cut socies" must also realize the "cool" patterns of adolescent social life. They must succeed in the intense competition for dates with high-status persons; the social circle from which a person selects his dating partners partially establishes his or her standing in the larger social system. After the second year of high school, "socie" boys must be "conditioned" drinkers, which means not getting prematurely or obnoxiously inebriated in social situations. Sexually, "socie" boys must "make out" and thereby provide some concrete evidence for their frequent and exaggerated boasts about their sexual prowess.

For these boys, drinking and dating are the definitive areas in which one's manhood is tested and proven. They talk a great deal about and admire toughness but studiously avoid situations where they might have to fight. Buying liquor or beer in a store is viewed as a potential threat to their image as autonomous "men," and, conversely, it is seen as a challenge which, if handled properly, can add greatly to one's stature in the group. As our informants perceive it, buying beer in a bar or package store is a battleground reserved only for the courageous: the risks to one's self-esteem are great. If a boy reveals that he is afraid to show a false identification card or otherwise bluff his way through demands that he prove his age, then he loses considerable face within his peer group. But if he stands his ground when accused of being under age and does not give in to his desire to flee the situation, then he proves that he has "guts" regardless of whether the store ultimately sells him the beer. Our informants tell us that it

[80] N. Riley, J. Riley, and M. More, "Adolescent Values and the Riesman Typology: An Empirical Analysis," *Culture and Social Character*, ed. Seymour M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962), found this same dual orientation to parental and peer-group standards. Also see C. V. Brittian, "Adolescent Choices and Peer Cross Pressures," *American Sociological Review* Vol. XXIII (June, 1963).

[31] Being "sociable" often means that a person is able to articulate previously unconnected persons or cliques into larger and sometimes bounded social networks. This trait, in turn, is closely related to a person's standing in the "socie" world. For example, one of our informants who actively aspired to this stratum told us that part of her lack of success was due to her inability to bring her various, disparate friendship groups together. She sat in the middle of the lunch table between these two groups but could not promote social intercourse between them and felt marginal to both. However, another informant, who lacked the usual physical attributes of a "socie" girl, was an "elite" largely because she could not only integrate separate dyads into larger friendship networks, but could then combine these networks into a named group whose membership was drawn from both the sorority world and from those girls who were by and large sorority "material" but who were excluded by the "blackball" system—one vote against a prospective member was enough to reject her. This girl provided the rationale, the occasions (e.g., "hen parties"), and most importantly, the contacts which enabled some girls to validate their status in the larger social system through membership in this group.

is crucial not to "lose your cool" in these situations, and anyone who fails to rise to the occasion has his claims to "coolness" ruthlessly deflated by his peers.

Girls prove their worth in a more contracted arena. They must attract many high-status boys as dates, and to do so they must occasionally engage in rather intense petting without endangering their "reputations." While their prestige depends partly on the status their presence bestows upon their dating partners, it can be compromised if they give sexual favors to all who request them.

The "socies" (our informants usually employ the term "socie" and qualify it when they want to refer to those who adhere to the "clean-cut" or "hoody" variant) fully realize the adolescent dimensions of this social system. Though a member of the "clean-cut socies" adopts many "cool" patterns, he never relinquishes his commitment to adult standards of accomplishment. On the other hand, the "hoody-socies" devote themselves wholeheartedly to adolescent conceptions of excellence. They are the most enthusiastic fraternity and sorority members and are not usually very interested in academic pursuits. Instead they spend a good deal of time and energy systematically refining their dating and drinking techniques. And they are the avant-garde leaders in musical tastes, dress styles, etc.

The "hoods" and the "hoody-socies" should not be confused. The latter represent the furthest an adolescent in the "socie" stratum can move away from adult values without openly rejecting them, that is, they rarely openly defy adult authority in acts of serious delinquency, and, unlike some of the "hoods," they rarely drop out of high school before graduation.

"Socies" have developed a special set of status terms which distinguish various social segments among those who occupy the lower orders of the status system. These terms have depreciatory connotations because they imply that these social types are represented by persons with morally defective or socially underdeveloped personalities. From the "socie" perspective, the "hoods" belong to the more encompassing social category of "out-of-its." One informant described the "out-of-its" as follows: "They're misfits; they're insecure, they don't think they're cute enough, or they're awkward, or they have a lisp or something." This is a heterogeneous category; here one finds the rebels, the retarded or slow learners, the intellectuals, and anyone else who is deviant from the point of view of the prestige criteria which define this status system.

"Socies" also perceive another category of persons who are not attached to or even loosely associated with "socie" cliques and yet who do not fit into the "out-of-its." Some of our "socie" informants call them the "others," and they are just ordinary students who are not distinguished by some success or blatant failure in the adolescent social system. One student described the "others" in this way: "Some of them may not come out of their shell until they get to college, and they may find a group whether it's intellectual or social. These kids will usually gravitate toward getting the higher grades—some don't concentrate on anything at all. They just go along and get by in school and don't join activities, but just sit home and watch television all the time." The derogatory implications associated with the term "others" do not simply derive from exclusion from "socie" social circles: It means that a person has no definite social identity in this social system. As far as "socies" are concerned, these people are faceless because they are not demonstrably attached to a discernible adolescent style. As one of our informants put it, "others" are people you do not notice or know anything about unless you happened to go to elementary school with them.

As we have seen, the process of status attribution is quite complex and does not result simply from objective talents and characteristics, for example, a boy's athletic ability, a girl's physical attractiveness, etc. Thus, an individual must take the esteem he has gained in a variety of contexts and transform this diffuse prestige into a sub-

culturally validated image of the successful adolescent. He must present himself as "cool," and our informants tell us that if a person truly believes he is "cool" he generally acts "cool." In other words, concrete achievement buttresses the crucial mode of presentation of self in the adolescent subculture, and *it is this self-image and not the concrete role performance which ultimately interests adolescents. Confidence about one's essential masculinity or femininity and the ability to manifest this in smooth performances in many spheres is the essence of high status in this social system.*

One might expect a normative shift toward adult success standards over time in a youthful population largely oriented to college. But as an adolescent progresses through high school he discovers that the tension between adult and adolescent patterns increases rather than decreases. By the final year of high school the social category of the "clean-cut socies" has very few members. Those who cling to "clean-cut" patterns and hence are not trying to be "cool" no longer dominate the status system. In fact, those "clean-cut socies" who do not perceive this shift toward "cool" patterns are called "milk and cookies boys" and rapidly descend in the status system. One informant described what happened to a fraternity which did not make the shift to the "socie" patterns: "The Lambdas aren't well liked now because the Lambdas don't drink, and the other kids are all getting to drink, and they [the Lambdas] are not that well liked anymore because they look down upon it [drinking]. So now if you want social prestige with the kids, you wouldn't dare mention the Lambdas." The former members of the "clean-cut socies" who retain their social supremacy do so by appearing to adhere to responsible adult standards while, at the same time, actively participating in covert adolescent patterns.

CULTURAL SOURCES OF INTEGRATION IN THE YOUTH CULTURE

Every cultural system has internal normative inconsistencies. In this section, we will show how certain cultural categories partially resolve some of the paradoxical or contradictory behavioral implications of the norms which govern dating. "Cute" and "cool" are prestigeful terms in this system, and an "elite" girl should be both. Girls see these as consistent personal attributes when they refer to the norms which regulate the ways in which a person achieves pre-eminence in the prestige system. But when girls talk about the ideal norms which should control relationships between members of the opposite sex, these two terms assume partly antagonistic meanings.

Both our male and female informants define a "cute" girl as a person who exudes a certain kind of sexual attractiveness but who does not demonstrate her sexual superiority in intercourse. In fact, if it is widely known that a high-status girl has had sexual intercourse, she very likely will be dropped from the "elite" circles even if she did not get pregnant. Yet, if she is "cool," a girl must be quite adept in the dating system. This means that she must "make out" with a comparatively large number of boys without, on the other hand, being "made." She must allow herself to reach a relatively high level of sexual excitement and intimacy without giving into what are described as persistent demands for greater sexual favors. Consequently, if a girl is considered both "cool" and "cute" by her age mates, she must not only be physically attractive but also confidently manage the sexual self-aggrandizement which marks these temporary unions.

So far, "cuteness" and "coolness" are somewhat different but essentially complementary social categories. But girls have their own moral standards which form part of the meaning of these terms. When the social context is restricted to feminine interests and when the norms of proper behavior vis-à-vis males are at issue, "cool" and "cute" become partly contradictory categories.

Adolescent girls in this community discuss the motives and the norms which should govern dating in terms of "good clean fun." A good dating partner should be companionable, have similar interests, and

should be a sympathetic and lively person. In this context, the "cute" girl is viewed as the friendly, "all-American girl" whom everyone likes and admires. She is vivacious, attractive, and, above all, not overly interested in the leverage one can obtain over boys through the judicious allocation of her affections. In short, she is a very wholesome girl. However, this category of the "all-American girl" quickly drops out of the picture when the girls talk about the realities of the power struggle which almost invariably accompanies dating. Incidentally, "going steady" is an institutionalized way of emphasizing the solidarity rather than the individualism of dating oriented to the status system. But among "elites" the dominant concern of who is going to control the relationship—all of our informants were convinced that long-term dating was an intrinsically asymmetrical relationship and were afraid that their peers would see them as the subordinate partner[32]—almost inevitably leads to its dissolution in a relatively short time. One girl viewed dating as follows:

(Q) You see this [dating] as pretty much of a game of strategy?

(A) Definitely! It's one of the most fun games around too. Because you never know what's going to happen. . . . It's up to you. There are no rules really. There might be a couple of rules that you take for granted, but basically. . . .

(Q) Like what [rules]?

(A) Well, not to do anything really nasty. Like go out with his best friend—break a date with him and go out with his best friend or something like that. Nothing really drastic, but aside from that there aren't too many rules, and you've just always got to make sure that you're on top, that you're winning because otherwise if you're not winning you're losing and there's no tie. So you always make sure you're winning.

[32] Many of our male informants expressed what seemed to us an almost pathological fear of being "pussy whipped," but we shall let psychoanalysts reveal the psychological implications of this term.

According to ideal feminine norms, real sex, as distinguished from the "good-night kiss," is out of place, undesirable, and, in some sense, morally wrong on a good date. The feminine vision of a romantic relationship holds that a date should come from mutual concern with the other partner's true or inner qualities. As even a cursory glance at love comics and true romance magazines will attest female ideology maintains that it is possible to appreciate the true worth of another person only if one is willing to rise above the ordinary trivial absorption in the competitive aspects of cross-sex relations, that is, with the other person's physical appearance, with his or her superficial manners (usually with their sophistication or lack of it), with the other person's prestige value (whether one's peers think he or she is "cool"), etc.

In light of these norms, "coolness," which is manifest in an attachment to "making out," is apparently incompatible with purely feminine conceptions of "cuteness." Thus, when girls talk solely in terms of their own moral standards, the "cute" girl is defined less by reference to her physical attractiveness than by her attractive "personality." Nevertheless, if a "cute" girl is to retain or achieve a position among the "elite" of the adolescent social system, she must attract high-status boys. How, then, does she retain her image of "cuteness" and the esteem that goes with it in the eyes of her girlfriends if she must also engage in a wide range of petting activities with many boys? Or, to phrase this in motivational terms, how does she keep her "cool" orientation toward sex within the moral boundaries of the feminine universe? That is, how can she participate in a rather promiscuous pattern of sexual intimacy with many boys and, at the same time, exercise considerable control over her sexual encounters?

This somewhat contradictory pattern of normatively encouraged sexual promiscuity and restraint is resolved by a higher-order cultural category. This category defines the sexual nature of boys in both cognitive and evaluative terms. Our girl informants tell

us that boys "naturally" try to "get all they can" sexually because boys are born with uncontrollable sexual urges.[33] One girl discussed the issue in the following terms:

(Q) Whose responsibility is it [regarding how far things go sexually on a date]?
(A) The girl's. I mean because guys can't help it. I mean they are born that way, but then girls get carried away because guys can't help themselves and girls can. To a point, but once past that point there's no hope.
(Q) Are all guys like this or just particular guys?
(A) Some guys would get as far as they could get, just for kicks, but there are other boys who are just as nice as they can be, but any boy who likes a girl enough . . . I don't think he would do it intentionally to hurt her, but just can't help to get as far as he can get. I don't think even the nicest guy can help being that way.

In terms of dating norms, girls say that it is their responsibility both to satisfy part of this inborn male desire for continual sexual satisfaction and to keep the situation from getting out of hand. Though girls admit that they also have strong sexual feelings, they agree that they and not the boys are capable of rational control, of setting limits.[34] Thus, girls claim that nature has burdened them with the responsibility of keeping petting relationships within the prescribed moral limits. In a basic sense, girls see boys as morally defective—or, if not as morally defective, at least as morally immature. Boys are said to be simply incapable of realistically assessing the negative consequences of giving free rein to sexual impulses in a dating situation. And, from what we have been able to observe, boys often fulfil these cultural expectations which have been phrased in such biological terms.

Although success in dating seems superficially completely tied to ascriptive criteria, there are important performance aspects to dating. Female competence is culturally defined as the ability to manipulate the sexual component of dating relationships to one's own advantage. Some girls have told us about a technique of "dumping" which they use to entice boys and yet keep them in a dependent position, never certain of whether they will be abandoned for a more attractive partner. One girl described her dating relationship in the following way:

Like when Jim and I first started dating, we got along just fine. Then I started to dump on him, being a little snotty once in a while and stuff like this. Then I decided to be nice because it would be nice to be nice for a while, just as a change. Then I figured if he was so nice to me when I was dumping on him, just think if I was nice to him, he would really be nice to me. Well then he decided that wasn't such a hot idea [and] that he would start dumping on me which I didn't think was such a good idea either. So when he started dumping on me, I just decided to give him the shaft.

One of the latent and unintended consequences of this dating system is the widespread fear among "popular" girls that they are being exploited by the boys. A "popular" girl often feels that if she becomes too attached to a boy he may, in reality, be dating her only for the prestige which comes from being in the company of a "cool" and "cute" girl or, what is worse, he may play upon her romantic proclivities to seduce her.

Incidentally, we have found that many of the girls who "fall in love with" a popular entertainer, such as one of the Beatles

[33] The Ngulu, by way of contrast, are convinced that women are born sexually insatisfiable (see T. Beidelman, "Pig (Gulwe): An Essay on Ngulu Sexual Symbolism and Ceremony," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. XX (1964).

[34] For a long time we were puzzled about the reasons why one of our informants was systematically excluded from the girls' group mentioned above. Our other informants in this group told us, at first, that her clinical attitudes toward sex repulsed them, but upon reflection they admitted that they too collectively discussed sex in a similar manner. Upon further investigation, we found that this girl revealed her desire for sex, she "needed it," and hence she violated these norms.

(an English singing group), are often marginal in a very special way. They may have all the prerequisites for success in the dating system; they are often physically attractive and personable. But these girls reject the hostility and exploitation inherent in the dating system and prefer an imaginary but romantically perfect relationship with these remote figures.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we do not hold that the youth subculture is a closed normative system. The normative integrity, coherence, and identity of a subculture is not always based upon estrangement from the larger culture nor does it always reside in social organizations which resist integration into the larger society. On the other hand, in a discussion of the reality of the youth culture, Berger declares that subcultures must not only have "relatively distinctive styles of life, but styles of life which are to a great extent self-generated, autonomous, having institutional and territorial resources capable of sustaining it in crisis and insulating it from pressures from without."[85] In our opinion, this limits the concept of a subculture to very special, and possibly almost non-existent, cases of cultural differentiation in this society. The high degree of interdependence of functionally differentiated subsystems in this society makes it unlikely that many subcultures will fulfil all of Berger's stringent prerequisites.

In contrast to Berger's strictures, we propose a more catholic and perhaps more fruitful view of a subculture. Rather, we suggest that the core of the youth culture resides in its distinctive evaluative standards. They endow the adolescent status terminology (and thus the social categories through which the members of this age-grade orient themselves to their peers) with qualities and attributes which do not dominate adult status judgments. Here we follow Anselm Strauss's view of the connection between social categories linked to a person's position in age and other societal structures and the ways in which people perceive social reality:

> These changes in conceptual level involve, of course, changes in behavior, since behavior is not separate from classifying. Shifts in concept connote shifts in perceiving, remembering and valuing—in short, radical changes in action and person. . . . Terminological shifts necessitate, but also signalize new evaluations: of self and others, of events, acts and objects; and the transformation of perception is irreversible; once having changed, there is no going back. One can look back, but he can evaluate only from his new status.[86]

From our point of view, then, the members of a subculture can be integrated into basic societal institutions even though their definitions of ordinary social situations are predicated upon a special set of cultural meanings. Consequently, the crucial criterion for the identification of a youth subculture is whether its norms provide its members with a distinctive world view, a style of life, and the standards against which they can measure their own worth. Here again it is worthwhile to quote Strauss on age-graded perceptions of the world: "But the world is different for persons of different age and generation even if they share in common sex, class, and nationality, and occupation."[87]

Finally, our approach emphasizes the element of free cultural play in the genesis of the youth culture. Of course, we do not deny that the typical psychological and role problems of this age-grade provide the raw materials out of which youth culture is built. But we do point to the ways in which the meanings inherent in this adolescent normative order transcend the requirements of simple adjustment to these exigencies. In other words, these adolescent cultural inventions and innovations impose a discernible order upon the crises and dilemmas of adolescence.

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[85] Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

[86] Strauss, *Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 92.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

Alienation in the Ghetto[1]

Bonnie Bullough

ABSTRACT

Two samples of middle-class Negro subjects were investigated, one group living within the traditional Negro ghetto areas and the other living in a predominantly white suburban area. The integrated subjects expressed fewer feelings of alienation; they felt less powerless and scored lower on the anomia scale. They tended also to orient themselves toward the mainstream of society rather than just the segregated institutions of the Negro subculture. It is argued that in the ghetto alienation takes on a circular characteristic; it not only is a product of ghetto living but helps keep people locked in the traditional residential pattern.

Thirty years ago Chicago sociologists described the pattern of the urban Negro ghetto. The center of the "black belt" was occupied by the new arrivals to the city who were often unskilled and unemployed. The more successful and better-educated residents tended to move further out toward the periphery of the area; occasionally they even moved a short distance beyond the concentrated Negro area, so that there were neighborhoods which were temporarily integrated as the ghetto expanded.[2] In spite of the current revolutionary drive for integration, this over-all pattern has not changed much in the large cities of the North and West. Even in the sixteen states that have laws making discrimination in housing illegal there has been no massive movement toward residential desegregation.[3]

Recently, however, it has been reported that in Boston, Seattle, and Philadelphia there are isolated Negro families who have moved completely away from the old ghettos and have settled in previously all white areas.[4] In Los Angeles, where a similar movement has taken place, a small but growing number of Negro families have moved into the previously all white areas of the San Fernando Valley. Although actually a part of the sprawling city of Los Angeles, "the Valley" is separated from the older, central portion of the city by the Santa Monica mountain range. It is one of the fastest growing areas in the country, having developed in the last twenty years from a few scattered communities to one large solidly settled area with almost a million inhabitants. Even before the postwar building boom it contained one predominantly Negro community called Pacoima, which reported a Negro population

[1] I am indebted to Melvin Seeman for advice and help in all stages of the research and in preparation of this manuscript. Computing assistance was obtained from the Health Sciences Computing facility of the University of California, Los Angeles, sponsored by National Institutes of Health grant FR-3. I am supported by a U.S. Public Health special-nurse fellowship.

[2] E. Franklin Frazier, "The Negro Family in Chicago," in Ernest Burgess and Donald Bogue (eds.), *Contributions to Urban Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 404–18. A similar pattern was described by St. Clair Drake and H. R. Cayton in *Black Metropolis* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1945), pp. 174–213.

[3] "How the Fair Housing Laws Are Working," *Trends in Housing*, IX (November–December, 1965), 3–4, 7–10.

[4] Helen MacGill Hughes and Lewis G. Watts, "Portrait of the Self Integrator," *Journal of Social Issues*, XX (April, 1964), 103–15; L. D. Northwood and Ernest A. T. Barth, *Urban Desegregation: Negro Pioneers and Their White Neighbors* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965); and Commission on Human Relations, *Some Factors Affecting Housing Desegregation* (Philadelphia, 1962).

of 9,000 in 1960,[5] but the remaining large expanse of the Valley was until recently almost "lily white." It is too soon to say whether the movement of these scattered Negro families in Los Angeles or elsewhere portends future urban integration, but such a possibility cannot be discounted. In any case these first families, which I have called "barrier breakers," seemed like an interesting group of people to study.

Preliminary investigation of the families in Los Angeles who had made this move indicated that they tended to be well educated and occupationally successful, which is consistent with the findings reported in the other cities mentioned. Since portions of the Los Angeles ghetto also contain areas in which there are many well educated and successful Negroes, it was reasoned that socioeconomic status was not the only factor that determined who would be able to break through the barriers of housing discrimination. The problem for research, then, was to determine some of the social-psychological characteristics that distinguish the barrier breakers from other middle-class Negroes.

The main theoretical framework used to investigate the social psychological barriers to integration was an alienation one. Alienation would seem to be particularly important since it has been mentioned as an aspect of ghetto life by many writers, both popular and scholarly.[6] The alienation of many Negro residents of Los Angeles was dramatically demonstrated in smoke and flames across the skies of Watts during the riots. The rioters, however, were drawn primarily from the poorly educated, unemployed youths,[7] and the focus of this research, which was actually completed before the riots, was on the consequences of alienation for the well-educated, employed middle-class ghetto dwellers.

Previous studies have suggested that those who are less alienated are more likely to seek integration. Researchers in a southern Negro college found that students who felt that they themselves could control their own fate were more willing to participate in a civil rights demonstration.[8] In a study done in Nashville the Srole anomia scale was used to predict which families would seek an integrated school for their children.[9] Based on the conceptualization developed by Melvin Seeman, alienation in this research was viewed as not just a single attitude but as a group of attitudinal variables, which under certain conditions can be related, but which for conceptual clarity should not be confused with each other.[10] Three aspects of the alienation complex were investigated: (1) powerlessness; (2) anomia, which in Seeman's scheme is called normlessness; and (3) an orientation toward or away from the ghetto, which in his scheme would be called a type of value isolation. In conceptualizing the direction of orientation as a type of alienation it should be noted that the alienation can be from the values and institutions of

[5] Marchia Meeker and Joan Harris, *Background for Planning* (Los Angeles: Research Department, Welfare Planning Council, Report #17, 1964), pp. 55–60. A Negro population of 334,916 was reported in 1960 in the city of Los Angeles; see Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, *Population and Housing in Los Angeles County: A Study in the Growth of Residential Segregation* (Los Angeles, 1963), p. 1.

[6] See, e.g., James Baldwin, *The Fire Next Time* (New York: Dial Press, 1963); Charles Silberman, *Crisis in Black and White* (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 189–223; James Coleman, "Implications of the Findings on Alienation," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXX (July, 1964), 76–78; and Russel Middleton, "Alienation, Race and Education," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (December, 1963), 793–97.

[7] John A. McCone (chairman), *Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning? A Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots* (Los Angeles: State of California, 1965).

[8] Pearl Mayo Gore and Julian B. Rotter, "A Personality Correlate of Social Action," *Journal of Personality*, XXXI (March, 1963), 58–64.

[9] Eugene Weinstein and Paul Gusel, "Family Decision Making over Desegregation," *Sociometry*, XXV (March, 1963), 58–64.

[10] Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December, 1959), 783–91.

the Negro subculture or from the dominant society. It was hypothesized not only that powerlessness and anomia would be associated with ghetto life but that they played a key role in holding people within the old residential patterns. It was also hypothesized that the subjects would turn their attention away from the strictly segregated institutions of the ghetto as they moved out into integrated neighborhoods.

Sixty-one Negro families, scattered throughout the predominantly white section of the Valley, were located and interviewed during the winter and spring of 1964–65. All available Negro adult members of the household were included in the sample (three non-Negro spouses were excluded).[11] This yielded a sample of 104 persons, 54 men and 50 women. The names and addresses of these subjects were obtained through the efforts of members of the Valley Fair Housing Council, a local civil rights group. Members of the council used a wide variety of contacts to locate the subjects, including other organizations, work contacts, schools, and so on. The subjects themselves were able to furnish the names of some other Valley Negro families known to them. A control group of 106 persons, 48 men and 58 women from sixty-five families, was obtained by randomly sampling two middle-class neighborhoods with Negro populations of over 90 per cent. One of these areas was in the Pacoima section of the Valley, and the other was in central Los Angeles, several miles to the north of the now famous Watts area. Actually, the physical characteristics of all the sampled areas, integrated and ghetto, were somewhat similar. Most of the dwellings were single family with just an occasional apartment building; the neighborhoods were attractive and the yards well kept. Sixty-three persons from Pacoima and forty-three from the central Los Angeles area were interviewed; two white spouses were excluded from the sample. There seemed to be little difference between the two ghetto areas; the educational, occupational, and income levels were similar, as well as the findings on the alienation scales, so the two areas were combined for the final analysis.

The powerlessness scale that was used measures the extent to which the subject feels that he himself can control the outcomes of events that concern him.[12] The conceptualization of powerlessness is based on the social-learning theory of Julian B. Rotter, which, stated in a simplified way, holds that behavior is a function of values and expectations.[13] It has been argued that people tend to develop generalized expectancies, including those for control or lack of it. Since integration seems to be a commonly held value among Negroes, at least on the surface, it would seem that the expectation for successful integration would play an important role in determining who would make the effort to move into the integrated or predominantly white neighborhood. The powerlessness scale uses a forced-choice format so that subjects chose between pairs of items such as the following: (1) I have usually found that what is going to happen will happen, no matter what I do. (2) Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a definite decision.

The Srole anomia scale was selected as a second alienation measurement because it seems to be a more global type of measurement of the subject's lack of integration

[11] Both spouses were included in the sample because there was some question ahead of time as to which one would be the most significant in deciding about moving and in carrying through the decision. As it turned out, there was agreement in most families, although in some one partner was a stronger force in the decision, but it could be either the husband or the wife.

[12] The powerlessness scale was developed by Shephard Liverant, Julian B. Rotter, and others. For a discussion of its use and development see Melvin Seeman, "Alienation and Social Learning in a Reformatory," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (November, 1963), 270–84.

[13] Julian B. Rotter, *Social Learning and Clinical Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954).

into the ongoing society. The Srole scale also captured the feelings of hopelessness and despair expressed by some of the subjects. It is a five-item Likert-type scale made up of statements such as the following:[14] In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse. A ten-item factual test was constructed to assess the amount of information subjects had about housing integration and the legal rights of minority people in the housing market. It included items such as: Restrictive housing covenants are still legal in California (false) and real-estate offices were defined as places of public accommodation so they are not supposed to discriminate (true).

A fourth scale, which measures the orientation toward or away from the ghetto, was built from information obtained in the interview schedule. It actually measures reported behavior rather than an attitude, but the behavior suggests an underlying orientation toward the Negro subculture of the ghetto or away from it. Subjects indicated what organizations they belonged to, their church affiliations, their chief leisure-time activities, the newspapers and magazines they read regularly, the schools they sent their children to, the racial identities of their close friends, and the degree of integration in their work situations. Each of these items was rated as to whether it was exclusively Negro or was reflective of an integrated situation.[15] It was expected that there would be some drifting away from a strictly segregated life as a part of the process of moving out of the ghetto. Obviously, some of the items in this scale, such as the school, the church, and even the friendship choices, are affected by place of residence, so the fact that the ghetto dwellers and the outsiders would differ was to be expected. It nevertheless proved to be a useful device for looking at what happens to people when they move out.

A special methodological problem in a study such as this one is the possible biasing effect of the race of the interviewer. Approximately half of the interviews were done by white and half by Negro interviewers. The data were therefore analyzed controlling for this factor. Slight differences (not statistically significant) were found in the answers about the racial characteristics of friends; more people indicated that they had non-Negro friends when the interviewer was white. There did not seem to be other differences in responses that could be related to the race of the interviewer.

FINDINGS

As had been anticipated, the educational and income levels of the barrier breakers were high. Their median income was approximately $11,000 a year, which is well over the average Valley income.[16] The hope was that the ghetto samples would be of the same socioeconomic level as the people in the integrated sample, but due to the rather wide variety of income levels found in segregated neighborhoods the median income for the ghetto samples was lower, being approximately $9,700. There were, however, only six persons in the ghetto and two persons in the Valley-wide sample who reported family incomes of less than $5,000, so that poverty was not a factor in either area. Part of the difficulty in matching socioeconomic levels was due to the decision to avoid the mixed neighborhoods on the edge of the ghetto where the incomes might well have been more uniformly high but where some of the impact of segregated life would have been lost.

There were some factors that were simi-

[14] Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (December, 1956), 709–16.

[15] The items in this scale of ghetto (versus outside) orientation were scored in the following way: 0 if the activity was ghetto and only that, 1 if no direction could be determined, and 2 or 3 if the activity was clearly integrated or pointed to an outside interest. Eight items were included in the scale, and a range of scores from 0 to 19 was possible, with the low scores pointing toward the ghetto and the high scores indicating an outside interest.

[16] Meeker and Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

lar in and out of the ghetto. The majority of people in both samples said they saw some value in living in an integrated or predominantly white neighborhood; 87 per cent of the Valley-wide group and 80 per cent of the ghetto dwellers indorsed such a statement, although the Valley residents could think of more concrete reasons why they felt that way. Both groups seemed to be made up of occupationally mobile people. The Bogue scale was used to assign numerical ratings to occupations, and about half of the people in each sample had moved up forty or more points beyond the level of their parents' occupations.[17] It was, for example, not at all unusual to find people with technical or professional jobs whose fathers had been laborers or their mothers domestic workers. This finding supports observations made by such writers as the late Franklin Frazier that there is a new and rapidly growing Negro middle class.[18] Possibly also related to the recent development of this middle class was the scarcity of older people in both groups. The median age in both samples was thirty-nine, but there was just one person over sixty in the Valley group, and in the ghetto sample there were just four.

TABLE 1

MEAN POWERLESSNESS AND ANOMIA SCORES IN THE VALLEY-WIDE AND GHETTO AREAS WHEN EDUCATION, INCOME, AND SEX ARE CONTROLLED

CONTROL	POWERLESSNESS		ANOMIA	
	Valley Wide ($N=101$)	Ghetto ($N=105$)	Valley Wide ($N=103$)	Ghetto ($N=105$)
Education:				
College graduate	2.14 ($N=43$)	2.88 ($N=32$)	9.67 ($N=43$)	11.72 ($N=32$)
Some college or technical education	2.73 ($N=42$)	3.15 ($N=39$)	10.90 ($N=42$)	12.54 ($N=39$)
High school or less	2.75 ($N=16$)	2.97 ($N=34$)	12.17 ($N=18$)	14.38 ($N=43$)
Income:				
$15,000 and over	2.05 ($N=34$)	3.05 ($N=22$)	9.91 ($N=34$)	12.60 ($N=22$)
$7,800–$15,000	2.59 ($N=49$)	2.80 ($N=56$)	10.26 ($N=50$)	11.77 ($N=56$)
Below $7,800	3.00 ($N=18$)	3.27 ($N=26$)	12.79 ($N=19$)	15.19 ($N=26$)
Sex:				
Male	2.55 ($N=53$)	2.77 ($N=48$)	10.77 ($N=54$)	12.65 ($N=48$)
Female	2.42 ($N=48$)	3.21 ($N=57$)	10.42 ($N=49$)	13.08 ($N=57$)

When the powerlessness scores of the two groups were compared, significant differences were found; the people in the ghetto sample have a mean powerlessness score of 3.01, while the outsiders' mean score is 2.48 ($t = 2.07$; $P < .05$). The people who have moved out thus indicate that they feel that they have more control over their own lives. Table 1 shows these scores with education, income, and sex con-

[17] Donald Bogue, *Skid Row in American Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), Appendix.

[18] E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).

trolled. As can be noted in the table, the greatest differences in powerlessness between the in- and out-of-the-ghetto samples show up in the high income and educational levels. This suggests that when the objective criteria for overcoming the barriers of housing discrimination are most favorable, the expectation for control of one's life helps predict who will actually make the move.

The anomia scores follow a similar pattern. In the ghetto the mean score on the anomia scale is 12.9; in the integrated community the mean score is 10.6; these differences are also significant ($t = 4.24$; $P < .001$). The controls for income and education indicate that, although the anomia scores vary more in relation to these factors, the area of residence still makes a difference at each level. There is a correlation between anomia and powerlessness; inside the ghetto it was $r = .43$ and outside it was $r = .37$. This suggests that there is indeed a relationship between these two kinds of alienation in this situation, although the two scales are not measuring the same thing.[19]

Most of the people now living in the Valley spent their childhoods in the ghetto or on its edge (only twelve people reported having grown up in predominantly white neighborhoods). Some explanation should be given as to why the two groups of people scored differently on the alienation scales. This paper cannot, of course, supply all of the answers to that question, but if we look at some of the other factors associated with anomia and powerlessness some clues are offered. Anomia seems to correlate negatively with almost any of life's advantages,[20] so it would seem that the people with lower scores on the Srole scale, including those who moved out of the ghetto, somehow escaped some of the worst disadvantages. Table 2 shows the small but consistently negative correlations with several of these factors. Since powerlessness is a less global sort of attitude it does not correlate highly with as many variables; in this study the development of a high expectation for control seems most related to past and present experiences with integration, not only in housing but also in other aspects of life. Segregation and all that is associated with it emerges as such a crucial problem for Negroes that successful experiences with integration seem to raise the general level of expectation for control. Notice that the childhood experiences most related to lower powerlessness scores are those of integrated school experience and living in a racially mixed neighborhood while growing up.

It was expected from the beginning of the study that the Valley-wide residents would have lost some of their ties with the strictly segregated institutions within the ghetto. In fact, giving up some of the old customs and ties seems to be the price paid by any minority group that is assimilated. It was therefore not surprising that the Valley group had a mean score of 13.0 on the "ghetto-orientation" scale, while the mean of the ghetto sample was 9.7 ($t = 7.99$; $P < .001$). This wide difference on the ghetto-orientation scale indicates that the various aspects of integration tend to be related to each other; moving out of the ghetto is one part of a total life pattern. That this change in pattern is a long-term process is suggested by the fact that the last residence of 61 per cent of the Valley group was described as predominantly white or mixed, while only 23 per cent of the ghetto sample reported that the place they lived in last had even token integration.

[19] The relationship of powerlessness and anomia is discussed by Arthur Neal and Melvin Seeman, "Organization and Powerlessness: A Test of the Mediation Hypothesis," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (April, 1964), p. 222 n.; see also Arthur G. Neal and Salomon Rettig, "Dimensions of Alienation among Manual and Non-Manual Workers," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (August, 1963), 599–602.

[20] Dorothy L. Meier and Wendell Bell, "Anomia and Differential Access to the Achievement of Life Goals," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (April, 1959), 189–202.

It was of interest to find out that within each sample the drift away from a ghetto orientation was related to a greater expectation for control and to lower anomia scores. Table 3 shows the differences in powerlessness and anomia when the two samples are split at the median on orientation. As an alienation measurement the orientation scale is two sided. It indicates the degree to which the customs and associations of the subculture are selected over those of the mainstream of the society; movement away from one pole implies a movement toward the other. This type of value isolation is alienation of a different dimension than that assessed by the Srole scale in which movement away from the mainstream could mean a withdrawal into apathy. The concept of value isolation has been used to describe the alienation felt by intellectuals, although presumably members of any subculture that holds values that deviate from the commonly held societal values would be alienated in this sense.[21] Of course it is also possible to be alienated from the subculture. Since the ghetto orientation was related to both powerlessness and anomia, regardless of place of residence, it would seem that the securely "locked-in" position within the Negro ghetto was not a particularly desirable state. The "marginal" or moving-out position may not be as undesirable as it is sometimes considered. Of course it can be argued that, since Negroes are already familiar with American culture, and yet not completely accepted by it, their position in the ghetto is already a marginal one.

TABLE 2

CORRELATIONS (PEARSON'S r) OF POWERLESSNESS AND ANOMIA[a] WITH SELECTED FACTORS

	Valley Wide	Ghetto
	Powerlessness	
Father's occupational level	−.04	−.004
Employed subject's occupational level	−.31**	−.05
Present income	−.18*	−.03
Educational attainment	−.17*	−.07
Amount of integrated schooling	−.22**	−.10
Neighborhood of childhood (segregated to integrated)	−.30**	−.24**
	Anomia	
Father's occupational level	−.04	−.20*
Employed subject's occupational level	−.22**	−.22**
Present income	−.23**	−.28**
Educational attainment	−.28**	−.31**
Amount of integrated schooling	−.13	−.19*
Neighborhood of childhood (segregated to integrated)	−.12	−.27**

[a] The numbers varied in these correlations from 79 to 105.
* Significant ($P < .05$).
** Significant ($P < .01$).

One of the items used to make up the orientation scale was the racial makeup of the subject's church congregation. In addition to the racial characteristics of the individual congregation, the denominational identification also turned out to have predictive value. As can be noted in Table 4, not only were members of Baptist and Holiness churches more powerless than

[21] Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation."

others, they were seldom found outside the ghetto. Methodists, whose churches also have been segregated historically, did not score so high on the powerlessness scale, and they were well represented in the Valley-wide area. Members of other Protestant churches, Catholics, and non-church members were the best represented in the Valley. The church is the focus of much of the social life within the ghetto, so that it may sometimes act as a positive tie to hold people within the segregated areas.[22] These differences by denomination were not adequately anticipated in the planning of the study, so that data were not obtained about past religious identification. It is therefore not known whether certain church affiliations are associated with staying in the ghetto or whether people change their religious identifications when they move out.

TABLE 3

MEAN POWERLESSNESS AND ANOMIA SCORES IN THE VALLEY-WIDE AND GHETTO AREAS WHEN THE SAMPLES ARE DIVIDED AT THE MEDIAN[a] ON ORIENTATION

Orientation	Valley Wide	Ghetto
Powerlessness:		
Integrated orientation	2.38 ($N=49$)	2.63 ($N=57$)
Ghetto orientation	2.75 ($N=52$)	3.45* ($N=48$)
Anomia:		
Integrated orientation	10.00 ($N=49$)	11.86 ($N=57$)
Ghetto orientation	11.19* ($N=54$)	14.10** ($N=48$)

[a] The median scores on the orientation scale were 13 in the valley-wide area and 9 in the ghetto.

* Differences between the mean scores of those with integrated or ghetto orientations were significant ($P < .05$).

** Significant ($P < .01$).

Having found that Negroes who live outside the ghetto feel less powerless and less of the hopeless detachment measured by the anomia scale still leaves an unanswered question; are the feelings of alienation a selective factor that keeps some people from moving out, or does the experience of having successfully moved lessen the feelings of alienation? Probably both happen, but the evidence for alienation as a negative selective factor is strongest. Some of the correlations associated with childhood conditions suggest that feelings of alienation are fairly stable attitudes, developing sometimes over a lifetime. When the powerlessness scores of the Valley residents who have lived outside of the ghetto for more than five years were compared with the newcomers, the older residents did have lower scores, but even the newcomers were lower in alienation than the average for the ghetto.

TABLE 4

MEAN POWERLESSNESS SCORES AND RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION*

Religion	Valley Wide ($N=101$)	Ghetto ($N=105$)
Baptist	3 29 ($N=7$)	3.62 ($N=29$)
Methodist	2.17 ($N=23$)	2.95 ($N=19$)
Holiness	3.00 ($N=3$)	3.63 ($N=8$)
Other Protestant	2.10 ($N=28$)	2.27 ($N=22$)
Catholic	1.96 ($N=24$)	2.28 ($N=17$)
None	3.45 ($N=16$)	2.70 ($N=10$)

* Differences in religious affiliation in the two areas: $\chi^2 = 19.4$ ($P < .01$).

As suggested by other research on alienation, one of the mechanisms by which higher expectation for control fosters integration is probably through its relationship with more effective social learning.[23] People who feel less powerless would thus

[22] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Church in America* (New York: Schocken Books, 1964); Joseph R. Washington, Jr., *Black Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

[23] Seeman, "Alienation and Social Learning in a Reformatory"; see also Melvin Seeman and J. W. Evans, "Alienation and Learning in a Hospital Setting," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (December, 1962), 772–82.

be expected to have learned more about their rights in the housing market and how they might be able to secure a house or an apartment in an integrated area. Table 5 shows the differences in scores on the housing-facts test with the subjects divided at the median on their powerlessness scores; the low powerlessness group does tend to have learned more of these facts.

Both powerlessness and anomia seem to act as psychological deterrents to people making the kind of sustained effort that is necessary to be successful in overcoming the barriers to integration. Subjects in the ghetto were asked if they had ever looked for housing in an integrated or predominantly white neighborhood. Fifty-six of the people in that sample said they had done so at some time in their lives. However, when the ghetto sample was divided by this factor, the anomia scores were the same for the two groups (12.9), and the powerlessness scores were actually higher for the group that said they had looked (3.20 mean score as compared with 2.80). Just looking at these scores it would seem that alienation was not a selective factor. However, when these people were asked to elaborate on their experiences in looking, they characteristically told of a single experience in which they looked and were rebuffed. When the Valley residents told of their experiences they sometimes described years of searching until they were finally successful. Occasionally these accounts included reports of open refusals, but more often they were faced with a long series of evasions and trickery including realty salesmen who were "out" or ran to hide from them in the other room, managers who had no authority to rent the apartments, owners who could not be located, forms that could not be processed, returned deposits, and so on. The persistence shown by some of these people in the face of one disappointment after another is worthy of note. It would seem, then, that alienation as a selective factor may function more in fixing the amount of determination and effectiveness that the subjects bring to the task, rather than merely selecting who will make a single attempt. The people who were successful in moving out, despite the present barriers of discrimination, were unwilling to accept one act of prejudice as their final answer, and here an ultimate belief in a manageable world undobutedly helped them.

TABLE 5

MEAN SCORES ON THE HOUSING-FACTS TEST WHEN DIVIDED AT THE MEDIAN IN EACH AREA ON THE POWERLESSNESS SCALE[a]

Powerlessness	Valley Wide	Ghetto
Above median or at the median	7.10 ($N=47$)	6.27 ($N=61$)
Below median	7.37 ($N=54$)	7.02 ($N=44$)

[a] Both samples were split at 2.

* The differences in the ghetto sample were significant ($P <$ .05).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

When a group of integrated middle-class Negro subjects was compared with another group of middle-class subjects who remained within the traditional Negro ghettos, significant differences in alienation were found. The integrated subjects had greater expectations for control of events that concerned them and less of a feeling of anomia. They also tended to orient themselves toward the mainstream of society rather than toward the segregated institutions of the Negro subculture. Alienation within the ghetto takes on a circular characteristic; not only is it a product of segregated living, it also acts to keep people locked in the traditional residential patterns.

The fact that alienation is such a circular process does not mean that nothing can be done to deal with the problems of segregation. It does mean that antidiscriminatory legislation alone cannot bring about

instant integration. Instead such legislation would be more effective if accompanied by other efforts to overcome the psychological barriers to integration. The fact that anomia correlates with almost any kind of deprivation suggests the need for effective programs to combat poverty, unemployment, and lack of educational opportunity in the ghetto; these programs are needed not only for their own intrinsic worth but also to combat the feelings of hopelessness and despair that are a part of the ghetto attitude. The fact that choosing the integrated way of life in one sphere is related to choosing it in others suggests that any sort of program aimed at decreasing segregation is worth trying. A fair-employment-practices act can even help bring about more housing integration by giving the workers the experience of working together. Integrated school or church experiences give children the opportunity to set up patterns of mixed associations. However, the solution to the problems of segregation are not easy; the old patterns, supported by the psychological barriers of alienation, do not change rapidly.

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Social Participation and Happiness[1]

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ABSTRACT

The effects of social participation on self-reports of happiness are examined, and attention is focused on the mechanisms through which the relationship is established. Analysis of the data reveals that, as hypothesized, the greater the extent of participation, the greater the degree of happiness reported. This relationship, it is argued, emerges from the fact that positive feelings are directly correlated with social participation, while negative feelings bear no relation to participation. Thus, the net difference between positive and negative affect, which previous investigators have termed the "Affect Balance Score," is a major determinant of happiness.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with determining the effects of social participation upon self-reports of happiness among a sample of six hundred adults. Further, it attempts to examine the processes through which social participation influences the degree of happiness which people experience. To some extent, this research represents a partial replication of the "Happiness Studies" of Bradburn and his associates at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC).[2] It goes beyond their work, however, in formulating more explicitly the underlying theoretical bases for the presumed relationship between social participation and happiness.

Under the initial direction of Peter H. Rossi and Jacob J. Feldman, the staff of NORC has recently been engaged in research concerned with: (1) determining how self-assessments of happiness are distributed throughout the population, (2) locating the separate dimensions of happiness, and (3) assessing how people vary over time in their levels of happiness.[3]

In their reports of the NORC "Happiness Studies," Bradburn and his associates have argued that happiness can best be conceptualized as a function of the relation between the two independent dimensions of (*a*) positive and (*b*) negative affect.[4] Their findings indicate that positive and negative affect do not occupy two polar positions on a single dimension, but are two *separate* dimensions which vary independently of one another. Utilizing a ten-item battery containing items referring to five negative and five positive feelings, they present findings showing that the greater the preponderance of positive over negative affect, the greater the probability that an individual will report being "very happy." Conversely, the greater the preponderance of negative over positive feelings, the greater the liklihood of an individual's being "not too happy."[5] Bradburn and his co-workers conclude that the *difference* between the scores on the positive and negative feelings indexes—which they

[1] I am grateful to Thomas P. Wilson, Dartmouth College, for his helpful comments and advice on earlier drafts of this paper.

[2] Norman M. Bradburn, *In Pursuit of Happiness* (Report No. 92 [Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1963]); Norman M. Bradburn, "Measures of Psychological Well-being" (NORC working paper, Survey 458, 1964); Norman M. Bradburn and David Caplovitz, *Reports on Happiness* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965); David Caplovitz and Norman M. Bradburn, *Social Class and Psychological Adjustment* (Study 458 [Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1964]).

[3] See especially, Bradburn and Caplovitz, *op. cit.*

[4] Bradburn, "Measures of Psychological Well-being"; Bradburn and Caplovitz, *op. cit.*

[5] *Ibid.*

call the Affect Balance Score (ABS)—is a good indicator of an individual's current level of happiness. Thus, they argue, the ABS, a scale constructed by taking the difference between a person's score on the positive feelings index and his score on the negative feelings index, is measuring the same underlying dimension as the items concerned with self-reports of happiness.

Although the ABS is obviously an important central variable to be considered in focusing on happiness, it is not clear whether the ABS can better be considered as an indicator of happiness or as a determinant of happiness. While the NORC investigators seem to regard the ABS and self-reports of happiness as being "interchangeable indices" of some underlying happiness state, the focus here will be on the ABS as an explanatory factor influencing self-reports of happiness. Since the ABS is being utilized here to help explain happiness, attention will be given, therefore, to examining determinants of the ABS: positive and negative feelings.

SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND HAPPINESS

At this point, social participation becomes an important concern in terms of its possible significance for the happiness that people experience. Social participation has long been considered important as an index of social integration, reflecting common prescriptions and proscriptions for conduct and beliefs among individuals.[6] Durkheim and Tonnies, among others, were of course concerned with these aspects of social participation.[7] Very little direct attention, however, has been given to empirical examinations of the consequences of social participation for a person's feelings of well-being or happiness, although the works of Durkheim and of Henry and Short, for instance, are indirectly concerned with indicators of happiness.[8] More importantly, prior to the NORC research there were apparently no studies dealing with the processes or mechanisms through which even the presumed relationship between social participation and happiness is established.

In this report, the relationship between *voluntary* social participation and self-reports of happiness will be examined. To determine the mechanisms through which the presumed relationship comes about, the relationship of positive and negative feelings—individually and in combination—to voluntary social participation and to happiness, will be studied. Three hypotheses are formulated for examination:

Hypothesis 1.—The number of positive feelings which individuals experience is related to their voluntary social participation; the higher the extent of social participation, the greater the number of positive feelings.

Hypothesis 2.—The number of negative feelings which individuals experience is *not* related to their voluntary social participation.

Hypothesis 3.—Happiness is related to social participation; the higher the extent of voluntary social participation, the greater the degree of happiness reported.

The first hypothesis is derived from consideration of Homans' general proposition that individuals tend to repeat those activities that were found to be rewarding in the past, and to avoid those activities that were found unrewarding.[9] Thus, if an activity is not rewarding, or is punishing,

[6] See, e.g., Emile Durkheim, *Division of Labor* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947); Frederick Tonnies, *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft*, trans. Charles Loomis (New York: American Book Co., 1940); Charles Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1909); Amos Hawley, *Human Ecology: A Study of Community Structure* (New York: Ronald Press, 1950).

[7] Durkheim, *op. cit.*; Tonnies, *op. cit.*

[8] Durkheim, *op. cit.*; Andrew F. Henry and Joseph F. Short, Jr., *Suicide and Homicide* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954).

[9] George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961); George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1950).

individuals sooner or later will look for some alternative source of reward—*if they are free to do so.* This qualification is an extremely important one. For unless an individual has the freedom not to engage in an activity from which he derives little or no reward, the fact that he continues to engage in an activity does not necessarily mean that he finds the activity rewarding. Since with the activity under consideration here—voluntary social participation—men are free to look for alternatives, we are hypothesizing that a greater frequency of social participation (or, in Homans' terms, a greater quantity of activity emitted) leads to a greater frequency of rewards. In this case, the rewards result in a greater number of positive feelings deriving from social participation.

Our second hypothesis, that negative feelings are *un*related to voluntary social participation, follows from the above argument. For as long as they are free to do so, we should expect individuals to withdraw from any social activities that are unrewarding or result in negative experiences. At the same time, there is no basis for expecting that the absence of voluntary social participation will increase negative feelings, which, it is suggested, derive largely from social situations in which individuals are *not* free to discontinue interactions; for example, certain work and family interactions may be of this nature. Homans has noted, in qualifying his proposition regarding increase in degree of liking for one another as a function of frequency of interaction among men, that "When the costs of avoiding interaction are great enough, a man will go on interacting with another even though he finds the other's activity punishing; and far from liking the other more, he will like him less."[10] And Bradburn and his associates report that, among men, negative feelings are related to differences in marital and work satisfaction but not to social participation.[11]

It seems likely that the majority of people are reasonably able to avoid most social situations which may result in their being the recipients of negative affect. In situations where it is difficult to withdraw or cease social interaction, however, the probability of experiencing negative feelings may be high. On the other hand, the experiencing of positive feelings is probably to a large degree dependent on people seeking out activities where there is the possibility of a mutual exchange of rewards and where, as a result, they can maximize the social rewards which they receive.[12] Hence, although it is sometimes difficult or impossible to avoid negative feelings, the acquisition of positive feelings often requires that the individual seek out social activities providing the possibility of positive experiences.

Hypothesis 3 is derived from the first two hypotheses and from our earlier discussion of the relation of the ABS to happiness.

METHODS

To test the three hypotheses, interviews were conducted with a sample of six hundred adults living in the state of New Hampshire. Both the sample selections and the interviewing were done by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago.[13] The interviews took place in the respondents' homes and were approximately one hour in duration.

Social participation, the chief explanatory variable in this report, was measured by three items, which were later converted into index form:

1. During the past few weeks how many times did you get together with friends—I mean things like going out together or visiting in each other's homes?

[10] Homans, *Social Behavior*, p. 187.

[11] Bradburn and Caplovitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–49.

[12] This is not to say that people do not derive rewards from situations in which there is little chance of withdrawal without heavy costs. Rather, the point to be made is that those situations make the avoidance of negative experiences very difficult.

[13] NORC Study 750.

2. About how many neighbors around here do you know well enough to visit with?

3. How many organizations such as church and school groups, labor unions, or social, civic, and fraternal clubs do you take an active part in?

As noted earlier, the basic dependent variable in our report is the respondent's self-report concerning his present state of happiness. All respondents were asked the question, "Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days—would you say you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?" In addition, measures of positive and negative affect—which previous investigators have found to be related to self-reports of happiness—are derived from responses to a ten-item batter of positive and negative feelings. Finally, the ABS, obtained from the net balance of positive and negative feelings, is employed in the analysis.

FINDINGS

Of the six hundred respondents in our sample, 41 per cent said that they were "very happy," 52 per cent said "pretty happy," and 7 per cent said "not too happy."[14]

Before proceeding to a test of our three hypotheses, it is necessary to present one additional finding. Table 1 presents the relationship between the ABS and happiness. The table shows that, as previously found by Bradburn and his associates, the percentage of respondents reporting that they are "very happy" steadily decreases as we move from a positive ABS to a negative ABS.

We are now ready to proceed with an examination of the data relevant to our three hypotheses. The results in the first column of Table 2 strongly support our first hypothesis—that the higher the extent of social participation, the higher the number of positive feelings. For ease of comparison, only the percentage with a high number (four or five) of positive feelings is reported. With each of the three measures of social participation, the percentage experiencing a high number of positive feelings increases with greater social participation.

It is also interesting to note the relative effects of various degrees of participation on each of the three social participation measures upon positive feelings. The differences between low and high participation are greatest on the measure concerning contacts with friends, and least on the measure of neighbors known. This does not appear to be a function of the cutting points selected but, rather, suggests that contacts with friends tend to increase positive feelings to a greater extent than do either of the other two types of social participation under consideration. A similar finding is reported by Langner and his associates on the Midtown Study staff. Concerned with the relationship of mental

[14] Each of the separate feeling-state items was preceded by the phrase: "During the past few weeks did you ever feel ———?" The percentages responding "Yes" to each of the items is as follows. *Positive feelings:* (1) Pleased about having accomplished something? (80 per cent); (2) That things were going your way? (72 per cent); (3) Proud because someone complimented you on something you had done? (55 per cent); (4) Particularly excited or interested in something? (53 per cent); (5) On top of the world? (31 per cent). *Negative feelings:* (1) So restless that you couldn't sit long in a chair? (27 per cent); (2) Bored? (26 per cent); (3) Depressed? (19 per cent); (4) Very lonely or remote from other people? (18 per cent); (5) Upset because someone criticized you? (17 per cent).

A cluster analysis revealed, as was found by Bradburn, that the positive items intercorrelated with one another and the negative items intercorrelated with each other. But the items in one cluster were not correlated with those in the other, nor did the two clusters correlate negatively with one another. Although the two scales showed little relationship to one another, each is related in the opposite direction to the respondents' self-reports of happiness. The greater the number of positive feelings, the larger the percentage reporting they are "very happy." On the other hand, the fewer the number of negative feelings, the greater the percentage reporting that they are "very happy." Similarly, the percentage reporting that they are "not too happy" increases as one moves in the opposite direction on each of the scales.

illness to "Interpersonal Affiliation," they found that having no friends involved a greater risk of mental illness than did either lack of organizational activity or lack of visiting with neighbors.[15]

Since individuals differ in the degree to which they are involved in social activities, the multiple effects of the three indicators of social participation were examined. An index was formed combining an individual's scores on each of the three indicators.[16] As would be expected, the relation of social participation and positive feelings is even more pronounced here. As seen in Table 2,

[15] Thomas S. Langner and Stanley T. Michael, *Life Stress and Mental Health* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 285–90.

[16] The three items were combined in the following manner: those with 0 contacts, 1 or 2 contacts, and 3 or more contacts with friends were assigned scores of 1, 2, 3, respectively; those knowing 0, 1–3, and 4 or more neighbors were assigned scores of 1, 2, 3, respectively; those with no organizational activity were assigned scores of 1, and those active in 1 or more organizations were assigned scores of 2. The scores ranged from 3 to 8. Those with scores of 3 or 4 were considered "low" on the index, those scoring 5 or 6 were "medium," and those scoring 7 or 8 were "high."

TABLE 1

RELATION OF AFFECT BALANCE SCORE TO SELF-RATINGS OF HAPPINESS (REPORTED IN PERCENTAGES)

Self-Rating of Happiness	Positive > Negative		Positive = Negative	Negative > Positive
	+3 or More ($N=111$)	+1 or 2 ($N=239$)	0 ($N=113$)	−1 or Less ($N=131$)
Very happy	71	40	26	21
Pretty happy	29	58	70	54
Not too happy	0	2	4	25

TABLE 2

RELATION OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FEELINGS TO SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Social Participation Measure	High Positive Feelings		High Negative Feelings	
	Percentage	γ	Percentage	γ
Contact with friends:				
0 ($N=138$)	21.4		9.2	
1–2 ($N=159$)	39.3	.34	12.7	.03
3+ ($N=300$)	47.0		9.6	
Number of neighbors known:				
0 ($N=97$)	29.8		11.2	
1–3 ($N=191$)	39.7	.12	9.4	.01
4+ ($N=308$)	41.0		10.6	
Organizational activity:				
0 ($N=325$)	32.8		10.7	
1 ($N=123$)	39.8	.27	11.4	−.05
2 ($N=148$)	52.4		8.7	
Social participation index:				
Low ($N=83$)	15.8		12.0	
Medium ($N=267$)	39.1	.32	10.9	−.08
High ($N=243$)	46.9		9.5	

fewer than 16 per cent of those low on the index report a high number of positive feelings, compared to 39 per cent of those occupying a medium position and 47 per cent of those respondents high on the index. Thus we see that, as hypothesized, social participation bears a strong relation to positive feelings.

The data necessary for examining hypothesis 2 are contained in the second column of Table 2. If our hypothesis is correct, then we should see no relation between social participation and negative feelings. As with positive feelings, only the percentage reporting a high number is reported. Observing the percentages experiencing a high number of negative feelings for each of the three indicators of social participation, we see no pattern of association among the variables. On each of the three measures, those occupying "low," "medium," and "high" positions appear to experience a high number of negative feelings with about equal frequency. When the three measures are examined in combined form, there is a slight tendency for negative feelings to decrease with greater social participation.[17]

Table 3 presents the data relevant to our third hypothesis. Clearly, the hypothesis is supported. The percentage of respondents reporting that they are "very happy" increases with social participation, whereas the percentage reporting that they are "not too happy" bears an inverse relation to social participation. This pattern is revealed for each of the three measures of social participation and for the social participation index. Among those low on the index, more than 14 per cent report being "not very happy," while only 22 per cent are "very happy." At the other extreme, only 3 per cent of those respondents high on the index report being "not very

TABLE 3

RELATION OF HAPPINESS LEVEL TO SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Social Participation Measure	Level of Happiness			γ
	Percentage Very Happy	Percentage Pretty Happy	Percentage Not Too Happy	
Contact with friends:				
0 (N=138)	27.5	61.6	10.9	
1–2 (N=159)	43.7	48.1	8.2	.22
3+ (N=300)	45.3	49.7	5.0	
Number of neighbors known:				
0 (N=97)	29.9	59.8	10.3	
1–3 (N=191)	37.2	53.9	8.9	.22
4+ (N=308)	46.4	48.4	5.2	
Organizational activity:				
0 (N=325)	34.5	55.7	9.8	
1 (N=123)	39.0	56.9	4.1	.29
2 (N=148)	56.1	39 9	4 0	
Social participation index:				
Low (N=83)	21.7	63 9	14.4	
Medium (N=267)	38.6	53.2	8 2	.32
High (N=243)	49.4	47.3	3.3	

[17] Using different cutting points for positive and negative feeling scores gave the same results. And the findings hold generally true for each of the five positive and five negative items. In addition to the percentage differences presented in the following tables, γ is used as a coefficient of association (see W. Allen Wallis and Harry V. Roberts, *Statistics: A New Approach* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956], pp. 282–84).

happy," whereas almost 50 per cent say that they are "very happy."

In order to determine the stability of the demonstrated relationships, they were examined under several control variables: sex, age, religion, and education. Rather than present the relationships of the dependent variables for each of the indicators of social participation under different controls, their relationships to the index of social participation are examined under the various test factors. For the most part, the same patterns were revealed for each of the measures of social participation as for the participation index.

When the respective influence of each control variable is examined in its own right, the following consequences are observed: (1) Women experience both more positive and more negative feelings than men do, and a slightly greater percentage report being very happy[18]—although this is true only in the low participation category; (2) respondents under age fifty report more positive feelings and are happier than those over fifty, but there are no apparent differences for negative feelings;[19] (3) religious affiliation has only a slight effect on positive and negative feelings, although Protestants report a somewhat higher level of happiness than do Catholics;[20] (4) positive feelings and happiness increase with education, but negative feelings seem to be unrelated to educational attainment.[21]

Looking now at the influence of the control factors on our relationships, it can be seen in Table 4 that the relationships between voluntary social participation and positive feelings, social participation and negative feelings, and social participation and happiness are generally maintained under each of the test factors. There are, however, four exceptions to this. Among respondents in the 35–49 age category and among those with less than a high school education, there are strong inverse relationships between voluntary social participation and negative feelings. For high school graduates, there is only a weak relationship between social participation and positive feelings. And among those with college training, there is no relationship between social participation and happiness. Although we are not in a position at present to explain these specifications of the original relationships, it is clear that they cannot be explained by these background factors.

Each of the control variables has some influence on the dependent variables. But, with every comparison of the joint effects of social participation and the control variables, the effects of participation are greater than the effects of the background characteristics of the respondents. Clearly, the previously demonstrated relationships appear to possess a high degree of stability. Also worth noting is the relationship of the background characteristics to our explanatory variable, social participation. Sex and age were in no way related to social participation. Forty per cent of the men and 41 per cent of the women in the sample were high on the index of social participation. With age, 40 per cent of the youngest group, 44 per cent of the middle, and 40 per cent of the oldest group were high on the social participation index. Although there were religious differences (with 47 per cent of the Protestants and 35 per cent of the Catholics high on the social participation index), these were mainly a function of differences in educational attainment among the two religious groups and disappeared when the joint effects of religion and education on social participation were examined.

[18] Bradburn, "Measures of Psychological Well-Being," reports similar findings.

[19] Bradburn and Caplovitz, *op. cit.*, and Gerald Gurin *et al.*, *Americans View Their Mental Health* (New York: Basic Books, 1960), also found happiness inversely related to age.

[20] Neither Bradburn and Caplovitz, *op. cit.*, nor Gurin *et al.*, *op. cit.*, investigated the influence of religious affiliation.

[21] Both Bradburn and Caplovitz, *op. cit.*, and Gurin *et al.*, *op. cit.*, report a strong positive correlation between education and happiness.

TABLE 4

SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND POSITIVE FEELINGS, NEGATIVE FEELINGS AND HAPPINESS—BY DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Demographic Characteristics and Social Participation	Percentage High Positive Feelings	γ	Percentage High Negative Feelings	γ	Percentage Very Happy	γ
	Sex					
Males:						
Low (N=40)	7.5		7.5		15.0	
Medium (N=139)	37.4	.41	10.8	.17	36.0	.73
High (N=117)	47.0		5.9		51.3	
Females:						
Low (N=50)	22.2		14.0		28.0	
Medium (N=128)	40.6	.27	10.9	.00	41.4	.22
High (N=126)	46.8		12.7		47.6	
	Age					
21–34:						
Low (N=20)	30.0		15 0		30.0	
Medium (N=82)	45.1	.15	12.2	−.01	50.0	.17
High (N=69)	47.8		13 0		52.2	
35–49:						
Low (N=22)	18.2		22.7		19.0	
Medium (N=79)	45 6	.27	8.9	−.53	43.0	.22
High (N=78)	50.0		3.8		46.2	
50+:						
Low (N=41)	7.7		5.1		17.1	
Medium (N=106)	29.9	.50	11.3	.16	26 4	.47
High (N=98)	42.9		11.2		50.0	
	Religious Affiliation					
Catholics:						
Low (N=38)	7.9		13.2		18 4	
Medium (N=119)	42.9	.39	10.1	−.01	35.3	.40
High (N=86)	47.7		11.6		51.2	
Protestants:						
Low (N=36)	26.7		8.3		22.2	
Medium (N=121)	38.8	.27	9.9	−.07	47.1	.23
High (N=142)	47.5		6.8		50.0	
	Education					
Less than high school:						
Low (N=50)	6.0		14.0		16.0	
Medium (N=124)	32.3	.37	13.7	−.16	33.9	.40
High (N=72)	33.3		8.3		42.5	
High school graduate:						
Low (N=23)	34.8		13.0		21.7	
Medium (N=95)	45.3	.09	5.3	.08	42.1	.33
High (N=91)	46.2		9.9		53.8	
College training:						
Low (N=10)	20.0		0.0		50.0	
Medium (N=48)	43.8	.40	14.6	−.03	45.7	.01
High (N=74)	60.0		10.0		50.0	

A very strong relationship, however, was found between level of education and social participation. Almost 54 per cent of those with college training were high on the social participation index, compared to 43.5 per cent of the high school graduates and 29.3 per cent of those with less than a high school education.[22] This finding is in line with previous results and suggests that increased education tends to teach individuals more of the skills that facilitate participation, as well as enhancing their prestige and making them more desirable participants from the point of view of others.[23]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has been concerned both with determining the influences of social participation upon self-reports of happiness and with examining the mechanisms through which this relationship is established. The results of previous empirical work by Bradburn and his associates at NORC, as well as the influence of some of the theoretical work of George G. Homans, played a major part in the formulation of the hypotheses in this research. Analysis of our data revealed that, as hypothesized, self-reports of happiness were highly related to social participation; the greater the extent of participation, the greater the degree of happiness reported. This relationship, it is argued, emerges from the fact that positive feelings are directly correlated with social participation. Thus, the net difference between positive and negative feelings, which previous researchers have termed the Affect Balance Score, is a major determinant of happiness.

From these findings, the following conclusions and implications are drawn:

1. This partial replication of the research of the NORC staff tends to support their contention that people feel happy or unhappy according to the relative balance of good and bad feelings. If an individual experiences several negative feelings, he is not necessarily unhappy, since the number of positive feelings may exceed the unpleasurable. The opposite is equally true, of course. An individual may have few negative feelings but even fewer positive feelings, thus resulting in an over-all feeling of unhappiness.

2. While social participation and positive feelings are highly related, there is no evidence here to show that these positive feelings are a *direct* result of social participation. Further research might deal more directly with the presumed causal connection between these two variables.

3. If positive feelings are a direct result of social participation, then these findings may have implications for the willingness of mentally ill persons to seek psychiatric assistance. True prevalence studies have reported that the great majority of persons classified as mentally ill have never sought psychiatric help for their illnesses.[24] Perhaps social participation has the effect of protecting people from having to seek psychiatric help because the positive feelings associated with participation tend to offset the unpleasurable feelings of psychiatric disorders. If so, then this helps to "explain" the finding of Segal and his associates that, for a given level of emotional maladjustment, college students affiliated with fraternities or athletic teams had

[22] Both the frequency of getting together with friends and the extent of organizational activity were positively related to education. The number of neighbors known, however, bore no relationship to educational attainment.

[23] See, e.g., Howard E. Freeman, Edwin Novak, and Leo G. Reeder, "Correlates of Membership in Voluntary Associations," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (October, 1957), 528–33; Leonard Reissman, "Class, Leisure, and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (February, 1954), 76–84; Joel Smith and Horace D. Rawls, "Standardization of an Educational Variable: The Need and Its Consequences," *Social Forces*, XLIV (September, 1965), 57–66.

[24] Dorothea C. Leighton *et al.*, *The Character of Danger* (New York: Basic Books, 1964); Leo Srole *et al.*, *Mental Health in the Metropolis* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962).

lower psychiatric treatment rates than did their unaffiliated classmates.[25] That is to say, it may be positive feelings intervening between social participation and felt discomfort—rather than affiliation per se—which determined whether emotionally disturbed students sought psychiatric treatment.

4. A main concern in this report has been with investigating the consequences of social participation for the positive feelings which people experience. As was predicted, social participation was not, however, found to be related to negative feelings. It was suggested that perhaps negative feelings result from social activities or situations in which the individual is not free to withdraw if he chooses. Any further attempts to locate the source of a negative-feeling state must pay close attention to locating situations that are for the most part "non-voluntary" in nature, for example, family- and work-related interactions.

5. Finally, future research should attempt to determine which of the wide variety of social activities open to a person have the most positive consequences in terms of the pleasurable feelings which he may experience. Obviously, this depends to a large extent on an individual's own particular needs and desires. Yet if, as is often assumed, the need for affiliation is widespread, when we should begin to investigate how different individuals attempt to maximize the probability of their experiencing positive affects by selecting from among the available alternatives for social participation.

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[25] Bernard E. Segal, Robert J. Weiss, and Robert Sokol, "Emotional Adjustment, Social Organization, and Psychiatric Treatment," *American Sociological Review*, XXX (August, 1965), 548–56.

Professionalization as Career Immobility[1]

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ABSTRACT

Examination of the use of professional career ladders in industry indicates that power is the ignored variable that obviates the usefulness of such a structure for engineers and other professionals whose work requires co-ordination or the allocation of scarce resources. Although engineers differ from other professionals in a number of ways, an analysis of their place in large organizations throws doubt on the utility of the concept of professionalism for understanding large, complex organizations. This is particularly true when the executives of an organization attempt to utilize current popular beliefs and images about professions in an attempt to manipulate definitions of success and failure for organizational members.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between professionalism in large organizations and career mobility. The rapid increase in the industrial employment of professionals along with the proliferation of specialist units in industrial organizations has led to a number of organizational problems. For example, these specialist groups bring to the organization a set of career aspirations that comes into conflict with existing career paths. The accepted definitions of success that accompany these existing career paths are challenged by the development of specialist careers.

New organizational forms and relationships have been produced to accommodate these problems.[2] We shall attempt to describe some of the factors related to this process of accommodation by focusing on one of the particular organizational arrangements that has been produced in adapting to new specialist careers—the dual ladder. We shall be especially concerned with its use in providing alternative career paths for engineers and salesmen.

The dual ladder refers to the side-by-side existence of the usual ladder of hierarchical positions leading to authority over greater and greater numbers of employees and another ladder consisting of titles carrying successively higher salaries, higher status, and sometimes greater autonomy or more responsible assignments.[3]

Much of the literature discusses the dual ladder as an incentive provided by the organization in response to various pressures from professionals working within it.[4] Our research indicates that the dual ladder can also be created by management. While

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[2] For an account of these accommodations see William Kornhauser with the assistance of W. O. Hagstrom, *Scientists in Industry: Conflict and Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962). The best theoretical discussion of these problems is presented in Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961).

[3] For a review of the literature on the dual ladder see the chapter on "Professional Incentives in Industry" in Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 137, 143–49. See also Bertram Schoner and Thomas W. Harrell, "The Questionable Dual Ladder," *Personnel*, XLII (1965), 53–57.

[4] Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–205, Schoner and Harrell, *op. cit.*, p. 53; and Bernard Barber, "Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions," *Daedalus* (Fall, 1965), p. 681.

organizational members often do aspire to professionalism, management frequently imposes such a definition on specialists. And in many of the cases where professionalism is sought after, it is only by those who have failed to be promoted.

Organizations require the continued productive efforts of experienced specialists who will remain in their specialties. Management thus attempts to impose professionalism[5] as a definition of success within the organization in order to maintain commitment on the part of those specialists who would ordinarily be considered failures for not having moved into management. Identification as professional has become a way to redefine failure as success. It will be our claim that professionalism is often synonymous with career immobility in many of the emerging specialist occupations.

THE PROFESSIONAL LADDER: SOME FALSE ASSUMPTIONS

A common explanation for the problems that result when professionals enter industrial organizations is that their goals clash with the reward of promotion into management which serves as one incentive for employees to perform tasks required by the organization. Success in most organizations is defined as movement into management. This route, however, leads the professional away from the practice of his chosen specialty. Engineers, for example, are reported as having a dislike of working with people—preferring the handling of "things."[6] In addition to requiring a different set of incentives, professionals are also assumed to have stronger loyalties to their profession than to the organization employing them.[7] A professional is said to care little for organizational matters that do not impinge upon his area of specialty.[8] The ideology of professionalism, as stated, implies a trade-off between specialist autonomy and power in the organization. All of these portraits embody the notion that upward mobility in the organizational hierarchy is of little importance to the professional. Furthermore, mobility aspirations are seen as antithetical to the true values of a profession.

These beliefs led to the development of what has been referred to as the dual ladder or, as we shall refer to it, the professional ladder:[9] "in simplest terms, the problem appears to be to find a way of rewarding scientists for good scientific performance without removing them from scientific work."[10] This is to be done by "re-

[5] The term "professional" and its variations are generally used rather loosely—especially in popular usage. We will use "professionalism" to indicate the possession of some of the attributes of a profession. We will use "professionalization" to indicate a process of acquiring some degree of these attributes. Whenever we think one of these terms describes a group possessing so few of these attributes that the terms would only be used thusly by a "layman," we will try to indicate this by using quotation marks. We would agree with Vollmer and Mills about the disutility of arguing whether a group is or is not a profession and about the usefulness of professionalization as a concept. However, we would go beyond them and maintain that even the professionalization concept has severe limitations in helping to understand the effects of the emergence of new occupational groups in organizations and in society. The concept offers little aid in understanding large, complex technical organizations that contain a work force increasingly composed of college-educated specialists who carry with them myths and ideologies that only pertain to independent professionals. See Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills (eds.), *Professionalization* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. v–ix.

[6] James A. Davis, *Great Aspirations* (National Opinion Research Center Report No. 90, March, 1963), p. 283.

[7] George Strauss, "Professionalism and Occupational Associations," *Industrial Relations*, II (1963), 7–31. See especially pp. 8 and 9.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[9] We refer to the ladder as a professional one because it has been set up specifically to accommodate professionals. While it has been called the dual ladder by some, we feel this is not appropriate because there are already dual ladders in organizations that have both general management and functional management (e.g., engineering or marketing management).

[10] Herbert A. Shepard, "The Dual Hierarchy in Research," *Research Management*, I (1958), 179.

warding them with prestige, freedom, and job luxuries (special parking spaces, comfortable offices, secretaries, private laboratories, etc.)."[11] The connection between incentives and the professional ladder was made clear by Kornhauser: "Insofar as the traditional system of incentives in organizations prevails, motivation for a career in science or engineering will be dampened. Industry is becoming aware of this, and recently has been experimenting with "professional ladders," whereby scientists and engineers can secure advances in salary and status without taking on administrative duties. Instead of greater authority, they are rewarded with greater freedom to engage in their specialties."[12]

The professional ladder makes no pretense in the direction of increasing the authority of title-holders. It is based on the same assumptions that support an ideology of professionalism, assumptions stating that upward mobility in the power hierarchy is of no importance compared to autonomy in the practice of one's special competence and that success for the professional is independent of such mobility.

These assumptions are incorrect when applied to most engineers.[13] And it is primarily for engineers that the professional ladder has been instituted. Engineers generally enter industry with non-professional goals. The goals of recent engineering graduates are oriented toward entrance into positions of power and participation in the affairs of the organization rather than simply the practice of their original specialties. From the start of their business careers many engineers have personal goals that coincide with the business goals of the corporation (see Table 1).[14] These data indicate that most of the engineers in our sample display few, if any, characteristics of professionals. They strongly identify with the organization and its goals, and they want to participate in decisions that affect their area. In contrast, the professional values of communication of results

TABLE 1

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT PERSONAL GOALS FOR NATIONWIDE SAMPLE OF ENGINEERING SENIORS WHO RECEIVED JOB OFFERS FROM COMPANY A

Personal Goal	Percentage Indicating Goal Is Important
Participate in decisions that set the direction of technical effort in the company	68*
Participate in decisions that affect the future business of the company	64*
Have the opportunity to help the company increase its profit	57*
Become a first-line manager in your line of work	56
Advance to a policy-making position in management	55*
Work on projects that have a direct impact on the business success of your company	47
Establish a reputation outside the company as an authority in your field	41**
Communicate your ideas to others in your profession through papers delivered at professional meetings	21
Publish articles in technical journals	20**
Be evaluated *only* on the basis of your *technical* contribution	14

Note.—Results shown above are from surveys in 1964 (N = 629) and 1965 (N = 447) and include electrical and mechanical engineers only. Items used in 1964 are asterisked. Double asterisked items represent the composite percentages for items used in both 1964 and 1965. All other items are from 1965.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

[12] Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

[13] For this discussion it is important to differentiate between scientists and engineers. Strauss, *op. cit.*, p. 22, takes note of such differences, as does Kornhauser at times. We intend to treat these differences more fully in a forthcoming publication.

[14] These data come from 1964 and 1965 anonymous opinion surveys of engineers who have received offers of employment from Company A. Those who accepted the offer of employment constitute roughly half the sample in both years. Responses to these items were given on a 0–10 scale anchored at "of no importance whatsoever" and "of utmost importance." An item checked 8, 9, 10 was scored as being an important goal for the respondent. Importance scores for the total group who rejected the employment offer correlate .98 (1964) and .95 (1965) with the scores for the total group accepting. Furthermore, similarity in percentage levels indicates no sizeable bias attributable to trying to "look good."

and of basing reputations on technical contributions seem to be of little importance.[15]

Even while they are still in engineering school they seem more business than professionally oriented. For example, 60 per cent of the seniors from a large engineering school agreed with the statement that the goal of most engineers is to become a member of management.[16] Sixty-nine per cent expressed optimism over this possibility by agreeing with the statement that, "more and more, industry is realizing that engineers make the best executives." On the other hand, only 25 per cent agreed with the statement that "a staff engineer's important work is on his own technical projects; he leaves the organization of others' efforts to management."

The replies of 205 engineering seniors who accepted a job offer from Company A[17] in 1965 further contradict the notion that engineers, as professionals, identify more with their specialty than with their company. When asked, "To what extent do you think of your job as a career in (Company A) rather than as a career in your field of specialty?" 6 per cent replied, "primarily or solely as a career in my specialty" as opposed to 41 per cent replying "primarily or solely as a career in (Company A)." (Thirty-four per cent indicated "somewhat more" as a career in the company, and 19 per cent "somewhat more" as a career in their specialty.)

From these data, it is quite clear that the professional ladder is based on erroneous notions about the goals of engineers. Perhaps this is the reason why commentators and analysts, after ten years of writing about it, still refer to the professional ladder as an experiment.[18]

WORK ACTIVITIES AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF POWER

The failure of these assumptions about engineers casts doubt on the ability of the professional ladder to fulfil its function of providing the desired incentives of increased status, increased money, and more freedom for individual research. Indeed, there have been comments about its lack of success, but these comments have focused on the ladder's inability to provide enough of the first two incentives of status and money.[19] We believe, however, that the third item of freedom or autonomy is more central to its lack of success. If we examine the possibility of such freedom it will become apparent that the professional ladder must be judged in terms of power as well as just its incentive value.

Professionalism is commonly defined as having the four ingredients of (1) specialized competence, (2) autonomy in exercising the competence, (3) commitment to a career in this competence, and (4) in-

[15] For recent similar evidence from a large national sample of employed engineers see: William K. LeBold, Robert Perrucci, and Warren Howland, "The Engineer in Industry and Government," *Journal of Engineering Education*, LVI, No. 7 (March, 1966), 237–73.

[16] From an unpublished study by R. R. Ritti of Purdue University engineers in 1957. See Harold L. Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?" *American Journal of Sociology*, LXX (September, 1964), 137–58 for a discussion of the role of the training school in the process of the professionalization of a specialty. We would expect seniors about to graduate from the professionalizing institution to best exhibit the professional value system. Wilensky's data indicate engineers to be the least professionally oriented of the groups he considers.

[17] Company A is a large electronics company employing engineers who work on the development of electrical and electronic systems as well as on the mechanical components that serve these systems. The resulting systems can be classified as "highly engineered" and require large project groups. Approximately 3 per cent of the engineers have Ph.D.'s, 23 per cent have a master's degree, and 63 per cent have a bachelor's degree. Ten per cent are classified as "professionals" through experience.

[18] John J. Beer and W. David Lewis, "Aspects of Professionalization of Science," *Daedalus*, XCII (1963), 776; Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

[19] Schoner and Harrell, *op. cit.*, p. 57; Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 146. Shepard, *op. cit.*, p. 184, in listing the weaknesses of the dual ladder mentions power but does not develop his argument further.

fluence and responsibility in the use of the special competence.[20] The professional ladder only partially meets these requirements. It does provide a career solely within the specialty, but it fails to provide the autonomy considered so important—except in a few isolated cases where the nature of the work makes autonomy possible for a few individuals. And by definition the professional ladder fails to provide the influence and responsibility that is part of professionalism.

If progress up the professional ladder is supposed to include greater freedom over what one does, it becomes crucial to inquire whether the work can be done by an *individual*. If so, that individual can be rewarded by letting him spend all or a significant part of his time on work of his own choosing—with the hope that there might be a payoff for the employing organization. However, if the work can only be done in co-operation with others, or if one person can only do part of a project, then a need for some co-ordinated group effort remains. And if this is so, then the larger freedom, freedom to set the course of work activities, can be had only by project groups—not by individuals in those groups. In fact, freedom to pursue individual work may simply mean withdrawal from the crucial work of the field.

But the professional ladder was never meant to provide this freedom for professional *groups*—only for individuals. It is a mechanism to satisfy the personal goals of individual professionals within the constraints of their containing organizations. It is most definitely not a mechanism to reduce strains resulting from conflict between organizations and the *profession as an institution*. In any particular case, then, a number of questions must be asked about the actual work—whether it can be done in isolation, done with resources also used by others, done with resources not obtainable on one's own, or done with others.

A consideration of whether or not solo work is possible also leads us to question some of the assumptions about freedom as a source of strain between professionals and the organization. For example, Kornhauser puts it as a prime source: "The scientific community places a very high value on its freedom from outside control, and on the autonomy of the individual scientist. The ideal form of professional control is advice and consultation among colleagues, leaving the final responsibility for professional judgment to the individual. This procedure is subject to considerable pressure from the organization."[21] The ideal of "leaving the final responsibility for professional judgment to the individual" is dependent not so much on the extent to which a group or an individual meets criteria of professionalism but on whether the work can be done alone or must be done with others. Although individual work is more possible among scientists than engineers, Kornhauser evidently considered teamwork among scientists so important that he found it necessary to discuss the differences between scientific work teams organized along functional lines and those along project lines.[22]

The bulk of the engineering carried on by large industrial employers is group effort. It is programmatic rather than individualistic. Few, if any, engineering projects can be accomplished by one man. There is a complex division of labor resulting from, among other things, the need for specialized skills and the time pressures created by market competition. In turn specialization means that individuals with different skills are required to perform complementary assignments. Complex engineering efforts can easily involve several years of effort on the part of hundreds of engineers. The ability to co-ordinate this kind of program is a premium skill, and it

[20] Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[21] William Kornhauser, "Strains and Accommodations in Industrial Research Organizations," *Minerva*, I (1962), 34.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 50–56. See also Herbert A. Shepard, "Nine Dilemmas in Industrial Research," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I (1956), 300–303.

is the program administrator who must pre-empt much of the decision-making power of individuals. Clearly, not everyone can have the powers that go with the managerial role. If the only question, then, is whether this administrator happens to be a fellow scientist or professional rather than a layman, the important distinction is not between superordinate control and colleague (peer) control but whether the control is by knowledgeable and sympathetic people.[23]

We contend that the work done in many fields commonly called professions is not done in isolation and, therefore, requires varying amounts of co-ordination. And, if this is true, then the professional ladder is not a viable alternative to having the kind of power over one's work usually associated with being a professional. More than that, as we discuss below, there are areas other than one's own immediate professional work where control is desired.

PROFESSORS AND PROFESSIONALS MISLEADING ANALOGUES

An analogy between the professional ladder and professorial rank has frequently been made as has the inference that the university setting provided the example that industry followed.[24] It is implied that those on titled ladders have the same relation to managers as do professors to university administrators. The analogy is false—it ignores consideration of power.

Questions related to power and control are crucial on the campus; professors maintain power over what is important to them. Conflicts take place over the kind of people to recruit, curriculums, socialization processes, what constitutes acceptable research, and the methodologies that are appropriate.[25] Those things that are not the sole prerogative of the academic department are frequently acted upon by committees composed of peers in other departments rather than administrators. Professors are even able to control the affairs of other groups in the university, such as students.

The professional ladder does not provide an organizational arrangement for a share of the power necessary in controlling professions and scientific disciplines. That is its major fault. Conflicting issues are as prevalent in industry as on the campus. Whenever there are scarce resources, there will be an evaluatory and an allocative process that requires control.[26] The view of a clash between the organization and the "independent" or "autonomous" professional conceals the many power struggles that take place over issues such as those cited in the preceding paragraph.

The lack of power in the professional ladder comes not so much from the lack of supervisory responsibility over others as from a lack of involvement in the decision-making and power processes of the organization. Promotions to higher positions in organizations customarily are accompanied by getting more power within the organization and getting confidential information—in brief, a change in organizational style of life.

The professional ladder leads away from desired and required power. Status and money accrue to those with power, and, hence, the ladder cannot provide enough to those who have chosen to work with things

[23] For a detailed discussion of superordinate as opposed to colleague control in research organizations see Simon Marcson, "Organization and Authority in Industrial Research," *Social Forces*, XL (1961), 72–80.

[24] Beer and Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 777.

[25] For examples see the excellent book by Warren O. Hagstrom, *The Scientific Community* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965). For an example of an academic tenure conflict involving some of these questions, see the article on the Yale Philosophy Department: *New York Times*, March 10, 1965, p. 52.

[26] This might not be true of the independent professional, but he hardly exists outside of the old prototype of the family doctor—and that is who really runs the American Medical Association. Most professionals are engaged in working with other professionals, for example, in universities, medical schools, hospitals, law firms.

rather than with people.[27] It is not, then, primarily a form of incentive demanded by those who do not desire or have not the capability to go up the normal managerial ladder with its "onerous" administrative duties. For example, one Company A engineering manager, describing his duties with some distaste, pointed to the crucial "trade-off" between power and professionalism.

MANAGER: I spend (about 50 per cent) of the time in planning, managerial problems and a lot of just plain "hand-holding."

INTERVIEWER: Which type of work do you prefer, then, the purely technical or the type of job you've just described?

MANAGER: Oh! The kind of job I've got now.

INTERVIEWER: Why is this?

MANAGER: Power! To be brutally frank, power! You see in this position I have some say in policy decisions. As a technical engineer I would have to stick strictly to design problems.[28]

The importance of power in its relation to the professional ladder is indicated by the change in the attitude of engineers from the time they enter the organization until they learn something about the world of work. Before making a choice (or having it made for them) about the route they wish to travel, they view the professional ladder as relatively attractive. Once on the ladder, they come to recognize that power is an essential ingredient of success and that the ladder does not provide it (see Tables 2 and 3).[29] Our data indicate that most beginning engineers see promotion onto the professional ladder as at least equal to a promotion onto the managerial ladder. As they advance in the company this percentage declines. While it seems reasonable that individuals would adjust their views of "where they stand" in a favorable direction, those already on the professional ladder overwhelmingly see the

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR ENGINEERING EMPLOYEES OF COMPANY A, BY HIERARCHICAL LEVEL, ON REPLIES TO THE QUESTION, "HOW DO YOU THINK MOST TECHNICAL PEOPLE VIEW A PROMOTION FROM ASSOCIATE LEVEL TO STAFF LEVEL AS COMPARED TO A PROMOTION FROM ASSOCIATE LEVEL TO (EQUIVALENT MANAGER) LEVEL?"

Level	Percentage Saying		Total	
	Promotion to Manager Is Much or Slightly Bigger	Promotions Are about the Same or Promotion to Staff Is Bigger	Per Cent	N
Professional ladder (staff level)	86	14	100	324
Preladder:				
Associate level	71	29	100	782
Entry (beginning) level	45	55	100	154

Note.—The staff level represents positions on the professional ladder that correspond on organization charts to managerial levels. The preladder levels of Associate and Entry precede promotion to either the professional or managerial ladder.

[27] Engineers may not place a high value on working with people, but they are evidently willing to do it to secure other goals. The study by Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 282–97, bears out that student engineers are less interested in working with people but that they are as interested as any in money. He did not present the alternative goal of working only with "things."

[28] For more examples of this issue see R. R. Ritti, "Engineers and Managers: A Study of Engineering Organization" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1960).

[29] These data come from a company-wide survey of engineers in Company A taken in 1964. Responses of those on the managerial ladder were almost the same (within 3 percentage points) as those on the professional ladder.

promotion they have received as being smaller than the one onto the managerial ladder. The same pattern occurs with responses to a question about the respective opportunities of the two groups to make important technical decisions. The preladder engineers see those above them on the professional ladder as having more chance to make such decisions than those on the managerial ladder. Those who have already gone onto the professional ladder see the managers as having more chance.[80]

The inadequacy of the professional ladder to provide the kinds of power required even in technical fields is indicated by 1961 questionnaire data from a small engineering research laboratory in Company B (another large electronics equipment manufacturing company). The company merged the two sides of a dual ladder into a single management hierarchy. Those who had been on the professional ladder were placed on the merged ladder just below positions that were supposed to have been equivalent to their positions on the professional ladder. Even though they got lower formal positions they were evidently pleased to be where it was possible to have power. Fifty-four per cent of them said that their goals were better served by the change, and only 15 per cent felt that they had lost ground. They now attended policy-making management meetings and shared authority and status with those in supervisory management. On the other hand, those who had been the sole occupants of the managerial ladder were much less pleased by the merger. Thirty-seven per cent of them said they had lost ground, and 25 per cent answered that their goals were better served.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR ENGINEERING EMPLOYEES OF COMPANY A, BY HIERARCHICAL LEVEL, ON REPLIES TO THE QUESTION, "TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE MANAGERIAL JOB DIFFER FROM THE EQUIVALENT STAFF PROFESSIONAL JOB IN THE CHANCE TO MAKE IMPORTANT TECHNICAL DECISIONS?"

LEVEL	PERCENTAGE SAYING		TOTAL	
	Manager Much or Slightly More Chance	About the Same or Staff More Chance	Per Cent	N
Professional ladder (staff level)	56	44	100	332
Preladder:				
Associate level	42	58	100	792
Entry (beginning) level	33	67	100	161

The relevance of power to even the technically oriented engineer is shown by the very favorable responses to the new arrangement by those in Company B's laboratory who were most concerned with technical expertise. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that the more importance one accorded to being a technical authority and the higher one rated himself in technical ability, the more he thought his goals were better served by the change away from a professional-ladder structure.

PROFESSIONALISM AND DEFINITIONS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

What, then, is the professional ladder all about? On the surface, it appears that the professional ladder is nothing more than an

[80] Another indication of lack of influence in professional positions is the fact that propensity toward union membership increases with length of time in the company. See James W. Kuhn, "Success and Failure in Organizing Professional Engineers," *IRRA Proceedings* (December, 1963), pp. 200–201.

attempt by management to cool out[81] those who have not made it into management—an attempt to maintain the commitment of those who can no longer retain normal organizational aspirations. And those organizations whose work consists of mental performance are dependent on retaining the commitment of employees—a commitment that might be lost if employees do not achieve expected successes.

But this is too simple a description of the processes we have been discussing. It is not just a process of cooling out those who do not reach a goal but is an attempt to make alternative goals viable. Employees who might otherwise be considered failures by other organizational members are provided with alternative definitions of success.[82] Also, anxiety caused by the disjunction between goal and opportunity is alleviated by reducing or changing the goals. Sociologists have long been concerned with deviance that arises from the failure to achieve success in a society.[83] In organizations, however, the structure of success is different—

[81] Erving Goffman, "On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Adaptions to Failure," *Psychiatry*, XV (1952), 451-63.

[82] The power of ambiguity to confuse definitions of failure is indicated in Fred H. Goldner, "Demotion in Industrial Management," *American Sociological Review*, XXX (1965), 714-24.

[83] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), chap. iv.




FIG. 1.—Relationship of attitudes toward the merging of professional and managerial ladders to relative self-rating of technical ability. Attitudes were indicated by answers to the question, "With respect to your personal goals, do you feel that the new organizational structure will make much difference?" Respondents rated themselves on a percentile scale of technical ability relative to others of similar age and training. These ratings have been combined into three approximately equal groups around the average of the ratings.

for unlike society—an organization can deliberately create new definitions of success.[84]

Instead of dealing with various adaptations to failure, we are discussing a process whereby situations that have formerly been defined as failures are redefined as success experiences. This is accomplished by creating new sets of expectations so that there will be no need for a cooling-out process.[85] It has become not an "after-the-fact" adjustment but a "before-the-fact" one.

Definitions of success and failure vary by society, as well as by reference groups within societies.[86] One of the most persistent themes in the literature on professionals in organizations deals with the claim that scientists, engineers, or other technical specialists are "usually more concerned about securing recognition from their professional colleagues than from the company where they happen to be working."[87] But this is

[84] This is of course an overstatement. As societies do this, they become more like organizations.

[85] For examples of prior adaption processes see Goldner, *op. cit.*

[86] For example, see Samuel A. Stouffer, Edward A. Suchman, Leland C. De Vinney, Shirley A. Star, and Robin M. Williams, Jr., *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life* ("Studies in Social Psychology during World War II," Vol. I [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949]).

[87] Schoner and Harrell, *op. cit.*, p. 53. For a fuller account of the claim about the importance of colleague recognition see Simon Marcson, *The Scientist in American Industry* (Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Report No. 99, 1960), chap. vi.




FIG. 2.—Relationship of attitudes toward the merging of professional and managerial ladders to importance of being an authority in a technical field. Percentages based on answers to same question as in Figure 1.

not at all inconsistent with movement into management being defined as "success." If most of the "good" people (defined in terms of competence in the specialty) do, in fact, move up and the "bad" ones are left behind, then moving up or staying behind will be defined by specialist groups as success or failure as they are defined by those in the rest of the organization.

Those who are thoroughly professionalized before entrance into the organization are likely to have established notions of success and failure as related to the practice of their specialized competence. However, undergraduate and graduate engineering schools do not provide such specific definitions of success and failure in technical-engineering endeavors. Instead, success is characterized by most engineering students (even at the graduate level) in such general terms as advancement, getting ahead in the organization—getting into "management."[38] The definitions of success, in a professional sense, must thus emerge from the organizational context in which engineers find themselves. Without a firm prior definition they will be influenced by their current peers. The professional ladder is thus one way of attempting to redefine success for a whole group so that the new definition will be accepted by any individual who uses this specialist group as his reference group.

The professional ladder is an attempt to provide engineers with a new set of expectations about their future careers—expectations that will serve as acceptable alternatives to the possession of power. It is at least partially successful in this respect, because engineers are specialists who are generally acknowledged as professionals. But the professional ladder is increasingly held out to other groups of specialists and thus operates as a force for professionalization.

[38] H. S. Becker and J. Carper, "Identification with an Occupation," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (1956), 341–48. More recently see Walter Barlow, "Discontent among Engineers," *Journal of College Placement*, XXV (1965), 24, 25, 72, 74, 76.

THE CREATION OF THE "PROFESSIONAL": FROM ABOVE

Management may attempt to thrust the definition of "professional" upon a group in order to turn failure into success. The use of the professional ladder has not been confined to scientists and engineers. Organizations have used these ladders in an attempt to professionalize other occupational groups. The logic runs something like this. (1) If organizations have to provide success experiences to serve as incentives to employees, then the organizations must be prepared to handle a number of failures. (2) In order to serve as an incentive, success must be distinguished from something —from failure. (3) One of the ways of dealing with failure is to try to provide alternative modes of success that might appeal to those who have not succeeded along conventional lines. As one Company A sales manager put it:[39] "We have to cultivate in the company the idea that there is a future for those who don't make management. In the 1950's we hired on the notion that if you don't make management, you are a failure. This has to be reversed."

This organization has attempted to create the notion of "professional salesmen" in order to maintain the effectiveness of older salesmen[40] who have not made it onto the managerial ladder. In an organization where there is a heavy emphasis on rising into management (as indicated in the above quotation), those who do not rise become labeled, in time, as failures. In order to forestall subsequent self-identification as a failure, the organization will try to provide alternative definitions that have some currency in society. Identification as a "professional" is a ready-made alternative. As a sales manager said: "I have a

[39] Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all managers and salesmen referred to or quoted are from Company A.

[40] Older salesmen in this case were frequently those in their late thirties who were operationally defined as older because they no longer were looked at as candidates for promotion and had been in the business about fifteen years.

guy who was [one of the top salesmen in the company] and everybody says, how can we get him promoted? He says he wants it but I can talk of professional salesmen and convince him the other way."

There are many salesmen who prefer to remain salesmen because of the nature of the work, the lack of responsibility, and the good pay but who buckle under the pressure of being labeled as failures because they did not pursue the more generally preferred management career. They get lumped together with those who wanted to but could not move up. And both of these groups find themselves thrown together with much younger and less experienced men who have not yet exhausted the possibility of moving into management.

The company has attempted to solve this problem by creating a professional ladder for salesmen with appropriate titles, status symbols, and special territories. They have attempted to create enough differences between these salesmen and the younger ones to reduce the stigma of failure to become a manager. The need was acknowledged by one manager because: "We need Indians. I have thirteen salesmen and four are promotable [into management]. It is a good percentage. We need professional salesmen." *This last sentence was an equating of "professional" with those who failed to move up into management.*

This same technique was used in this company with another occupational group —those who repair and maintain the company's products in the customer's office. It was called a "career program." One executive even maintained that the new position levels were not the creation of the company but a direct result of the achievements of the technicians themselves.

THE CREATION OF THE "PROFESSIONAL": FROM BELOW

We do not maintain that all attempts to professionalize specialist groups are initiated from above. We acknowledge that many individuals identify themselves as professionals prior to their entrance into an organization and that they may desire no other role. In addition, many employees attempt to become professionals—not only by joining an established profession but by professionalizing their own occupation.[41]

It has been pointed out in another study[42] that an attempt to professionalize an occupation was one of the reactions to blocked mobility even among those already in management. Thus, a safety director of Rock Product Corporation was quoted: "Mobility possibilities can be limiting. It's not a real deterrent. Safety is a real profession as good as any of them. We can't all be chiefs. . . . I have lots of contacts with other companies. I belong to two societies and also panels, and community organizations."[43]

This professional identification sustains many in a position of blocked mobility by providing them both with a reason for their lack of mobility and an alternative chance to advance within their "profession"—on a plateau within the management organization. This same kind of reaction was reported by Peter Blau, who found that "the system that prevents civil servants from deriving satisfaction from hopes of spectacular advancements probably also constrains them to find gratification in their work and thus invites a professional attitude toward it."[44]

If blocked mobility leads to attempts to become professionalized, there may be some who see the causal relationship going in the opposite direction. For example, managers in the Rock Product's labor-relations de-

[41] There is a good deal that has been written about occupational groups—outside of organizational contexts—attempting to become professionalized. For one of the more recent and better studies see Wilensky, *op. cit.*

[42] Fred H. Goldner, "Industrial Relations and the Organization of Management" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1961).

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 206–7.

[44] Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 258.

partment not only rejected a professional identity but also rejected attempts to have it thrust upon them. They made it a big point to proclaim that one could not prepare for this kind of job through formal schooling.[45] This group, unlike those in safety and other areas of personnel, already had power within the organization and had aspirations of moving into general management. As they approached the top of their specialist hierarchy, they entertained notions of moving into whatever would afford further opportunities of promotion. To be identified as part of a "profession" would preclude concurrent identification as general management. Their rejection of professionalization was an attempt to prevent part of a dual ladder from being identified as a professional ladder. *From this perspective we again see professionalization identified as synonymous with immobility.*

Professionalization pressure from below has also come from the salesmen discussed above. It comes not only from the immediate fact of their blocked mobility but also from the way this blockage structures their relations with customers. Permanent salesmen evidently become more attached to the customer relationship than to the relationship with those above them in the organization. Salesmen become more dependent on their customers than on their bosses when they forsake promotion into management. They frequently take the customer's point of view. They see him as a client, and the more specialized and complicated the product they sell the more they must develop a service relationship with the customer. They feel they are involved in a professional-client relationship. As one put it: "I look upon it [selling] as a service we are doing to an individual that will be of value to him. I feel as though we are more or less professional in filling the need we may create for an individual. We speak with people who are on the management level most of the time and aren't trying to con people but doing them a service. There are times we actually don't recommend our equipment—that is professionalism."

[45] Goldner, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Our studies of engineers and salesmen, and observations of other kinds of work, indicate that, although in a "real" profession (one that meets the original criterions of a profession) positions on a professional ladder may indicate success, the use of such positions in a "profession" imbedded in the context of a larger non-professional organization is an indication of failure.[46]

The established professional within an organization does not covet the professional ladder—it offers him little; he already has status in the wider society, and the ladder leads away from power. The employee in a specialty occupation, blocked from further promotion, seeks professionalism and the professional ladder to gain status. At this stage, he not only is without power but is in no position to aspire to it.

The strain between organizations and the new professions has been misunderstood as one of obtaining traditional professional rewards such as autonomy and not wanting administrative or supervisory duties. The conflict between superordinate and collegiate authority is *real*, but there has been confusion about it. The professional ladder was never an answer to that problem. Professionalization continues apace, but the new professions within organizations are different from the autonomous professions of old.

The proliferation of specialties has resulted in a pluralistic system of contending groups. And that struggle is not simply between a professional group and the "organi-

[46] While his imagery is somewhat obsolete technologically, Hughes makes the point well. "In a considerable number of professions the basic techniques and intellectual skills are becoming something one learns as a condition of getting on the ladder of mobility. The engineer who, at 40, can still use a slide rule or logarithmic table, and make a true drawing, is a failure." (Everett C. Hughes, *Men and Their Work* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958], p. 137).

zation"; it is between that professional group and other groups in the organization.

The use of the term "professional" says too much and not enough. The term has lost much of its meaning because of the proliferation of meanings. If we cannot use it except in its pure form, then some new terms are necessary. We can use the concept of professionalization to understand the processes at work and to examine changes that have occurred in organizational form. But this is not enough. We need new concepts to describe what is and has been emerging from the process of professionalization. But what new terms, and to describe what? Many have used the term "profession" as synonymous with staff. That really obscures the issues. We will have to start by asking what, in fact, is *management* as opposed to *professional?* The term "management" itself has also lost much of its meaning. It includes more than those who supervise others, for it must include those involved in actively allocating the resources of the company and involved in the decision-making process.

In summary then, the professional ladder has been used as a means of providing an alternative definition of success in order to prevent an otherwise failure from opting out of the system. However, it has not really provided the status and money of "equivalent" managerial positions. It does not provide these because it does not provide the power to allocate limited resources or to pursue alternative goals, and this power is intrinsic to traditional prestigious and successful professional performance.

The very existence of the professional ladder is evidence that those in power—top management—define the "professional" as a person who cannot be moved up the main ladder. Recognition of the same definition can be seen in efforts to professionalize work—initiated, not from above, but from below by people who are blocked in any further mobility up the management ladder.

But professional ladders remain and are still being constructed because the problem is still an emergent one. The proliferation of new functions and the development of entire work forces composed of highly trained specialists (all college educated) have taken most of the meaning from our old definition of management as simply one of supervision. The professional ladder is not an answer to these new problems, but it is part of the adaptive process. We are on our way to radically different organizations.[47] The uncritical use of the old concept of profession or even the use of the concept of professionalization, can only obscure the process.

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[47] Questions of the relationship between new organizational forms and professionalism have been raised in Wilensky, *op. cit.*, pp. 157–58.

Program Change and Organizational Properties

A Comparative Analysis[1]

Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken

ABSTRACT

Empirical indicators of the organizational properties of complexity, centralization, formalization, and morale are developed and related to the rate of adoption of new programs and services in sixteen social welfare organizations. Specifically, a high degree of participation in agency-wide decisions, a low degree of job codification, and a high degree of job satisfaction are found to be most highly associated with a high rate of program change. Measures of staff attitudes toward change are found to be only weakly and inversely related to the rate of innovation of new programs and techniques. The relationships between organizational properties and rate of program change largely remained when size, auspices, age of organization, and function were controlled. The distinction between rate of program change and changes in decision making, job codification, and job satisfaction allows us to discuss changes within a system and changes of a system of organizational properties.

A major problem in the study of organizations is the analysis of organizational change. One of the difficulties in studying change is the determination of an adequate definition of organizational change.[2] Etzioni has suggested that most organizational studies implicitly, if not explicitly, involve the study of change of some variable or property.[3] This difficulty has been labeled by Parsons as the problem of change within a system as opposed to change of the system.[4] The difficulty lies in determining which kind of change results in a change of the organizational system. New techniques may be adopted, new models may be tried, and new rules and policies may be formulated; yet these are changes that do not necessarily imply fundamental changes in the organizational system. We shall offer a tentative solution to this problem by limiting our analysis to one kind of change within the system—the adoption of new programs or services. This kind of change appears to be an important one albeit not the only kind because it can imply changes in techniques, rules, or even goals. We are interested in studying the relationship between different organizational properties and the rate of program change, and we assume that the rate of program change, as well as other organizational properties, can be conceived most advantageously as variables in a system. We assume that a change in one variable leads to a change in other variables. If different rates of program change are

[1] This investigation was supported, in part, by a research grant from the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C. We are deeply indebted to Professor Harry Sharp and the Wisconsin Survey Laboratory for their helpful suggestions and assistance in the preparation and execution of the interviewing involved in this study and to the University of Wisconsin Computing Center and the National Science Foundation for their research support. We are also grateful to Keith Warner for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. A special note of thanks is given to M. Garcon for his assistance in the final revision of this paper.

[2] See Jerald Hage, "Organizational Response to Innovation" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1963), chap. iii, for a discussion of several different kinds of change.

[3] Amitai Etzioni (ed.), in Introduction to section on "Organizational Change," *Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961), pp. 341–43.

[4] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), chap. xii.

related to different configurations on other organizational properties, then we can speak of different systems. This is our approach to the problem of studying organizational change.

In our study, we have measured the rate of program change in sixteen organizations over a five-year period.[5] This rate is then related to other organizational properties, for example, job satisfaction, codification of rules, decision making, which are measured cross-sectionally, not longitudinally. While this prevents our making any statements about cause and effect, it does allow us to examine how different rates of program change are associated with various organizational properties.

To this end, we studied sixteen social welfare organizations staffed largely by professionally trained personnel. These organizations provide a particularly interesting testing ground for hypotheses relating rate of program change to other organizational properties, since the organizations provide services for the physically handicaped, emotionally disturbed, or mentally retarded. It might be assumed that each agency would attempt to add as many new programs as resources allow, but this was not the case. Some welfare organizations were primarily concerned with the quantity of client service. Given additional financial resources, these organizations would probably either reduce the case load of staff members or increase the number of clients serviced. For example, a county children's welfare department had added only one new program in the previous five years and had no plans for future changes. This agency was primarily concerned with reducing the case loads of its social workers. The rationale was not to improve the quality of service but, rather, to reduce turnover among its social workers, since the case load was unusually high in this agency, well beyond typical limits. Similarly, the head of a private home for emotionally disturbed children reported that no new programs had been added in his agency in the previous five years. In contrast, some welfare organizations were primarily concerned with the quality of client service. These organizations would probably use additional financial resources to add new programs or techniques. A county mental hospital, the organization in our study with the highest rate of program change, had added eight new programs in the past five years, including a sheltered workshop, a training program in group therapy for the attendants, and a placement service. In addition, there were already plans afoot for future changes. Similarly, a private home for emotionally disturbed boys had added six new programs in the last five years and had plans for still more. One of the greatest concerns in this organization was that the case load might increase, since the agency head felt that the major emphasis should be placed on improving the quality rather than the quantity of client service. The contrasting policies of these organizations cut across the different kinds of goals and are reflected in the varying rates of program change among the sixteen organizations. The rate of program change by type of organization is shown in Table 1. While rehabilitation centers have the greatest incidence of program change, and social casework agencies the least, there are still considerable variations among these categories of organizations that ostensibly have similar goals. Furthermore, the crucial question is whether a rehabilitation center with a low rate of program change has organizational characteristics that are similar to a social case-

[5] Executive directors were asked: "How many new programs or services have you added in the last five years?" In many cases the new programs did not involve the addition of new personnel or new funds but, instead, represented reallocation of existing resources. The question used a standard interval of time so that the rate could be expressed as a number. It might also be noted that the choice of an interval of time is not an easy one. We selected an interval of five years as a minimum because any shorter period is too likely to be subjected to random or episodic fluctuations.

work agency with a low rate of program change.

The assumption of an organization as a system implies that certain organizational configurations are most likely to be associated with a high rate of program change. This also implies that if a high rate of program change occurs in an organization, it is likely to bring about changes in the working conditions of the organization.[6] Our data are not longitudinal, and thus it becomes impossible to stipulate any cause or effect relationships.[7] That is, we are unable to stipulate if program change brings about alternatives in other organizational properties or if new programs are introduced because of the presence of some other organizational characteristics. While our study is framed in the latter sense, this is simply for the convenience of the presentation of our findings. We would like to know organizational scores at both the beginning and end of the five-year period to unravel this problem, but unfortunately we only know organizational characteristics at the *end* of the five-year period.

Our purpose in this paper, then, is to relate the organizational characteristics of complexity, centralization, formalization, and job satisfaction to the rate of program change. We hypothesize that the rate of program change is positively related to the degree of complexity and job satisfaction, and negatively related to the degree of centralization and formalization.[8] The rationale for each hypothesis is discussed below as the data are examined.

TABLE 1

AVERAGE NUMBER OF PROGRAM CHANGES BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

Type of Organization	Number of Organizations	Average Number of Program Changes	Range
Rehabilitation centers.....	3	4.67	3–6
Hospitals..................	3	4.67	3–8
Special education department—public schools ...	1	4.00	4
Homes for emotionally disturbed.............	3	2.67	0–6
Social casework agencies ..	6	1 33	0–3

STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The data upon which this study is based were gathered in sixteen social welfare agencies located in a large midwest metropolis in 1964. Ten agencies were private; six were either public or branches of public agencies. These agencies were all the larger welfare organizations that provide rehabilitation, psychiatric services, and services for the mentally retarded as defined by the directory of the Community Chest. The agencies vary in size from twelve to several hundred. Interviews were conducted with 314 staff members of these sixteen organizations. Respondents within each organization were selected by the following criteria: (*a*) all executive directors and department heads; (*b*) in departments of less than ten members, one-half of the staff was

[6] In other words, all hypotheses are reversible; see Hans Zetterberg, *On Theory and Verification in Sociology* (rev. ed.; Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1963), p. 11.

[7] We are presently engaged in the second logical step of research, namely, the attempt to predict the future rate of program change on the basis of organizational properties measured prior in time.

[8] For a discussion of why these properties should be related as hypothesized, see Jerald Hage, "An Axiomatic Theory of Organization," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, X (December, 1965), 289–321.

selected randomly; (*c*) in departments of more than ten members, one-third of the staff was selected randomly. Non-supervisory administrative and maintenance personnel were not interviewed.

This sampling procedure divides the organization into levels and departments. Job occupants in the upper levels were selected because they are most likely to be key decision makers and to determine organizational policy, whereas job occupants in the lower levels were selected randomly. The different ratios within departments insured that smaller departments were adequately represented. Professionals, such as psychiatrists, social workers, rehabilitation counselors, etc., are included because they are intimately involved in the achievement of organizational goals and are likely to have organizational power. Non-professionals, such as attendants, janitors, and secretaries are excluded because they are less directly involved in the achievement of organizational goals and have little or no power. The number of interviews varied from seven in the smallest to forty-one in one of the larger agencies.

It should be stressed that in this study the units of analysis are organizations, not individuals in the organizations. Information obtained from respondents was pooled to reflect properties of the sixteen organizations, and these properties are then related to one another.[9] Aggregating individual data in this way presents methodological problems for which there are yet no satisfactory solutions. For example, if all respondents are equally weighted, undue weight is given to respondents lower in the hierarchy. Yet those higher in the chain of command, not those lower in the chain of command, are most likely to make the decisions which give an agency its ethos.[10]

We attempt to compensate for this by computing an organizational score from the means of social position within the agency. A social position is defined by the level or stratum in the organization and the department or type of professional activity. For example, if an agency's professional staff consists of psychiatrists and social workers, each divided into two hierarchal levels, the agency has four social positions: supervisory psychiatrists, psychiatrists, supervisory social workers, and social workers. A mean was then computed for each social position in the agency. The organizational score for a given variable was determined by computing the average of all social position means in the agency.[11]

The procedure for computing organizational scores parallels the method utilized in selecting respondents. It attempts to represent organizational life more accurately by not giving disproportionate weight to those social positions that have little power and that are little involved in the achievement of organizational goals.

[9] A very common error in statistical analysis is the failure to realize that assumptions must be made not only about the unit of analysis, usually the individual, but also about the time and place. Few studies systematically examine these three factors together, yet each is important. Most studies should be qualified with reference to a specific time and place.

[10] For a discussion of some of the basic differences between individual and collective properties, see Paul Lazarsfeld and Herbert Menzel, "On Individual and Collective Properties," in Etzioni (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 422–40; and James S. Coleman, "Research Chronicle: The Adolescent Society," in Phillip E. Hammond (ed.), *Sociologists at Work* (New York: Basic Books, 1964).

[11] One advantage of this procedure is that it allows for the cancellation of individual errors made by the job occupants of a particular position. It also allows for the elimination of certain idiosyncratic elements that result from the special privileges a particular occupant might have received as a consequence.

An alternative procedure for computing organizational means is to weigh all respondents equally. These two procedures yield strikingly similar results for the variables reported in this paper. The product moment correlation coefficients between the scores based on these two computational procedures were as follows for the variables indicated:

Hierarchy of authority	.70
Actual participation in decision making	.90
Job codification	.68
Rule observation	.88
Job satisfaction	.89
Satisfaction with expressive relations	.88
Professional training	.90
Professional activity	.87
Index of self-interest and non-change	.87
Index of values and pro-change	.74

Computation of means for each social position has the advantage of avoiding the potential problem created by the use of different sampling ratios. In effect, responses are standardized by organizational location—level and department—and then combined into an organizational score. Computation of means of social position also has a major theoretical advantage in that it focuses on the sociological perspective of organizational reality. We consider an organization to be a collection of social positions which we call jobs, not simply an aggregate of individuals. Ideally, sociological properties are more than a summation of psychological properties. We feel that our computation procedures are, hopefully, more consistent with a "sociological imagination."

ORGANIZATIONAL PROPERTIES AND RATE OF PROGRAM CHANGE

Following the work of Pugh *et al.*, we find it useful to make a distinction between structural variables and performance variables as two special kinds of organizational properties.[12] The former refers to the arrangements of positions or jobs within the organization, for example, the utilization of different professional specialties or the degree of complexity, the distribution of power or the degree of centralization, the utilization of rules or the degree of formalization. The latter refers to the outcomes of the arrangements of positions, for example, the rate of program change, the degree of job satisfaction, the volume of production. In addition we examine a personality characteristic of the individuals who work in the organization, namely, their attitudes toward change. Since we are interested in rates of program change, it is entirely possible that this is affected not only by the structural and performance characteristics of the organization but also by the general orientations of the individual members. Admittedly these are not the only distinctions that can be made, but they provide a useful framework for distinguishing among major kinds of variables, helping to isolate the characteristics that are part of the system.

STRUCTURAL VARIABLES: THE DEGREE OF COMPLEXITY

Since the publication of the English translation of Durkheim's *The Division of Labor*, the degree of complexity, or specialization, has been a key concept in the organizational literature.[13] Yet, this variable has seldom been systematically related to other organizational properties. For our purposes, we define organizational complexity with three alternative empirical indicators: occupational specialties, the length of training required by each occupation, and the degree of professional activity associated with each occupation. The greater the number of specialties, the greater the length of training required by each occupation; and the greater the degree of professional activity, the more complex the organizational structure. The term "specialization" has frequently been used to describe both this phenomenon and the minute parceling of work such as that of an assembly line where training of job occupants is minimized. From our perspective, the latter is the opposite of complexity. In order to avoid terminological confusion, we prefer to use the word "complexity" to refer to the former phenomenon, since we feel that this is more consistent with Durkheim's usage of the term.[14]

A recently published axiomatic theory hypothesizes a direct relationship between complexity and the rate of program change.[15] There are several reasons why these two properties should be related in this way. The addition of new programs

[12] D. S. Pugh *et al.*, "A Scheme for Organizational Analysis," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VIII (1963), 289–316.

[13] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1933), Part I; also Preface to 2d ed.

[14] See Victor Thompson, *Modern Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1964), chap. iii.

[15] See Hage, "An Axiomatic Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 303.

frequently necessitates the addition of new occupations. Job occupants of such occupational specialties often have a particular organizational perspective which leads to the introduction of still other new programs. Further, the professional activities of job staff members function as communications links between the organization and its competitors, providing a source of information about new ideas and techniques. In addition, conflicts among the different occupational specialties in an organization act as a further dynamic force for the creation of new programs. The more professionalized the occupations, the greater the struggle to prove the need for expansion.[16]

In our interviews with staff members of organizations, each respondent was asked to describe the nature of his duties, the extent of his training, and the amount of his professional activity. Just as the number of jobs reflects the complexity of the organization, it was our belief that the more the training required, the more the probable complexity of the job itself, so that this needed to be considered as well. Furthermore, the more the professional activity of the job occupants, the more likely there would be continued increases in the complexity of the job. On the basis of the respondents' answers to our questions, three indicators of organizational complexity were computed. The first indicator is the number of occupational specialties, which was measured by counting the numbers of different kinds of work that exist in an agency. There is a correlation of .48 between the number of occupational specialties and the rate of program change. A variety of occupational perspectives is associated with a higher rate of change.

We have already stated that we are unable to determine causation because our data are taken at one point of time. Since occupational specialties more than any of our other variables can be closely linked to the programs that are added, we reconstructed the number of occupational specialties that existed in each organization prior to 1959, the beginning of the five-year period we used for measuring the rate of program change. While the number of occupational specialties was altered in several organizations, the correlation between these two properties remained virtually unchanged ($r = .45$).[17]

The amount of professional training is another indicator of the complexity of organizations. This was measured by computing an index reflecting the degree of formal training and other professional training for each social position in the organization.[18] As can be seen from Table 1, there is a weak but positive correlation between the organization score of professional training and the rate of program change ($r = .14$). Thus the amount of professional training in an organization is positively associated with the rate of program change.

To measure the extent of the extra-organizational professional activity of members of each organization, the respondents were asked to report the number of professional associations to which they belonged, the proportion of meetings attended, the number of papers given, and offices held, all of which represent profes-

[16] Durkheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 267–70.

[17] It should be noted that our count of occupational specialties is not based on the number of specific job titles. Instead, each respondent was asked what he did and then this was coded according to the kind of professional activity and whether it was a specialty. This procedure was used for two reasons. First, it allows for comparability across organizations. Second, it avoids the problem of task specialization where one activity might be divided into many specific and separate tasks (see Thompson, *op. cit.*).

[18] The index was scored as follows: (*a*) An absence of training beyond a college degree and the absence of other professional training received a score of 0; (*b*) an absence of training beyond college degree and the presence of other professional training received a score of 1; (*c*) a presence of training beyond a college degree and the absence of other professional training received a score of 2; (*d*) a presence of training beyond a college degree and the presence of other professional training received a score of 3.

sional involvement.[19] The higher this score, that is, the greater the extra-organizational professional activities of members of the organization, the more likely it was to have a high rate of program change, as shown in Table 2 ($r = .37$). It should be noted that the amount of professional involvement is more highly related to program change than the amount of professional training.

Involvement in extra-organizational professional activities evidently heightens awareness of programmatic and technological developments within a profession.[20] Professionally active job occupants introduce new ideas into the organization, and the outcome is a high rate of program change. Similarly, new programs require the addition of new job occupants who are highly trained. A plausible line of reasoning is that greater extra-organizational professional activity implies a greater emphasis on the improvement of the quality of client service, whether the clients are emotionally disturbed or mentally retarded. Such an emphasis requires a continual application

[19] The index of professional activity, which ranged from 0 to 3 points, was computed as follows: (*a*) 1 point for belonging to a professional organization; (*b*) 1 point for attending at least two-thirds of the previous six meetings of any professional organization; (*c*) 1 point for the presentation of a paper or holding an office in any professional organization.

[20] See Victor Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* X (June, 1965), 10–13.

TABLE 2

RATE OF PROGRAM CHANGE AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL PROPERTIES

	Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients of Each Organizational Characteristic with Rate of Program Change*
Structural variables:	
1. Degree of complexity:	
a) Measure of the number of occupational specialties	.48
b) Measure of the amount of extra-organizational professional activity	.37
c) Measure of the amount of professional training	.14
2. Degree of centralization:	
a) Measure of the degree of participation in organizational decision making	.49
b) Measure of hierarchy of authority	−.09
3. Degree of formalization:	
a) Measure of the degree of job codification	−.47
b) Measure of the degree of rule observation	.13
Performance variables:	
1. Degree of satisfaction:	
a) Measure of job satisfaction	.38
b) Measure of expressive satisfaction	−.17
Personality variables:	
1. Motive of self-interest and negative attitudes toward change	−.04
2. Motive of values and positive attitudes toward change	−.15

* The measures of association reported here are Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. The units of analysis in this report are the sixteen organizations in our study, not our 314 individual respondents. Product-moment correlation coefficients are highly sensitive to even slight modifications of numerical scores with so few cases. We rejected the use of non-parametric measures of association because our scales are lineal and not ordinal; non-parametric statistics necessitate our "throwing away" some of the magnitude of variations in our data. Since these sixteen organizations represent a universe of organization, tests of statistical significance are inappropriate.

of new knowledge, whether reflected in new programs or in new techniques. The number of occupational specialties and the amount of extra-organizational professional activity were themselves related; the correlation coefficient was .29. The sheer presence of different occupational perspectives, implying the idea of occupational conflict, appears to heighten professional involvement, as was sugested by Durkheim.[21]

STRUCTURAL VARIABLES: THE DEGREE OF CENTRALIZATION

There are many debates in the organizational literature about the relative merits of centralization as opposed to decentralization of decision making. On the one hand, Weber argued that strict hierarchy of authority increased both the volume of production and the efficiency of an organization.[22] On the other hand, the human relations specialists have argued that decentralization increases job satisfaction and reduces resistance to change.[23] Both arguments are probably correct.

In our study the staff members were asked how often they participated in organizational decisions regarding the hiring of personnel, the promotions of personnel, the adoption of new organizational policies, and the adoption of new programs or services.[24] The organizational score was based on the average degree of participation in these four areas of decision making. As can be seen from Table 2, the greater the participation in agency-wide decisions, the greater the rate of program change in the organization ($r = .49$). Decentralization allows for the interplay of a variety of occupational perspectives. As Thompson has suggested, a centralized organization is one in which change can be, and frequently is, easily vetoed.[25]

Agency-wide decisions are not the only kind that are made. Other decisions are those concerning the performance of a specific job. Agency-wide decisions are basically decisions about the control of resources, while job decisions are basically decisions about the control of work. It is at least logically possible that the centralization of the former kind of decision making can be associated with the decentralization of the latter kind of decision making. We measure the degree of decision making about work with a scale called the "hierarchy of authority."[26] This scale

[21] Durkheim, *op. cit.*; although he was discussing the characteristics of city life, the argument is that much more compelling in the context of an organization where interaction is facilitated.

[22] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. Henderson and Parsons (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), pp. 334–40.

[23] The classic study is, of course, Lester Coch and John French, Jr., "Overcoming Resistance to Change," *Human Relations*, I (1948), 512–32. For a review of the literature and organizational experiments reflecting this dilemma between satisfaction and production, see Nancy Morse and Everett Reimer, "The Experimental Change of a Major Organizational Variable," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LII (1955), 120–29.

[24] The index of actual participation in decision making was based on the following four questions: (1) How frequently do you usually participate in the decision to hire new staff? (2) How frequently do you usually participate in the decisions on the promotion of any of the professional staff? (3) How frequently do you participate in decisions on the adoption of new policies? (4) How frequently do you participate in the decisions on the adoption of new programs? Respondents were assigned numerical scores from 1 (low participation) to 5 (high participation), depending on whether they answered "never," "seldom," "sometimes," "often," or "always," respectively, to these questions. An average score on these questions was computed for each respondent, and then the data were aggregated into organizational scores as described above.

[25] Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation," *op. cit.*, pp. 13–18.

[26] The empirical indicators of these concepts were derived from two scales developed by Richard Hall, namely, hierarchy of authority and rules (see his "The Concept of Bureaucracy: An Empirical Assessment," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIX [July, 1963], 32–40). The index of hierarchy of authority was computed by first averaging the replies of individual respondents to each of the following five statements: (1) There can be little action taken here until a supervisor approves a decision. (2) A person who wants to make his own decisions would be quickly discouraged here. (3) Even small matters have to be referred to some-

was found to have little relationship with the rate of program change, although it was in the predicted direction ($r = -.09$). It is the centralization of decisions about organizational resources, not the centralization of work control, that is highly related to low rates of this kind of organizational change.

STRUCTURAL VARIABLES: THE DEGREE OF FORMALIZATION

Rules or regulations are important organizational mechanisms that may be used to insure the predictability of performance. There are two aspects of the use of rules as a mechanism of social control; one is the number of regulations specifying who is to do what, where, and when; we call this the degree of job codification. Another is the diligency in enforcing these rules that specify who is doing what, where, and when; this we call rule observation. The latter is important because many organizations may not enforce all regulations. The degree of formalization is defined as both the degree of job codification as well as the degree of rule observation.

While it has been commonplace to argue that bureaucracies retard change, there have been few studies that have examined this proposition in a comparative framework. One of the essential elements of bureaucracy is its emphasis on formalization. Our hypothesis is that the two aspects of formalization outlined above retard the adoption of new programs because they discourage individual initiative.[27] Clearly codified jobs that are closely supervised to insure conformity also reduce the search for better ways of doing work. Such a use of rules encourages ritualistic and unimaginative behavior.

The two indexes of formalization were constructed on the basis of a factor analysis of scales developed by Hall.[28] At best these scales are only rough indicators of the degree of formalization in an organization. As indicated by Table 2, job codification is inversely related to the rate of organizational change ($r = -.47$). The relationship between the degree of rule observation and the rate of program change is much weaker and is in a direction opposite from our prediction ($r = .13$).

In order to determine whether each of the observed relationships between each of our indicators of various structural properties and the rate of program change are spurious, multiple and partial correlation analyses are introduced.

As shown in Table 3, only two of these variables have strong and independent relationships with the rate of program change: the degree of job codification ($rp = -.47$) and the degree of participation in decision making ($rp = .39$). It should be noted that the β weights for participation in decision making are great-

one higher up for a final answer. (4) I have to ask my boss before I do almost anything. (5) Any decision I make has to have my boss's approval. Responses could vary from 1 (definitely false) to 4 (definitely true). The individual scores were then combined into an organizational score as described above.

[27] Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in Etzioni, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–61.

[28] Hall, *op. cit.* The index of job codification was based on the following five questions: (1) I feel that I am my boss in most matters. (2) A person can make his own decisions without checking with anybody else. (3) How things are done here is left up to the person doing the work. (4) People here are allowed to do almost as they please. (5) Most people here make their own rules on the job. Replies to these questions were scored from 1 (definitely true) to 4 (definitely false), and then each of the respondent's answers was averaged. Thus, a high score on this index means high job codification.

The index of rule observation was computed by averaging the responses to each of the following two statements: (1) The employees are constantly being checked on for rule violations. (2) People there feel as though they are constantly being watched, to see that they obey all the rules. Respondents' answers were coded from 1 (definitely false) to 4 (definitely true), and then the average score of each respondent on these items was computed. Organizational scores were computed as previously described. On this index, a high score means a high degree of rule observation.

er (.555), however, than the β weights for job codification (—.379).

The number of occupational specialties and the degree of hierarchy have moderate but independent relationships with the number of program innovations, although the latter variable is related in the opposite direction when the other six variables are controlled. The degree of extra-organizational activity, the degree of professional training, and the degree of rule observation have little relationship with the number of program innovations after controlling for the other factors, although rule observation remains virtually unchanged.

PERFORMANCE VARIABLES: THE DEGREE OF SATISFACTION

Since the famous French and Coch experiment, the advocates of the human relations approach to organizational analysis have emphasized the importance of morale as a factor in understanding differential acceptance of change and, therefore, implicitly differential rates of program change.[29]

[29] Coch and French, *op. cit.*

We developed two different measures of morale—an index of job satisfaction and an index of satisfaction with expressive relations.[30] There is a correlation of .38 be-

[30] We used a satisfaction scale developed by Neal Gross, Ward Mason, and Alexander McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), Appendix B. When factor analyzed, this battery provided the following scales: job satisfaction, satisfaction with expressive relations, satisfaction with salary, and satisfaction with time. The index of job satisfaction was computed on the basis of responses to the following six questions: (1) How satisfied are you that you have been given enough authority by your board of directors to do your job well? (2) How satisfied are you with your present job when you compare it to similar positions in the state? (3) How satisfied are you with the progress you are making toward the goals which you set for yourself in your present position? (4) On the whole, how satisfied are you that (your superior) accepts you as a professional expert, to the degree to which you are entitled by reason of position, training, and experience? (5) On the whole, how satisfied are you with your present job when you consider the expectations you had when you took the job? (6) How satisfied are you with your present job in light of career expectations?

The index of expressive satisfaction was com-

TABLE 3

MULTIPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF PROGRAM CHANGES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL PROPERTIES

Organizational Properties	Partial Correlation Coefficient*	β Coefficients in Standard Form†
1. Degree of complexity:		
a) Measure of the number of occupational specialties‡	+.24	+.202
b) Measure of the amount of extra-organizational professional activity	+.08	+ 104
c) Measure of professional training	−.10	−.137
2. Degree of centralization:		
a) Measure of the degree of participation in organizational decision making	+.39	+.555
b) Measure of hierarchy of authority	+.23	+.231
3. Degree of formalization:		
a) Measure of degree of job codification	−.47	−.379
b) Measure of degree of rule observation	+.15	+.134
Coefficient of determination	....	.558
Multiple correlation coefficient	....	.75

* These are the partial correlation coefficients between each variable and the rate of program change, controlling for the other six structural variables. Thus, each is a sixth-order partial correlation coefficient.

† These are β coefficients in standard form, i.e., β weights.

‡ This is the number of occupational specialties as of 1959, before the program changes discussed in this paper were introduced.

tween job satisfaction and rate of program change. On the other hand, satisfaction with expressive relations is negatively correlated, albeit the size of the correlation is small ($r = -.17$). This suggests a plausible explanation for several contradictory viewpoints in the literature concerning morale and organizational change. The work of Coch and French suggests a positive relationship between morale and change, but a series of studies by Mann, Hoffman, and others at the University of Michigan have noted that change creates social strain in the organization.[31] One may infer, not necessarily from our data, that job satisfaction may be a necessary precondition for the introduction of changes, but after this change has been introduced it may have disruptive and negative effects on social relationships among members in an organization. It is also plausible to argue that the organizational conditions that facilitate the introduction of change, namely, occupational diversity and decentralization, reduce satisfaction with expressive relationships because of the conflicts they engender.

PERSONALITY VARIABLES: GENERAL ORIENTATION TO CHANGE

It is argued by some social psychologists and psychologists that all collective properties of organization, such as the degree of centralization, the degree of formalization, or the degree of complexity, are ultimately reducible to psychological factors. Since this is a common argument, we attempted to measure several personality variables that might account for differences in organizational rates of program change. It could be argued that change occurs in organizations because the organization has a high proportion of individuals who are favorably oriented to social change. Selznik has suggested the idea of selective recruitment of certain personality types; that is, when an organization needs new job occupants, the attempt is made to recruit individuals who have personality attributes consistent with organizational needs.[32] Mann and Hoffman have hypothesized the obverse of this process, namely, that individuals who cannot tolerate change will leave changing organizations and seek work in more stable ones.[33] Finally, Homans and others have argued that sociological variables are fundamentally reducible to psychological variables.[34] While we do not accept this argument, we included measures of individual orientations toward change developed by Sister Marie Augusta Neal in an attempt to test the validity of such assertions.[35]

The Neal batteries of self-interest motives, value motives, pro-change motives, and anti-change motives were factor analyzed and yielded two clear factors; one factor contains items representing attitudes of self-interest and a negative attitude toward change, while the second factor contains items representing attitudes of ideals and a positive orientation toward change.

puted from responses to the following two questions: (1) How satisfied are you with your supervisor? (2) How satisfied are you with your fellow workers?

[31] See Floyd C. Mann and Lawrence Williams, "Observations on the Dynamics of a Change to Electronic Data-processing Equipment," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* V (September, 1960), 217–57; and Floyd Mann and T. Hoffman, *Automation and the Worker* (New York: Henry Holt, 1960). The same point is made in several other studies of organizational change; see, for example, Harriet Ronken and Paul Lawrence, *Administering Changes* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Graduate Business School, 1952); and Charles Walker, *Toward the Automatic Factory* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957).

[32] Philip Selznick, "Critical Decisions in Organizational Development," in Etzioni, *op. cit.*, pp. 355–62.

[33] See Mann and Hoffman, *op. cit.*

[34] George Homans, "Bringing Men Back In," *American Sociological Review,* XXIX (December, 1964), 809–19.

[35] Four scales that purport to measure attitudes toward change developed by Sister Marie Augusta Neal, *Values and Interests in Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), were used.

We would expect the former to be *negatively* associated with rate of program change and the latter to be *positively* associated with program change. We found only a modest relationship between these measures of attitudes toward change and the amount of organizational program change.

The measure of self-interest and anti-change was virtually unrelated to program change ($r = -.04$), while the measure of ideals and pro-change was related to program change opposite from the expected direction ($r = -.15$).

An organization can have a high proportion of job occupants who are favorably disposed toward change in their personal orientations, and yet the organization does not necessarily adopt new programs. The reverse pattern is equally true.

What this suggests is that the personality attributes included in our study add little to our understanding of organizational change as we have measured it. On the other hand, there is the possibility that there are other personality variables that are appropriate for the understanding of organizational change.

It would be desirable to know the relative importance of performance variables, such as job satisfaction and the structural properties, but the limited size of our universe of organizations ($n = 16$), makes a multiple correlational and partial correlational analysis (reported in Table 3) for all the variables that we have measured inappropriate. It should be understood that there is a very strong relationship between the degree of centralization and job satisfaction in particular.[36] At the same time, the concept of a system assumes that there is this high degree of interdependence. The precise importance of each of these variables must be determined with a much larger number of organizations and preferably with longitudinal measurements.

CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES, ORGANIZATIONAL PROPERTIES, AND RATE OF PROGRAM CHANGE

The fact that there are varying rates of program for our different kinds of agencies, as indicated in Table 1, suggests that there may be disparate situations faced by each of our organizations. The rate of technological change may be faster in rehabilitation than in social casework agencies.

In particular, the organizations in our study vary considerably in their ease of access to resources, whether personnel or finances. They differ considerably in their age and autonomy. These and other indicators of their environmental situation can have an impact on the organization and its ability to adopt new programs. By studying the impact of such variables as auspices, size, and function, it becomes possible to view the process by which organizations are likely to develop one or another system. It also allows us some insight into the generalizability of our findings. If one of these variables accounts for most of the observed relationship between the rate of program change and the organizational properties, then we are aware of a significant limitation on our findings.

In a recent review of the organizational literature, Pugh and his associates suggest a number of contextual variables that can be used either as controls or as independent variables when examining the relationships among organizational properties. The variables that they discuss are: origin and history, ownership and control, size, charter, technology, location, resources, and interdependence.[37] Presumably, each of these factors could have an impact on the characteristics of the organization, including the rate of program change. In particular,

[36] See Michael Aiken and Jerald Hage, "Organizational Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, XXXI (August, 1966), 497–507, for a discussion of this relationship.

[37] D. S. Pugh *et al.*, *op. cit.* See Hage, "An Axiomatic Theory," *op. cit.*, pp. 304–6, for hypotheses concerning these contextual variables.

there is always the possibility that any of the relationships reported in Table 2 are simply a function of some of these contextual variables. For example, there is a standard organizational hypothesis that increasing size means more centralization and formalization, and, therefore, one might expect large organizations to have low rates of program change as a consequence. Another standard hypothesis is that older organizations are likely to be more bureaucratic and therefore to have lower rates of change.

To explore the relative importance of these environmental factors for the relationships discussed above, we employed partial correlations. A fourth-order partial correlation was computed between each of the organizational properties and rate of program change, controlling for *size*, auspices, age of organization, and major function.

Size represents the rank order of organizations by number of employees in the organization; it is the same as the contextual concept discussed by Pugh *et al.*

Auspices, that is, whether the organization is public or private, is similar to their concept of ownership and control. Since none of our organizations is a business, most of the analytical distinctions that they discussed do not apply. It should be noted that "auspices" not only includes the idea of the nature of the accountability of the chief executive, but it suggests the sources of revenue, an idea contained in the concept of resources. The public agencies are largely tax supported, while the private agencies rely upon donations, grants, and fees. In other words, the distinction between public and private carries many implications; therefore, the word "auspices" appears to be a more appropriate one than either ownership or resources.

The age of the organization is only one aspect of the organization's origin and history, but it is an attempt to measure some of the ideas discussed by Pugh *et al.*

Finally, function is our attempt to divide a relatively homogeneous universe of organizations into at least two kinds of goals and technologies. We separated our organizations into those that deal with their clients for a relatively short period of time, the typical casework situation found in the social welfare agencies, and into those that deal with their clients for a relatively long period of time, the sheltered workshop, the school, and hospital situations. The one-hour interview and the total institution reflect different kinds of technology, at least in terms of the intensiveness, even though all of our agencies are concerned with providing rehabilitative and psychiatric services.[38]

Location and interdependence are two contextual variables discussed by Pugh *et al.* that are not included in our analysis. Location is impossible to include because all of our agencies are in the same metropolitan area. We feel that interdependence is an exceedingly important contextual variable, but we are still in the process of collecting data on it. A separate analysis of this contextual variable and its impact will be made at a later date.

Not all of the four contextual variables are related to the rate of program change. Both age ($r = -.03$) and auspices ($r = -.06$) were unrelated to this kind of organizational change as we have measured

[38] Size was based on a rank order of all salaried employees. Rank ordering was used because we had an extremely skewed distribution. Auspices is a natural dichotomy between tax supported and non-tax supported. Age was treated as a trichotomy because all the organizations were founded either prior to 1900, between 1919 and 1923, or after the Great Depression period. Function was measured by creating a dummy variable based on the amount of contact per week between the agency and the client. An hour or less per week, the typical casework interview, was treated as low client involvement. The sheltered workshops, the rehabilitation agencies, and the total institutions were categorized as high-involvement agencies. Ideally more distinctions would be desirable, but with only sixteen organizations additional refinement becomes impossible.

it. But size ($r = -.61$) and function ($r = .58$) were highly related to the rate of program change. The larger the size of the organization and the more time the client spends in the organization, the higher the rate of program change. Since these contextual factors are themselves interrelated (larger organizations were much more likely to be total institutions) and since these factors do have an impact on rate of program change, the question remains whether the relationships between our dependent variable and the other organizational properties will be maintained if we simultaneously control for all four of the contextual variables. To put it another way, we want to know if our results are a consequence of organizational arrangements or a consequence of the environmental situations.

The partial correlation analysis is reported in Table 4. If this table is compared with Table 1, it will be noted that the correlations remain approximately the same when size, age, auspices, and function are controlled, except for two measures: the number of occupational specialities and the hierarchy of authority. Function has a very high correlation with the number of occupational specialities, while size and auspices have moderately high correlations. The more time the client spends in the organization, the greater the number of occupational specialties ($r = .67$). If the organization is public, there are likely to be more occupational specialties than if it is private, suggesting different availability of funds ($r = .39$). Similarly, larger organizations have more occupational specialties ($r = .41$). When function, size, and auspices are held constant, the relationship between number of occupational special-

TABLE 4

RATE OF PROGRAM CHANGE AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL PROPERTIES WHEN SIZE, AUSPICES, AGE OF ORGANIZATION, AND FUNCTION ARE CONTROLLED

	Partial Correlations with Rate of Program Change*
Structural variables:	
1. Degree of complexity:	
a) Measure of the number of occupational specialties†	.00
b) Measure of the amount of professional activity	.11
c) Measure of the amount of professional training	.14
2. Degree of centralization:	
a) Measure of the degree of participation in decision making	.46
b) Measure of hierarchy of authority	−.37
3. Degree of formalization:	
a) Measure of the degree of job codification	−.33
b) Measure of the degree of rule observation	−.02
Performance variable:	
Degree of satisfaction:	
a) Measure of job satisfaction	.27
b) Measure of expressive satisfaction	−.19

* There are fourth order partial correlations, i.e., the partial correlation coefficients between each factor listed and the rate of program change, controlling for size, auspices, age of organization, and function.

† This is the number of occupational specialties as of 1959, before the program changes discussed in this paper were introduced.

ties and rate of change disappears. This suggests a process when the time ordering of these variables is considered.

The function of the organization, its size, and its auspices affect the number of specialties it has; this in turn is associated with the rate of program change. The partial correlation analysis makes clear, however, that the number of occupational specialties has little independent effect in explaining the variation in rate of program change once auspices, size, age, and function are held constant.

In contrast, the partial correlation between rate of program change and hierarchy of authority, holding constant the four contextual factors, has the predicted negative relationship with rate of program change. In fact, the relationship is stronger after controlling for these contextual factors.

In general, the observed relationships between rate of program change and the organizational properties remain, even after simultaneously controlling for these contextual factors. That is, even though the context or environment affects the organization, most of the organizational properties examined are still related to the rate of program change.

Another way of determining the generalizability of these findings is the examination of other studies of organizations to see if they found similar results. In a study of large business firms in the United States, Chandler suggests that increases in complexity as measured by product diversification led to the decentralization of decision making.[39] This was especially likely to occur after the introduction of professional managers. These firms were also more likely to allocate a much larger proportion of their budget to research, indicating a higher rate of program change. Woodward's study of some ninety industrial firms in South Essex, England, suggests that those firms that made small batches of products or custom models were more likely than the assembly-line manufacturers to have professional managers, skilled labor, decentralized decision making, higher job satisfaction, and less routinization of procedures.[40] While this study does not have a direct measure of the rate of program change, both of these studies are at least supportive of the findings reported here.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Our findings suggest the following two stories about the rate of program change. One line of reasoning is as follows: Given that there is a high rate of program change, there is likely to be relatively decentralized decision making because of the necessity for discussions about the problems of change. There is a variety of decisions involving the allocation of personnel and funds attendant to the addition of new programs. In addition, the implementation of programs inevitably indicates contingencies not considered and engenders conflicts that must be resolved. Similarly, the high rate of program change will necessitate the relaxation of rules in order to solve the problems of implementation. There will be conflicts between the demands of the new program and previous regulations that will make rule observation difficult. The addition of new programs is likely to attract better-trained and active professional personnel who will like the challenge of change. And new programs can require, in many cases, new skills or areas of expertise relative to the organization. The high rate of job satisfaction can flow from the satisfaction of being a member of a dynamic organization. But the high rate of change creates strain in interpersonal relationships.

Another line of reasoning is as follows: If an organization is relatively decentral-

[39] A. D. Chandler, Jr., *Strategy and Structure* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1962).

[40] Joan Woodward, *Industrial Organization: Theory and Practice* (London: Oxford Press, 1965), chap. ii, pp. 23–25.

ized, it is likely to have a variety of information channels which allow the consideration of both the need for new programs and their appropriateness. The sheer number of occupational specialties also increases the diversity of informal channels of communication. This is likely to lead to conflict among competing ideas for organizational resources. In contrast, the amount of job codification reduces the diversity of informal channels of information by circumscribing the occupants' perspectives, including the recognition of needs and the choice of remedies. Given that an organization is complex, decentralized, and non-formalized, then it is likely to be high in rate of program change. Such an organization is also likely to have high job satisfaction but low satisfaction with expressive relations. High job satisfaction evidently facilitates the introduction of changes, but the changes themselves are evidently disruptive of interpersonal relationships. The structural arrangements that facilitate change seem to generate conflicts among staff members. The diversity of occupational specialties, the power struggles in a decentralized arrangement of decision making, and the lack of clear work boundaries—consequences of the lack of formalization—are all conducive to organizational conflicts that are manifested in dissatisfaction with expressive relationships.

The nature of our data does not allow us to choose between these two lines of reasoning. It is our belief that both are correct and reflect again the system nature of organizations. However, future research should be directed to verifying which line of reasoning is more pervasive, but this will require longitudinal studies. Our analysis indicates that rate of program change is associated with configurations on other organizational properties, supporting the basic assumption that an organization is best viewed as a system of variables. While program change is only one kind of change within the system, future research should be directed to the question of whether other changes within the system, such as changes in rules as opposed to changes in degree of job codification, changes in who makes decisions as opposed to changes in emphasis on hierarchy, changes in techniques as opposed to changes in technology, can be analyzed in the same way. We feel that this study provides an illustration of how change within the system and change of the system can be differentiated.

Our analysis indicated that different empirical indicators of the three structural properties of organizations, that is, centralization, complexity, and formalization, are related differently to the rate of change in new programs, at least among the sixteen organizations in this study. The number of occupational specialties in the organization, an indicator of complexity, is a better predictor of program change than professional training or professional activity. Participation in agency-wide decision making is a more powerful predictor of organizational change than the degree of hierarchy of authority. Finally, the degree of job codification, an indicator of formalization, is a more powerful predictor of program change than the rule observation.

A partial correlation analysis simultaneously controlling for size, auspices, age of organization, and function demonstrated that most of the organizational properties have associations with rate of program change which are independent of variations in these contextual factors. However, function and auspices, to a lesser extent, were so strongly related to the number of occupational specialties that the relationship between number of occupational specialties—one indicator of complexity—and rate of program change disappears. Future research should attempt to consider additional contextual variables besides the ones included here.

A major theme contained in this paper is that it is important to view organizations from a sociological viewpoint. Our method

for drawing the sample and the procedure for computing scores for organizational properties conceive of organizations as a collection of social positions (or jobs), not simply as an aggregate of individuals. Several different collective properties of organizations were found to be related to the rate of change. When individual orientations toward change were measured, they were found to be relatively unrelated to the rate of organizational change, at least as we have defined it. Our findings are supportive of Durkheim's famous phrase that "social facts must be explained by other social facts." That is, we were able to explain the rate of organizational change better with other organizational properties, such as degree of centralization, degree of complexity, or degree of formalization, than with measures of attitudes of organizational members toward change. Certainly this does not constitute definitive proof, but it does suggest that emphasis on structural and performance variables in organizations may be a more fruitful way to study organizational change.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Sources of Social Change in Community, Family, and Fertility in a Puerto Rican Town[1]

Joseph W. Scott

ABSTRACT

The point of departure for this study is the book, *The Family and Population Control,* by Hill, Stycos, and Back. In it, they report a correlation between two typologies each having eight family types reflecting "urbanity" on one hand and "familism" on the other hand. They hypothesize that this correlation is perhaps due to the "sharing of common life experiences and values and the learning of common patterns of family decision-making." In the present research, this general hypothesis is tested in a small Puerto Rican town specifically selected because it was under the impact of economic and social change. The findings of this study support their general hypothesis in full.

This research[2] attempts to test a rather general hypothesis raised by Hill, Stycos, and Back in their book, *The Family and Population Control.* This book is a continuation of a long line of research on Puerto Rico.[3] In a fairly recent study[4] of fertility planning in Puerto Rico, they developed two typologies of family characteristics. Their "Folk-Urbanity" typology yielded eight types arrayed along a continuum created by combining the properties of rural-urban residence, type of marital union, and amount of education. They found that "the array of family types on the urbanity scale predicts reasonably well the number of children (r_r 0.66) in the family."[5]

Their "Familistic-Personcentered" typology yielded a series of eight types reflecting the freedom of the wife to be gainfully employed, freedom from the husband's dominance in decision making, and freedom from prohibitions on participation in social activities. "The results in sheer numbers of children are that the more restrictive family types have larger families, although the correlation is far from perfect (r_r 0.57)."[6] An intercorrelational analysis of typologies revealed a relationship between the two sets

[1] This study was supported by National Institute of Mental Health Predoctoral Fellowship MPM-17,618. I wish to thank J. Mayone Stycos, Bernard Meltzer, John Liell, and Grafton Trout for helpful comments and criticisms on an early draft.

[2] For a more complete treatment of the subject, see Joseph W. Scott, "Sources of Change in Community, Family, and Fertility in Aibonito, Puerto Rico," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1963).

[3] See Kingsley Davis, "Puerto Rico: A Crowded Island," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CCLXXXV (January, 1953), 116; Paul K. Hatt, *Backgrounds of Human Fertility in Puerto Rico* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952); J. Mayone Stycos, "Family and Fertility in Puerto Rico," *American Sociological Review,* XVII (October, 1952), 572–80; Clarence Senior, "Migration and Puerto Rico's Population Problem," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CCLXXXV (January, 1953), 130–36; Reuben Hill, Kurt W. Back, and J. Mayone Stycos, "Family Structure and Fertility in Puerto Rico," *Social Problems,* III, No. 2 (October, 1955), 73–93; Arnold S. Feldman and Paul K. Hatt, "Social Structure as Affecting Fertility in Puerto Rico," *Annals of the American Academy of Politcal and Social Science,* CCLXXXV (January, 1953), 128; J. Mayone Stycos and Reuben Hill, "The Prospects of Birth Control in Puerto Rico," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CCLXXXV (January, 1953), 144.

[4] Reuben Hill, J. Mayone Stycos, and Kurt W. Back, *The Family and Population Control* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959).

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 209.

of family types. The authors summarize the finding in this way:

The two typologies are empirically interrelated with a rank-order correlation of 0.89. It is hypothesized, but beyond test in this study, that the interrelation can be accounted for theoretically by the sharing of common life experiences and values and the learning of common patterns of family decision-making which would tend to join the folk-types with the familistic types on the one hand, and the urbane-types with the personcentered flexibility-organized types of the familistic organization array on the other.[7]

As it is stated, the hypothesis is too general and vague. Thus, to test the *general* hypothesis suggested by Hill, Stycos, and Back, several variables have to be reconceptualized. The variable, "common life experiences," has been conceptualized chiefly as educational and employment experiences. Following Loomis,[8] "family organization" has been conceptualized as "elements" such as beliefs, sentiments, norms, goals, power, and status roles. "Fertility" has been defined as the number of children ever born alive. The following section presents some findings from the study of common life experiences.

THE TOWN AND SOCIAL CHANGE[9]

COMMON LIFE EXPERIENCES

"Mountain Town," Puerto Rico (as the locale will be known) was selected for the present study because it was undergoing industrial, demographic, educational, and ecological expansion. For example, between 1950 and 1960, approximately ten small factories, which hired mostly women, set up business in this town. Accordingly, since this had typically been a male-dominated social system, it was believed that family life and fertility would be undergoing change even in the beginning stages to some degree.

The town was geographically located in Puerto Rico's central mountain chain among some of the highest peaks. It was in the beginnings of "Operation Bootstrap" and was emerging from an era of agriculture. In 1960 there were about 5,000 residents in town and 13,000 residents in the rural hinterlands. The town and the adjoining hinterlands together were called a "municipality" (county).

Demographic changes were as follows: The population of the whole municipality (county) increased about 17 per cent from 1920 to 1960. It increased only 0.9 per cent from 1950 to 1960. Apart from the municipality, Mountain Town itself increased 154 per cent from 1920 to 1960 and showed a 6.9 per cent gain during the decade of 1950–60. During this time, the males in town increased 5.5 per cent and the females 8.1 per cent.

Educational changes were as follows: Approximately 32 per cent of the children of school age were enrolled in 1910, 28 per cent in 1930, 51 per cent in 1950, and 63 per cent in 1960. As a result, the median educational level of the whole population has been steadily climbing.

Economic changes were as follows: Change has been from large-sized farms to small- and medium-sized farms. The total number of farms increased more than 80 per cent between 1920 and 1960. However, the number of farms 260 acres and over declined 28 per cent, while those of 50 acres and less increased over 250 per cent. The subdividing of farms occurred as a result of the failure of large-scale farming to be profitable on the hilly terrain. Subsistence farming gradually replaced large-scale farming, but only up to 1950. Then, commercial chicken raising began to replace subsistence farming.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

[8] Charles P. Loomis, *Social Systems: Essays on Their Persistence and Change* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand & Co., 1960).

[9] This section draws heavily on census data from the years 1910 to 1960. Therefore see the U.S. Census of Population for Puerto Rico from 1910 to 1960. Also, see the U.S. Census of Agriculture for Puerto Rico from 1910 to 1960.

In non-agricultural employment the percentage of jobs in manufacturing increased from 9.1 per cent in 1930 to 20.7 per cent in 1950 and to 25.5 per cent in 1960. Non-agricultural employment increased over-all from 25 per cent in 1930 to 65 per cent in 1960. The greatest gains were made by women who had increased their employment in factories to the point that in 1960 they held a five to one edge over men in manufacturing. In addition, in 1960 professional women outnumbered professional men.

Socioecological changes were as follows: Many multiple-purpose businesses, like "general stores," had begun to subdivide and to specialize. Moreover, there had been a proliferation of governmental agencies, transportation facilities, communication facilities, and eating facilities catering consciously to females. The net result was a new structure of "physical" opportunities for wives to shop, to eat outside the home, to engage in recreation, and to meet and converse with persons of the opposite sex. The new situation in effect constituted an "opportunity structure" for the women who had newly adopted equalitarian attitudes to express. These new urban developments served to encourage women openly to take advantage of their opportunities for personal independence, self-reliance, and equality.

It is reasonable to conclude that, if common life experiences like the new social, economic, and ecological opportunities have any effect on women at all, such effects should be reflected in the family patterns and fertility rates of those women most involved in these *experiences* of change.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

These data above permit us to summarize a five-point sequence of social change: (1) Since the rural economy is male dominated, if women desire employment, they migrate to the urban centers in search of opportunities. (2) As educational opportunities increase in urban areas, more females (as well as males) enrol in school. and the result is a "pool" of people with modern industrial skills and advancement-oriented attitudes. (3) If there is a relatively rapid expansion of the industrial economy (as occurred in this town) and a decline in the traditional agricultural economy, those women having the most formal knowledge and modern skills tend to be preferred for employment (assuming, of course, women are needed). (4) With employment and high education, wives change in terms of beliefs, values, status roles, aspirations, and the like, including the acquisition of increased family power. (5) Finally, fertility rates decrease relative to the degree that the family is characterized by a wife who is simultaneously employed, highly educated, and in possession of high family power.

These "theoretical implications" permit us to advance the following hypotheses.

CONCERNING FAMILY ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL-EMPLOYMENT STATUS

The higher the combined educational and employment status of the wife, the more likely she is

a) to believe in innate female equality,
b) to be self-oriented,
c) to aspire to be a housewife-with-employment,
d) to have high communication with her spouse on family issues,
e) to share widely in shopping for the family,
f) to share in making many final decisions,
g) to belong to voluntary associations,
h) to have a broad social life outside the home.

As corollaries, the lower the combined educational and employment status of the wife, the more likely she is

a) to believe in innate female inferiority,
b) to be family oriented,
c) to aspire to be a housewife-without-employment,
d) to have low communication with her spouse on family issues,
e) to share little in shopping for the family,
f) to share in just a few final decisions,
g) to not belong to voluntary associations,
h) to have a limited social life outside the home.

CONCERNING FERTILITY, FAMILY ORGANIZATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

The higher the wife's status (combining education, employment, and family power), the lower the fertility rate; as a corollary, the lower the wife's status, the higher the fertility rate.

MEASURING INSTRUMENTS

FAMILY ORGANIZATION VARIABLES

In order not to reprint the questionnaire here in this paper, let it be sufficient to indicate that all the variables mentioned in the hypotheses (such as beliefs, sentiments, and so on) were tested in one way or another through the following items of information:

The wives were asked whether they believed men were innately more capable of directing things, more intelligent, more knowledgeable about the world, and more stable in thinking ability.

They were asked their preferences about family size, about their willingness to go out to work and leave the children with someone else, about their determination to work in order to provide themselves a better life in the event their husbands fell short of providing their life goals, and their aspirations for employment during the next five years. They were also asked whether they discussed the following issues with their husbands: education of children, family size, use of contraceptives, husband's work, and night activities of the husband; whether they, their husbands, or both do the shopping for the necessities of children, the furniture, the clothes of the wife, and the clothes of the husband; whether the husband, wife, or both make the final decisions in the treatment of children, the budgeting for food, the purchases of furniture, the social activities of the family, and the amount of money to be spent for the wife's clothes and for the husband's clothes; whether they belong to any voluntary associations; and, finally, whether they go to movies, parties, and social club meetings.

EDUCATIONAL-EMPLOYMENT STATUS DEFINED

The combined educational-employment status was determined by first separating the wives into two educational categories. Those with zero to six years of education were grouped together and called "low education," while those with seven years or more of education were grouped together and called "high education." The wives were again separated into two employment categories. Those who were presently working were grouped together and called "employed," and those presently not working were grouped together and called "unemployed."

SAMPLING

The sample universe was the married women of Mountain Town. The plan, at the outset, was to compare married women who were working (termed, "employed") with married women who were not working (termed "unemployed"). Hence, two samples were necessary.

The investigator visited the Office of the Registrar of Property, in which all households were supposedly listed, in order to draw a stratified random sample. However, the official listing of households was quite incomplete, and this sampling procedure had to be abandoned. Instead, a combination of area and systematic sampling had to be devised: A map of all lots in town was obtained, and 20 per cent of the lots were selected in each block. The goal was to interview 20 per cent of the females of households from each block to give a total of about two hundred wives in our sample. The procedure was systematic. Assuming that each lot had a house on it, every second household within each city block was included in the sample with a random start in each block. Working women were proportionately less frequently found than were those not working. Not knowing (without asking) which houses were those of the employed or unemployed women, the interviewers proceeded systematically to every second household until the required

number of wives of each type was obtained. The total number of interviews was 211; the number retained for analysis was 206. Five respondents were left out because they were wives of invalid husbands, a factor making these families atypical. This gave a sample of 107 employed and 99 unemployed wives (out of a total universe of about 1,100 wives) with which to begin the analysis.

The measuring instrument was a highly structured questionnaire, which included several statements to measure family-related beliefs, sentiments, goals, norms, status roles, power, and personal characteristics. The questionnaire was pretested in the United States using both native-born housewives and wives from various countries of Latin America, including Puerto Rico. As a further pretest, after arriving in Puerto Rico the investigator also informally interviewed several wives in Mountain Town. The final revised questionnaire (translated into Spanish) took about thirty minutes to administer.

FINDINGS

FAMILY-ORGANIZATION HYPOTHESES

The χ^2 and γ tests were used to analyze the family-organization hypotheses wherein educational-employment status is analyzed in relation to beliefs, sentiments, aspirations, norms, power, and status roles.[10] Table 1 presents the results of the hypotheses testing. This table indicates that the educational-employment status of the wife is significantly related to each element of family organization as hypothesized in this study. In each case, the χ^2 coefficient is significant beyond the 5 per cent level. To determine the direction and degree of association in the relationships, γ analyses were used. All γ coefficients are positive, indicating positive relationships among the variables. In addition, all coefficients differ significantly from zero, indicating, in percentage terms, the preponderance of agreement over disagreement in the cases supporting the hypothesized relationships. In other words, since γ is a measure of association, we may say that the educational-employment status of the wife is positively associated with family organization as measured in these elements. All family-organization hypotheses were supported.

THE FERTILITY HYPOTHESIS

To test the relationship between the wife's over-all status and fertility, a typology was constructed. Education, being the earliest experience and being an important prerequisite for employment was designated first in importance; employment, being a prerequisite for acquiring family power was designated second in importance; family power,[11] the major intervening variable in family decision making was designated third in importance. Based on the "theoretical implications" of the data about social change, these three variables were weighted in order to compute rank-order correlations. Higher education, employment, and high family power were respectively weighted[12] 4, 2, and 1, based on the primacy of education for the future attainment of employment and power.

To test the fertility hypothesis, the nominal family categories were ranked ordinally along with the mean number of children born alive to the women of each of these categories (see Table 2). A rank-order correlational analysis yielded a coefficient of .83. This indicates that the higher the wife's over-all status (combining education, employment, and family power), the lower the fertility rate. The lack of an even higher correlation is due to the "deviant" types

[10] See a discussion of the χ^2 test used in this analysis in Sidney Siegel, *Non-Parametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956). Also see David M. Shaw, "The Chi-Square Contingency Test," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV (November, 1959), 301–2.

[11] Family power was determined by combining the shopping index with the final-decision index. See the section above where the measuring instruments are presented.

[12] Hill, Stycos, and Back used these same numerical weights.

which combined attributes (like high education with unemployment and low power) that worked at cross-purposes with one another. To add support to this correlation, further analyses were made.

Table 3 presents still a further comparison of the family types and their corresponding fertility rates with age controlled. The two age categories, 15–34 and 35-and-over, have been chosen in order to facilitate this analysis. To be sure, the collecting together those 15–34 or 35-and-over has not been done in order to obscure possible fertility differentials at the earliest ages of childbearing. Within each category, 15–19, 20–24, and so on through 45-and-over, those of low education have higher fertility rates than those with high education at every age level. To continue with our analysis, within the age limits specified, there is still a marked correlation between the variables within each age grouping. Thus the hypothesis has again been substantiated.

Table 4 presents still a third look at the predictive power of the typology of variables. It presents the perfect "scale types" when the variables are considered on an absence or presence basis. Here, as before, the higher the wife's status, the lower the number of children ever born alive in those families. Each variable itself makes a marked difference in the number of children born alive in each family.

TABLE 1

FAMILY-ORGANIZATION VARIABLES BY EDUCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS FOR HOUSEWIVES (PERCENTAGES)

Education and Employment Status	Beliefs		Aspirations		Sentiments		Communication		Memberships		Social Life		Final Decisions		Shopping		N
	Equal	Inferior	To Work	Not To Work	Self	Family	High	Low	One or More	None	Broad	Limited	Many	Few	Wide	Narrow	
High education/employment	63	37	43	57	64	36	57	43	49	51	49	51	68	32	77	23	84
High education/unemployment	28	72	47	53	40	60	47	63	28	72	17	83	62	38	64	36	47
Low education/employment	30	70	35	65	30	70	40	60	17	83	30	70	57	43	70	30	23
Low education/unemployment	18	82	65	35	21	79	29	71	15	85	6	94	31	69	36	64	52
χ^2	$\chi^2=22.92$		$\chi^2=9.13$		$\chi^2=22.59$		$\chi^2=10\ 75$		$\chi^2=20.72$		$\chi^2=14.21$		$\chi^2=16.72$		$\chi^2=16.57$		
γ	$\gamma=.94$		$\gamma=.66$		$\gamma=.54$		$\gamma=25$		$\gamma=.51$		$\gamma=62$		$\gamma=.42$		$\gamma=.48$		

DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION

Before we begin, let us bear in mind that this discussion is largely a presentation of supporting ethnographic data collected during eight months of living with Puerto Rican families in Puerto Rico. This is *not* a speculative essay.

The traditional family[18] in Puerto Rico is a patriarchal-type family. The tradition-oriented woman (who numerically predominates) believes in the innate inferiority of

[18] The most complete description of the traditions of Puerto Rico can be found in Julian H. Steward and associates, *The People of Puerto Rico* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956).

TABLE 2

MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE BY EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT STATUS, AND FAMILY POWER FOR ALL WIVES AGE 15-AND-OVER

Education, Employment Status, and Family Power	Mean Number of Children Born Alive	*N*
I. High education/employment–high power	2.6	66
II. High education/employment–low power	2.8	18
III. High education/unemployment–high power	3.8	30
IV. High education/unemployment–low power	3.4	17
V. Low education/employment–high power	4.6	16
VI. Low education/employment–low power	3.0	7
VII. Low education/unemployment–high power	5.1	13
VIII. Low education/unemployment–low power	6.1	39
	$\rho = .834$	

TABLE 3

MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE BY EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT STATUS, AND FAMILY POWER FOR WIVES AGE 15–34 AND 34-AND-OVER

EDUCATION-EMPLOYMENT-FAMILY STATUS	MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE			
	Women 15–34	*N*	Women 35-and-Over	*N*
I. High education/employment–high power	2.0	45	3.9	21
II. High education/employment–low power	1.9	14	5.0	5
III. High education/unemployment–high power	3.2	13	4.2	18
IV. High education/unemployment–low power	3.0	10	4 2	5
V. Low education/employment–high power	3.9	7	5.2	9
VI. Low education/employment–low power	2.5	4	3.7	3
VII. Low education/unemployment–high power	4.0	4	5.6	9
VIII. Low education/unemployment–low power	4.3	10	6.4	29
	$\rho = .81$		$\rho = .57$	

TABLE 4

MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE TO CATEGORIES OF WIVES RANKED ORDINALLY AS CUMULATIVE SCALES TYPES

Guttman Cumulative Scale Types (Categories of Wives)	High Power	Employment	High Education	Mean Number of Children	*N*
I	+	+	+	2.6	66
II	–	+	+	2.8	18
IV	–	–	+	3.4	17
VIII	–	–	–	6.1	39

Note.— + = Present; — = Absent.

females, aspires to be only a housewife and mother, desires a large family, willingly subordinates herself to her husband's wishes, has almost no social life outside the home, does not belong to secular voluntary associations, does little or no shopping for herself and others, does not discuss many family-related issues with her husband, and participates in few, if any final decisions.

This is the point from which women undergoing change have moved or are moving. They have not started from a neutral point and moved to either the patriarchal-type system or the equalitarian-type systems. The investigator, therefore, proceeded on the basis that the patriarchal-type system is the point from which all family change is to be measured. We turn now to a discussion of change in beliefs, values, aspirations, and other aspects of family structure, as a result of industrialization and mass public education experiences.

Beliefs[14] have the cultural function of defining what is, what was, or what might be. Cognitive ideas are acquired as part of the socialization processes of the school system, the factory system, and the governmental system, not to mention the many other private systems in the community. In terms of word-of-mouth acquisition of new cognitive ideas, outside the family and the church, the school system is most notable because it typically has the earliest contact with the child. From the first day of attendance, girls in particular are presented new cognitive "definitions of situations" which they are expected to assimilate. But even more consequential in the case of females is the later equal participation with males in the social system of school. In the open competition with males for prestige, power, grades, scholarships, girls begin to acquire new images of femininity which contrast sharply with the traditional images. Winning leadership positions in school and winning scholarships, or even seeing other girls do so, gradually has the effect of changing the traditional self-idea of females from the idea of inferiority to the idea of equality, or at least near-equality. The girls discover that in social competition education itself is an "equalizer." They also discover that systematic knowledge and skill are more important in seeking employment in the modern factories than maleness or femaleness. The school itself validates these cognitive discoveries through the teaching faculty. The female teachers, who were once the minority but are now the majority, are practical examples of the new equality of opportunity for females.

The work plant contributes in its own unique way to the new images and to the new cognitive definitions of innate female capacity. Simply offering jobs to all who qualify is enough to stir the imaginations and aspirations of young girls, but the new plants, mostly light industries, do more. They hire more women than men and thereby encourage young women to give up their near-slave status for a newer independent one. By leaving home for outside employment and earning as much or more as their husbands, a near-independent status can be achieved. Once the females start working in the factories side by side with the males, where they cannot ask for any "breaks" nor give any "breaks," especially where piecework is involved, the idea of equal worth is tested in reality. As it happens, on payday, many women line up at the pay window and take home more than their male counterparts. At this time the cognitive idea of equality receives a reinforcement as never before. Personal worth is financially measurable now, and out of this experience they conclude that money and productivity are also more valued than maleness or femaleness. In fact, money and productivity, like education, are objective measures of individual worth; they become ways by which women and men alike can

[14] See J. Mayone Stycos, *Family and Fertility in Puerto Rico: A Study of the Lower Income Group* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955).

compare themselves to one another. Because these industrial developments are relatively recent, so too are the new cognitive experiences. This is the reason that the young are more apt to have inculcated the new images of femininity.

Value orientations[15] are things, qualities, or states that people consider preferable. Tradition emphasizes family orientations as the most worthy value orientation for females. Outside employment, a childless marriage, and material acquisition are not considered "proper" goals for females. Nevertheless, outside the home, females learn new sex-role orientations and life goals chiefly by their direct participation in the social systems of the schools and of the work plants.

Aspirations[16] are those things, statuses, or states people strive to attain; they are, in part, a reflection of objective opportunities. The objective situation is that the contemporary opportunities belong to the wives-with-employment. Through the school curriculum such aspirations are held out to them. Through study they acquire the skill, knowledge, and attributes which give them access to the scarce, desirable jobs of the marketplace. Then the factories get into the process and validate the curriculum and years of study. They recruit these women with the new aspirations and practical educations. It follows that the contemporary jobs belong chiefly to the younger generation, and it is their education which makes it so. In this respect, young females have a definite advantage over young males, for the light industries in town require sewing and other "delicate" skills, and females seem more adept at these than males. The older women, educated or not, employed or not, do not have much opportunity to change their marital arrangements—especially after three or more children—so they do not have the same aspirations.

[15] *Ibid.*, chap. ii.

[16] See A. J. Jaffe, *Jobs and Economic Development* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959).

Traditionally, women were neither expected nor permitted, in most instances, to participate in the sociopolitical life of the community outside the home. However, the social life of the wife is changing. The traditional wife-mother role precludes an extensive social life, and women have not participated to a great extent outside the home. But going to school begins the modification of this facet of the traditional female sex role. With participation in school, females acquire a new degree of personal freedom of mobility, new social interests, and new memberships in clubs designed for ego expansion and diversion. After marriage these conditioning experiences typically result in a broadening social life, especially when combined with the work plant's encouragement of social life through its worker associations, parties, and recreation programs. The "proper place" for women was the home, and, therefore, those women who wanted to join special interest associations had a difficult time finding them available. But industrialization, education, and urbanization seemingly in due time give rise to business, professional, and civic groups. Besides, they give rise to desires for personal freedom of mobility,[17] freedom to select associates, and freedom for humor and diversion. Thus it is understandable that these women who are highly educated and employed (mostly factory workers and teachers) have a disproportionate involvement in special interest associations outside the home.

Years ago, women, on the whole, had neither voice nor vote in important family decisions. This developed into a unilateral flow of ideas and commands from husband to wife. Such a communication pattern was a barrier to effective exchanges of information in all matters from sexual intercourse

[17] This point of desire for freedom of mobility is discussed at length in David Landy, *Tropical Childhood* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959).

and family planning to budgeting of time.[18] Education, however, sets into motion some social changes in this process. By getting a formal education, women are able to bring to given issues relevant facts which increase their verbal facility and persuasiveness in discussion of important family issues. Employment makes itself felt even more directly in these changes. As working women begin to bring home their paychecks, husbands must either change their traditional authoritarian way of communicating or give up trying to get access to the wife's money. (If the wife's income is to be used to the advantage of all, husbands are forced to create and maintain something approximating a democratic communication pattern.) In this development, the one-way flow of commands breaks down and becomes a two-way flow of information and advice. The young employed wives just starting out in life feel they can influence decisions on family-related issues and exert pressure for such changes. The older women starting late careers have come to accept the traditional pattern. Therefore, they discuss fewer issues with their husbands; being more "tradition-directed," they apparently do not feel the necessity to change the traditional system.

Traditionally, shopping has been the job of husbands, chiefly because they allocated the money for food and other things. Restrictions on the freedom of mobility of wives was a second major factor in this shopping pattern. Restrictions may be overt or covert. A significant percentage of unemployed women of both generations stated that they do not go to the store alone, even though not actively prohibited from doing so by their husbands. This indicates that their adherence to traditional prescriptions results in the limiting of their freedom of movement and, unknowingly, the limiting of their involvement in shopping. But education helps change this situation through increased knowledge, increased voice in family decisions, and increased intellectual choice and autonomy in family matters concerning the children and the household. Employment continues the social change by resulting in control over some funds and thereby a direct voice and a vote in the allocation of family funds. These factors, combined with better ecological opportunities for shopping, better transportation, and more consumer goods, make it highly probable that educated employed wives will eventually have a wide scope in family shopping.

According to tradition, husbands are supposed to have the ultimate voice in final decisions.[19] In the past, wives have had neither voice nor vote. Higher education, however, leads to more independent thought and to the pursuit of certain self-interest on the part of wives.[20] Employment leads to financial independence, new objective measures of personal worth, freedom of choice, and a more democratic flow of information between husband and wife. As a result, there is emerging a democratic decision-making process in many families, and this includes a sharing of final decisions by wives with their husbands.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The central finding of this study was that the employing and the educating of wives under certain specific conditions were

[18] Hill, Stycos, and Back, *The Family and Population Control*, pp. 147–52.

[19] Several authors have written on the traditional power of the Puerto Rican wife. See, e.g., Stycos, *Family and Fertility in Puerto Rico*, chap. ii; Hill, Stycos, and Back, *The Family and Population Control*, pp. 49–59; Landy, *op. cit.*, p. 80; Charles Rogler, *Comerio: A Study of a Puerto Rican Town* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1940), pp. 84–85.

[20] See Melvin Tumin and Aronld Feldman, "Status Perspective and Achievement: A Study of Education and Class Structure in Puerto Rico," *American Sociological Review* (August, 1955), pp. 125–39; and Theodore Brameld, *The Remaking of a Culture: An Interdisciplinary Study of Culture and Education in Puerto Rico* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959).

associated with the new emerging family organization and subsequently with a decreasing number of children per family. In both age categories (15–34 and 35-and-over), high education and employment combined were consistently related to equalitarian or near-equalitarian-type family organizations, whereas low education and unemployment combined were consistently related to the patriarchal type of family organization. The equalitarian-type families had the lowest fertility rates, and the patriarchal-type families had the highest fertility rates. The general hypothesis of Hill, Stycos, and Back was fully supported.

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The Female Clergy: A Case of Professional Marginality

E. Wilbur Bock

ABSTRACT

The present paper reports an analysis of data on one marginal position, the clergywoman. At least two general factors have interacted to produce changes in the number and characteristics of clergywomen in the United States in the present century: opposition to women as clergy, and conflict between the roles required of clergy and those traditionally required of American women. Evidence is presented that the females have made some inroads into the clergy, but their numerical contribution has fluctuated greatly and remains small. The characteristics of females who enter and remain in the clergy are not likely to improve the image and status of the clergywoman. Clergywomen today are generally older and less educated than clergymen. They are less likely to be married than their male colleagues, and, if married, their spouses are more likely than those of clergymen to be absent. In comparison with male clergy, clergywomen are more likely to work part-time and to report much lower annual incomes. These characteristics provide little evidence for the increased professionalization of clergywomen, suggest at least their professional marginality, and may be seen as questioning the labeling of these females as "professional."

Most professions have been traditionally defined as open only to males and have been male dominated and male controlled. The boundaries of these occupations have been tightly maintained by the occupants and by the public at large. Recently, however, the barriers have been lowered, and women have entered many of these occupations in increasing numbers. The opening of professional roles to women has probably been greater for the whites than for the Negroes, and the number of professional alternatives remains relatively greater for white females.[1]

Practical considerations may help open professional avenues for women. The lack of males to fill the increasing number of professional positions may necessitate greater reliance on female occupants to perform these roles. Norms have been developed and structures have been created for the recruitment, training, and placement of women in these "male" professions. Although females are increasingly being encouraged to enter these occupations, they frequently find themselves on the fringe of their profession. They are not completely accepted by the public or by their male colleagues in their professional roles. Their experience in the labor force is likely to be that of professional marginality.

However, the degree of marginality of women varies among the different professions. One profession that apparently is quite, if not the most, resistant to change is the clergy,[2] which has not only been defined as masculine but as "sacredly" masculine. The father figure, a prominent feature of Christianity, is also a predominant ingredient in the image of the clergy. Sacred tradition has therefore helped maintain the boundaries of the clerical profession.

There has been much publicity regarding the increasing number of churches without

[1] Census data for 1960 indicated that, in comparison with their white colleagues, Negro female professionals were concentrated in a smaller number of professional occupations.

[2] The American Association of Women Ministers was founded in 1919 with the stated purpose "To promote equal ecclesiastical rights for women and to encourage young women to take up the work of the ministry." The organization claims a membership of 250 women who are licensed, ordained, or authorized to preach. It holds annual meetings and publishes a quarterly, *Woman's Pulpit* (reported in *Encyclopedia of Associations*, Vol. I: *National Organizations of the United States* [Detroit: Book Tower, 1964], p. 758.

religious leadership. This perceived threat of the decline in the provision of ministers could possibly help remove some of the barriers to the admission of women to the clergy. Although there has been no publicity regarding the state of religious leadership among Negroes, a recent study indicated that the lack of Negro clergy may be far more acute than that of the white clergy.[3] Negro females may, thus, have relatively greater opportunities to occupy ministerial positions than their white colleagues.

Although there have been some changes to permit women to become clergy,[4] these changes have met opposition both within and without the professional bodies of clergy.[5] After much deliberation, some major denominations have finally allowed women the full rights of ordination.[6] Females, however, do not necessarily serve in the ministerial role after they have been ordained.[7] One recent outcome of the debate over the ordination of women was the apparent creation of a "fourth order" of clergy in the Episcopal hierarchy so that a woman could be included on the clerical role. This clergywoman, however, will not perform marriages or administer communion.[8]

Opposition to women as clergy has varied not only among the large church bodies but has also varied among types of church organizations. Sect-type groups appear to approve of female clergy to a greater extent than do church-type groups; at least a much larger percentage of clergywomen are affiliated with sect-type than with church-type groups.[9] Even here, however, Negro females probably have a greater opportunity to serve as clergywomen than do white females, since Negroes are more likely than whites to be affiliated with sect-type groups or congregationally based churches. The greater approval of clergywomen by sects than by denominations reflects differences regarding definitions of the clergy.[10] The

[3] E. Wilbur Bock, "The Decline of the Negro Clergy: Changes in Formal Religious Leadership in the United States in the Twentieth Century" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, New Orleans, Louisiana, April, 1966 [mimeographed]).

[4] Recent books on the sociology of religion suggest that the admission of women to the clergy may be one of the most significant changes taking place in church organizations (see David O. Moberg, *The Church as a Social Institution* [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1962], pp. 508–9; Glenn M. Vernon, *Sociology of Religion* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962], pp. 198–99; and especially W. Seward Salisbury, *Religion in American Culture* [Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1964], pp. 284–88.

[5] Compare, e.g., a Gallup poll, which reported in 1947 that 47 per cent of the respondents were unconvinced that women should be clergy, with a Minnesota poll, which reported in 1956 that 59 per cent of the respondents were willing for women to be clergy (see "Public Still Reluctant To Accept Women Clergy," *Christian Century*, LXIV [July 16, 1947], 869; and Moberg, *op. cit.*).

[6] Salisbury, *op. cit.*, pp. 285–86.

[7] "Women in the Churches," *Christian Century*, LXIX (May 21, 1952), 606–7; and "Breakthrough for the Woman Minister," *Christian Century*, LXXIV (January 23, 1957), 100. Jones and Taylor report that only one-third of their sample of clergywomen was able to move directly into ministerial positions upon completion of education and certification. Two-thirds of these women found it necessary to enter other occupations until ministerial positions were available to them (see Arthur R. Jones, Jr., and Lee Taylor, "Differential Recruitment of Female Professionals: A Case Study of Clergywomen" [paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, April, 1965 (mimeographed), p. 5]).

[8] "California Woman 'Recognized' as Episcopal Clergy Member," *Lutheran*, III (October 13, 1965), 31.

[9] George F. Ketcham (ed.), *Yearbook of American Churches* (New York: National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1951), pp. 239–43; Benson Y. Landis (ed.), *Yearbook of American Churches* (New York: National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1952), pp. 264–65; and Benson Y. Landis (ed.), *Yearbook of American Churches* (New York: National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1964), p. 283.

[10] The sect emphasizes the saliency of clerical roles compared with other social roles, priority of the preaching role compared with other clerical roles, the "call" as compared with formal education, and lay leadership (see, e.g., John Scanzoni, "Resolution of Occupational-Conjugal Role Conflict in Clergy Marriages," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, XXVII [August, 1965], 396–402).

association of female clergy with sect-type organizations should be reflected in the characteristics of most clergywomen, since their characteristics are related to the social base of sect membership from which they are recruited and which they, in turn, serve.

The characteristics of clergywomen are affected, however, not only by the varying amounts of opposition to them but also by the conflict between roles expected of clergy and other roles expected of females. The roles required of the clergy may often conflict with those traditionally required of women. The expected greater orientation toward marriage and the family on the part of the female often precludes her consideration of the clergy as an occupation. If she enters such an occupation, conflict between roles of clergy and roles of marriage and family may result either in leaving the ministry and "disappearing into marriage" or forgoing marriage and family for the sake of a career.[11] This role conflict can, of course, occur between any career and marriage and family expectations. The conflict may be more acute, however, in the case of the ministry because this occupation is defined as a leadership position which tends to make exclusive and extensive demands on the role player. The husband may resent his wife's being a clergywoman, unless perhaps he also occupies a position of leadership (e.g., if he also is clergy). This conflict in role systems can be expected to be reflected in the characteristics of female clergy who probably must decide which system of action is to be most important in their lives: career or family. In the case of the clergy, the acuteness of the conflict may be too great to permit females to operate effectively or satisfactorily in both action systems.

[11] Cf. Jessie Bernard, *Academic Women* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1964), in which the author argues that the decline since 1930 in the proportion of academic personnel who are women is due partially to the "flight into maternity" as well as to the increasing attraction of other professional careers.

PROPOSITIONS

The above considerations led to the formulation of the following general propositions which guided the present investigation.

Proposition I.—There has been an increase in the number of clergywomen since the beginning of the present century. This increase has not been great, however, due to the lingering opposition to clergywomen, and the proportion of clergy who are female has remained small.

Proposition II.—A larger percentage of female than of male clergy is Negro. This is expected because the white female has more professional alternatives than the Negro female, and because of the greater association of the Negro than of the white with sect-type organizations.

Proposition III.—The female clergy is older, on the average, than the male clergy. This is expected because the lack of commitment to this occupation and the strong attractiveness of the alternatives are more likely to be experienced by the younger than by the older females.

Proposition IV.—The female clergy has obtained a lower level of education than the male clergy. The general opposition to clergywomen would lead the more highly educated women to enter other professions. At the same time, the sects continue to recruit from a less educated social base and accept a less educated clergy, including women.

Proposition V.—The clergywoman is less likely than the clergyman to be married and to be living with spouse. This is expected because of the conflicts between clergy and marriage roles.

DATA AND METHOD

Data for the present report were drawn from tabulations published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Information regarding a number of significant variables allowed comparisons of male[12] and female clergy,

[12] For the sake of brevity, only a limited amount of census data on male clergy is reported here. A more complete presentation of these data is to be made in a separate article (see also Bock, *op. cit.*).

comparisons of white and Negro clergy, as well as the determination of changes occurring in each of these racial and sex categories. The factors on which information was available are racial composition, age, educational attainment, and marital status. Some information was available for each of the decades from 1900 to 1960. Certain comparisons, however, could be made only for shorter periods of time due to the nature of the census reports. Whenever possible, the analysis was limited to employed clergy, although the information on certain variables was available only for experienced clergy.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGES OF EMPLOYED FEMALE CLERGY IN SPECIFIED RACIAL CATEGORIES, 1900–1960

YEAR	N	RACE			
		Total	White	Negro	Other Non-white
1900	3,405	100.0	95.05	4.9	0.05
1910	685	100.0	89.6	10.0	0 4
1920	1,787	100.5*	87.2	12.8	0.05
1930	3,276	100.0	84.6	15.1	0.3
1940	3,148	†	†	†	†
1950	6,777	100.0	89.6	10.4	0.0
1960	4,695	100.0	87.5	11.5	1.0

* Because of rounding, the percentages do not add to 100.0.

† Racial composition of clergywomen was not available for 1940.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Statistics of Occupations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), Table 36, p. cxiii, and Table 37, p. cxiv; U.S Bureau of the Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910*, Vol. IV: *Population—Occupational Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), Table 6, p. 428; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920*, Vol. IV: *Population—Occupations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923), chap. iii, Table 5, p. 342; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930*, Vol. V: *Population—General Reports on Occupations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), chap. iii, Table 3, pp. 83–84; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1950*, Vol. IV: *Special Reports*, Part 1, chap. B, "Occupational Characteristics" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), Table 3, p. 29; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Subject Reports, Occupational Characteristics*, Final Report PC(2)-7A (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 3, p. 21.

FINDINGS

PROPOSITION I

Census data support the proposition that the number of clergywomen has increased between 1900 and 1960. There were 4,695 clergywomen in the United States in 1960, an increase of about 38 per cent since the turn of the century, at which time there were 3,405 clergywomen (see Table 1). However, the male clergy increased approximately 81 per cent during this period, so that the percentages of females in the total clergy decreased somewhat from 3.0 per cent in 1900 to 2.3 per cent in 1960.

Moreover, the number of clergywomen displayed great fluctuations between 1900 and 1960, with increases between 1910 and 1950, but decreases between 1900 and 1910 and between 1950 and 1960. The percentages of females in the total clergy decreased from 3.0 in 1900 to 0.6 in 1910, increased steadily to 4.0 in 1950, and decreased to 2.3 in 1960.

The remarkable fluctuations by decades in the number of clergywomen are difficult to interpret. They may result from opposition experienced in the ministry, conflict between marital and clerical roles, the lack of strong commitment to the clergy as a career, and the existence of professional alternatives. However, the fact that the fluctuations by decade are quite uneven

would necessitate the assumption that these explanatory factors are also unevenly experienced from decade to decade. Since there is no known evidence to support this assumption, the explanation of the fluctuations in the number of clergywomen remains conjecture.

Even if these "explanations" were valid, they would, of course, have a differential effect on the various categories of women. The discussion of each of the subsequent propositions notes which of the categories have fluctuated the most, and which of the factors mentioned above might help to explain these differentials.

PROPOSITION II

The second proposition, that a larger percentage of female than of male clergy is Negro, is not supported by census data in any decade until 1960.

One method of ascertaining the degree to which Negro and white females contribute their proportionate shares to the clergywomen is to compare the percentages of the male clergy that is Negro with the corresponding percentages of the female clergy. Such comparisons show that the male had higher percentages of Negroes than the female clergy between 1900 and 1950. During this period, however, the percentage of clergymen that was Negro decreased,[13] while the percentage of clergywomen that was Negro increased (see Table 1). Thus, relative to the male clergy, Negroes did not contribute disproportionately to clergywomen until 1960, at which time the female clergy had a higher percentage of Negroes than the male clergy (11.5 per cent versus 6.7 per cent).

However, it has long been noted that, relative to the total male population, Negro males have made up a disproportionately large percentage of male clergy. This same "predisposition" to become clergy may or may not be true for Negro females. One way of answering this question is to compare the percentage of the white clergy that is female with a corresponding percentage of the Negro clergy (see Table 2). Such comparisons show higher percentages in the white clergy than in the Negro clergy between 1900 and 1960, during which time these differences diminished. In 1960, the percentage of females in the Negro clergy was higher than that in the white. Thus, relative to the Negro males, the Negro females did not contribute disproportionately to the clergy until 1960.

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL EMPLOYED CLERGY THAT IS FEMALE, ACCORDING TO SPECIFIED RACIAL CATEGORIES, 1900–1960

Year	Race			
	White		Negro	
	N	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent
1900	3,207	3.3	164	1.1
1910	614	0.6	68	0.4
1920	1,558	1.4	228	1.2
1930	2,772	2.3	494	2.0
1940	*	*	*	*
1950	6,450	4.5	750	4.0
1960	3,859	2.1	508	3.7

* Racial composition of clergywomen was not available for 1940.

Source: See Table 1.

The increasing visibility of Negroes among female clergy is probably related to the decreasing number of Negro clergymen. The steady loss of Negro clergymen since 1930 may have provided more opportunities for Negro women to serve as clergy. The increasing number of white clergymen during that period has probably limited the number of opportunities for white clergywomen.

PROPOSITION III

The third proposition, that female clergy are relatively older than male clergy, is not supported by census data in any decade of the present century until 1960. (The changes that have occurred in the age composition of the female clergy are indicated

[13] *Ibid.*

in Table 3 for those years in which census data were tabulated in comparable age categories according to race or color.)

Regardless of race, today there is a tendency for clergywomen generally to be older than male clergy. The median age for clergymen in 1960, for example, was 43.2, while that of clergywomen was 48.7.[14] Whereas in earlier decades of the present century there were higher percentages of female clergy under thirty-five years of age than was true of the male clergy, there has been an apparent tendency for clergywomen to experience a greater "aging process" than clergymen from 1900 to 1960. Both white and Negro female clergy have displayed greater fluctuations in number at the younger than at the older ages (over forty-five) than was true for male clergy. Thus, it may be more difficult to recruit and keep relatively young clergywomen than young clergymen.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGES OF THE EMPLOYED CLERGYWOMEN WHO WERE IN SPECIFIED AGE CLASSES, BY COLOR, UNITED STATES, 1900, 1930, 1950, AND 1960

COLOR AND YEAR	N	AGE LEVELS					
		Total	Under 35	35–44	45–54	55–64	65 and Over
White:							
1900	3,207	100.0	53.0	21.6	12.9	9.5	3.0
1930	2,772	100.0	25.0	25.5	24.2	17.2	8.1
1950	6,450	100 0	31.1	25.6	20.5	15.8	7.0
1960	3,859	100.0	19.6	21.8	28.3	14.2	16.1
Non-white:*							
1900	164	100.0	32.6	32.5	20.2	9.2	5.5
1930	494	100.0	20.3	33.5	30 0	12.2	4.0
1950	750	100.0	16.0	16.0	28.0	24.0	16.0
1960	550	100.0	14.9	10.9	29.6	19.0	25.6

* The figures for 1900 and 1930 are for Negroes only; those for 1950 and 1960 are for all non-whites.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Statistics of Occupations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), Table 5, pp. 20–21, Table 6, pp. 24–25, Table 7, pp. 28–29, and Table 9, pp. 36–37; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930*, Vol. V: *Population—General Reports on Occupations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), chap. iv, Table 7, pp. 154–55, Table 8 pp 174–75, and Table 9, pp. 192–93; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1950*, Vol. IV: *Special Reports*, Part 1, chap. B, "Occupational Characteristics" (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), Table 6, p. 75, and Table 7, p. 87; U S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population· 1960, Subject Reports, Occupational Characteristics*, Final Report PC(2)-7A (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 6, p. 81, and Table 7, p. 101.

PROPOSITION IV

Census data support the proposition that clergywomen have attained a relatively lower level of education than clergymen. (The information in Table 4 is based on census reports for the two decades for which data were available. It was assumed that treating non-whites as Negroes would not bias the interpretation unduly.)

White and Negro female clergy tend to be of lower educational status than their male colleagues. The median number of completed years of school in 1950 was 16.0 plus for clergymen and 12.8 for clergywomen; comparable figures for 1960 were 17.1 and 12.8. Differences between the sexes in educational attainment were more marked among white than among Negro clergy.

Given the age and racial composition of the clergywomen, however, the low level of attained education is perhaps to be expected. Since no direct comparisons regarding attained education could be made between clergywomen and clergymen, or between clergywomen and females in the

[14] This difference in age is greater than would have been expected from comparisons of male and female professionals and of males and females in the general labor force.

total labor force (with age and color controlled), indirect standardization was used.[15] This method indicated that the educational attainment of clergywomen, given their age and racial composition, was no less than that of the female labor force. In fact, clergywomen had attained a level of education greater than the female labor force would lead one to expect. In comparison with other working females, then, clergywomen appear in a favorable light. In comparison with other female professionals, however, and in comparison with clergymen, the lower educational attainment of clergywomen (regardless of age and racial composition) remains conspicuous.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGES OF THE EXPERIENCED CLERGYWOMEN WHO COMPLETED SPECIFIED NUMBERS OF YEARS IN SCHOOL, BY COLOR, UNITED STATES, 1950–60

COLOR AND YEAR	N	LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED					
		Total	Elementary School or Less	High School		College	
				1–3 Years	4 Years	1–3 Years	4 Years or More
White:							
1950	6,540	97.7*	18.8	10.1	22.0	22.9	22.9
1960	3,859	100.0	14.6	16.6	23.3	22.9	22.6
Non-white:							
1950	780	96.1*	34.6	23.1	15.4	11.5	11.5
1960	550	100 0	32.7	11.1	18.0	12.0	26.2

* Because of rounding and the omission from census reports of persons not reporting their educational status, percentages do not total 100.0.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1950*, Vol. IV: *Special Reports*, Part 1, chap. B, "Occupational Characteristics" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), Table 10, p. 107, and Table 11, p. 115; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S Census of Population: 1960, Subject Reports, Occupational Characteristics*, Final Report PC(2)-7A (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 9, p. 123, and Table 10, p. 137.

The median educational attainment of clergywomen apparently did not increase to any great extent between 1950 and 1960. Census data disclosed further that, with increasing education, females were more likely to enter professional occupations but less likely to use the ministry as a professional outlet. These highly educated women were more likely to enter other professions in which they were accepted by the public.

PROPOSITION V

Census data support the proposition that clergywomen are less likely than clergymen to be married and to be living with spouse. (Although data were available from previous census reports, only those for 1960 are presented in this paper for the sake of brevity.)

The census report for 1960 indicates

[15] The following steps were involved in indirect standardization: (1) determining what proportions of persons in the labor force at each age level had attained given levels of education, (2) distributing the number of clergy of each age level across levels of education in the same proportions as the labor force, (3) summing across age levels within educational levels, and (4) using these summary figures on each educational level as standards for comparisons with the actual number of clergy at each educational level. This procedure was performed for each color and sex category separately. The method, of course, involved the assumption that at each age level the distribution of educational attainment (or any other variable under consideration) was similar to that of the labor force. The validity of this assumption remains an unknown (see George W. Barclay, *Techniques of Population Analysis* [New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958], pp. 174–77, for a discussion of indirect standardization).

that clergywomen are more likely than clergymen to be single, widowed, or divorced (see Table 5).[16] These differences in marital status were apparent in every census report since 1900. Additional information provided by the 1960 census report indicates that, among the married, the spouses of clergywomen are more likely to be absent than those of clergymen (7.1 per cent versus 1.7 per cent).

The marital status of clergywomen, however, may be due to their age and racial composition. Indirect standardization indicated the marital status of clergywomen, given their age and racial composition, was the same as that of the female labor force. Although clergywomen do not differ maritally from other females of the same age and racial composition, they do differ from clergymen in this respect. Census data allowed the marital status of clergymen and clergywomen to be compared directly within each age category. Such comparisons established the fact that, age for age, female clergy are less likely to be married than are male clergy.

It has been suggested above that this marital deviance reflects various solutions to the conflict between marital and occupational roles. The fact that clergywomen are more likely than clergymen to work part-time suggests one solution to the conflict between requirements of family and career. The fact that clergywomen have a relatively high percentage of absent spouses may have resulted from another type of solution. The relatively high percentage of divorced clergywomen hints at still another possibility. And widowhood, perhaps, frees the female from both marital and family responsibilities, forces her to work, and affords her the opportunity to assume the ministerial role previously occupied by her husband. These solutions could, of course, hold true for many other occupations that women perform. That they might hold true for the clergywomen suggests, at least, that ministerial roles for females are different or differentially experienced from those same roles for males.

The author proposes, however, that the most significant evidence for the conflict between career and marital orientations is the large amount of fluctuation in number of young (25–44 years of age) single clergywomen. As young single females enter the ministry, they face opposition, experience role conflict, and do not perform the roles for which they thought they were prepared. Consequently, they leave the ministry for a more satisfactory alternative. Whether these clergywomen are "disap-

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGES OF THE EXPERIENCED CLERGY WHO WERE IN SPECIFIED MARITAL CATEGORIES, BY SEX, UNITED STATES, 1960

Sex	N	Marital Categories				
		Total	Single	Married	Widowed	Divorced
Male.......	196,367	100.0	22.2	76 5	0.9	0 4
Female......	4,409	100 0	23.4	57.8	15.2	3.6

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Subject Reports, Occupational Characteristics*, Final Report PC(2)-7A (Washington, D.C.. Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 12, p. 174.

[16] The percentages of unmarried male and female clergy appear to be approximately the same in Table 5. However, when the presence of Catholic priests among male clergy is taken into account, the differences in percentages between unmarried clergywomen and clergymen become even more noticeable.

pearing into marriage" or choosing another career awaits field research.[17]

CONCLUSIONS

Census data provide little evidence for the increased professionalization of clergywomen, greater acceptance of women as clergy, more use of the clergy by women as an occupational outlet, or improvement of the composite "woman preacher."[18] In fact, the data may be interpreted to question attributing the very label of "profession" to these females. In some characteristics (e.g., educational attainment), they are more like the general labor force than like other professionals. The differences between male and female clergy in age, educational attainment, and marital status are quite conspicuous, and these distinctions suggest that clergy roles are different for females than for males or are differentially experienced by the two sexes. The opportunities for females to act as clergy are more limited than for males, and these limitations have produced a composite picture of the female clergy that *at least suggests* professional marginality.

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[17] Data from earlier census reports (1900, 1920, and 1930) indicated that the large percentage of single clergywomen is probably due more to white females while the large percentage of widowed clergywomen is probably due to Negro females. If "flight into marriage" is occurring, it may more likely be experienced by white than by Negro clergywomen. On the other hand, the assumption of the ministerial role of the deceased husband may be experienced by a greater percentage of Negro than of white clergywomen.

[18] See, e.g., "Breakthrough for the Woman Minister," *op. cit.*, p. 100, where the anticipation was that "A significant result of the Methodist and Presbyterian, USA, actions in 1956 is likely to be enhancement of the quality of the composite 'woman preacher.'"

Birth Order and Attainment of the Doctorate
A Test of Economic Hypotheses[1]

Alan E. Bayer

ABSTRACT

One of the often posed explanations for the repeated finding of an overrepresentation of early-born among high academic achievement groups has been that firstborn have greater access to family financial resources for education than do those born later. Data from a sample of 8,124 doctorate recipients fail to support a number of hypotheses derived from this explanation, however. Doctorates whose fathers have little education are not as likely to be firstborn as are those whose fathers have greater educational accomplishments. Later-born who attain the doctorate are not found to be lacking older brothers more often than expected. High measured ability level does not appear to be a compensatory trait for those assumed to be in a position of relative financial disadvantage. Alternative explanations of the pervasiveness of birth-order effects on achievement are noted, and the role of future birth-order research is discussed.

Social researchers have been giving increasing attention over the past century to the effect of sibling position on personality formation and on subsequent behavior. One of the most striking birth-order effects, and also one of the most researched relationships using this variable, is that of the association between one's sibling position and his ability and achievement. In a recent review of the literature, Altus summarizes twenty studies, all of which report impressive findings indicating that firstborn and only children are overrepresented relative to later-born, in high-intelligence groups, in cohorts which go on to college and graduate from college, and in groups of eminent scholars.[2] However, each of these three probable correlates of birth order are interrelated. Ability level affects the likelihood of attending college, graduating from college, and going on to graduate school. In turn, having attended college and graduate school increases the likelihood of achieving eminence. Thus, any point in this causal chain may be affected by birth-order differ-

[1] This research is part of the work of the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Education which is supported by grants from the Carnegie Corporation and the Russell Sage Foundation. I am indebted to Lindsey R. Harmon and Herbert Soldz of the National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council, Office of Scientific Personnel, for making available the data and necessary tabulations. I also wish to thank Dee Burton for considerable assistance in bibliographic and computation work and to acknowledge the helpful comments of John K. Folger and Helen S. Astin in their critical reading of the paper. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, New York City, April, 1966.

[2] William D. Altus, "Birth Order and Its Sequelae," *Science*, CLI (January 7, 1966), 44–49. Other reviews of the literature report studies which hint at different relationships, although the number of these is in a definite minority. Gardner Murphy, Lois B. Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1937), pp. 348–63, review a number of studies, some of which show no birth-order differences in ability, others which show that firstborn are more intelligent than later-born, and still others that show later-born to be more intelligent than firstborn. One of the earliest and most convincing findings showing superior intelligence of the later-born is reported by L. L. Thurstone and Richard L. Jenkins, *Order of Birth, Parent-Age, and Intelligence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931). These researchers found that within families (i.e., between actual siblings) there is a consistent increase in average intelligence from firstborn to lastborn, with the average ad-

ences, with subsequent effects only indirectly related to birth order.[3]

EXPLANATORY HYPOTHESES

There are three relatively distinct frames of reference utilized to interpret the findings relating ordinal position to ability and achievement. Each yields alternative hypotheses which allow the interpretation of conflicting findings.

INTRAUTERINE AND PERINATAL INFLUENCES

A large number of possible physiological sources of variation associated with birth order have been noted. One of the primary physiological explanations that has been posed to explain the higher ability level of earlier-born over later-born is the uterine-fatigue hypothesis. A primary aspect of this hypothesis is that of an assumed richer uterine environment for the earlier-born. A woman is viewed as having a partially exhaustive supply of nutriment; and with succeeding births, the aging effects of the mother also make it more difficult for the fetus to assimilate these necessary materials. Thus, each succeeding fetus receives a lesser degree of nourishing materials essential for superior development than did the previous child.

The alternative physiological hypotheses are based on such birth-order-related phenomena as length of labor, frequency of use of forceps, and variation in weight at birth. Permanent neural damage as a result of hypoxia during delivery or the use of instruments to facilitate the birth process, or long-term weaknesses as a result of prematurity and subsequent increased physical difficulty in coping with the outside world, is more prevalent in firstborn. On these bases, later-born siblings within a family would be expected to possess greater intellectual capacity than their older siblings.

A third possibility is that if several of these physiological effects, both facilitative and detrimental, are operative, the ability level of the earlier-born would be of a greater range and variance than that of the later-born. At least one preliminary study would suggest that this is the case. Nichols has reported an analysis of the birth positions and ability level of 1,600 National Merit Scholarship finalists and a normative group of 850 students which suggests that earlier-born children in a family are more variable in intelligence than later-born, resulting in increased concentrations of the early-born at both the very high and the very low ability levels.[4]

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vantage over the firstborn rising to eighteen I.Q. points for those born eighth or later. Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), p. 225, suggest that this finding may not necessarily be at odds with those reviewed by Altus, however, in that the consistent increase in average intelligence from first- to lastborn only holds *within* families and that, in the population at large, when a cross-sectional research design is employed, later-born have lower I.Q.'s as the result of larger families being more prevalent among lower I.Q. groups.

Stanley Schachter, "Birth Order, Eminence, and Higher Education," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (October, 1963), 757, notes two relatively obscure reports regarding birth order and eminence, one of which reports that distinguished men are more frequently the lastborn members of a family and the other of which reports that birth order has no effect on greatness. The remaining eleven studies he reviews, however, reflect overwhelming evidence of a marked association between birth order and productivity, creativity, and eminence.

The relationship between being firstborn and the greater likelihood of attending and graduating from college has been documented a large number of times with virtually no contradictory findings.

[3] Schachter, *ibid.*, argues this point in regard to the eminence studies. He maintains that the "surplus of first-borns among eminent scholars appears to have nothing to do with any direct relationship of birth order to eminence, but is simply a reflection of the fact that scholars, eminent or not, derive from a college population in which first-borns are in marked surplus" (p. 768).

[4] Robert C. Nichols, "Birth Order and Intelligence" (unpublished manuscript, National Merit Scholarship Corporation, 1964). The earlier work by Thurstone and Jenkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–12, suggests that variability of intelligence increases in later birth orders, however.

ORDINAL POSITION DIFFERENCES IN SOCIALIZATION

A second kind of explanation is social-psychological. Researchers have reported a large number of personality variables which are associated with birth order and with achievement. Differential achievement is viewed as a function of various personality attributes which largely result from differential parental treatment accorded children of different ordinal positions. However, so many of the findings have been contradictory (e.g., some studies report firstborn are more independent than later-born, others the reverse; some report firstborn are more passive than later-born, others report firstborn are more aggressive) that any given relationship which may be found between birth order and achievement can usually be explained by calling upon a selective rationale and review of findings regarding the relationship between personality variables and birth order or achievement.

Roe, for example, hypothesizes that the overrepresentation of firstborn among high achievers is a function of their greater need for and development of *independence* as the result of childhood experiences. She says:

> Two hypotheses come to mind. One is that first-born are likely to be overprotected . . . [and thus they] may be compensating in terms of seeking more independence. The other hypothesis is that eldest sons may have more responsibility for themselves and have it earlier than is the case for other children; they also have been spared the discouragement of not being able to compete with those just older. Hence they are just continuing an early pattern of independence.[5]

Altus, on the other hand, uses a rationale which partially attributes the greater educational achievement of firstborn to their greater *dependency* needs. After reviewing selected research findings, he concludes:

> The first-born may do better in school . . . [because] his curiosity, dependence upon adults, and greater conscience development doubtless make him respond more affirmatively to the teacher and to the school. He should thus more frequently win the teacher's approval, which should serve to augment further his tendencies to do that which is expected of him as a student. If this inference is correct, it is easy to understand why the colleges attract such a high proportion of the first-born.[6]

Other psychologists have presented implicit hypotheses which suggest lower academic achievement among firstborn as a result of differential socialization processes. Heilbrun and Fromme,[7] for example, review five studies which had employed Parsons' instrumental-expressive orientation analysis and had reported that college achievement is related to high instrumental–low expressive behavior. The authors further note that their studies show that firstborn children of both sexes have greater identification with the mother and higher expressive orientations than do later-born. Thus, although not stated explicitly by the authors, one would conclude on this basis that there would be an underrepresentation of firstborn in high academic achievement groups.

Hypotheses based on differential socialization processes accorded to children of different ordinal positions have also been posed as alternative or supplementary to physiological and genetic hypotheses that have been used to explain I.Q. differences. Altus concludes:

> [There is] room to believe that the child can increase his intelligence by hard intellectual work. If the first-born, by virtue of his different treatment in the home, takes to school more readily, works harder, persists longer (as the college attendance figures attest), then it

[5] Anne Roe, "A Psychological Study of Eminent Psychologists and Anthropologists, and a comparison with Biological and Physical Scientists," *Psychological Monographs*, LXII, No. 2 (1953), 47.

[6] Altus, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[7] Alfred B. Heilbrun, Jr., and Donald K. Fromme, "Parental Identification of Late Adolescents and Level of Adjustment: The Importance of Parent-Model Attributes, Ordinal Position, and Sex of Child," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, CVII (1965), 49–59.

might be expected that he may well increase his intellectual stature in the process.[8]

ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS OF ACHIEVEMENT DIFFERENCES

A third frame of reference which has been used to interpret findings of over- or underrepresentation in college enrolments for those in particular ordinal positions is an economic one. Again, alternative hypotheses are posed which could account for several different outcomes.

Clark[9] argues that the firstborn in a family is likely to have more financial resources available to him than do the later-born. The firstborn gets a good start in education before adversity befalls the family, or before the expense of caring for an increasing number of children reduces the financial resources available to him. Further, the firstborn uses up a disproportionate amount of the family's available financial resources for education, thereby causing a curtailment in the educational achievement possible for those siblings who follow him.

Clark also notes, however, that the laterborn may be able to draw upon the wages of the earlier-born to support his continuing education, thereby surpassing the educational attainment of the older siblings. Cattell and Brimhall[10] also point out that families are likely to improve their economic condition over time, thereby increasing the possibility of the younger children in the family pursuing further education than their older siblings.

TESTING HYPOTHESES DERIVED FROM THE EXPLANATIONS

A comprehensive treatment of the birth-order variable, with concomitant factors controlled, requires an extremely large sample size. The permutations of sex and spacing, in combination with the large number of possible birth-order positions and family sizes, yield an extremely large number of categories. The complexity of research is further magnified by the introduction of just one independent variable together with only a few basic control variables, such as the age of the mother at birth of the child, the socioeconomic position of the family, or the personality configurations of the parents.[11]

Adequate controls for simultaneously testing alternative hypotheses derived from the three theoretical foci have not been possible in any study to date, primarily because of the small number of cases that have generally been employed. Adequate explanation of observed overrepresentation of firstborn in high achievement groups is highly dependent upon the cumulative nature of scientific findings which are based on relatively narrowly defined and focused researches which test specific hypotheses. Heretofore, little attempt has been made at hypothesis testing; descriptive studies abound which demonstrate that ordinal position is related to achievement, but the explanation is either left unmentioned or relegated to the realm of speculation.

In this present study, birth-order data are presented on a large sample of individ-

[8] Altus, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[9] E. L. Clark, *American Men of Letters, Their Nature and Nurture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916), p. 84.

[10] J. McKeen Cattell and Dean R. Brimhall (eds.), *American Men of Science: A Biographical Directory* (3d ed.; Garrison, N.Y.: Science Press, 1921), p. 803.

[11] Several other methodological difficulties are also unique to the study of birth-order effects. Obvious examples are the classification problems encountered with samples which include those of multiple births, those with half-siblings and step-siblings, or those who had an older sibling who died in infancy or childhood. Such a minority of cases, however, is unlikely to affect the findings to the extent that they become troublesome to the interpretation of results. Krinsky, for example, defined birth order so as to take into separate account chronological and psychological birth-order position. However, the results and conclusions were unaffected by this distinction (see Susan Gans Krinsky, "The Relationship among Birth Order, Dimensions of Independence-Dependence and Choice of a Scientific Career," in William W. Cooley, *Career Development of Scientists: An Overlapping Longitudinal Study* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Graduate School of Education, 1963], pp. 157–70).

uals with high academic achievement (the doctorate degree). These data are employed to test the following hypotheses which are derived from an economic frame of reference and economic theory which would suggest that the firstborn benefit more than the later-born from the available financial resources (with father's educational achievement employed as a proxy variable for economic position):

Hypothesis I.—Firstborn are more overrepresented in the high educational achievement group if drawn from a low economic background (as reflected by little formal education of the father) than if drawn from a high economic background.

This hypothesis is based on the assumption that if limited financial resources are available for education, they will be channeled to the earlier-born. If relatively unlimited resources are available, later-born as well as earlier-born will be able to benefit.

Hypothesis II.—Later-born who attain the doctorate are likely not to have older siblings who are male.

This hypothesis is based on the assumption that in American society male achievement is valued over female achievement. Thus, if limited financial resources are available for education, they will be channeled to the eldest child who is a male.

Hypothesis III.—The ability level of later-born who attain the doctorate is generally higher than that of the firstborn.

This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the availability of family financial resources is related to the order of birth and is one of the factors which precludes or enhances educational achievement. If this economic factor is minimized for the later-born relative to the firstborn, other factors, including ability level, would in turn need to be more facilitative to high achievement.

THE DATA

The National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council collects and publishes information on virtually all earned doctorates annually awarded in the United States. For the first time, in 1962, the doctorate questionnaire included an item requesting the sex and ordinal positions of the doctorate's siblings. Between 1957 and 1962, I.Q. data, collected from a follow-up of the high schools of the doctorates, were also gathered as a part of a research study by Lindsey Harmon.[12] Thus, for those doctorate recipients of 1962, available data on birth order and on measured I.Q. can be collated.

The doctorate records also contain information on the educational achievement of the parents. No occupational or income data were collected, however. Admittedly, father's education is a crude and incomplete measure of the socioeconomic position of the doctorate's family of origin, but it is the only available measure, and it is directly related to income levels.[13] For purposes of testing the above hypotheses, only gross groupings of doctorates are made on the basis of education of the father. Three categories are formed which yield a relatively even distribution of doctorates and are consistent with occupationally important points in the American educational system (i.e., at completion of elementary school and at completion of undergraduate school).

[12] Lindsey Harmon, "High School Backgrounds of Science Doctorates," *Science*, CXXXIII (March 10, 1961), 679–88; and *High School Ability Patterns: A Backward Look from the Doctorate* (Scientific Manpower Report, No. 6 [Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council, Office of Scientific Personnel, August, 1965]). In the present paper the concept "I.Q." is employed as an abbreviation for "measured ability score" rather than in the literal sense of the mental age to chronological age ratio multiplied by 100. Multiplication of the reported "I.Q." scores will yield an intelligence quotient value comparable to Army General Classification test scores.

[13] Robert W. Hodge, "The Status Consistency of Occupational Groups," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (June, 1962), 336–43, reports a correlation of .78 between education and income from 1950 census data. This direct relationship between income and education, by age group, from the 1960 census is reflected in the tabulations presented in U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of the Population: 1960*, Subject Reports: *Educational Attainment* (Final Report PC[2]-5B [Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963], pp. 88–89).

Of the 11,950 doctorates awarded in 1962, two-thirds (8,124) had what is defined as complete birth-order information.[14] These 8,124 compose the sample in this study.

Thirty-seven per cent (3,009) of the sample have ability measures available. These I.Q. scores, from various intelligence tests, have been converted to equivalent standard scores with a population mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. Those included in the sample have a mean I.Q. score of 64.9 and a standard deviation of 8.8. As the high school, rather than the individual, was responsible for reporting these ability scores, and as previous studies which have used these I.Q. data have found no evidence which would suggest that those doctorates with I.Q. scores available are different from those without the I.Q. scores, it is reasonable to assume no missing I.Q. score bias with regard to the present study variables.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

ORDINAL POSITION CHARACTERISTICS OF DOCTORATES AND POSSIBLE METHODOLOGICAL ARTIFACTS

About one-half (4,059) of the doctorates in the sample are firstborn, one-fourth are second-born, and the remaining one-fourth are third- or later-born. As the distribution in live-birth order is variable over time (in the last twenty years it has varied from only 27 per cent being firstborn in some years to 43 per cent being firstborn in other years), each birth cohort in the doctorate sample is adjusted to the reported live-birth-order distribution of the population of the same year of birth cohort. This adjusted expected distribution in birth order reflects a distribution (in the population from which the 1962 doctorates were drawn) of 33.3 per cent firstborn, 22.9 per cent second-born, and 43.9 per cent third- or later-born.[15] The resulting observed-to-expected ratios are as follows: firstborn, 1.50; second-born, 1.10; and third- or later-born, 0.57—an overrepresentation of *both* first- and second-born in the doctorate group. As the age at the doctorate varies considerably among fields (from a mean age of 27 for physical scientists, to 35 for those in education), the adjusted expected birth-order distribution is also computed separately for each major field area. In all fields, *both* the first- and second-born emerge as being overrepresented in the doctorate sample.

No conclusion may be drawn with regard to the magnitude of birth-order effects on educational attainment from these data, however. A comparison of the distribution of the sample with that of the population must take into account not only the variation in live-birth order over time but also other differences which may exist between the sample and the population which could account for the observed birth-order differences (e.g., difference in family size which is related to such factors as social class and racial composition).

Further analysis shows that doctorates are drawn from a select subpopulation of the United States which has characteristics

[14] The question in the survey asked the respondent to report the number of siblings (if none, write zero) in each sex-position category—number of older brothers, older sisters, younger brothers, younger sisters. Of the 11,950 doctorates, 6,097 filled in all four responses (with 1,140 having zeros in all four categories); an additional 1,782 reported a number in at least one category, but not all four (the blank categories were assumed to indicate no siblings in the category); and an additional 245 left all the categories blank but had answered all the previous and subsequent questions on the survey (in this case, the blank categories were also assumed to indicate no siblings). The remaining 3,826 had left the sibling-position question blank and had left some of the other adjacent questions in the survey blank also. Only this latter group is omitted. This definition of response acceptance probably tends to understate the number of doctorates who are only children. Although acceptable for the present analyses, extreme caution should be exercised in using these data for estimating the proportion who are only children in this high achievement group.

[15] Based on variation in the distribution in white live-birth order by year of birth of doctorates. Computed from U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Vital Statistics of the United States, 1961*, Vol. I: *Natality* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Table 1-F, pp. 1–22, and Table 1-J, pp. 1–24.

that would lead to an overrepresentation of early births in the doctorate sample, relative to the total population, even if birth order per se is unrelated to high academic achievement. As the average age of doctorates is in the early 30's and that of parents at the time of childbearing is in the mid-20's to late 30's, the parents of doctorates who were graduates in 1962 would be age 55 and over at the time of the 1960 census. The male cohort of this age in the 1960 population has a median of 8.5 years of education, while the doctorates have reported a median of 11.8 years for their father's education.[16] These educational differences, which partially reflect socioeconomic differences, are known to be related to fertility behavior. Indeed, while the family of orientation of doctorates has a median of 2.6 children, that of the family of procreation of mothers in the total population, age 55 and over, is 2.8 children.[17]

The appropriate base population, to which the doctorate sample should be compared, cannot be derived from published vital statistics or census data. No statistics are available on live-birth-order distribution in the population over time, controlling for the necessary sociodemographic variables. Analysis of birth-order data which compares the observed distribution in birth order to a priori probabilities, or notes ratios of firstborn to lastborn, oldest to all others, first half of sibship to last half of sibship, or some similar dichotomy, may be employed as a means to partially circumvent the methodological problems related to analyses which employ the population as the referent.

Table 1 shows the observed and a priori birth-order distribution in the doctorate sample, by size of sibship. In each sibship size from two to five, a greater number of doctorates are firstborn than is expected.[18] Those in an intermediate sibship position are consistently underrepresented. Youngest, however, are underrepresented only in two- and three-child families; in four- and five-child families a slightly greater than expected proportion are lastborn. Similar conclusions may be drawn on the basis of the oldest-to-youngest, oldest-to-intermediate, and youngest-to-intermediate ratios that are also reported in the table.

One of the particularly evasive analytical considerations in the above analysis which may partially account for the overrepresentation of the firstborn in the doctorate sample is related to educational trends in the United States. Parents of later-born doctorates are, on the average, older than those of the firstborn doctorates. As the trend is toward increasing educational attainment over time, and academic achievement of children is correlated with that of their parents, we would expect that the firstborn, being of younger and more educated parents, would be overrepresented in the doctorate sample even if there were no achievement virtue in being firstborn.[19] The following analysis, which introduces partial control of father's education, in part eliminates this explanation.

TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES

In each sibship size investigated (2–5), firstborn drawn from homes of relatively

[16] Population median computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of the Population: 1960*, Vol. 1: *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 1, United States Summary (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 404.

[17] Median number of children ever born to ever married women, ages 55 and over, who are not childless, computed from *ibid.*, p. 480.

[18] Six-child or larger families are grouped together because of the small number of each of these large family sizes. Thus, they cannot be analyzed in this fashion and have been excluded.

[19] The population cohort of the younger parents of doctorates (ages 55–64 in 1960) does indeed exhibit higher educational attainment than does the population cohort of the older parents of doctorates (ages 65–74 in 1960). In the former cohort of males, the median number of school years completed is 8.6, and 6.3 per cent had completed four or more years of college; in the latter cohort of males, the median number of school years completed is 8.2, and only 4.2 per cent had completed four or more years of college (computed from *U.S. Census of the Population: 1960*, Subject Reports [see n. 13 above], p. 16).

TABLE 1

OBSERVED AND A PRIORI EXPECTED DISTRIBUTION OF BIRTH-ORDER POSITION BY SIZE OF SIBSHIP: 1962 DOCTORATE RECIPIENTS*

Size of Sibship	Position in Sibship						Total	Observed Oldest-to-Youngest Ratio	Observed Oldest-to-Intermediate Ratio†	Observed Youngest-to-Intermediate Ratio†
	Oldest		Intermediate		Youngest					
	Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected				
Two	1,385 (56.5%)	1,225.0 (50.0%)	...	...	1,065 (43.5%)	1,225.0 (50.0%)	2,450	1.30	...	...
Three	683 (39.2%)	581.0 (33.3%)	543 (31.2%)	581.0 (33 3%)	517 (29.7%)	581.0 (33.3%)	1,743	1.32	1.26	0.95
Four	309 (30.8%)	250.7 (25.0%)	421 (42.0%)	501.5 (50 0%)	273 (27.2%)	250.7 (25.0%)	1,003	1.13	1.48	1.30
Five	139 (26.0%)	106.8 (20.0%)	282 (52.8%)	320.4 (60.0%)	113 (21.2%)	106.8 (20 0%)	534	1.23	1.48	1.20
Total	2,516	2,163.5	1,246	1,402.9	1,968	2,163.5	5,730	1.28	1.33	1.06

* Excludes 1,385 who are only children and 1,009 who are of six-child or larger families.

† To compute this ratio in the case of four-child families, the observed number in the intermediate category is divided by two; in five-child families, by three.

lower means than the total doctorate group (based on father's education) are under-represented relative to lastborn from the same family size (Table 2). In three-through five-child families there is an increasing overrepresentation of first children as father's education increases—the reverse of what is predicted by Hypothesis I. Although some selectivity is evidenced on choice of major field by father's education, this consistent increase in the ratio of oldest-to-youngest as father's education increases is evidenced across all major fields; and in no fields are firstborn with father's education less than ninth grade overrepresented.

The proportion of doctorates with an older male sibling, by birth order and sibship size, is presented in Table 3. These distributions are not in a consistent direction or significantly different from those expected on the basis of the sex distribution by birth order in the population, based on a sex ratio of 105.[20] These data do not support Hypothesis II.

[20] Only slight variation in the sex ratio at birth is evidenced over time; however, sex ratio by birth order varies between 106 for firstborn to 104 for

TABLE 2

OBSERVED OLDEST-TO-YOUNGEST RATIO FOR THOSE OF TWO- TO FIVE-CHILD FAMILIES, BY FATHER'S EDUCATION

Father's Education	N Oldest	N Youngest	Sibship Size			
			Two	Three	Four	Five
None to grade 8	562	660	0.95	0.87	0.63	0.75
Grade 9 to college 3	1,081	730	1.46	1.51	1.47	1 25
College 4 to graduate	828	531	1.41	1.74	1.76	2 10
Unknown	45	47	1.35	0.87	0.40	0.50
Total	2,516	1,968	1 30	1.32	1.13	1.23

TABLE 3

OBSERVED AND EXPECTED PERCENTAGE WITH OLDER BROTHERS, BY BIRTH ORDER AND SIZE OF SIBSHIP: 1962 DOCTORATE RECIPIENTS FROM TWO-CHILD OR LARGER FAMILIES

Size of Sibship	Birth Order			
	Second ($N=2,027$)	Third ($N=941$)	Fourth ($N=492$)	Fifth ($N=239$)
Two	52.5	....	....	....
Three	55.8	80.3	....	....
Four	47.7	75.4	85.7	....
Five	47.7	78.0	93.2	97.3
Six or more	50.4	76.2	90.5	96.8
Total	52.5	78.4	88.4	97.1
Expected*	52.5	77.4	89.3	94.9
Z†	0.00	1.08	− 0.89	1.55

* Based on a sex ratio of 105 and assuming this is constant over time and independent of parity or sex of preceding births.

† None of these Z-values for tests of differences between proportions are significant at the .05 level.

Across all categories of father's education, average I.Q. generally tends to decrease with each successive birth-order position and with an increasing family size of the doctorates. Firstborn (including "onlys") have a mean I.Q. of 65.7, significantly higher than any other ordinal position; and those born sixth or later have a mean I.Q. of 61.8, the lowest of any ordinal position. Those who are members of one- to three-child families have a mean I.Q. of 65.4, significantly larger than the 63.5 mean of those from four-child or larger families.

As small but statistically significant I.Q. differences are observed among each of the three categories of father's education, with a mean I.Q. of 62.8 for those whose father's education was less than ninth grade, 64.6 for those whose fathers had nine to fifteen years of education, and 67.5 for those whose fathers had at least a bachelor's degree, control is introduced for this variable (Table 4). However, I.Q. differences in a direction opposite from that predicted in Hypothesis III persist. As major fields vary significantly in the mean I.Q. of graduate doctorates (from a mean of 67.1 in physical sciences to 60.5 in education), control is also introduced for major field. Again, however, no change from the over-all relationship emerges.

TABLE 4

MEAN I.Q. OF ONLY CHILDREN, FIRSTBORN, AND LATER-BORN, BY FATHER'S EDUCATION*

Father's Education	Only Child		Firstborn (Not Only Child)		Later-born		Total		
	N	Mean I.Q.	*N*	Mean I.Q.	*N*	Mean I.Q.	*N*	Mean I.Q.	S.D.
None to grade 8	134	62.5	212	63.4	460	62.6	806	62.8	8.7
Grade 9 to college 3	268	65.3	476	65.2	548	63.8	1,292	64.6	8.3
College 4 to graduate	149	67.8	363	68.2	343	66.6	855	67.5	8.9
Unknown	9	66.7	21	65.5	26	62.4	56	64.2	9.0
Total	560	65.3	1,072	65.9	1,377	64.1	3,009	64.9	8.8

* See footnote 12 and text for definition of "I.Q."

CONCLUSION

The financial position of the family of orientation is not of direct primary importance in educational attainment beyond the bachelor's degree. Only about one-quarter of graduate students receive financial assistance from parents; two-thirds receive stipends from institutional or governmental sources.[21] In undergraduate education, however, parental support is the primary source of financial assistance and is thus indirectly basic to the ability to pursue graduate education (i.e., an undergraduate degree is a prerequisite to graduate school enrolment). If family financial resources are differently

sixth-or-later-born (see U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, *Natality Statistics Analysis, United States, 1962* [Series 21, No. 1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 29]). Adjustment of these birth-order sex ratios, based on 1962 data (106 for firstborn, 105 for second-, third-, and fourth-born) yields no effectual differences in the outcomes reported in Table 3. The assumption that the sex ratio is unaffected by the sex distribution of previous births is supported by the evidence presented by Richard A. Greenburg and Colin White, "The Detection of a Correlation between the Sexes of Adjacent Sibs in Human Families," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, LX (December, 1965), 1035–45.

[21] Seymour Warkov, Bruce Frisbie, and Alan S. Berger, *Graduate Student Finances, 1963* (Report No. 103 [Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1965], pp. 154–55).

available to those of various ordinal positions, it should therefore be reflected in graduate as well as undergraduate enrolment and graduation.

One of the often posed explanations for the repeated finding of an overrepresentation of early-born among high academic achievement groups has been based on this economic rationale, namely, families who send their early-born children to receive higher education have spent so much on education that they cannot afford to send their later-born, especially if they have many children or are of low economic means.

The data from the study do not support this hypothesis. Indeed, the data suggest that, as economic resources become more limited, firstborn within all family sizes are less likely to receive the doctorate degree, relative to lastborn from the same family size, than is the case of their firstborn peers from families of greater economic means.[22]

Under the above hypothesis, it would be consistent to suggest that those who were not firstborn and achieved the doctorate would be likely to have no older male siblings. The limited economic resources would be channeled to the oldest male if all the earlier-born were female. The data do not support such a relationship, however. Nor do the data support the assumption that those of a later ordinal position, who are thus of relatively limited family resources, need have high ability to compensate for the economic preclusion on educational achievement.

Other economic hypotheses need also to be examined. What, for example, are the economic effects on achievement of variations in child spacing, or of differences in family income patterns at the time of college attendance of those of various ordinal positions? While these further investigations of economic hypotheses are necessary, the investigation of other alternative explanatory hypotheses are probably required for further specification of birth-order relationships. Admittedly, rigorous analyses of many of these factors are difficult. Physiological hypotheses, for example, require actual measurements of intrauterine environment, or well-developed indirect inferences which assume socioeconomic and social-psychological factors constant but uterine environmental effects variable (e.g., by employing a sample in which miscarriages or early death of firstborn children in the family is evidenced). The socialization hypothesis can be strengthened if the economic and physiological hypotheses can be rejected. However, its demonstration should involve measures of some personality variables associated with birth order and academic achievement.

In conclusion, the complexities of the birth-order variable, in conjunction with the methodological problems of cross-sectional design and indirect inference, offer a difficult task for social researchers. The point, however, is that we can advance beyond the simply descriptive cross-sectional studies of birth order that have heretofore been the mode. Relatively narrowly defined and focused researches which test specific hypotheses are feasible. Sample techniques which employ a large number of cases of actual siblings within completed families have been largely overlooked. The potential of cumulative findings which test alternate explanatory hypotheses of birth-order variation in achievement has been neglected. It is time to replace the speculative explanations of the repeatedly demonstrated pervasiveness of birth-order effects on human behavior by vigorous empirical verification of explanatory hypotheses.

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National Academy of Sciences

[22] Sidney Cobb and John R. P. French, Jr., "Birth Order among Medical Students," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, CXCV (January 24, 1966), 172–73, report similar findings for a small sample of medical students. Their data reflect an oldest-to-youngest ratio of 1.6 for those whose fathers had no college education and a ratio of 2.8 for those whose fathers had some post-high school education.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

G. H. Mead

While interest in G. H. Mead among sociologists has perhaps gone into decline, the past five years have seen a markedly increased interest in and commentary upon Mead in philosophical contexts. The Mead sources have become more available, especially with the publication of *Selected Writings* (see item [75] below). We pass over here the increasingly frequent cross-disciplinary references to Mead.[1] With Mead about to become of age, as it were, a brief assessment of the present state of the question on Mead bibliography can help highlight what work remains to be done preparatory to a full exploitation of his philosophical ideas. The exposition proceeds under the following four headings: I. Published Sources; II. Reliability of Published Sources; III. Unpublished Sources and Their Evaluations; IV. Select Secondary Works on Mead Evaluated in the Light of This Survey. The bibliographical list will be interspersed with comments. Unless otherwise noted, an item will be referred to by its number in the list.

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[1] See, e.g., Thomas S. Szasz, "The Game Model Analysis of Human Behavior," *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations for a Theory of Personal Conduct* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961), Part 5; Tamotsu Shibutani, *Society and Personality: An Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961); Ernest Becker, *The Birth and Death of Human Meaning: A Perspective in Psychiatry and Anthropology* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

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These items are listed in the chronological order of their appearance, with [67] to [75] being posthumously published. The sixty-six items published during Mead's lifetime extend from 1894 to 1931 and include twelve reviews and abstracts, eighteen nonphilosophical articles concerned mainly with practical civic and social affairs, thirty-three philosophical or philosophically oriented articles, two speeches, and a commit-

tee report. The abstracts and reviews predominate in his early life, the practical articles in his middle period, and the philosophical in his final period, though all three types of writings are found at every stage.

There are four collections posthumously published in hardcover, and three posthumously published articles. Let us examine the contents of each in the chronological order of their appearance.

The substance of *PP* [67] is the Carus Lectures, as they were read at Berkeley in December, 1930. They were hurriedly written in the midst of the emotional stress of his administrative problems at Chicago, and Mead had not intended to publish them without considerable revision and expansion. Their main contribution, an extended view of sociality, occurred to him as a kind of last-minute insight and was especially in need of further explanation. Two additional manuscripts, preliminary drafts of the Carus Lectures, were found among his papers and included in *PP*. The collection concludes with an excerpt from [56] and a complete reprint of [57], two articles published during his lifetime.

The best known of the Mead volumes is *MSS* [68], containing the views developed in Mead's influential social psychology course. The editors desired to give a systematic ordering of Mead's thought in a more extended form than he had given in his published papers. Through the foresight of student George Anagnos and the financing of fellow-worker Alvin Carus, stenographers were employed during Mead's final years to take down verbatim reports of Mead's various courses. *MSS* is based on a stenographic copy of the 1927 social psychology course. While this set of notes does not have the completeness of a court record, it is very full. The 1927 notes have been enriched by "the faithful and full" (*MSS*, p. vi) notes of student Robert Page from the 1930 course. Any material added to these combined sets of notes, either from other course notes or from Mead's manuscripts, is clearly indicated. The ordering and titles, as well as the deletion of repetitions and stylistic corrections, are due to the editors.

Article [69], published in 1935–36, is a Mead manuscript, probably a preliminary draft made preparatory to publishing [64].

Except for a clearly noted section on Bergson inserted from non-stenographic notes, the procedure in *MT* [70] is the same as that used in compiling *MSS*. Editor Merritt Moore notes that the stenographic reports used in the compilation of these books can be safely regarded as verbatim transcripts, with error consisting mainly in such details as misspelled names, and that they represent Mead's mature thought. Dr. Henry Mead, George's son, and his daughter-in-law, Dr. Irene Tufts Mead, formerly married to Henry, planned for the editing and publishing of this material.

Unlike *MSS* and *MT*, *PA* [71] consists almost entirely of unpublished papers left by Mead representing, according to the editors, the last ten or fifteen years of Mead's life. As with the other unpublished manuscripts, there is no evidence that Mead would have published any of them in the form in which they stand. All titles including the title of the volume itself are the work of the editors. While compiling *PA*, every effort was made to find and publish all the remaining manuscripts of Mead. Some manuscripts turned up in the hands of graduate students who had been allowed to enter Mead's office and remove books after his death. Henry C. A. Mead and Irene Tufts Mead have no further manuscripts and believe it unlikely that other manuscripts remain in the hands of students. After such efforts and inquiries, the editors concluded that *PA* exhausted all literary remains worth publishing.

That had been the story until 1964 when David Miller, one of the collaborators in *PA*, brought out in *Review of Metaphysics* two hitherto unpublished manuscripts, [73] and [74], which he removed from Mead's desk drawer at the time of his death. These fragments are also found in the Mead Papers (see below, [77], box 11, folder "Mead —mss fragments"). Andrew Reck's collec-

tion [75] makes conveniently available for the first time what Mead actually published while alive, and should be a corrective to the dominant influence exercised until now by the posthumous publications.

II. RELIABILITY OF PUBLISHED SOURCES

Obviously, the articles published during Mead's lifetime are sure guides to both the content and the chronology of Mead's thinking. The problem of reliability lies with the posthumous papers and their variegated sources. I will make some general remarks on these as a whole and then comment upon particular compilations.

The sources of these compilations are made up of four types of materials: unpublished papers by Mead's own hand; stenographic reports of Mead's lectures; non-stenographic student notes made during Mead's lectures; and the titles, divisions, and ordering contributed by the editors. The manuscripts written by Mead himself can be accepted for what they are, namely, sure reflections of the content of Mead's thought, and which he undoubtedly intended to revise. We should recall that even had he revised them, he would have even further developed and revised their content in the ever on-going process of his reflection.

Non-stenographic student notes play but a small part in these compilations and can be readily checked against the stenographic sources which can be accepted as reliable. We may trust the testimony of the editors and recall, in any case, that it is the Mead of the stenographic reports, whoever he is, who is exercising the most influence today. The reports in *MSS* represent courses given in 1927–30, and those in *MT* are said to represent Mead's "mature thought." We might add as a final general remark the observation of Merritt Moore that Mead is not alone among the great philosophers for whose doctrine we depend to a certain extent upon class notes.

With all its incompleteness, *PP* is most valuable both as a holograph and as certainly representing Mead's latest thought. The content of *MSS* can be accepted as reliable, though the chronology cannot be made any more specific than the four-year period 1927–30. *PA* is valuable as the major source of the Mead holographs along with [69], [73], and [74]. It is of no help on chronology, covering a fifteen-year period. Special reserve should be exercised in accepting the editor's divisions, for example, the fourfold division of the stages of the act.

III. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES AND THEIR EVALUATIONS

76. "Mead, George H., *The President's Papers*." (A folder in the Department of Special Collections of the Harper Library, University of Chicago.) Refers to Mead's correspondence in his capacity as chairman of the board of the Hospital School for Abnormal Children, and also to two letters by John Dewey to William Rainey concerning Mead.
77. "The Papers of George Herbert Mead (1863–1931)." Fourteen boxes containing the manuscripts of *PA* and *MSS*, the correspondence among the editors with reference to the compiling of *PA*, and manuscripts of several of Mead's published articles, as well as students' notes for Mead's courses on Bergson, Dewey, elementary ethics, Hegel, Hume, Leibniz, logic, movements of thought in the nineteenth century, the philosophies of eminent scientists, the problem of consciousness, social psychology and advanced social psychology, and students' notes on six lectures concerning rationalism and empiricism.
78. "The Papers of Henry Northrup Castle (1862–1895)." Eight boxes with 1,500 items including in box 5, folder 10, fourteen letters from Mead to the Castle family written in the years 1889–1901.
79. Electrostatic copies of letters of George Herbert Mead. (As of July, 1964, privately owned by Mrs. Henry C. A. Mead, Birdwood, Ocean Springs, Mississippi; letters written July 19, 1883, to October 20, 1891, to Henry Northrup Castle; two letters written April 9, 1891, to Henry's father and to his sister Carrie, and thirty other personal letters.

80. Mead, George and Helen (eds.). *Henry Northrup Castle: Letters.* Privately printed for the Castle family and friends, London, 1902. In the Rare Books Room of the University of Chicago Library, this volume includes an essay (pp. 807–12) by George Herbert Mead, "Recollections of Henry in Oberlin and After," and some letters to G. H. Mead written in 1886–87 and 1893–94.

The unpublished papers especially could enrich the biographical dimension of Mead studies. Besides the testimonials to his interests during the active professional period of his life ([76] and [78]), a unique revelation of the intense moral preoccupation of Mead's earlier years is provided by [79] and [80]. From his Oberlin days onward, his life-ideal, which he never thought of abandoning, was an urge toward contributing to moral and social reform. At first in his heart he was the minister, true son of his clergyman father, but his mind could not follow his heart. So the expression of his life-ideal changed from Christianity to the political ideals of socialism, and finally to the less doctrinaire application of scientific method to social reform. The letters tell the story of this agonizing transition, but they are not yet released for scholarly use.

Of course it is [77] which bears most directly on doctrinal understanding of Mead, and here there is little that is new. The contents of these manuscripts have either found their way into print already (especially in the posthumously published volumes) or are doctrinally insignificant (as are, for example, the elementary ethics notes which follow very closely the Dewey-Tufts *Ethics* textbook). But a comparison of the published sources with the manuscripts of [77] can increase one's confidence in the reliability of the former. And a nuanced biographical knowledge of Mead can illuminate the genesis of some of Mead's philosophical attitudes. Compare, for example, with Dewey's polemicism, Mead's irenic incorporation of Christian ideals into his own naturalistic pragmatism.

IV. SELECTED SECONDARY WORKS ON MEAD EVALUATED IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SURVEY

81. Lee, Grace Chin. *George Herbert Mead: Philosopher of the Social Individual.* New York: King's Crown Press, 1945.

82. Natanson, Maurice. *The Social Dynamics of George Herbert Mead.* Introduction by Horace M. Kallen. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956.

83. Pfuetze, Paul E. *The Social Self.* New York: Bookman Associates, 1954. (Reprinted with revisions in Harper Torchbook ed.: New York: Harper & Bros., 1961, under the title *Self, Society, Existence: Human Nature and Dialogue in the Thought of George Herbert Mead and Martin Buber.*)

84. Reck, Andrew J. "The Philosophy of George Herbert Mead (1863–1931)," *Tulane Studies in Philosophy,* XII (1963), 5–51. This is substantially reprinted in Reck, *Recent American Philosophy.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1964.

85. Victoroff, David. *G. H. Mead: Sociologue et Philosophe.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953.

Without justifying in detail the judgments made here, I will simply remark on how each of these commentaries uses the Mead sources. Using adequacy to the sources as a criterion, [82] is the most deficient among this select group of commentaries. Relying almost exclusively on the posthumously published *MSS, PA,* and *PP,* Natanson sees an actual change of doctrine in Mead from volume to volume. His conclusions are invalidated by his assumption that these volumes can be taken independently of each other and of the whole Mead corpus which illuminates their genesis. For example, Natanson gives to the sociological materials of *MSS* a priority over the biological orientation in *PA*. Attention to the genesis of these ideas as revealed in the whole corpus would reverse the priority, if indeed the two orientations should be discussed separately at all.

Lee's early, but now superseded, study suffers from the same too-heavy reliance on the posthumously published volumes, *MSS*

and *PA*. Playing the ideas of "sociality" and "act" off against one another, Lee comes up with "social individualism" as the unifying theme in Mead. A greater appreciation of the struggle of Mead to hammer out a social psychology from roots in evolutionary biology and tested in daily civic, social, and university projects (see [1]–[66]) would prevent such an attenuated approach to Mead's doctrine as an ideal structure. Mead's life, social involvement, teaching, and thought are all of a piece. This is the unmistakable impact of contact with Mead's *whole* corpus. Appreciating this, one will not compartmentalize Mead's doctrine (as does Victoroff in his otherwise excellent Introduction) into social psychology, philosophy, and history of philosophy. This obscures the unified methodic approach which integrates these dimensions. Neither will one tend to judge Mead from the standpoint of one's personal philosophical orientation, as existentialist Pfuetze tends to do.

Of the few comprehensive commentaries on Mead made to date, Reck is by far the most faithful to Mead's spirit, and most able to unify the various strands of his thought while respecting its complexity and even inconsistency. Reck uses the "act" as the root metaphor. "Sociality" is the next doctrinal task for the Mead commentator, namely, the interrelating of these two key conceptions of Mead's philosophy: "act" and "sociality." Finally, the unpublished papers contain the makings of a biographical task which has yet to be begun.

CONCLUSION

Posthumously published sources.—These are ideologically comprehensive and reliable, historically and genetically deficient, and have had too predominant an influence to date in the understanding of Mead.

Publications of Mead's lifetime.—Their recent availability augurs well for increased appreciation of the genesis and variety of the dimensions of Mead's thought.

Unpublished papers.—So far these are untapped sources for situating Mead's thought within his personal biography and within the context of history.

Selected secondary works.—They are deficient mainly in understanding the nature of the sources (Natanson), in appreciation of historical genesis of Mead's thought (Lee), in appreciation of Mead's methodology (Pfuetze) or of its unity (Victoroff), except for Reck whose view of Mead's philosophy of "act" needs to be complemented by a stress on sociality.

EDWARD STEVENS

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Some Comments on Premarital Sexual Permissiveness

November 21, 1966

To the Editor:

James Coleman's Letter to the Editor (September, 1966, p. 217) raises some interesting questions concerning the explanation of premarital sex codes. Coleman posits the degree of female control over the determination of family status as the key factor in explaining the rigidity of premarital sex codes. I have just finished a national study of premarital sexual permissiveness which will be published in book form next summer. I have arrived at some theoretical conclusions relevant to Coleman's view. There are seven propositions which summarize the empirical findings and from which the theory derives. I will not delve into these here but instead will present a simple statement of part of the overall theory and show its relevance for Coleman's comments.

The basic theory can be simply stated as follows: The degree of premarital sexual permissiveness which is acceptable among courting individuals varies directly with the degree of autonomy in the courtship roles and with the degree of premarital sexual permissiveness accepted in the social and cultural setting of those individuals. Now let me briefly explain the theory and show where Coleman's notion fits.

I am speaking of only those courtship systems which allow adolescent dating of some sort. In such a system the courtship can be heavily controlled by adult regulations or it can be largely given over to be run by the participants. The latter type system has high autonomy, and the reason I posit that such a system, everything else equal, would tend to promote premarital sexual permissiveness is that the biological sex drive pressures in the direction of permissiveness. Thus, when allowed contact with the opposite sex and little outside control, the performance and acceptance of permissiveness should increase. The second factor in the theoretical statement concerns the sociocultural setting, and that is important because it has effects on the way the biological sex drives are channeled and on the way such sex drives will be expressed when autonomy is present. For example, our culture stresses the association of sex with affection, so that even in our highly autonomous courtship systems one notes that much of the sex that occurs is associated with affectionate relationships. Typically the predominantly adult-run sociocultural setting is less permissive than the courting individuals themselves. The adults are in a role responsible for the young people and are not exposed to the temptations of the young people. Simply put, the theory states: In the same sociocultural setting, the more autonomous group would be more permissive. With equal degrees of autonomy in two courtship groups, the sociocultural setting would determine the difference in permissiveness.

Coleman's factor of female power is one possible factor that might well promote greater courtship autonomy for the female role. In addition, it might alter the broader set of attitudes shared by adults so as to make female permissiveness more acceptable at that level also. But in any case, it is but one factor. Religiosity, love affairs, closeness to parents, and many other factors also affect permissiveness because they are relevant to the autonomy of the courtship role and/or to the sociocultural setting. I believe sex and racial differences in

premarital sexual permissiveness are better understood in terms of the theory I have put forth than as simply the result of one factor, such as the degree of female control of family status. Surely there are differences in sexual permissiveness among cultures which are the same on female power. This would be so for the autonomy, and sociocultural setting need not be identical in all such cultures. Nevertheless, Coleman has contributed an interesting hypothesis which is worthy of careful testing.

The entire area of premarital sexual permissiveness is at the heart of the fundamental sociological inquiry regarding how social order is possible. Sexual permissiveness presents a case wherein a biological drive pressures in one direction on all courting groups, and yet society produces groups quite variant in sexual attitudes and behavior. This surely is a most strategic area for future sociological inquiry.

Ira L. Reiss
University of Iowa

BOOK REVIEWS

Youth and the Social Order. By F. MUSGROVE. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965. Pp. xix+168. $5.00.

Society and the Adolescent Self-Image. By MORRIS ROSENBERG. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xi+326. $6.50.

Lewis A. Coser, in his *Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's View*, claims that intellectuals are distinguished by their determination to view conflicts of interest in terms of conflicts of values and ideas, their judgmental attitude toward society, and their taste for play with ideas for its own sake. In discussing Coser's work, Robert A. Nisbet has suggested, in addition, that an important distinction between the intellectual and the scientist is the former's preference, if he must choose, for being brilliant rather than right.

The typology is of interest here because, although their subject matters are basically the same, it is obvious that the two authors under review aspire in different directions—one mainly to brilliance, the other to truth.

Musgrove is the intellectual. Technological limitations rank low among the considerations that dictate his choice of problem. There is a tendency in the profession to see something heroic in this particular kind of disregard. How heroic it is is sometimes revealed by how well the intellectual handles problems that are well within the scope of existing methodology. Given his opportunity, Musgrove turns out to be better than we expected, but not as good as we would like.

Musgrove's book raises a number of interesting, perhaps even important, questions concerning the social status of adolescents. He attempts to show that their status has fluctuated in the last two centuries and that this is linked to changes in the industrial demand for child labor, to changes in the abundance of children, and to the decreased dependence of old people upon their children brought about by the introduction of insurance. Currently, he holds, the young enjoy high status.

However, this status is high only in the objective sense of financial independence and early marriage. In terms of the subjective opinion of their elders, the current status of the young is low. Expanding the Oedipal drama to the societal level, Musgrove claims that the older generations hate and fear the young and protect themselves from the full force of youthful competition by a variety of puerilizing stratagems advanced in the ostensible best interests of young people. The conception of adolescent status is itself a recent invention, he argues, that tends to create the immaturity it supposedly merely describes.

All of this is presented in so lively a manner that it is difficult to tell whether Musgrove is seriously advancing a conspiracy theory of the dominance of elders or merely employing a rhetorical device. The resultant ambiguity enables him to exploit the advantages of both possibilities—to charge boldly forward without exposing his flank to accusations of irresponsibility. Clearly, if one is striving for brilliance, one should avoid soft, mushy words like "ambivalence" and favor hard, glittering ones like "hatred."

Unfortunately, Musgrove so thoroughly overlooks obvious alternative interpretations of the items upon which he bases his argument of wilful exclusion of adolescents from adult life that the reader is embarrassed for him. For some inexplicable reason, he never came right out and asked adults directly what their feelings were concerning this issue. The validity of his closely related finding that adults are hostile and critical toward adolescents depends heavily on the representativeness of the 35 per cent that returned his mailed questionnaires. It is not unreasonable to suspect that those who were most negative toward young people were also more motivated to respond. The paucity of respondents in the 20–29 age category, and their overrepresentation in the over-45 age category, is consistent with this surmise.

In another chapter, Musgrove presents evidence for greater role conflict among students in the more prestigeful English grammar

schools than among students in the so-called modern schools. Since Musgrove makes so much out of the fact that grammar school students see themselves, their peers, and adults as assigning different priorities to the same set of expected behaviors, it would have been helpful had he included some measure to show that this discord was also accompanied by greater psychic distress. Again, the most straightforward question was not asked. Perhaps the grammar school students are simply better at discriminating fine differences in social expectations.

Musgrove's chapter relating social change to the status of the young is certainly one of the most interesting. Employing the comparative method, he argues that change is most stimulated when the young are excluded from the rewards of the society.

That there is a ring of truth in all of Musgrove's assertions is beyond question. Assessment of the extent of this truth calls for fine tuning; Musgrove, however, has devoted himself mainly to turning up the volume. For example, much of the excessive sheltering of young people is clearly motivated by a desire to prevent them from having sexual experience. The primary agents in furthering this aim are parents and not other unrelated adults worried by the threat of youthful competition. Although Musgrove does advocate greater sexual permissiveness, he nowhere confronts squarely the issue posed by sexuality and the conservative influence of parents on social institutions dealing with youth. In his desire to portray young people as being more mature than society is willing to admit, he seems at times to be wilfully naïve. Furthermore, his evidence for youthful responsibility depends largely upon measures of attitudes, when it has been shown that even extreme behavioral deviants, such as hard-core delinquents, have attitudes in many ways similar to those of the rest of society.

For Rosenberg, the scientist, issues begin where they leave off for Musgrove. A co-winner of an American Association for the Advancement of Science Socio-Psychological Prize, his survey study of adolescents' self-images is a model of scientific endeavor. Because of its thoroughness and its validational efforts, this book should lend strong support to many of the major findings in self-concept research that have been subject to controversy because of occasional conflicting evidence.

Given the preference in sociology for causal hypotheses sufficiently removed from individual psychology to qualify as being structural, the most important finding is that the self-images of adolescents appear unaffected by the broader social status of their ethnic or religious group in society at large. Such differences as do exist seem traceable instead to actual interpersonal relations within the family and the neighborhood. Status as an abstract idea does not seem to matter.

There are rich chapters on the effects of the broken family and birth order; on parental interest, supportiveness, and punitiveness; on participation and leadership in high schools; and on concern with public affairs. Especially fascinating is the chapter on differences in interpersonal behavior between those with high and low self-esteem. The value of this last chapter is greatly enhanced as a result of Rosenberg's decision to do some intensive interviewing of extreme types.

The self-concept is itself a difficult concept. In their eagerness to avoid Freud, many researchers inflate it to the point of incorporating all of personality; others regard it as an epiphenomenal triviality. Rosenberg has a nice sense of its relevance, but we would disagree when he suggests that it is causally antecedent to anxiety. Anxiety is the deeper phenomenon, we fell certain, and probably most clinicians would agree. By employing an expanded definition of the self-concept one could make a case for his causal ordering, but it would amount to an essentially Freudian view of personality stripped of its dynamic explanatory advantages. By introducing control variables into the relationship between self-esteem and anxiety, Rosenberg gives the impression of presenting evidence in favor of his causal sequence, although he freely concedes that the data are equally consistent with the opposite sequence. There is a problem in exposition here, for many readers will overlook this frank but insufficiently emphasized admission. There is also something grotesque about an argument built around evidence that is completely equivocal.

Much evidence, including Rosenberg's own, indicates that low self-esteem is a good indicator of neurosis. According to psychoanalytic theory, neurotics have their libido tied up in internal conflicts and therefore unavailable for external commitments; consequently one would naturally expect healthier persons, with high self-esteem, to have their libido free for outside investment. Acceptance of self and accept-

ance of others have in fact been found to be positively correlated again and again. Yet Rosenberg somehow attributes exactly the opposite hypothesis to Freud, that those with high self-esteem have so focused their libido on themselves that they are less able to love others. Of course, this straw Freud comes out looking bad, because those with high self-esteem are, as might be expected, more positive toward others.

Rosenberg's book is so good, however, that it is easy to admire it greatly despite these disagreements. Those who have trouble placing themselves as either intellectuals or scientists in the discipline have only to note which of these two books they would rather have written—the test is guaranteed to be valid.

ROBERT A. GORDON

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Britain's Married Women Workers. By VIOLA KLEIN. New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Pp. xiv+166. $5.00.

This small volume is a welcome addition to the growing literature on married women and especially of mothers in the role of provider. It is composed of just four chapters: (1) an Introduction which places today's employed married woman in historical perspective; (2) a description of the characteristics of employed married women and the meaning of work to them and to their husbands; (3) a description of employers' perspective on women as employees, both full-time and part-time; (4) an attempt to assess the future of employment of married women.

If the reader already has some familiarity with the literature on employed married women, he probably will be especially interested in the first chapter. The American studies have focused on employed mothers at a given point in time. Viola Klein places hers in the history of the employment of women and is especially helpful in pointing out that lower-class women were a major part of the labor force during the Industrial Revolution. Only the middle and upper classes were limited to the home. The exclusion of married women from the labor force is thus seen as only an occasional and partial historical phenomenon, rather than a near universal one.

Klein's analysis of the employed married woman and her family is based primarily on a large survey she conducted of a representative sample of 1,068 women and 962 men, although she also draws from American and European research and from official sources. She provides a clear picture of who the employed women are and how they and their husbands feel about her employment and its effects on the family. The report is made by social class throughout and is often reported in the words if the respondent, which gives a feeling of intimacy and immediacy to the findings. However, the general findings are also adequately provided in tables and statistical analysis.

Unfortunately, she was unable to obtain a representative sample of employers. This is partially compensated for by a careful description of the discrepancies between her sample and the population of employers. This description is presented separately for full-time and part-time employees. This is especially useful in that American studies are weak on information on part-time employed married women.

I would, however, take issue with her (and most other researchers on employed married women) in that she still sees the interest or willingness of women to take employment as the controlling element in the proportion of them who will be employed. Most of the facts seem to support the generalization that it is the need of business and other employers for employees and for certain types of employees that has more bearing on the proportion of married women who will be employed.

This book constitutes a continuation of a long-term involvement of the author in new role definitions for women which goes back at least to her important volume *Women's Two Roles* (with Alva Myrdal) published in 1956. It will be welcomed by American readers, not only because it provides a specific picture of employment of married women in Britain, but perhaps even more in that it helps in setting the employed married woman in the relevant cultural perspective. One better "sees the forest, not just the trees" as he reads this book.

F. IVAN NYE

Washington State University

Technological Change: Its Conception and Measurement. By LESTER B. LAVE. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966. Pp. xx+228. $6.95.

This is an extraordinarily useful volume for those who wish to catch up with the large technical literature on technological change which has appeared in the last ten or fifteen years. With what seems to be almost a chronic tendency in this kind of literature, the book is poorly arranged. To some extent it seems to have been put together with scissors and paste, and betrays something of its origin in a Ph.D. thesis. Nevertheless, it is extraordinarily complete, the writing for the most part is clear, and the account of the literature which comprises about half of the book is extremely valuable. There are also some interesting chapters of application; two chapters on American agriculture; one on the special problems of Appalachian agriculture; a chapter entitled "The Falling Rise of Indistan, a Fable," about the peculiar statistical difficulties of economic development; and a concluding chapter on structural unemployment and technological change. The book is extremely rich in material and therefore hard to summarize.

The basic problem relates to the nature of the production function of the economic system, particularly the aggregate production function. Putting the matter very crudely, the production function concerns the relationship between what goes in and what comes out of the production function process. The level of technology determines the ratio of inputs to outputs; the higher the level of technology, the more output per unit of input. The problems of measurement arise because the number of inputs and outputs are very large, hence there has to be aggregation of quite heterogeneous quantities if any simple over-all production function is to be derived. The subtitle of this work, indeed, might well have been "Paradoxes of Aggregation." There is a long, and possibly unfortunate, tradition in economics which classifies the inputs into the productive process under the aggregative heads of labor, capital, and possibly land. In this work, land is simply included with capital, so we are reduced to two classes of inputs, labor and capital. The problem of measuring technical change then arises because in a developing society like the United States, increases in the inputs of labor and capital have produced a much more than proportional increase in outputs of product. One possible measure of technical change, therefore, is that increase in the product which cannot be accounted for by increases in inputs. Though the concept seems to be simple, the statistical difficulties involved in this measurement are very great, partly, one suspects, because of the virtual impossibility of an adequate conceptualization of the quantity of capital. It may be, indeed, that this is quite an unreal problem, a sort of examination question which economists have set themselves simply as a result of the way they have aggregated the system in the first place. Anybody who wants to find out about it, however, will find it all here in this volume.

This book will probably confirm the worst prejudices of sociologists about economics, in that it neglects nearly all the things in which sociologists are likely to be interested. Nevertheless, the level of abstraction which the volume represents is almost certainly a necessary stage in the development of a more complete theory of the over-all developmental process. Development sociologists, therefore, should find this book extremely useful in acquainting them in a succinct form with the large and rather confusing literature which their economist confrères have produced.

KENNETH E. BOULDING

University of Michigan

The Vanguard Artist: Portrait and Self-Portrait. By BERNARD ROSENBERG and NORRIS FLIEGEL. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965. Pp. xi+366. $7.50.

In this volume, Rosenberg and Fliegel attempt to delineate some of the common characteristics in the life histories of successful American artists and to explore the social and economic milieu in which they have lived and worked. Their primary concern is that this milieu has undergone a revolutionary change and that this change threatens to undermine the traditional values of creative artists:

> We would argue that the artist, in order not to be alienated from his work, must be alienated from the dominant commercial values of his civilization.

For as long as American artists knew that financial success was unattainable, the issue was clear cut. Now such success is attainable, a change which disrupts everything that appeared to be settled for so long. We have chosen to make this change a major pivot of our study, and it hovers over every line in the book [p. 9].

Hover it does, but unfortunately the design and scope of the study preclude bringing this, or any of the other intriguing arguments it raises, down to a direct confrontation with the evidence. The book is, in fact, largely a forum for the views and experiences of a relatively small number of successful and established New York painters and sculptors whose average age (over fifty) places them as participants in the vanguard movements of the 1940's and 1950's. From a "purposive sample" of fifty New York artists "held in high esteem by their peers and by 'men of good taste' in the art world" (p. 7), twenty-nine subsequently participated in a series of focused, but unstructured, and informal tape-recorded interviews.

Around lengthy (and frequently eloquent) quotations from these interviews, the authors weave a sociological and psychological narrative organized into chapters concerned with the development of an independent New York school of painting and sculpture, the generational conflict between these and younger artists, the common social and psychological characteristics and familial and cultural origins of the older artists, their alienation from bourgeois goals and values, their current relationship to various publics, and their views on the role of museums and dealers in the contemporary art market. The final chapter focuses on the recurring and unifying theme that the "American artist is a person who does not fit into the system—unless he is made to fit" (p. 313) and concludes with a section on the perils of subsidized art. Separate chapters are offered on the unique role conflicts of female and Negro artists; a lengthy Appendix deals with the source of creative energy, "Sexuality and Sublimation," and suggests support for reformulations of Freud's concept of artistic sublimation.

Throughout, the views of the subject artists are generally presented as archetypal statements; the authors infrequently attempt either to relate these views to individual experiences or to indicate the range of opinion and experience within their sample. Rather, the views of any or all of their subjects are accorded a pre-eminence which permits them to stand as the primary evidence in support of a wide variety of generalizations. At their best, these suggest that successful creative artists share a coherent and sometimes rigid set of personal and professional values. At their worst they lead to such statements as:

Artists suggest, directly and indirectly, that the Negro who attempts to paint lacks requisite personality characteristics for success. They make these generalizations with different samplings of Negro painters in mind, so that the overlapping of judgments appears significant [p. 297].

All in all however, this is a pioneer study which attempts to cover a lot of previously untrod ground. Whatever its shortcomings as a piece of research, its value in suggesting and formulating numerous provocative hypotheses should not go unheralded.

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Managers, Employees, and Organizations: A Study of 27 Organizations. By RALPH M. STOGDILL. In collaboration with DAVID R. DAY, DONALD A. GAAL, NORMAN GEORGE, and OMAR S. GOODE. Columbus: Bureau of Business Research, Ohio State University, 1965. Pp. xiii+315. $6.00.

Managers, Employees, and Organizations is a comparative study of twenty-seven organizations that ends where comparative studies usually begin. Most comparative studies start with the ideas that there are great differences among organizations and that these differences need explaining. By contrast, *Managers, Employees, and Organizations* starts by looking for organizational similarities and, finding few, concludes that the differences among organizations are great indeed.

The research has been at least modestly successful in accomplishing the aim of learning something new about organization. Not the least significant is the discovery that it is very difficult to obtain findings that characterize all organizations of a given type, and still more difficult to secure findings that apply to organizations in general [p. 47].

Unfortunately, the discovery of differences does not in this case lead to the next step, which is the attempt to explain them.

The research on which the above conclusion

is based consisted of administering questionnaires and scales to personnel at all hierarchical levels below the production manager or his equivalent in each of the twenty-seven organizations. The questionnaires and scales concerned respondents' personal characteristics (age, education, etc.); the scope, level, and extent of their authority, responsibility, and delegation; their job satisfaction and expectations; the "leader behavior" of their immediate superiors; and the characteristics of their work groups (cohesiveness, perceived productivity, loyalty to company, pressure to conform to group norms, etc.). And from higher-level superiors, ratings of work performance for groups under lower-level supervisors were obtained. The bulk of the book is made up of a detailed report of the factor analyses that were subsequently carried out on these data. The analyses are presented one by one (starting with "Findings for Company 1" on p. 66 and ending with "Findings for Organization 27" on p. 287) with very little interpretation or comment. The task of attaching significance to the findings is left largely to the reader. However, it should be added that he can turn for help to Stogdill's earlier theoretical work, *Individual Behavior and Group Achievement*. The rest of the book is concerned with comparing the results of the separate analyses for the twenty-seven organizations as a whole and when grouped by "type," which here means metals industry, chemicals and refining, textiles and accessories, aircraft, retail stores, and government departments.

The comparison, as already noted, is mostly concerned with establishing similarities, and finds few relative to the differences. But among the few, there are at least two that will certainly interest those who study organizations. One is that supervisory behavior and productivity are found to be largely unrelated, and the other is that group cohesion and productivity are found to be negatively related. However, Stogdill leaves unanswered the question of how his findings are to be reconciled with the studies of all those other organizations that have been published over the last twenty years showing different relationships among the same or similar variables. This also might have been the start of a comparative study.

JOHN D. BREWER

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Lawyers in the Making. By SEYMOUR WARKOV. With a chapter by JOSEPH ZELAN. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xxii+180. $5.00.

Lawyers in the Making is a monograph in the National Opinion Research Center series. It is based primarily on returned questionnaires from about 2,500 college seniors who showed (or had shown) an interest in legal careers and a follow-up study of about 1,700 of these men during their first year of legal studies. The data are presented in a series of rather simple tables and with relatively little interpretive comment. The authors have chosen to present a straightforward account of their materials without excursions into the quicksands of sociological conjecture.

Most of the tables are not surprising. We should not be startled to learn that social class, academic performance, and religious affiliation are associated with pursuit of a legal career. Nor is it news that the social characteristics and aspirations of law students differ in the various strata of law schools. The peculiar fascination of the book lies in the arrangement of the materials to show the successive phases of entry into a legal career, thus laying bare the processes of social selection. At each stage, the forces symbolized by the predictor variables show their selective and directive influence, so that we come to have a cumulative sense of the power of social organization to shape the process of allocation to roles.

Unfortunately, the work is marred by several technical faults. For example, in arguing that occupational values influence choice of a legal career, the authors fail to show a control by social status. At times, the text fails to point out that the percentage differences being described are quite small. Conversely, at least once an important difference is described as negligible: in a chapter contributed by Zelan on occupational inheritance, it is alleged that "socio-economic status has little predictive value independently of parental occupation," despite the fact that sons of *non-lawyer* fathers of high socioeconomic status are almost twice as likely to aspire to legal careers as the sons of low-status fathers. It seems highly likely that failure to achieve statistical significance for this relationship is a consequence of testing for the difference between two percentages where both percentages are necessarily small and the sample size has been reduced. Further,

we are not allowed to see how much the elimination of lawyer fathers changed the distributions.

LEON MAYHEW

University of Michigan

Fertility and Family Planning in the United States. By PASCAL K. WHELPTON, ARTHUR A. CAMPBELL, and JOHN E. PATTERSON. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xxxiv+443. $12.50.

One of the outgrowths of the postwar surge in population growth has been a boom of concern with fertility and its control, a boom which has fostered a spate of studies of reproductive behavior, desires, knowledge, expectations. This volume, a research monograph reporting the findings of the 1960 Growth of the American Family study, is one of the better products in this recent tradition. It is a companion piece to the report of the original 1955 GAF study (Freedman, Whelpton, Campbell, *Family Planning, Sterility, and Population Growth*), its greatest value lying in the continuity of the two and the possibilities they afford to trace changes through time, both generational and maturational. To the extent that both volumes are resplendent with tabular data, the present one sporting 223 tables, the reader can enjoy freedom to indulge interests which may differ substantially from those of the authors.

The main purpose of the 1955 and 1960 GAF studies was to provide data on birth expectations of a sample of American women, to the end of improving predictions of future trends in family size. In the earlier volume, the authors reasoned that ability to predict fertility is greatly enhanced simply by asking women how many children they expect to have. The results of the 1960 survey clearly support this argument. Women in 1955 did a remarkably good job of predicting how many children women *like them* (not a panel) would have by 1960. Only in small categories of women were 1955 predictions substantially at odds with 1960 reality. Most notably, the combination of low education and youth makes for underestimates of future fertility, estimates which are revised upward as women grow older and more familiar with childbearing. The final chapter of the book presents population projections based on these data. The procedure is slightly revised since the 1959 volume to accommodate the upward revision of birth expectations as women grow older. This chapter is the most significant in the book.

One valuable expansion of the scope of the GAF study in its 1960 version was the addition of a non-white subsample, treated in chapter ix. Here the image of Negro Americans as valuing and desiring the unwieldy families they so frequently bear is decisively put to rout. Non-whites *want* fewer children than whites and, among those with high education, they actually have fewer. Although the size of this sample (270 couples) severely restricts the kinds of comparisons that can be made with whites, the data provide valuable insights into the desires and expectations of non-white women and allow the non-white tenth of the U.S. population to be treated along with whites in the projections of the last chapter.

The most serious shortcoming of the book (and of the previous GAF study as well) is the failure to utilize more elaborate statistical analysis. The straightforward tabular presentation of data restricts the authors to the most elementary descriptive analysis. There is no attempt whatsoever to test or explore any proposition which might be taken as sociological. Even as descriptive analysis, the methods are inadequate. How much of the differences in fertility among various religions, social, and economic groups can be attributed to differences in desired family size, differences in willingness or ability to use contraceptives effectively, differences in fecundity or age at marriage (not to mention the forgotten variable of fertility research, coital frequency)? No techniques are used which can provide even crude answers to these questions. This is not the fault of the data; they are quite adequate to the task.

ANDREA TYREE

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Los Angeles

Sociological Aspects of Homosexuality: A Comparative Study of Three Types of Homosexuals. By MICHAEL SCHOFIELD. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965. Pp. vii+244. $10.00.

This comparative study provides the type of detailed information about one form of variant

behavior necessary for the development of a general theory of deviance. Schofield's work is concerned with a comparison of three types of male homosexuals with three non-homosexual samples in England. Altogether three hundred men were interviewed and these were equally divided into six groups. The three homosexual groups were divided into: (1) those who had been convicted of homosexual offenses with adults, (2) those under psychiatric treatment in hospital or out-patient clinics for homosexual problems, and (3) homosexuals (self-admitted) who had not been convicted for homosexual offenses and had not received psychiatric treatment. These three homosexual samples were compared with three non-homosexual samples composed of: (4) non-homosexual patients receiving psychiatric care, (5) men convicted of sexual offenses with boys under sixteen, and (6) non-homosexuals who had not been under psychiatric care or convicted for homosexual offenses. The first part of the book (chaps. i–vii) records in detail differences among the groups with regard to social characteristics, family background, early homosexual and heterosexual experiences (or their absence), and attitudes toward homosexuality.

The most surprising results (surprising to the author at least) do not appear in the comparison of the homosexual samples with their control groups; instead, we find the largest differences when the homosexual groups are compared with each other. The detailed presentation highlights four basic confusions which must be clarified before any significant understanding of the problem can be achieved. First, there is the persistent failure to distingish between homosexual acts and the homosexual condition. Second, there is the failure to differentiate between homosexuality and paedophilia, two separate phenomena with different etiologies and quite dissimilar social consequences. Third, there is a pronounced tendency on the part of law enforcement agencies to consider those arrested for homosexual acts as representative of the homosexual population, a fact which further complicates the problem, since they make distinctions which have no basis in reality. Finally, the most prevalent approach deals with homosexuality in medical or psychiatric terms, ignoring for the most part important social aspects.

The last portion of the book (chaps. viii–xi) presents a concise, cogent discussion of the results. Schofield argues well for a more tolerant, objective approach to problem homosexuals as distinct from the "homosexual problem." He offers some provocative ideas about bringing social control measures into a more realistic alignment with the amount of social harm produced by this form of deviance. For example, although the automobile inflicts heavy social damage, stringent social control measures are not enacted. Homosexuality has elicited stern social control measures without any clear assessment of the amount of social damage inflicted. In short, Schofield seriously questions efforts to "eliminate the problem," and by extension this argument applies to other forms of deviance. Would it not be more realistic and less wasteful of our resources to strive for their containment?

The need for legal reform is made abundantly clear, but the chances for the implementation of the Wolfenden recommendations, completed in 1957, seem remote. The laws governing homosexual conduct, like those governing other forms of nonconforming behavior, are actively supported by "moral entrepreneurs"—people with vested interests in their formulation and application. Recent legislative efforts to control non-narcotic drug abuse in the United States may illustrate again our incredible capacity for rejecting the lessons of the past, for example, prohibition. The fluidity of present moral standards requires the kind of flexibility which our rigid legal system seems incapable of giving.

The only disappointment I encountered here was the failure of Schofield to push his data to their theoretical limits. Since the homosexual population is not well represented by those in prison or under psychiatric care, the book would make for more profitable reading if the author had given more attention to the social factors which lead to the formation of homosexual subcultures by the least visible segment of the homosexual population. His failure here stems from the fact that his problem originally was not set in the larger theoretical setting of deviant studies. Much could be said about the implications of the material for the other areas of deviance. To those interested in doing this sort of work on their own, I highly recommend this book.

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The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation. By Bruce L. R. Smith. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii+332. $7.95.

American corporations, the armed services and other governmental agencies seem to have long believed that "if you want something done well, do it yourself." In the realm of research, advisory duties, and other aids in decision-making, they have therefore often relied upon their own personnel. In recent years, however, administrators have realized that "a man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client," and they have turned increasingly to outside agencies for research and advisory aids. Non-involvement in internal politics of the agency, the provision of a free atmosphere little hampered by rules and roles established for personnel hired for less creative purposes, and other factors provide such advisory organizations with definite advantages. The RAND Corporation, non-profit, is such an organization.

Bruce Smith has superbly described and analyzed the history, operations, and problems of the RAND Corporation. First-hand experience as a governmental and RAND employee has enabled Smith to secure and make use of rather detailed data. His range of contacts for information, and access to RAND and other files, and his extensive knowledge of RAND are impressive. However, his relative neglect of sociology and sociological analysis can be irritating (especially to the sociologist). Only one example: "the dominant political character of limited wars, with numerous subtle questions of morale, training, motivation, cultural attitudes, and many-sided conflict, calls for a stronger representation of such skills as political science, cultural anthropology, and social psychology" (p. 13.). Why not mention sociology too?

Those with some cynicism born of bitter experience in the netherworld of organizational operations may view the book with some skepticism. RAND as described looks *too* good. In any case, Smith provides ample documentation for his views which are well worth reading.

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